People v. Dixon CA4/2

CourtListener 10056586Calctapp22 de ago. de 2024

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Filed 8/22/24 P. v. Dixon CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E081321

v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF1605459)

GEMMEL A. DIXON, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge.

Affirmed.

William D. Farber, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley, and

Caelle McKaveney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant and appellant Gemmel A. Dixon appeals following a resentencing
1
hearing where the trial court struck defendant’s two one-year prior prison (Pen. Code,

§ 667.5, subd. (b)) term enhancements pursuant to section 1172.75 and reaffirmed

defendant’s upper term sentence of four years, doubled to eight years due to the prior

strike conviction defendant had admitted. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court

erred and abused its discretion in denying his request to resentence him to a lower or

middle term pursuant to Senate Bill No. 567 and the amended provisions of section 1170,

subdivision (b). We reject this claim and affirm the judgment.

II.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In May 2017, an information was filed charging defendant with assault by means

of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) and willful

endangerment likely to produce great bodily harm or death to a child (§ 273a, subd. (a)).

The information also alleged that defendant had sustained two prior prison terms

(§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and two prior serious and/or felony strike convictions (§§ 667, subds.

(b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) for a 1997 manslaughter conviction and a 2007 criminal

street gang conviction.

1
All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.

2
Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant subsequently pled guilty to the

aggravated assault (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) offense and admitted that he had suffered two

prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and one prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c),

(e), 1170.12, subd. (c)), to wit, the 1997 manslaughter conviction. In return, the

remaining allegations were dismissed, and defendant was sentenced to a stipulated term

of 10 years in prison as follows: the upper term of four years for the aggravated assault,

doubled to eight years due to the strike, plus two years for the two prior prison terms.

In 2022, defendant’s sentence was recalled for resentencing under section

1172.75. During the resentencing hearing on October 31, 2022, the trial court struck

defendant’s two prior prison terms pursuant to section 1172.75, subdivision (a) as legally

invalid based on a change in the law. Defense counsel then asked the trial court to (1)

strike the imposed fees and fines, which the court granted, (2) strike defendant’s prior

strike convictions under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497

(Romero), and (3) impose the low term. Counsel explained the low term was warranted

because defendant “was 21 at the time, so he was considered a youth, which makes low

term the presumptive term.” The court continued the matter to allow the parties to submit

briefing.

Both parties submitted numerous briefs as to defendant’s entitlement to a full

resentencing hearing and whether the court could entertain a Romero motion in light of

the terms in defendant’s negotiated plea agreement. Defendant claimed he was entitled to

full resentencing and submitted documents to support factors in mitigation. He argued

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that the court should strike his prior strikes under Assembly Bill No. 333 because his

judgment was no longer final. The People argued the court was bound by the terms of

the negotiated plea agreement and did not have jurisdiction or authority to invalidate the

upper term sentence because defendant had stipulated to a total prison term. The People

further asserted the court should not exercise its discretion under Romero and that, even if

defendant was entitled to full resentencing, an upper term was still justified due to

defendant’s criminal history.

The continued resentencing hearings were held on February 7, March 2, April 10,

and May 8, 2023. Following lengthy arguments by the parties, the court concluded

defendant was entitled to a full resentencing hearing under section 1172.75 and the

prosecution was not entitled to withdraw the plea agreement. The court noted that it was

not limited to only striking the prior prison enhancements under section 667.5,

subdivision (b).

On May 8, 2023, following further argument concerning defendant’s Romero

request, the trial court denied defendant’s request to dismiss his prior strike due to his

lengthy criminal history and “post-conviction conviction” felony while in prison on the

instant offense. The court also found that the upper term was still appropriate given

defendant’s criminal history as presented in his certified rap sheet, and resentenced

defendant to an aggregate term of eight years (the upper term of four years, doubled due

to the prior strike). Defendant timely appealed.

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III.

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the trial court erred and abused its discretion in denying his

request to resentence him to a lower or middle term because the trial court did not comply

with the requirements of section 1170 as amended by Senate Bill No. 567, and thus the

matter must be remanded for a new sentencing hearing. He asserts that no circumstance

in aggravation was stipulated to by him or found true beyond a reasonable doubt and the

court “simply imposed the upper term based on the terms of the plea agreement.”

The People respond that the ameliorative amendments in Senate Bill No. 567 do

not apply in the context of a stipulated sentence, and the court should have simply

dismissed the prior prison terms and sentenced defendant to the stipulated term. They

also assert that even if defendant was entitled to full resentencing, the trial court here

granted defendant a full resentencing hearing at which it considered whether there were

aggravating factors to support the upper term. The People further contend that even if the

court erred by relying on defendant’s certified rap sheet in finding aggravating factors

under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b), the error was harmless.

A. Applicability of Senate Bill No. 567 to Stipulated Plea Agreements

At the time defendant originally pled guilty and agreed to the upper term sentence

of four years, section 1170, former subdivision (b) “vested the court with ‘sound

discretion’ to simply weigh circumstances in aggravation or mitigation, and any other

relevant factors, and then impose any of the three prescribed terms (low, middle, or

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high)” of a sentencing triad. (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 426.)

As amended by Senate Bill No. 567, section 1170, subdivision (b) now provides,

in pertinent part: “(1) When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute

specifies three possible terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of

a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2).

[¶] (2) The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are

circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of

imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and the facts underlying those circumstances

have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable

doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial. . . . [¶] (3) Notwithstanding

paragraphs (1) and (2), the court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in

determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the

prior convictions to a jury. This paragraph does not apply to enhancements imposed on
2
prior convictions.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1)-(3).) Broadly speaking, the new sentencing

law “make[s] the middle term the presumptive sentence for a term of imprisonment . . . .”

(People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459, 464 (Lopez).)

As a general matter, Senate Bill No. 567’s amendments to section 1170 do apply

retroactively to all nonfinal cases. (People v. Zabelle (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1109.)

However, there is a split of authority among the Courts of Appeal as to whether these

2
California Rules of Court, rule 4.421 enumerates the factors courts may consider
as aggravating circumstances. (Chavez Zepeda v. Superior Court (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th
65, 70-71.)

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amendments apply retroactively to sentences imposed pursuant to stipulated plea

agreements. (Cf. People v. De La Rosa Burgara (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1054, 1063,

review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283452 [defendant entitled to remand], People v. Todd

(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 373, 381-382 (Todd), review granted Apr. 26, 2023, S279154

[same], and People v. Fox (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 826, 831 (Fox) [same] with People v.

Mitchell (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1051, 1057-1059 (Mitchell), review granted Dec. 14,

2022, S277314 [defendant not entitled to remand] and People v. Sallee (2023) 88
3
Cal.App.5th 330, 340-341 (Sallee) [same], review granted Apr. 26, 2023, S278690.)

In Mitchell, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 1051 review granted, the court stated that, in

imposing a sentence as part of a stipulated plea agreement, the trial court “had no

opportunity to exercise any discretion in deciding whether the imposition of the upper,

middle, or lower term would best serve ‘the interests of justice’ under former section

1170, subdivision (b).” (Mitchell, supra, at p. 1058.) Rather, “when presented with a

stipulated plea agreement, a trial court may either accept or reject it.” (Ibid.) Section

1170 contemplates imposition of sentence in the trial court’s “sound discretion.” (§

1170, subd. (b)(1).) The court in Mitchell stated this “language indicates that the statute

was not intended to apply to sentences imposed pursuant to a stipulated plea agreement,

3
According to the Supreme Court’s summary of issues, the Mitchell appeal
presents the following issue: “Does Senate Bill No. 567 (Stats. 2021, ch. 731), which
limits a trial court’s discretion to impose upper-term sentences, apply retroactively to
defendants sentenced pursuant to stipulated plea agreements?”

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as the trial court lacks discretion to select the sentence in the first place.” (Mitchell,

supra, at p. 1058.)

Defendant acknowledges Mitchell, but relies instead on Todd, supra, 88

Cal.App.5th 373 review granted. Relying on our Supreme Court’s decision in People v.

Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685 (Stamps), the Todd court disagreed with Mitchell,

concluding the defendant’s “sentence to the aggravated term as a condition of his

negotiated plea agreement does not negate the requirements imposed on the court by

amended section 1170, subdivision (b), which is retroactively applicable to him.” (Todd,

supra, at p. 381.) The court stated that section 1170 as amended “prohibits the

imposition of the upper-term sentence absent specific findings.” (Todd, supra, at p. 378.)

Thus, “the imposition of the aggravated term exceeds the court’s authority unless the

statutory prerequisites are met or waived because the aggravated term cannot be imposed

absent the court’s finding of those circumstances.” (Id. at p. 379.) Additionally, the Todd

court stated that adopting the reasoning in Mitchell would improperly render the

defendant’s plea bargain to a stipulated sentence “the very waiver of ‘unknown future

benefits of legislative enactments’ that the Legislature has deemed void as against public

policy because his entry of plea on those terms was not ‘knowing and intelligent.’”

(Todd, supra, at pp. 379-380, citing § 1016.8, subd. (a)(1) [plea agreements are deemed

to incorporate the power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the

public good and in pursuance of public policy; entering into plea agreement does not

insulate parties from changes in the law the Legislature intended to apply to them], (4)

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[“plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive unknown future benefits of

legislative enactments, initiatives, appellate decisions, or other changes in the law that

may occur after the date of the plea is not knowing and intelligent”].)

In Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th 685, our Supreme Court considered the retroactive

applicability of then recent changes in the law which allowed courts to strike serious

felony enhancements which were previously mandatory. Stamps had a negotiated

sentence which included a serious felony enhancement and sought remand to allow the

trial court to potentially strike it. (Id. at pp. 699-700.) The Supreme Court held that the

change in the law was retroactive and provided some relief. The limited relief the court

offered was that a “defendant should be given the opportunity to seek the court’s exercise

of its . . . discretion. If the court on remand declines to exercise its discretion . . . , that

ends the matter and defendant’s sentence stands.” (Id. at p. 707.) “However, if the court

is inclined to exercise its discretion . . . , such a determination would have consequences

to the plea agreement. . . . If the court indicates an inclination to exercise its

discretion . . . , the prosecution may, of course, agree to modify the bargain to reflect the

downward departure in the sentence such exercise would entail. Barring such a

modification agreement, ‘the prosecutor is entitled to the same remedy as the

defendant—withdrawal of assent to the plea agreement . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Upon

exercise of its discretion, a court may also “withdraw its prior approval of the plea

agreement,” as “[t]he court’s exercise of its new discretion to strike the serious felony

enhancement, whether considered a new circumstance in the case or simply a

9
reevaluation of the propriety of the bargain itself, would fall within the court’s broad

discretion to withdraw its prior approval of the plea agreement.” (Id. at p. 708.)

Under Stamps, then, retroactive changes in law entitle defendants with cases that

are not final to reconsider their negotiated pleas with full information about the governing

law. However, a defendant who wishes to change his or her plea could dismantle the

negotiated sentence and return the parties to a pre-plea agreement state if either the

People or the court withdraws their assent to the agreement.

Todd and Fox conclude that Stamps’s reasoning applies to cases about

retroactively applying Senate Bill No. 567. As Fox states, “section 1170[, subdivision]

(b)—like section 1385 (the statute at issue in Stamps)—involves a trial court’s

‘exercising [of] its discretion’ to make a sentencing choice.” (Fox, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th

at p. 834.) “By the same reasoning [as in Stamps], although a defendant who agreed to a

specific term cannot be resentenced to the middle or lower term while retaining the other

benefits of the plea bargain, the defendant may still seek relief under Senate Bill No. 567

with the understanding that if the trial court grants relief, the plea bargain is unlikely to

survive.” (Ibid.) “Indeed, whereas under Senate Bill No. 1393 [the bill considered in

Stamps] a sentence is lawful regardless of whether a trial court exercises its discretion to

strike an enhancement, under Senate Bill No. 567 an upper-term sentence is not even

authorized unless aggravating circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or

found true beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] Thus, the statutory amendment here

warrants a remand even more clearly than did the one in Stamps.” (Ibid.)

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In addition, our Supreme Court issued another opinion, People v. Prudholme

(2023) 14 Cal.5th 961 (Prudholme), that arguably charts a third path. In Prudholme, the

Supreme Court considered whether and how recent changes to the law capping the

maximum probation term for many crimes applied to non-final pleas. Rather than follow

Stamps, the court in Prudholme held that remand was not necessary, the People should

not be given an opportunity to withdraw from the plea deal, and the appropriate remedy

was to unilaterally reduce the plea for a sentence to match the new maximum probation

term. (Prudholme, supra, at p. 978.) The court held that adopting Stamps would

undermine the legislative goals of the statute, which intended to reduce probation lengths

across the board and reduce incarceration for probation violations because “if the

bargained-for statutory probation term is now considered insufficient, the People’s only

recourse would be to require a plea to a more serious offense, making Assembly Bill

1950’s two-year probation limit inapplicable, or to seek a prison term. It seems doubtful

the Legislature intended that its ameliorative action would transform plea bargains for

probationary terms into dispositions calling for admission of a more serious offense or a

state prison sentence.” (Prudholme, supra, at p. 977.) The court also held that

“[r]educing defendant’s probationary term from three to two years here would not so

‘fundamentally alter[] the character of the bargain’ that the People should have an

opportunity to withdraw from the plea agreement” (id. at p. 978), in part because it would

not offer Prudholme total relief, and “even assuming a modification granting less than

total relief to a defendant could still fundamentally alter a plea bargain under some

11
circumstances, the People here agreed to a disposition that included a probationary term

for less than the maximum period of five years allowed under then-existing law.” (Id. at

p. 979.) Generally, Prudholme advised that courts facing similar contests between

ameliorative sentencing changes and section 1192.5’s prohibition on modifying plea

agreements should look to the Legislature’s intent in passing the ameliorative law and

effect that intent. (Prudholme, supra, at pp. 975-976.)

We are persuaded by the reasoning in Todd and Fox, unpersuaded by Mitchell and

Sallee, and conclude under Prudholme’s guidance that the analysis outlined in Stamps is

appropriate here. First, neither Mitchell nor Sallee so much as address Stamps, the most

applicable controlling precedent in this area. Instead, Mitchell and Sallee hold that

section 1170, subdivision (b), does not apply when a trial court takes a plea with an

agreement to a stipulated sentence because the trial court is not exercising sentencing

discretion under section 1170, subdivision (b). But as Stamps points out, the court’s

power to accept or reject a stipulated plea is itself an exercise of its discretion. Indeed,

Stamps stated that “[t]he court’s exercise of its new discretion to strike the serious felony

enhancement . . . would fall within the court’s broad discretion to withdraw its prior

approval of the plea agreement.” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 708.)

Here, it is conceivable that the trial court would not have accepted defendant’s

plea agreement under the law as it exists now—at least without a factual basis for the

upper term, now that the middle term is presumptive without one. That is, just because a

court cannot modify the terms of a plea agreement does not mean it lacks any discretion

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when imposing those terms, as it can always reject the agreement entirely. Remanding

would give defendant an opportunity to consider his plea while informed of the

applicable law after Senate Bill No. 567, and it allows the trial court to re-evaluate the

propriety of defendant’s sentence given current law. However, under the circumstances

of this case, we need not remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing because the

record clearly indicates the trial court followed Todd and afforded defendant a full
4
resentencing hearing.

B. Imposition of Upper Term

Section 1170 generally provides that a trial court shall impose an upper-term

sentence only when there are aggravating circumstances “that justify . . . exceeding the

middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the

defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the

judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) Notwithstanding those proof requirements,

4
Todd noted the appropriate remedy is to “remand the matter to permit [the
defendant] to waive or invoke the requirements of section 1170, subdivision (b).” (Todd,
supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p 381, review granted.) If a defendant invokes those
requirements, “the trial court must determine whether the upper term can be imposed in
compliance with section 1170[, subdivision] (b). If it can be so imposed, then the
sentence will stand. But if it cannot, and the prosecution does not acquiesce to a reduced
sentence or the trial court no longer approves of the plea agreement with the reduction,
the court must ‘return the parties to the status quo.’ [Citation.]” (Fox, supra, 90
Cal.App.5th at p. 835.)

Citing to the court’s comment it was “not going to change the negotiated
disposition,” defendant appears to argue the trial court did not engage in full
resentencing. The record belies this claim. The statement was made at the end of the
proceedings after the court had already weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors
and declined to strike defendant’s prior strikes and impose the upper term.

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the trial court “may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing

based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a

jury.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3); see People v. Butler (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 953, 958-959,

review granted May 31, 2023, S279633.)

“We review a trial court’s sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion,

evaluating whether the court exercised its discretion ‘in a manner that is not arbitrary and

capricious, that is consistent with the letter and spirit of the law, and that is based upon an

“individualized consideration of the offense, the offender, and the public interest.”’

[Citation.]” (People v. Panozo (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 825, 837.)

“‘To prove an abuse of discretion, “‘[t]he burden is on the party attacking the

sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.

[Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to

achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a

particular sentence will not be set aside on review.’” [Citation.] To meet this burden, the

defendant must “affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court misunderstood its

sentencing discretion.”’ [Citation.] ‘“Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions

made in the exercise of the ‘informed discretion’ of the sentencing court. [Citations.] A

court which is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more exercise that

‘informed discretion’ than one whose sentence is or may have been based on

misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s record.”’ [Citation.]”

14
(People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 988; accord, Lopez, supra, 78

Cal.App.5th at pp. 466-467.)

To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion in imposing an upper-term

sentence, a reviewing court asks whether the aggravating factors relied upon by the trial

court could have been found to be unquestionably true, beyond a reasonable doubt. (See

People v. Flores (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 495, 500; Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 463;

People v. Zabelle, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1112-1113; see also People v. Butler,

supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 959-960, review granted; People v. Wiley (2023) 97

Cal.App.5th 676, 683, review granted Mar. 12, 2024, S283326 [“the Sixth Amendment

did not require that a jury make the determinations at issue here,” including whether the

defendant’s convictions were of increasing seriousness].) Where the record indicates the
5
aggravating factors were supported by uncontroverted evidence, there is no error.

As previously noted, “[p]ursuant to subdivision (b)(3) of section 1170, a trial court

‘may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a

certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.’”

(Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 466.) “‘The United States Supreme Court

consistently has stated that the right to a jury trial does not apply to the fact of a prior

conviction.’” (People v. Pantaleon (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 932, 938, citing People v.

Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 818.) “[U]nquestionably the trial court may still rely on any

5
In light of our conclusion that the trial court committed no sentencing error here,
we need not resolve any split in authority regarding the appropriate harmless error test.

15
single permissible aggravating factor to select an upper term sentence under the newly

revised triad system.” (Lopez, supra, at p. 467; accord People v. Flores, supra, 75

Cal.App.5th at pp. 500-501 [imposition of upper term supported by defendant’s prior

criminal history and poor performance on probation].)

Here, the trial court considered all the relevant factors submitted by the parties in

determining the appropriate term. The court considered defendant’s background,

defendant’s postconviction conduct, the factors in mitigation, the preliminary hearing

transcript, the circumstances of the instant offense, letters and statements in support of

defendant, and defendant’s statement at the resentencing hearing. However, the court

found that defendant’s criminal record, as supported by the certified criminal rap sheet,

supported imposition of the upper term of imprisonment. The court’s ruling finds ample

support in the record.

People’s Exhibit 1, the copy of defendant’s certified rap sheet, which the court

admitted into evidence at the hearing under seal, reflects that defendant has a lengthy

criminal history dating back to 1993. In 1996, defendant was convicted of manslaughter

with use of a firearm and sentenced to 14 years in prison. In 2001, defendant was

charged with prison assault charges which were later dismissed. In 2003, while

incarcerated in state prison, defendant was convicted of attempted damage to prison

property and sentenced to one year in prison. He was paroled in 2004/2005 but his parole

was revoked twice in 2006. In December 2006, defendant was arrested for

selling/transporting drugs while participating in a gang, and convicted of this charge in

16
2007 and sentenced to six years in prison. He was also convicted in another case in San

Bernardino County of possession for sale of cocaine base and sentenced to three years,

eight months consecutively. Defendant’s parole was again revoked thereafter. In

December 2015, he was arrested for marijuana sales and unlawful possession of a firearm

in Florida and a warrant was eventually issued. The Florida case was dismissed after he

was charged in the instant matter. In October 2016, defendant was arrested for the

current offenses after he assaulted a 19-year-old victim fracturing her fingers while

holding his infant daughter. During the current incident, defendant also threatened the

victim and her mother, who was also the mother of his infant daughter, with a firearm and

attempted to hit the mother with a vehicle while she was holding his infant child. Finally,

in 2020, defendant was charged with possession of contraband while in prison. In fact,

defendant admitted to this offense, stating at the May 2024 full resentencing hearing that

while incarcerated on the current offense, he “introduced contraband in the prison cell,

but only tobacco and THC wax,” and was reprimanded. In light of these facts, imposition

of an upper-term sentence was not an abuse of discretion.

Defendant’s criminal history demonstrates he had numerous prior convictions, that

courts had sentenced him to prison on multiple occasions, that he had violated the terms

of his parole on three occasions, and that he continued to violate the law. The court’s

selection of the upper term of imprisonment was not arbitrary or capricious. In addition,

contrary to defendant’s contentions, the trial court properly relied on defendant’s certified

criminal record to impose the upper term. (See People v. Wiley, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at

17
p. 685, review granted [the increasing seriousness of the defendant’s convictions (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)) and his poor prior performance on probation (Cal. Rules

of Court, rule 4.421(b)(5)) could be decided by the court under § 1170, subd. (b)(3)];

People v. Ross (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1346, 1353, review granted Mar. 15, 2023,

S278266 [certified records of defendant’s prior convictions supported consideration of

aggravating circumstances under Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(1), (2), (3) & (5)].)

In People v. Wiley, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at page 686 review granted, the court

reasoned, section 1170, subdivision (b)(3) “does not specify the court is limited to finding

that a prior conviction occurred; instead, it states the court may ‘consider the defendant’s

prior convictions in determining sentencing.’ (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).) And, as our

Supreme Court has recognized in the context of the prior conviction exception to the

constitutional jury trial right, consideration of prior convictions may establish recidivism-

based aggravating factors such as increasing seriousness of the convictions [citation] or

prior unsatisfactory performance on probation or parole [citation]. The statutory

language does not suggest the Legislature sought to depart from our Supreme Court’s

constitutional jurisprudence on this point by establishing a significantly narrower

statutory prior conviction exception.” (People v. Wiley, supra, at p. 686.)

Accordingly, the trial court properly relied on defendant’s certified record of

convictions, and we thus uphold the court’s imposition of the upper term at the full

resentencing hearing.

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IV.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON
J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
P. J.

MILLER
J.

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