CourtListener 10098124•People v. Witous CA4/1
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Filed 8/28/24 P. v. Witous CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D084022
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SWF2000177)
JESSICA MARIE WITOUS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Samuel Diaz, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
Urbanski and Brendon Marshall, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
The trial court sentenced Jessica Marie Witous to nine years in state
prison after a jury found her guilty of felony child abuse. (Pen. Code1,
§§ 273a, subd. (a), 12022.7, subd. (d).) Witous claims the prosecutor
misstated the law and improperly attempted to diminish the People’s burden
of proof. Witous also asks us to independently conduct a Pitchess2 review to
which the People do not object.
We conclude there was no prosecutorial error or abuse of discretion by
the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
In late October 2019, 18-month-old Z. began attending an in-home
daycare facility run by Witous. On Friday, November 8, 2019, Z. came home
with a bruise under her lip after spending the day at Witous’s daycare
program. Later that night Z. began vomiting. On Monday, November 11, Z.
came home from Witous’s daycare with a “busted lip” and an abrasion above
her left eyebrow. On Tuesday, November 12, Witous called 911 and reported
that Z. “jumped out” of the Pack ‘n Play and was unresponsive. When Z.’s
mother arrived at the hospital, she observed new abrasions above both of Z.’s
eyebrows and bruising inside her right ear and on her right arm. A CT scan
of Z.’s head revealed a subdural hematoma. Later that day, Z. underwent
surgery to reduce pressure on her brain.
1 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).
3 We limit our discussion to the factual and procedural background
relevant to the claim of prosecutorial error.
2
The following day, a child abuse pediatrician examined Z. and
diagnosed her with abusive head trauma (a head injury that cannot be
explained by accident or other medical causes). Z. remained in the hospital
for 26 days, undergoing additional surgeries and relearning how to balance
and walk.
The Office of the Riverside County District Attorney charged Witous
with one count of felony child abuse in violation of section 273a,
subdivision (a) and a sentencing enhancement allegation that Witous
personally inflicted great bodily injury on a child under the age of five.
(§ 12022.7, subd. (d).)
In April 2022, the trial court granted Witous’s Pitchess motion and
conducted an in camera review of the confidential personnel records of
Detective William Guimont. The court made no disclosures.
On June 7, 2022, at the conclusion of a nine-day trial, a jury found
Witous guilty of felony child abuse and found true the sentencing
enhancement allegation. Witous was later sentenced to state prison for a
total term of nine years.
Witous filed a timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Witous seeks reversal of her conviction based on alleged prosecutorial
misconduct.4 She claims that during closing argument the prosecutor
improperly attempted to diminish the People’s burden of proof by misstating
4 Witous uses the term “prosecutorial misconduct,” which “ ‘is somewhat
of a misnomer to the extent that it suggests a prosecutor must act with a
culpable state of mind.’ ” (People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 666–667
(Centeno).) “ ‘A more apt description of the transgression is prosecutorial
error’ ” (id. at p. 667), and we therefore use the term “prosecutorial error.”
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the law. As we explain, Witous forfeited the issue, and we find no
prosecutorial error.
A. Forfeiture
To preserve a claim of prosecutorial error for appeal, “ ‘a criminal
defendant must make a timely and specific objection and ask the trial court
to admonish the jury to disregard the impropriety.’ ” (People v. Clark (2011)
52 Cal.4th 856, 960.) “The failure to timely object and request an admonition
will be excused if doing either would have been futile, or if an admonition
would not have cured the harm.” (Ibid.) However, “[a] prosecutor’s
misstatements of law are generally curable by an admonition from the court.”
(Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 674.)
Nothing in the record indicates an objection or request for an
admonition would have been futile. Witous’s claim of prosecutorial error was
therefore forfeited. Even assuming she had preserved the issue for appeal,
the challenged statements do not constitute prosecutorial error.5
B. No Prosecutorial Error
“[I]t is improper for the prosecutor to misstate the law generally
[citation], and particularly to attempt to absolve the prosecution from its
prima facie obligation to overcome reasonable doubt on all elements.” (People
v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 831.) Although a showing of bad faith by
the prosecutor is not required (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 822),
Witous “must show that, ‘[i]n the context of the whole argument and the
instructions’ [citation], there was ‘a reasonable likelihood the jury understood
5 Witous contends defense counsel’s failure to object would constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel and asks this court to exercise its discretion
to address her substantive claim. Because we find no prosecutorial error, we
do not address these additional arguments.
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or applied the complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous manner.
[Citations.] In conducting this inquiry, we “do not lightly infer” that the jury
drew the most damaging rather than the least damaging meaning from the
prosecutor’s statements.’ ” (Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 667.) If, when
viewed in context, the prosecutor’s challenged comments “ ‘would have been
taken by a juror to state or imply nothing harmful, [then] they obviously
cannot be deemed objectionable.’ ” (People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101,
130.) Applying these principles, we find no prosecutorial error.
Prior to closing arguments, the trial court pre-instructed the jury and
specifically advised: “You must follow the law as I explain it to you . . . . [¶]
If you believe that the attorneys’ comments on the law conflict with my
instructions, you must follow my instructions.” The trial court also explained
general intent with CALCRIM No. 250, saying “[a] person acts with wrongful
intent when he or she intentionally does a prohibited act or fails to do a
required act.” After the attorneys completed their closing arguments, the
trial court read to jurors, among other instructions, CALCRIM No. 821 which
explained that Witous needed to “willfully inflict[ ] unjustifiable physical pain
or mental suffering on a child,” and that “willfully” meant an act was done
“willingly or on purpose.”
Witous extracts the following statements from the first half of the
prosecutor’s closing argument as the basis for the prosecutorial error claim:
“For child abuse, it’s different. It is a general intent crime. You do not have
to intend to harm the child. You don’t have to intend to inflict any injuries.
You don’t have to have any intent at all.”
When placed back in context we find the prosecutor’s comments were
not error; they were made while explaining the difference between general
and specific intent crimes. (See People v. Moore (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 889,
5
893 [“General intent crimes require only a general criminal intent to commit
the proscribed act, while specific intent crimes require an additional intent to
do some further act or achieve some further consequence . . . .”].) As the
prosecutor observed, “[Witous] didn’t need to have been thinking in her mind,
I want to hurt this child [or] I want this child to be injured. All that needs to
happen is the actions need to be willful.” (See People v. Thurston (1999)
71 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1053 [“ ‘As a general rule, a statute proscribing willful
behavior is a general intent offense. . . . The only intent required for a
general intent offense is the purpose or willingness to do the act or
omission.’ ”].)
Contrary to Witous’s arguments on appeal, the prosecutor did not
improperly attempt to diminish the People’s burden of proof. Considering the
prosecutor’s entire closing argument, there is no reasonable likelihood the
jury would have understood the prosecutor’s remarks otherwise. (See
Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 667.) Furthermore, the trial court’s verbal
and written instructions to the jury buttress our conclusion. We find no
prosecutorial error.
C. Pitchess Review
At the request of Witous, and with no objection by the People, we
independently reviewed both the sealed reporter’s transcript of the trial
court’s in camera Pitchess proceeding, as well as the sealed documents
provided to the Superior Court of Riverside County by the Riverside County
Sheriff’s Department. We are satisfied that the court did not abuse its
discretion by concluding there was no information to disclose. (See People v.
Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1228.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
RUBIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
O'ROURKE, Acting P. J.
KELETY, J.
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