CourtListener 10098118•Zale Design Studio v. Leevan CA2/1
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Filed 8/28/24 Zale Design Studio v. Leevan CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
ZALE DESIGN STUDIO, B324871 consolidated with
B326780 and B328264
Plaintiff, Cross-defendant,
and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SC120709)
v.
MARK LEEVAN,
Defendant, Cross-complainant,
and Appellant.
APPEALS from a judgment and orders of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, Craig D. Karlan, Judge. Affirmed.
Wright Kim Douglas ALC, J. Andrew Douglas, David M.
Kim; Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Raul Martinez,
Caroline E. Chan, Amy L. Pierce; William S. Brunsten, P.C.,
William S. Brunsten; Reed Smith, LLP and Raymond A. Cardoza
for Defendant, Cross-complainant, and Appellant.
Cohen Williams LLP, Marc S. Williams and Neil S. Jahss
for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant, and Respondent.
____________________________
INTRODUCTION
Mark Leevan hired designer Linda Zale, doing business as
Zale Design Studio, as part of a project to remodel his Beverly
Hills home. Under their agreement, Zale would pick out items
such as furniture, paint, carpet, tiles, and fixtures, and Leevan
would pay the amount Zale had paid for the items plus 30 percent
as a design fee. Towards the end of the project, Leevan
discovered that Zale had billed him for the cost of an item for
which she had not paid, became suspicious of other invoices
submitted by Zale, and stopped paying her.
Zale sued Leevan to recover what she claimed he owed her
for her work on the project. As an affirmative defense, Leevan
asserted that Zale had engaged in activities that required a
contractor’s license under the Contractors State License Law
(CSLL; Bus. & Prof. Code,1 § 7000 et seq.), and was thus
precluded from recovering anything for her services under section
7031, subdivision (a).2 It is undisputed that Zale did not have a
contractor’s license.
1 All further unspecified code references are to the Business
and Professions Code.
2 Section 7031, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part,
“no person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a
contractor, may bring or maintain any action, or recover in law or
equity in any action, in any court of this state for the collection of
compensation for the performance of any act or contract where a
2
Leevan also filed a cross-complaint, asserting a claim under
section 7031, subdivision (b) to have Zale disgorge all payments
Leevan had made to her on the ground she had engaged in
activities requiring a contractor’s license.3 Leevan also asserted
other cross-claims, including under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO; 18 U.S.C. § 1962), asserting
that Zale had fraudulently overcharged him.
The matter proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a
special verdict finding that Zale had not engaged in any acts
requiring a contractor’s license. The jury awarded Zale $64,000
on her breach of contract claim; it awarded Leevan nothing on his
claims. The trial court later granted Zale’s motion for attorney’s
fees under a prevailing party provision in the parties’ contract.
Leevan now appeals, arguing that the evidence shows Zale
did in fact engage in activities that required a contractor’s
license, a mechanic’s lien Zale recorded before the lawsuit
constituted a binding admission by Zale that she acted as a
contractor, the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the
scope of section 7031, and Zale’s counsel misstated the law during
his closing arguments. Leevan also challenges the attorney’s fee
award.
We find no prejudicial error and affirm.
license is required by [the CSLL],” without having a contractor’s
license.
3 Section 7031, subdivision (b) provides, with an exception
not relevant here, “a person who utilizes the services of an
unlicensed contractor may bring an action in any court of
competent jurisdiction in this state to recover all compensation
paid to the unlicensed contractor for performance of any act or
contract.”
3
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Although this case concerns a dispute over whether Zale
was owed approximately $74,000 or had to refund to Leevan
approximately $315,000, it has generated an inordinately
voluminous record, including over 5,000 pages in the parties’
appellate appendices and eight volumes of reporter’s transcript.
We need not, however, summarize the entirety of such a large
record to address the issues presented on appeal. Consistent
with the applicable standard of review, we set forth the
substantial evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. (Schmidt v.
Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 581-582.) However,
where relevant to our discussion of Leevan’s challenges to the
judgment, we note contrary evidence.
A. Leevan’s Home Remodel Project
Leevan decided to remodel his house and hired Jonathan
Silberman as the general contractor and Ward Jewell as the
architect. Leevan hired Zale as a designer. Leevan also directly
hired some subcontractors. Later, almost at the end of the
project, Leevan hired Bob Krumpe to act as an “owner’s
rep[resentative].”
Silberman was a licensed contractor who worked on the
entire project. He hired subcontractors for electrical work,
plumbing, heating and air conditioning, roofing, pool work, and
marble installation. Silberman would pay the subcontractors he
hired and charge enough for the work so that he could make a
profit. Silberman did not charge Leevan for the work of
subcontractors Silberman did not hire. Silberman was
“responsible for scheduling” and for supervising the work of the
subcontractors he had hired.
4
Jewell was a licensed architect who designed the remodeled
home and created drawings for the contractor; he also made sure
the house complied with city and state code requirements, and
was responsible for obtaining permit approval. Jewell was onsite
to observe the construction, but he did not supervise it as that
would have required him to be onsite all the time. Jewell was
paid 12 percent of the cost of construction based on the cost
provided by the contractor.
Krumpe monitored the construction and acted as a liaison
between Leevan and the various people working on the project.
B. Zale’s Contract with Leevan
Zale and Leevan entered into a written contract, which
consisted of a February 18, 2011 letter prepared by Zale setting
forth her “proposal to perform interior design services,” and an
attached preprinted form of “general terms and conditions”
(capitalization omitted). The contract provided, “[u]pon selection
and design approval, Zale Design Studio will procure for client[]
all of the tangible materials relating to the overall design scheme
notated. These items . . . include hardwood flooring, broadloom
carpet, ceramic and stone tile, stone slabs, window treatments,
decorative light fixtures, hardware, plumbing fixtures,
appliances, furniture and any specialized subcontracted work
(i.e.: wall covering installation, window treatment installation,
carpet installation, special paint and finish artists, etc.).”
The contract set forth the scope of Zale’s services in two
sections. The first, “[o]verall [d]esign [s]cheme/[i]nterior [d]esign
[d]etails,” covered “design” and/or “selections” for 13 elements of
the interior, including “[f]looring material,” “[f]loor covering,”
“[w]oodwork,” “[p]aint color and finish,” “[w]indow treatment,”
and furniture. The second section, “[e]xterior [d]esign,” covered
5
“[f]ront garden landscape design and plantings,” and “[b]ack
garden patio area furniture.”
The contract included a section titled, “[c]onstruction
[s]upervision,” which listed four items Zale was to perform:
“[r]eview contractor bids with client[] as required,” “[c]onsultation
meetings with client[], architect [and] contractors,” “[o]bserve
work and subcontractors throughout the job,” and “[a]ttend
jobsite meetings per client and architect’s schedule.” Zale
testified “[c]onstruction [s]upervision,” as used in the contract,
meant “observing and being a part of the design process. So all of
those [four items] aren’t really supervision. They are just, you
know, being a part of the design process on the job.”
Zale explained the four services listed in the “[c]onstruction
[s]upervision” section of the contract as follows. “Review
contractor bids” related to “anything that had to do with the
aesthetics of the job, any bids that Mr. Leevan might receive, I
would review them to make sure that they were accurate in
accordance with the design.”
“Consultation meetings with clients, architect and
contractors” referred to meetings “to consult over design ideas.”
As for “[o]bserve work and subcontractors throughout the
job,” Zale testified she would observe subcontractors performing
and inform Silberman if the execution did not match her design
vision. She gave the following example: “So, say, I designed the
tile in the bathroom and the installer—[Silberman]’s tile installer
would install per my pattern so the pattern that I designed was
on the architectural drawings. So by observing his work, I made
sure that I liked the grout joint, tiles weren’t crooked, the pattern
went in correctly, where to start and where to finish, if you
centerline and move out or you start at the corner and move
6
over.” If Zale observed and noticed an issue with installation
work by someone she had hired, she would address the issue
herself.
Silberman described Zale as “the designer” on the project,
who would “monitor” installation of items and communicate with
him about “the finished product that she wanted, how she wanted
it to look.” According to Silberman, Zale did not communicate
with him about the “means and methods” of the construction.
The contract limited Zale’s responsibilities with respect to
construction and subcontractors, stating, in relevant part: “Zale
shall not have control over, or charge of, and shall not be
responsible for construction means, methods, techniques,
sequences or procedures . . . .” According to Zale, this made clear
she was not a contractor, as she did not have a contractor’s
license.
Lastly, according to Zale “[a]ttend jobsite meetings”
referred to the weekly meetings with Silberman, Jewell, Krumpe
and Leevan, which she would attend “to offer any suggestions . . .
design-wise.” The participants would look at the work that had
been done the prior week and discuss what Silberman planned
for the upcoming week.
Under the contract, Zale was to be paid $150 per hour for
“time spent on the overall design scheme, selections and design
drawings,” and for attending meetings. In addition, she was to
provide the materials she selected “on a designer net cost plus 30
[percent] basis,” meaning she would charge Leevan for her cost
for obtaining an item plus a 30 percent markup. Zale and Leevan
both testified Zale was also entitled to her 30 percent fee on the
cost to install an item or material she had selected or designed
even where she did not arrange or pay for the installation.
7
C. Zale’s Role in the Remodel
At trial, Leevan claimed that Zale had engaged in activities
which required a contractor’s license with respect to four aspects
of the project: hardwood floors, window coverings, cushions on a
banquette bench, and bathroom cabinets.
1. Hardwood Floors
Hardwood floors were installed in several areas of the
house. Zale selected the type of wood, created the stain, chose
the size of the planks, designed the orientation of the planks, and
chose the finish.
Zale got bids for the wood flooring from two vendors, but
Leevan felt the bids were too high. Zale then suggested Jose
Ruiz’s name. Zale prepared Ruiz’s proposal for him because he
was not fluent in English. Ruiz came up with the price. Zale
reviewed Ruiz’s bid to ensure it correctly specified walnut wood
and to calculate her design fee.
Ruiz’s bid was $2,000 lower than a bid submitted by
Silberman, and Leevan accepted Ruiz’s bid because it was the
least expensive. Leevan hired Ruiz and paid Ruiz $35,750 for the
cost of the wood and the installation labor. Zale did not have a
contract with Ruiz or pay him.
Silberman, Leevan, and Krumpe were responsible for
scheduling the construction. Zale communicated the schedule to
Ruiz because she was his contact for Leevan’s project. According
to Zale, she did not direct Ruiz’s installation of the hardwood
floors. Zale did observe Ruiz when he applied the stain to make
sure it looked right.
Zale billed Leevan a design fee of $11,250 based on the
amount Ruiz charged.
8
Ruiz did not have a contractor’s license. Neither Zale nor
Leevan asked him if he had a license.
2. Window Coverings
Zale designed window coverings, including Roman shades,4
and hired and paid Anton’s Decorator Workroom (Anton’s) to
make and install the items. Zale charged her 30 percent fee
based on the invoice from Anton’s.
Anton’s hired Jose Lucero to install the window coverings.
Teresa Iizuka, Anton’s owner, testified that the window coverings
were attached by screws. The curtains were hung on rods held by
brackets screwed into the wall. The Roman shades had wooden
boards on top which were either screwed into the ceiling or
attached with L brackets to the wall. The brackets were attached
by screws. According to Iizuka, all of the window coverings were
“removable.”
The two Roman shades in the master bathroom were
motorized. The motors are attached to a piece of wood which is
either screwed into the ceiling or attached to a wall with L
brackets. Silberman hired an electrician to connect the motor to
a wire sticking out of the wall; the electrician also installed a
switch provided by Anton’s.
Anton’s did not have a contractor’s license. Iizuka believed
that Anton’s did not need a contractor’s license “[b]ecause
everything we install in terms of drapery and shades are
removable items.”
4 Roman shades “are window coverings that go up and
down.”
9
3. Banquette Cushions
Zale picked the material for cushions on a banquette5 in
the kitchen—leather for the seat cushions and fabric for the back
cushions. Zale paid A.P. Smiley & Sons to make the cushions
and install them on the banquette. Zale testified that the
cushions “are fixed, but they are removable. Imagine sliding in
[to sit down on the cushion] with a pen in your pocket and ripping
the leather. It’s very easy to take the seat [cushion] out,
reupholster it, put it back in. Same with the back.” Zale
submitted an invoice to Leevan for A.P. Smiley & Sons’ labor to
make and install the cushions plus her design fee.
Vince Paldino installed kitchen cabinets and the banquette,
which was “built-in” and made of the same wood as the cabinets.
Leevan hired Paldino to install the cabinets and the banquette
and paid Paldino directly. Zale charged Leevan 15 percent of
Paldino’s work on the cabinetry and paneling, which Zale had
designed.
4. Bathroom Vanities
Paul Einsiedler, who owned and operated L.A. Woodworks,
Inc. (L.A. Woodworks), built cabinets for Leevan’s bathrooms.
Zale paid for the bathroom cabinets and charged Leevan.
Paldino installed the bathroom cabinets, and a plumber
hired by Silberman cut holes for the plumbing.6 Leevan paid
Paldino for installing the bathroom cabinets.
5 Zale described a “banquette” as “a continuation of the
cabinetry, but you can sit on it.”
6 Both Zale and Leevan testified that Paldino installed the
bathroom cabinets. Zale also introduced an e-mail from Paldino
10
D. Leevan Stops Paying Zale’s Invoices
A plumbing supply company reported a balance due on a
sink which Zale previously claimed to have paid for when she
invoiced Leevan. Leevan learned from the supplier that Zale had
not paid for the sink, and he confronted Zale. Leevan then asked
Zale for all of her invoices from the supplier. Zale provided some
invoices from the plumbing supplier, but not all. Leevan then
asked Zale for copies of all original invoices from all vendors.
Leevan testified that he hired attorneys to look through
materials he received from Zale, and they found discrepancies
between her invoices and those of her vendors.
At some point near the end of the project, after the incident
with the plumbing supplier receivable, Leevan stopped paying
Zale’s invoices.
The remodeling work was completed around Thanksgiving
of 2012.
indicating he had installed the bathroom cabinets. There was
evidence to the contrary, however, as Einsiedler testified that
L.A. Woodworks installed the bathroom cabinets, and he was
present during the installation. Einsiedler, who held a general
contractor’s license, testified that in prior projects Zale had hired
and paid him to install custom cabinetry. On cross-examination,
Zale’s counsel asked, “Do you remember doing the installation?”
and Einsiedler responded, “I don’t specifically recall doing it, but
it would seem highly unusual if we did not.” Zale testified that
she did not pay $500 of L.A. Woodworks’ invoice because it was
for installation, and the installation was handled by someone
else, although she did not adjust her charge to Leevan
accordingly. Einsiedler agreed that Zale had deducted $500 from
his invoice, which was the cost of installation, and did not recall
whether Zale paid him for installation.
11
E. Zale Records a Mechanic’s Lien
Zale’s attorneys recorded a mechanic’s lien against
Leevan’s home for $80,816.75 which Leevan had allegedly failed
to pay Zale. Zale signed the lien and a verification on May 8,
2013.7 Zale followed her attorneys’ advice in having the lien
recorded.
F. Zale Sues Leevan
Zale sued Leevan on May 13, 2013, and in her operative
second amended complaint (filed on September 5, 2014) she
sought to recover $73,864.74 in unpaid invoices.8 She asserted
claims for breach of contract, common counts, foreclosure of
mechanic’s lien, quantum meruit, and declaratory relief.
G. Leevan Files a Cross-complaint Against Zale, Several
Subcontractors, and Zale’s Parents
Leevan filed a cross-complaint against Zale on June 27,
2013. In his operative first amended cross-complaint (filed on
August 13, 2014) Leevan asserted claims for RICO violations,
7 In Leevan’s appendix the mechanic’s lien purportedly
admitted at trial was signed by Zale on April 18, 2013, and bore
no markings it had been recorded. This appears to be an error as
the testimony of both Zale and Leevan refers to the May lien.
Zale’s appendix contains the May 8, 2013 lien, which shows it
was recorded. In any event, there do not appear to be any
material differences in the two liens, although the description of
the services Zale provided was more detailed in the May version.
8 The second amended complaint acknowledged that the
amount of Zale’s mechanic’s lien was higher than the amount
sought in the complaint, and stated, “Since the filing of the lien,
Z[ale] has determined that additional credits and offsets should
be deducted from this total.”
12
fraud, unlicensed contracting under section 7031, subdivision (b),
negligence, breach of contract, and fraudulent transfer. In his
unlicensed contracting claim, Leevan sought disgorgement of all
the money he had paid to Zale on the project. Leevan named Zale
and her parents as defendants on the fraudulent transfer claim.9
H. Pretrial Activity
In January 2015, Leevan recorded a lis pendens on Zale’s
home. He withdrew the lis pendens in February 2017. Leevan
also dismissed Zale’s parents from the case, although the record
does not include the date of the dismissal. The trial court
sustained a demurrer to Leevan’s RICO cause of action without
leave to amend on July 31, 2015.
Zale dismissed her mechanic’s lien claim on December 4,
2018, and recorded a release of the lien on December 7, 2018.
In September 2019, Leevan moved for summary
adjudication seeking dismissal of Zale’s breach of contract claim
and judgment in his favor on his cross-claim under section 7031,
subdivision (b) on the ground that Zale allegedly had engaged in
acts requiring a contractor’s license. The court denied Leevan’s
motion, ruling “Zale has raised a triable issue of material fact as
9 Leevan also sued several subcontractors, including Ruiz,
A.P. Smiley & Sons, and Anton’s. Before trial, Leevan dismissed
his claims against A.P. Smiley & Sons and Anton’s, and obtained
a summary judgment against Ruiz. Ruiz did not appeal; the
grounds for the judgment against him are not relevant to our
resolution of this appeal, so we do not further discuss them.
13
to whether she was engaged in work that required a contractor’s
license.”10
I. Trial
1. Evidence Regarding the Parties’ Billing Dispute
The case was tried to a jury on April 19-21, and 25-29,
2022. Zale, Leevan, Silberman, Iizuka, Ruiz, Jewell, and
Einsiedler testified.
We summarized above evidence regarding Zale’s role in the
remodeling project, and the work done by Ruiz, Anton’s, A.P.
Smiley & Sons, and Einsiedler, that was presented at trial. In
addition, the parties adduced the following evidence regarding
Zale’s invoices to Leevan and Leevan’s payments.
Zale admitted that she overcharged Leevan a total of
$16,762.60. This included a $2,000 “ ‘rebate’ ” she received from
the appliance supplier as a “designer incentive”—she received the
rebate when she went to pay the balance due on appliances, and
she did not credit Leevan for the reduced price. Zale similarly
did not credit Leevan for a discount she received on a mirror.
Zale received lampshades for free but charged Leevan for the
price originally quoted by the vendor. Zale also did not give
Leevan credit when she changed the orientation of the carpeting,
which resulted in a lower price, or when she decided to utilize
less expensive fabric for a headboard.11 Zale charged extra for
10 Leevan filed a petition for writ of mandate regarding this
ruling, which this court summarily denied. (Leevan v. Superior
Court (Aug. 11, 2021, B312450).)
11 As to the overcharge on the fabric, Zale testified, “It was
give and take. Some things came in higher than I, you know,
14
custom made chairs because they required substantial work and
she felt the price being charged was low.
In December 2012, in response to the demands of Leevan
and his attorneys that she substantiate her invoices, Zale
provided them with a reconciliation spreadsheet and vendor
invoices. Zale felt under pressure because Leevan had stopped
paying her invoices. Zale testified that, in order to hide the
overcharges from Leevan and his attorneys, she falsely
manipulated some of the vendor invoices to make the numbers
match.12 This included altering some vendor invoices, and
fabricating others.
Zale introduced into evidence a revised reconciliation
spreadsheet which listed the proper amount due for each item
and the amount paid, as well as her charge for her time and what
Leevan paid. The document showed that Leevan had paid
$571,438.21, and still owed $68,776.46. Zale testified that the
revised amount due did not include any amounts she had
overcharged Leevan. She also testified that Leevan was entitled
to $10,562.70 in other credits which was reflected in the revised
amount due, and that she had undercharged Leevan a total of
estimated and I paid more, and sometimes things came in lower.
So it was really—to me, it was just a give and take of—you know,
whatever was on the proposal, I thought, was what he agreed to,
and that’s why I charged him that way.”
12 Zale also testified she knew that some of the charges she
was claiming on her mechanic’s lien were “false and fabricated.”
15
$7,622.58 for various items and the revised amount due reflected
the correct (higher) amount for these items.13
Zale identified several specific charges Leevan had failed to
pay, including more than $15,000 for window coverings, more
than $23,000 for furniture, about $5,000 of Zale’s design fee on
the hardwood flooring, and about $15,000 for Zale’s time for 109
hours of meetings.
Leevan testified that under their contract, Zale could not
invoice him for a charge he had not pre-approved. According to
Leevan, Zale submitted several invoices near and after the end of
the construction work for charges he had not approved, including
a $3,005.60 invoice for pick up, delivery and installation of
furnishings and a $2,306.98 invoice for storage and release of
furniture.
Evidently relying on his claim that Zale was not entitled to
payment for acting as a contractor without a license, Leevan
testified he was “agreeing to pay for” “[a]ppliances and
furnishings,” but not for “fixture[s]” or appliances that were not
removable.
2. Jury Instructions
As relevant here, the trial court instructed the jury as
follows regarding Leevan’s claim that Zale had engaged in
activity requiring a contractor’s license.
a. Instructions referencing “incidental” services.
Special instruction No. 14 addressed Leevan’s affirmative
defense under section 7031, subdivision (a), and stated: “No
13 Zale testified that she had incorporated the opinions of
Leevan’s forensic accounting expert, Wesley Nutten. Leevan
decided not to have Nutten testify.
16
person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a
contractor may bring or maintain any action, or recover in law or
equity in any action, in any court of this state for the collection of
compensation for the performance of any act or contract where a
license is required without alleging that they were a duly licensed
contractor at all times during the performance of that act or
contract regardless of the merits of the cause of action brought by
the person, unless the contractor services they performed were
incidental to the parties’ overall business relationship.”
The language of this instruction tracked the language of
section 7031, subdivision (a), except the last clause setting forth
an “incidental” services exception that the trial court added based
on Zale’s argument that caselaw had recognized such an
exception. Leevan objected to this instruction.
Special instruction No. 2 stated: “A claim for recovery of
payments to an unlicensed contractor under Cal. Bus. & Prof.
Code § 7031(b) is not established if Ms. Zale performed services
as an unlicensed contractor but those services were incidental to
the parties’ overall business relationship.” Leevan objected to
this instruction on the ground it was not legally supported.14
b. Instructions concerning licensure requirement.
Special instruction No. 3, based on section 7045, stated: “A
contractor’s license is not required for the sale or installation of
any finished products, materials, or articles of merchandise that
do not become a fixed part of the structure or for a material
supplier or manufacturer furnishing finished products, materials,
14 The trial court rejected Leevan’s proposed instruction,
based on section 7048, defining incidental contractor services as
work costing less than $500.
17
or articles of merchandise who does not install or contract for the
installation of those items.”15
Special instruction No. 4, based on section 7052, stated: “A
contractor’s license is not required by any person who only
furnishes materials or supplies without fabricating them into, or
consuming them in the performance of, the work of the
contractor.”
Special instruction No. 10, based on Civil Code section 660,
stated: “A fixture is a thing that is deemed to be affixed to land
when it is permanently attached to what is thus permanent, as
by means of cement, plaster, nails, bolts, or screws.”16
Special instruction No. 12 regarding “[c]ontractor [l]icense
[c]lassifications” began, “Although the Contractors State License
Board has issued the following licensing classifications, whether
someone is required to have a contractor’s license is still subject
to the exemptions as stated elsewhere in the Court’s
instructions.” The instruction later stated, in relevant part, “A
D-52 license is required to be a window coverings contractor. A
window coverings contractor installs or applies decorative,
architectural/functional window/glass treatment or covering
products, including but not limited to the following: all types of
materials and fabrics that make up louvers, shutters, Venetian
and mini-blinds; residential or commercial draperies and screens;
15 Leevan objected to special instruction No. 3, apparently
arguing there was no factual support for it because “Zale is not
just a material supplier as she hired and paid some of the
subcontractors.”
16 Zale objected to this instruction on the ground it
conflicted with special instruction No. 3 and section 7045.
18
expanded metal window and door guards; plastic film window
treatment and/or any other window treatment applied for
temperature control or as a screening device.”
c. Instruction on mechanic’s lien.
Special instruction No. 15 described a mechanic’s lien: “A
mechanic’s lien may be filed by a person that provides work
authorized for a work of improvement, including, but not limited
to: (a) a direct contractor; (b) subcontractor; or (c) material
supplier. Work is authorized for a work of improvement if: (a) it
is provided at the request of or agreed to by the owner; or (b) it is
provided or authorized by a direct contractor, subcontractor,
architect or other person having charge of all or part of the work
of improvement. A material supplier means a person that
provides materials or supplies to be used or consumed in a work
of improvement. A work of improvement includes constructions
[sic], alteration[,] repair, in whole or in part, of, or addition to, a
building.”
3. Closing Arguments
In his closing argument, Zale’s counsel mentioned several
items for which Leevan had not paid (or paid only the deposit),
referred the jury to the revised reconciliation spreadsheet Zale
had prepared showing a balance due of $68,776.46, and requested
the jury award her $68,000. Counsel asserted that Zale had
given Leevan credit for all of the overcharges in her
reconciliation, so that the net amount due to her was
approximately $68,000.
Zale’s counsel denied that Zale had acted as an unlicensed
contractor with respect to the window coverings, the hardwood
flooring, the bathroom cabinets, and the banquette cushions. He
argued that under special instruction No. 3, the installation of
19
the window coverings did not require a contractor’s license
because they were simply screwed in and thus did not become a
fixed part of the structure. He asserted that the window
coverings were not “fixtures” as defined in special instruction
No. 10 because they were removable, and that Anton’s was not
responsible for hooking up the motors to the electrical system.
Counsel argued that Paldino, not Einsiedler, installed the
bathroom cabinets, and therefore Zale was not required to have a
contractor’s license to hire Einsiedler. With respect to the
hardwood floors, counsel argued that Leevan hired Ruiz and that
Zale did not supervise Ruiz’s work. Counsel argued that no
contractor’s license was required to install the banquette
cushions because the cushions did not become a fixed part of the
structure and were removable and thus not considered “fixtures.”
Lastly, counsel argued that, even if the jury concluded Zale had
done some work which required a contractor’s license, the work
fell under the “incidental services” exception.
In his closing argument, Leevan’s counsel asserted that
Zale had not presented evidence that the $68,000 she claimed
was owed was for items that had been proposed to and accepted
by Leevan. He also argued that Zale was not entitled to her
design fee based on Ruiz’s flooring work because Leevan
ultimately paid nothing for the work. Counsel argued that Zale
was not entitled to her fee on Anton’s work because Anton’s acted
as an unlicensed contractor, or on A.P. Smiley & Sons’ work
installing the banquette cushions for the same reason. Counsel
indicated that Leevan was defrauded out of $28,686 through false
billing. As for the amounts Leevan was seeking to be disgorged
because Zale was an unlicensed contractor, counsel indicated that
Leevan was not seeking the return of any amounts he had paid
20
Zale for furniture or appliances, which counsel later indicated
was $256,765.61, so that Leevan was seeking disgorgement of the
amount he had paid ($571,438.21) minus $256,765.61, which
equaled $314,672.60.
Leevan’s counsel argued that Zale had acted as an
unlicensed contractor by submitting Ruiz’s bid to install the
flooring and supervising Ruiz’s work. Counsel also argued that
Zale’s contracting activities were not merely “incidental” to her
work for Leevan because she was submitting bids and
supervising work “and acting like a contractor,” and because the
items that were installed were important and necessary parts of
the construction. Leevan’s counsel argued that the proper
standard for determining a “fixture” was not whether it was
“removable,” and custom window coverings and a cushion for a
custom banquette are “fixtures.” He similarly argued that the
bathroom cabinets were fixtures and that Einsiedler had
installed them. Counsel further argued that the regulations
requiring specialty contractor’s licenses showed that Anton’s was
doing work which required a contractor’s license.
Leevan’s counsel also argued that by recording a
mechanic’s lien, Zale admitted that she was either a contractor or
supplied items that became part of the construction.
Leevan’s counsel lastly argued that the parties’ contract
showed Zale was acting as a contractor because it required her to
perform “ ‘construction supervision.’ ”
4. The Jury’s Verdict
The jury reached a verdict on April 29, 2022. As reflected
on the special verdict form, the jury found that the parties had
entered into a contract, Zale had performed her portion of the
contract but Leevan had breached the contract, and Zale did not
21
“perform services that required a contractor’s license.” Based on
this response, the jury was instructed to skip the next question
(No. 6), which asked, “Were the contractor services that Linda
Zale performed incidental to the parties’ overall business
relationship?”17 The jury awarded Zale $64,000 for breach of
contract. To the extent one can discern the reason(s) for the jury
awarding $64,000 rather than the $68,000 Zale requested, it does
not appear to relate in any way to the issues presented in this
appeal.
As to Leevan’s disgorgement claim under section 7031,
subdivision (b), the jury found that Zale did not “perform services
. . . that required a valid contractor’s license” with respect to “the
hardwood floors,” “the bathroom cabinets,” “the window
coverings,” or “the banquette cushioning.” Given these responses,
the jury was instructed to skip the remaining special verdict
questions on this claim, including question No. 3 which asked,
“Were the contractor services that Linda Zale performed
incidental to the parties’ overall business relationship?”
The jury found that Zale had committed intentional
misrepresentation but that it caused Leevan no damages. The
jury found that Zale did not commit negligent misrepresentation.
On August 30, 2022, the trial court entered a judgment on
the jury’s verdict.18
17 Leevan had objected to including questions about the
“incidental services” exemption on the special verdict form. The
court decided to include those questions over Leevan’s objection.
18 Leevan filed posttrial motions for new trial and
judgment notwithstanding the verdict which the trial court
denied. Leevan filed a notice of appeal from the ruling on these
22
J. Zale’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees
Zale filed a posttrial motion for attorney’s fees under a
prevailing party attorney’s fees provision in the parties’ contract.
Zale sought $1,843,403, based on a lodestar of $1,568,501, plus
$274,902 reflecting a 1.5 multiplier for the fees incurred from
about June 15, 2021 onwards when Zale’s attorneys began
working on a partial contingency fee basis. Zale contended that
her fees were reasonable in light of Leevan’s aggressive litigation
tactics, and noted that Leevan had rejected two offers Zale had
made under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, including one in
May 2021 in which she offered to pay Leevan $100,000. Zale
argued that the attorney’s fees clause was broad enough to cover
the fees she incurred to pursue her breach of contract claim as
well as those incurred to defend against Leevan’s fraud and
disgorgement claims, and the issues involved in the various
claims were all inextricably intertwined.
Zale supported her motion with her own declaration, and
declarations from her current and former counsel with attached
billing statements. Zale did not include in the lodestar
$51,763.50 in fees for work related to the defense of a possible
criminal case against Zale, proceedings before the Contractors
State License Board, and the defense of Zale’s parents, and also
did not include various types of billing such as for administrative
work.
In his opposition, Leevan contended the litigation resulted
from Zale’s acts, including her fraudulent billing, her recording of
motions but makes no argument in his briefs regarding them. He
has therefore waived any claim of error related to the court’s
ruling on those motions. (E.g., Estrada v. Public Employees’
Retirement System (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 870, 889.)
23
an improper mechanic’s lien, and her failure to mediate as
required by the contract. He argued that the court should not
award Zale fees related to defending against the fraud claim or to
her mechanic’s lien claim. Leevan contended that Zale refused to
admit her fraud until trial, requiring him to litigate the issue.
Leevan argued that Zale’s lodestar amount was
unreasonable because it was 24.5 times the amount of the jury
award. In addition, he submitted a declaration from an expert
who opined that the attorneys’ bills were unreasonable for
various reasons, including excessive intra-office conferences,
round number billing, block billing, vague descriptions of tasks,
billing for clerical work, billing for the attendance of two
attorneys at a deposition and at trial, and excessive time spent on
tasks. The expert also identified, through a word search of the
billing statements, the attorney’s fees he opined should be
deducted as related to Leevan’s fraud claim and to Zale’s
mechanic’s lien claim.
Leevan argued that approximately $945,000 should be
deducted from Zale’s lodestar, that no multiplier was warranted,
and that therefore Zale should recover, at most, approximately
$625,000 in fees.
Zale filed a reply in which she set forth a revised lodestar of
$1,699,031 to include fees billed after the attorney’s fees motion
was filed. Zale also contended that the contract did not require
the parties to mediate as a precondition to recovering fees, and
that in any event Zale had agreed to mediate before filing her
complaint. Zale also asserted that the analysis of Leevan’s expert
was flawed in many respects.
The court heard the motion on December 14, 2022, and took
it under submission. On January 17, 2023, the court granted the
24
motion and awarded Zale $1,568,501 as a lodestar amount
without any multiplier. The court found that the contract did not
require the parties to mediate in order to recover their fees, and
that Zale had agreed to mediate before filing her complaint. The
court found it was proper to award Zale’s fees on Leevan’s fraud
claim because Leevan did not recover on his claim, and it was
unable to separate out the fees related to Zale’s mechanic’s lien
claim. The court noted the criticisms of Leevan’s billing expert,
but stated it had “reviewed the billing statements and [found] the
fees to be proper.” The court found, “the mere contingent nature
of the work [was] insufficient to justify application of a 1.5
lodestar multiplier for the time frame requested.”
On February 22, 2023, the court entered an amended
judgment to include the damages award, the attorney’s fees
award, $59,195.23 in prejudgment interest, and $71,500.21 in
costs, for a total of $1,763,196.44.
DISCUSSION
Leevan challenges the jury’s verdict, and the resulting
judgment, on four grounds. First, he contends that the evidence
adduced at trial showed that Zale acted as a contractor under the
terms of the parties’ contract, and through her work with
Anton’s, Ruiz, A.P. Smiley & Sons, and L.A. Woodworks. Second,
he contends that Zale made a judicial admission that she had
engaged in activities requiring a contractor’s license by recording
her mechanic’s lien. Third, Leevan argues the trial court erred
by instructing the jury on Zale’s theory that her lack of a
contractor’s license did not preclude recovery for services
requiring such a license if the services were “incidental” to the
parties’ business relationship. Fourth, Leevan asserts we should
25
reverse the judgment due to improper closing arguments by
Zale’s counsel.
Leevan also challenges the trial court’s award of attorney’s
fees to Zale on various grounds.
A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Verdict
1. Standard of Review
“When a party contends insufficient evidence supports a
jury verdict, we apply the substantial evidence standard of
review. [Citation.] ‘ “[T]he power of [the] appellate court begins
and ends with the determination as to whether there is any
substantial evidence contradicted or uncontradicted which will
support the [verdict].” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] We must ‘view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party,
giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving
all conflicts in its favor . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Wilson v. County of
Orange (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1188.)
Leevan contends that our review of the judgment should be
de novo, because it was undisputed what work Zale contracted to
perform, and the application of the relevant statutes to that work
presents a question of law. We are not persuaded. The parties’
contract was ambiguous regarding the nature of the services Zale
was to provide and thus whether they required licensure, and
“when, as here, ascertaining the intent of the parties at the time
the contract was executed depends on the credibility of extrinsic
evidence, that credibility determination and the interpretation of
the contract are questions of fact that may properly be resolved
by the jury [citation].” (City of Hope National Medical Center v.
Genentech, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 375, 395.) Evidence about the
course of performance under the parties’ contract is also relevant
to resolving contractual ambiguities. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1856,
26
subds. (a), (c) [the terms of “a writing intended by the parties as a
final expression of their agreement with respect to the terms
included therein . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . may be explained or
supplemented . . . by course of performance”]; Employers
Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Court (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 906,
920-922 [discussing admissibility of course of performance
evidence].) Similarly, what services Zale actually provided, and
the nature of the work her subcontractors performed, was
disputed at trial. Substantial evidence review therefore applies.
(See Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cashel & Emly (2009)
177 Cal.App.4th 209, 218 [substantial evidence review applied
despite the “plaintiff assert[ing] in his opening appellate brief
that the facts were not in conflict, calling for our independent
review”].)19
2. The CSLL
The CSLL “governs construction business in California in a
manner intended to ‘ “ ‘protect the public from incompetent or
dishonest providers of building and construction services.
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.] The CSLL requires all
contractors ‘be licensed unless exempt.’ [Citation.]” (Manela v.
Stone (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 90, 102.) “The California courts
have also long held that those who enter into construction
19 Vallejo Development Co. v. Beck Development Co. (1994)
24 Cal.App.4th 929, upon which Leevan relies, is inapposite
because the appeal in that case was taken from an order granting
a demurrer, and thus the allegations of the complaint were
accepted as true. (Id. at pp. 934-935, 937.) Furthermore, it was
undisputed in Vallejo Development Co. that the plaintiff did work
that required licensure. (Id. at p. 939.) Here, that issue was very
much disputed.
27
contracts must be licensed, even when they themselves do not do
the actual work under the contract.” (Vallejo Development Co. v.
Beck Development Co., supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 941.)
The primary enforcement mechanism for the licensure
requirement is section 7031. As previously noted, under section
7031, subdivision (a), “no person engaged in the business or
acting in the capacity of a contractor, may bring or maintain any
action, or recover in law or equity in any action, in any court of
this state for the collection of compensation for the performance
of any act or contract where a license is required by this chapter,”
unless they hold such a license. In addition, under section 7031,
subdivision (b), with an exception not relevant here, “a person
who utilizes the services of an unlicensed contractor may bring
an action in any court of competent jurisdiction in this state to
recover all compensation paid to the unlicensed contractor for
performance of any act or contract.”
The CSLL, in section 7026, defines “[c]ontractor,” in
relevant part, as “any person who undertakes to or offers to
undertake to, or purports to have the capacity to undertake to, or
submits a bid to, or does himself or herself or by or through
others, construct, alter, repair, add to, subtract from, improve,
move, wreck or demolish any building, . . . or to do any part
thereof . . . .”
The CSLL contains two exceptions relevant to this case.
Section 7045 provides that the CSLL “does not apply to the sale
or installation of any finished products, materials, or articles of
merchandise that do not become a fixed part of the structure, nor
shall it apply to a material supplier or manufacturer furnishing
finished products, materials, or articles of merchandise who does
not install or contract for the installation of those items.” Section
28
7052 provides that the CSLL “does not apply to any person who
only furnishes materials or supplies without fabricating them
into, or consuming them in the performance of, the work of the
contractor.”
As an example of the practical application of these
principles, in Finley-Gordon Carpet Co. v. Bay Shore Homes, Inc.
(1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 131, 132, the appellate court upheld the
trial court’s ruling that carpet installed by a “tackless strip
method” did not become “ ‘a fixed part of the structure’ ” within
the meaning of section 7045, stating, “The evidence that the
carpets can easily be removed without damaging the apartments
sufficiently supports the trial court’s finding the carpets did not
become a fixed part of the structure.” (Finley-Gorden Carpet Co.,
at p. 132; see also Walker v. Thornsberry (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d
842, 848 [holding a manufacturer fell within the scope of § 7045’s
exception when it provided a prefabricated restroom and had its
employees assemble the structure at the construction site and
bolt it to a concrete foundation].)
3. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Findings
that Zale Did Not Engage in Acts Requiring a
Contractor’s License
At the outset, we address what rules we measure the trial
evidence against. In arguing that Zale acted as a contractor,
Leevan relies on several statutory provisions that do not appear
anywhere in the jury instructions, including the definition of
“ ‘home improvement goods’ ” in section 7151, subdivision (b) and
the definition of “home improvement contractor” in section
7150.1. Leevan’s reliance on these statutes is unavailing,
because “[w]e review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
verdict under the law stated in the instructions given, rather
29
than under some other law on which the jury was not instructed.”
(Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 655,
674-675; accord, Mazik v. Geico General Ins. Co. (2019) 35
Cal.App.5th 455, 465.)
The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of
Leevan’s claims that Zale engaged in activities requiring a
contractor’s license by using the statutory language of section
7031. It also instructed the jury on the definition of “contractor,”
and the exceptions set forth in sections 7045 and 7052, utilizing
the applicable statutory language. Leevan does not contend that
the trial court committed any instructional error by utilizing the
language of these statutes.20 At Leevan’s request, the court
instructed the jury on the definition of “fixture” set forth in Civil
Code section 660. Leevan did not request any instructions based
on any other statutory provisions, such as sections 7150.1 and
7151.
Accordingly, we measure the sufficiency of the evidence
against the jury instructions as given. In doing do, as explained
next, we find there was substantial evidence supporting the jury’s
findings that Zale did not engage in any activity requiring
licensure with respect to the four subcontractors at issue:
Anton’s, A.P. Smiley & Sons, Ruiz, and L.A. Woodworks.
a. Anton’s and A.P. Smiley & Sons.
There was substantial evidence that the window coverings
installed by Anton’s and the banquette cushions installed by A.P.
Smiley & Sons did not become “fixed part[s]” of Leevan’s home,
20 As noted above, Leevan did object to the inclusion of an
exception for “incidental” services in some of the instructions. We
address this issue below.
30
and therefore were not subject to the CSLL pursuant to section
7045. Iizuka, Anton’s owner, described how the window
coverings were installed and testified they were “removable.” In
addition, Zale introduced into evidence photographs of the
window coverings which were consistent with Iizuka’s testimony.
An electrician hired by Silberman, not Zale, hooked up the
motors on the Roman shades in the master bathroom.
Zale testified that the banquette cushions “are removable.”
Zale introduced into evidence a photograph of the kitchen which
showed the banquette with the cushions in place. A.P. Smiley &
Sons did not install the banquette itself; Leevan hired Paldino to
install the cabinets and the banquette and paid Paldino directly.
Leevan contends that “the window coverings and the
banquette upholstery each became a fixed part of Leevan’s
home,” but he fails to identify any specific evidence supporting
that claim. Even if he had, substantial evidence supports the
jury’s contrary finding. Relying on Civil Code section 660,
Leevan also argues, “[w]hether an item becomes a fixture and
acquires permanence depends on intent” and that there was no
evidence of his intent regarding the window treatments. We
question whether Civil Code section 660 contains a subjective
intent requirement, as the plain language of the statute does not
mention it. But we need not resolve that question because the
jury instruction given, at Leevan’s request, did not require the
jury to determine Leevan’s intent regarding the permanency of
any products or materials installed in his home. The instruction,
consistent with the statute, required that the product or material
be “permanently attached,” and there was substantial evidence
that neither the window coverings nor the banquette cushions
satisfied this requirement.
31
Leevan also contends that a window covering installer is
required to have a specialty “D-52” license under the regulations
implementing the CSLL. However, the jury instruction on this
issue included the following preliminary statement: “Although
the Contractors State License Board has issued the following
licensing classifications, whether someone is required to have a
contractor’s license is still subject to the exemptions as stated
elsewhere in the Court’s instructions.” Thus, given there was
substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that Anton’s’
installation work was excepted from the CSLL under section
7045, there was substantial evidence that Anton’s did not need
any contractor’s license. (See Finley-Gordon Carpet Co. v. Bay
Shore Homes, Inc., supra, 247 Cal.App.2d at pp. 132-133 [“All
carpet installers and other specialty contractors using methods
which result in materials becoming a fixed part of the structure
. . . remain subject to the licensing requirement,” italics added];
Steinbrenner v. J. A. Waterbury Constr. Co.(1963) 212 Cal.App.2d
661, 663 [“The specialty classifications adopted by the registrar of
contractors cannot and do not purport to extend the scope of the
licensing statute”].)
b. Ruiz.
It was undisputed that Leevan, not Zale, hired and paid
Ruiz for Ruiz’s materials and installation work. Leevan contends
that Zale “procured Ruiz for the flooring work” and that Zale
“persuaded [him] to accept Ruiz’s bid,” but there was substantial
evidence that Leevan accepted Ruiz’s proposal because it was
lower than the other bids. In any event, there is no evidence that
Zale took any of the actions listed in the jury instructions
describing section 7026 that would have required a contractor’s
license with respect to the hardwood floor installation, namely,
32
“undertak[ing],” “offer[ing] to undertake,” “purport[ing] to have
the capacity to undertake,” “submit[ing] a bid to,” or “do[ing]” the
installation “herself or by or through others.”
Although Zale assisted Ruiz in preparing his proposal to
Leevan, there is no evidence it was in fact her proposal. She
testified she assisted Ruiz because he was not fluent in English,
and Ruiz came up with the proposed cost. Zale did review the
proposal, but only to ensure it specified the correct type of wood
and to determine her design fee.
Silberman, Leevan, and Krumpe were responsible for
scheduling the construction; Zale merely communicated the
schedule to Ruiz. Zale did not direct Ruiz on the installation of
the hardwood floors, and only observed him when he applied the
stain to make sure it looked right.
c. L.A. Woodworks.
There was substantial evidence that Einsiedler of L.A.
Woodworks only created the bathroom cabinets and did not
install them, and thus Zale was not required to have a
contractor’s license as a result of her involvement in procuring
the cabinets. The jury was instructed, based on section 7052, “A
contractor’s license is not required by any person who only
furnishes materials or supplies without fabricating them into, or
consuming them in the performance of, the work of the
contractor.”
In his reply brief, Leevan for the first time contends that
the evidence shows Zale contracted with Leevan to have L.A.
Woodworks install the bathroom cabinets, and this was an act of
unlicensed contracting even though it turned out that L.A.
Woodworks did not install the cabinets. We decline to consider
this argument given that it was first raised in Leevan’s reply.
33
(Varjabedian v. City of Madera (1977) 20 Cal.3d 285, 295, fn. 11
[“Obvious reasons of fairness militate against consideration of an
issue raised initially in the reply brief of an appellant”].)
4. The Parties’ Contract Did Not Require Zale to
Undertake Activities Requiring a Contractor’s License
Leevan argues that Zale was required to be licensed to
contract with Leevan as a matter of law because she “promised to
provide construction supervision and to procure specialty
contractors to perform required specialty trade work.” We
disagree.
First, while “directing or supervising the work performed”
can constitute activity requiring a contractor’s license
(Contractors Labor Pool, Inc. v. Westway Contractors, Inc. (1997)
53 Cal.App.4th 152, 165), there was substantial evidence that
Zale did not promise to supervise or direct the work of
subcontractors. The contract expressly provided that Zale did not
have any control over subcontractors’ work, stating, “Zale shall
not have control over, or charge of, and shall not be responsible
for construction means, methods, techniques, sequences or
procedures . . . .” Leevan points to a section of the contract titled
“[c]onstruction [s]upervision,” but the actual services described in
the section—“[r]eview contractor bids with clients as required,”
“[c]onsultation meetings with clients, architect [and] contractors,”
“[o]bserve work and subcontractors throughout the job,” and
“[a]ttend jobsite meetings per client and architect’s schedule”—
are all consistent with Zale being responsible for design and
selection of materials, but not for the actual construction. Zale
testified that, and provided examples of how, all of these
activities related to her design work and gave her the opportunity
34
to provide her input on design elements and ensure that her
designs were implemented.
Second, Zale testified without objection that her promise to
“procure . . . tangible materials relating to the overall design
scheme,” including “any specialized subcontracted work (i.e.: wall
covering installation, window treatment installation, carpet
installation, special paint and finish artists, etc.),” did not mean
that she would necessarily hire the installer. The evidence
showed that Zale only contracted with some of those who
installed materials she had designed; for example, she did not
contract with Ruiz, who did work requiring a contractor’s
license.21 Furthermore, the parties’ contract did not agree on any
specific installation work to be performed (and thus did not
necessarily include any work that necessarily required licensure).
In any event, section 7031 does not apply to the act of contracting
without any performance. Both subdivisions (a) and (b) of section
7031 apply to compensation for the “performance of any act or
contract,” and “[t]he ‘act’ of executing an agreement is not one for
which a contractor seeks compensation; rather, he or she pursues
payment for carrying out the contract in a satisfactory manner.”
21 Vallejo Development Co. v. Beck Development Co., supra,
24 Cal.App.4th 929, cited by Leevan, is distinguishable because
the plaintiff, who was found to be acting as an unlicensed
contractor, entered “agreements to ‘improve the [p]roperty [at
issue]’ and to be ‘solely responsible for completion of’
infrastructure improvements . . . including graded building pads,
storm drains, sanitary systems, streets, sidewalks, curbs, gutters,
utilities, street lighting, and traffic signals” and was thus “clearly
contracting to provide construction services.” (Id. at p. 940,
italics omitted.)
35
(MW Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works
Co., Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 412, 435, italics omitted.) As
discussed, Zale did not contract with any subcontractors who
provided services subject to the CSLL.
Finally, Leevan’s argument that Zale acted as a contractor
by collecting a fee based on the work of Ruiz, Anton’s, A.P. Smiley
& Sons, and L.A. Woodworks fails because there was substantial
evidence Zale was being compensated for her design services. In
addition, the only subcontractor who provided services subject to
the CSLL was Ruiz, and, as discussed, there is no evidence that
Zale took, and thus could have been compensated for, any of the
actions listed in section 7026 that would have required a
contractor’s license with respect to Ruiz’s installation of the
hardwood flooring, such as “undertak[ing]” or “do[ing]” the
installation “herself or by or through” Ruiz. To the contrary, Ruiz
undertook to perform the installation by contracting directly with
Leevan.
B. Zale Did Not Make a Judicial Admission Binding on
the Jury by Recording a Mechanic’s Lien
At Leevan’s request, the trial court gave an instruction on
mechanic’s liens, and Leevan’s counsel argued that by recording
such a lien Zale admitted that she was a contractor subject to
licensure. The jury was unpersuaded, as it found Zale did not
perform services requiring a contractor’s license. Leevan
contends that Zale’s recording of a mechanic’s lien and efforts to
foreclose on the lien were a binding admission that her work
involved “fixtures” regardless of the jury’s verdict.
Leevan relies on Banis Restaurant Design, Inc. v. Serrano
(2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1035, where the Court of Appeal held that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff
36
leave to amend its claim to allege “that at least a portion of the
products and services it provided [on a construction project] did
not involve fixtures” (id. at p. 1045) and therefore fell within the
section 7045 exception. The court reasoned that by asserting a
claim to foreclose on a mechanic’s lien, the plaintiff admitted that
the products and services at issue were fixtures because, “[b]y
definition, a mechanic’s lien involves fixtures.” (Banis
Restaurant Design, Inc., at p. 1045.)
We conclude that Zale’s invocation of the mechanic’s lien
remedy does not undermine the judgment in her favor. At the
outset, Leevan’s argument regarding the lien is untethered to
any challenge to a ruling by the trial court, and we decline to find
a judicial admission in the first instance. Zale dismissed her
mechanic’s lien claim and released the lien years before the
matter went to trial. (See Barsegian v. Kessler & Kessler (2013)
215 Cal.App.4th 446, 452, fn. 2 [“ ‘[t]he trial judge . . . has
discretion to relieve a party from the effects of a judicial
admission by permitting amendment of a pleading’ ”].)
Furthermore, we do not find Banis Restaurant Design, Inc.,
which was decided at the demurrer stage, persuasive in the
factual context here. In that case, the plaintiff sought to foreclose
on a mechanic’s lien, and attached to its complaint the contract
and mechanic’s lien, which both showed the plaintiff was engaged
to perform services requiring licensure. (Banis Restaurant
Design, Inc. v. Serrano, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1039-1040,
1044.) A demurrer was sustained without leave to amend
because the plaintiff was unlicensed, and the plaintiff had not
met its burden to demonstrate how it could plead different facts
entitling to relief. (Id. at p.1047.) Here, in contrast, the jury
found that Zale did not engage in unlicensed contracting. Unlike
37
the plaintiff in Banis Restaurant Design, Inc., Zale did not allege
in her prior lien or the claim on that lien that she was responsible
for the installation of any items which became fixtures.22
Substantial evidence also showed the contract between Zale and
Leevan did not state she was responsible for installation of items
that became fixtures.
The purported fact Leevan seeks to impose on Zale, namely,
that the items and materials she provided for the project were
fixtures, is based on the law applicable to mechanic’s liens and is
therefore a mixed question of fact and law which is not
appropriate for a judicial admission. (Bahan v. Kurland (1979)
98 Cal.App.3d 808, 812-813 [the plaintiff not bound by allegation
in complaint that the defendant was acting in the course and
scope of his public employment].) Further, the law is more
unsettled than Leevan suggests. For example, being a fixture for
purposes of mechanic’s lien law is not necessarily equivalent to
being a “fixed part” of an improvement under section 7045. In
Finley-Gordon Carpet Co., the court rejected the defendant’s
argument that by filing a mechanic’s lien the plaintiff was
precluded from arguing its installation of carpet was exempted
from licensure under section 7045, stating, “Neither compelling
reason nor authority has been presented, however, to indicate
why the law of fixtures should be incorporated into the
Legislature’s design for licensing contractors.” (Finley-Gordon
Carpet Co. v. Bay Shore Homes, Inc., supra, 247 Cal.App.2d at p.
22 Zale’s mechanic’s lien asserted that she was owed
compensation for “design services,” including “design and
material selection and procurement of” various materials and
items, and “floor plan layout/design/selection/procurement and
installation of new interior and exterior furnishings.”
38
132; see also Scientific Cages, Inc. v. Banks (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d
885, 888-889 [mechanic’s lien law and CSLL have different
objectives and the interpretation of one does not necessarily hold
in the other]; Steinbrenner v. J.A. Waterbury Constr. Co., supra,
212 Cal.App.2d at p. 665 [same].)
C. The Alleged Instructional Error Was Harmless
Leevan contends that the trial court erred in instructing
the jury that if it concluded Zale had engaged in services
requiring a contractor’s license, section 7031 would not apply if
“those services were incidental to the parties’ overall business
relationship.” This concept was set forth in special instruction
No. 2, as well as other instructions. Leevan further argues the
court erred in refusing to give his proposed instruction which
would have defined “incidental” to mean costing less than $500.
Assuming solely for the sake of argument that the trial
court committed the claimed instructional errors, the errors were
harmless given the jury’s finding that Zale engaged in no
activities requiring a contractor’s license. “A judgment may not
be reversed on appeal, even for error involving ‘misdirection of
the jury,’ unless ‘after an examination of the entire cause,
including the evidence,’ it appears the error caused a ‘miscarriage
of justice.’ (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) When the error is one of
state law only, it generally does not warrant reversal unless
there is a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error,
a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been
reached. [Citation.]” (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8
Cal.4th 548, 574.)
There was no such miscarriage of justice here. The jury
found that Zale had not engaged in any activity that required a
contractor’s license, and thus it never reached the issue of
39
whether the “incidental” services exception applied. Any error in
describing such incidental services was therefore harmless. Such
error could not have impacted the verdict because, as noted, the
jury properly skipped the questions on the special verdict form
that addressed the “incidental” services exception because the
jury did not find that Zale had performed any services requiring a
license.
Leevan contends he was nevertheless prejudiced because
the erroneous instructions “undoubtedly caused confusion and
error over whether Zale was required to have a contractor’s
license.” We fail to see such a connection, and in any event such
speculation is insufficient to show that a different result was
reasonably probable. Leevan also points out that Zale’s counsel
argued to the jury that Zale’s contracting acts were “incidental.”
But he fails to show how this argument in the alternative (as
Zale’s main argument was that her work did not require
licensure) impacted the jury’s finding that Zale engaged in no
acts requiring a contractor’s license.23
D. Leevan’s Challenge Based on Zale’s Closing
Argument Fails
At Leevan’s request, the trial court instructed the jury, in
special instruction No. 10, “A fixture is a thing that is deemed to
be affixed to land when it is permanently attached to what is
thus permanent, as by means of cement, plaster, nails, bolts, or
screws.” During his closing, Zale’s counsel argued the window
23 Leevan makes additional arguments in his reply brief
regarding prejudice, which we decline to address because they
were not raised in his opening brief. (Varjabedian v. City of
Madera, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 295, fn. 11.)
40
coverings and banquette cushions were not “fixtures” as defined
in this instruction because they were removable. Leevan’s
counsel argued in response that the proper standard for
determining a “fixture” was not whether it was “removable,” and
the custom window coverings and the banquette cushions are
“fixtures.”
Leevan contends the trial court erred in “permitting” Zale’s
counsel to argue that something which is removable is not a
fixture. Leevan has forfeited this ground for appeal because he
did not object in the trial court.24 (Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. (2009)
46 Cal.4th 247, 264.) Even were we to address this issue, we
would conclude there was no error as Zale’s counsel’s argument
was consistent with Leevan’s requested special instruction
No. 10, which stated that a fixture is something “permanently
attached” to the structure and, thus, fairly suggests the
argument that something “removable” is not a fixture.
Leevan also contends that Zale’s counsel’s closing argument
misstated the law regarding the specialty contractor’s license
requirements. Leevan has forfeited this contention because he
failed to object in the trial court to Zale’s counsel’s argument or to
special instruction No. 12, which was the basis for the argument.
(Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 264.)25
24 Leevan incorrectly asserts that the trial court
“encouraged” Zale’s counsel to make this argument. All the trial
court stated to Zale’s counsel, during discussions about special
instruction No. 10, was that “if you want to argue it doesn’t
apply, you’re welcome to.”
25 For the first time in his reply brief, Leevan contends that
the unclean hands doctrine bars Zale from any recovery because
41
E. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Awarding Attorney’s
Fees
1. Standard of Review
“[T]he trial court has broad authority to determine the
amount of a reasonable fee . . . ‘and while [its] judgment is of
course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the
appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong’—meaning
that it abused its discretion.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1984, 1095.)
Under the abuse of discretion standard, a trial court’s
“application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary
and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th
706, 712, fn. omitted.) “The normal rules of appellate review
apply to an order granting or denying attorney fees; i.e., the order
is presumed correct, all intendments and presumptions are
indulged to support the order, conflicts in the evidence are
resolved in favor of the prevailing party, and the trial court’s
resolution of factual disputes is conclusive.” (Apex LLC v.
Korusfood.com (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1017.)
2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Awarding Attorney’s Fees to Zale
Leevan challenges the attorney’s fee award on three
grounds. He first contends the trial court “did not properly
exercise any discretion with analyzing the evidence” because it
accepted Zale’s requested lodestar without any deduction. “The
she admitted to submitting false or altered vendor invoices. We
decline to consider this claim because it was not raised either
before the trial court or in Leevan’s opening brief. (Varjabedian
v. City of Madera, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 295, fn. 11.)
42
burden is on the objector [to an attorney’s fee award] to show
error.” (Karton v. Ari Design & Construction, Inc. (2021) 61
Cal.App.5th 734, 743.) Leevan fails to carry this burden because
he does not identify any aspect of the fees which he claims the
trial court was required to find unreasonable or excessive.
Instead, he relies on speculation to assume the trial court did not
consider the issues because it did not agree with any of his
arguments. This is insufficient to show an abuse of discretion.
Furthermore, Leevan ignores that the trial court stated it had
reviewed the billing statements and found them reasonable, and
that it specifically referenced and rejected several of the
arguments Leevan and his billing expert had raised.
Next, Leevan argues the trial court abused its discretion by
“adopt[ing] Zale’s theory that Leevan over[-]litigated the case,
when there would have been no lawsuit absent [Zale’s] billing
fraud.” We find no abuse of discretion. The trial court noted in
2015—nearly seven years before the case eventually went to
trial—that the case was being “over-litigated [and] acrimonious”
when it sustained a demurrer to Leevan’s RICO claim. The sheer
volume of the record after that ruling only confirms the lack of
any course correction. So too does Leevan’s disregard of Zale’s
Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offers. At the hearing on the
attorney’s fees motion, in response to Leevan’s arguments that
Zale’s actions were the cause for much of the litigation, the court
found that Zale was forced to continue litigating because her
offers to compromise, including one in which she offered to pay
Leevan $100,000, were rejected. The court’s overlitigation
finding was fully supported and the court’s rejection of Leevan’s
argument that Zale should be precluded from recovering fees
43
because she had caused the litigation was not arbitrary or
capricious.
Lastly, Leevan argues that the fee award “should . . . be
reduced to a reasonable sum commensurate with the modest
award of damages and the evidence.” Initially, we reject his
assertion that we should compare the fee award only to the
amount of Zale’s recovery for breach of contract. As Zale points
out, she prevailed not only on her breach of contract claim, but
also on Leevan’s cross-claim, which exposed Zale to potential
liability in the form of disgorgement of all amounts she had been
paid for the remodel, the substantial cost to repair allegedly
defective kitchen cabinets, and punitive damages.26
Furthermore, Leevan cites no authority that an attorney’s fee
award cannot exceed the prevailing party’s recovery, and the
caselaw is in fact to the contrary. (See Taylor v. Nabors Drilling
USA, LP (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1251 [“A reversal is not
compelled merely because the lodestar figure substantially
exceeds [the] respondent’s recovery”].)
Leevan cites Karton v. Ari Design Construction, Inc., supra,
61 Cal.App.5th 734, but the case does not aid him. The Karton
court did not hold that a fee award must be reversed if it exceeds
the damages award, or if it exceeds the award by any specific
multiple. The court did affirm the trial court’s reduction of the
lodestar requested by the prevailing plaintiff, but that was based
on the trial court’s findings the plaintiff had over-litigated the
case and the 600 hours of work claimed by the plaintiff’s attorney
was unreasonable. (Id. at pp. 738, 743, 745.) Karton is not
26 Leevan decided not to pursue his cost to repair and
punitive damages claims only after the close of evidence.
44
applicable here, where the trial court found Zale did not over-
litigate, and instead was trying unsuccessfully to “extricate
herself from” a case being over-litigated by Leevan.27
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment and the trial court’s order
awarding Zale her attorney’s fees. Zale is awarded her costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
KELLEY, J.*
27 In a footnote to his argument regarding the fee award,
Leevan asserts in passing that the judgment was excessive
because it necessarily included Zale’s fee based on the work of an
unlicensed subcontractor, Ruiz. We do not consider this
argument, as Leevan did not challenge the judgment on this
ground and provides no cogent analysis in support of this claim.
“As a general rule, ‘ “[w]hen an appellant raises an issue ‘but fails
to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority,
we treat the point as waived.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Estrada v. Public
Employees’ Retirement System, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 889.)
* Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
45
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