People v. Rojas CA1/1

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Filed 8/22/24 P. v. Rojas CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A168293

v. (Napa County
ALFONSO CORRO ROJAS, Super. Ct. No. 22CR002483)
Defendant and Appellant.

Alfonso Corro Rojas was convicted by a jury of evading an officer with
willful disregard and misdemeanor resisting arrest. He contends the trial
court violated his constitutional right against double jeopardy by allowing the
prosecution to amend the information to charge the lesser included offense of
misdemeanor resisting arrest after granting his motion for acquittal of felony
resisting arrest. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In November 2022, the Napa County Sheriff’s Department received
calls reporting a red truck “spinning donuts.” At the scene, the responding
officer noticed a purple truck parked near the reported area and investigated.
When the officer parked behind the truck and walked toward it, Rojas started
it up and drove away. The officer returned to his car, activated the
emergency lights, and pursued Rojas, who drove erratically. Eventually, the
officer blocked Rojas’s truck from leaving a dead-end street.
The officer exited his car, told Rojas to turn off the truck and put his
hands up. Rojas turned off the truck but would not raise his hands, even
after several commands to do so. Additional officers arrived on the scene and
formed a plan to arrest Rojas after he continued to ignore officers’ verbal
commands. The officers eventually removed Rojas from the truck and placed
him face down on the ground. When the initial responding officer grabbed
Rojas’s left arm to place him in handcuffs, he felt Rojas tense up and try to
pull away from him.
In an amended information filed March 2023, Rojas was charged with
three felonies: evading an officer while driving against traffic (Veh. Code,
§ 2800.4; count one), evading an officer with willful disregard (Veh. Code,
§ 2800.2, subd. (a); count two), and resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code,1
§ 69; count three). Rojas moved for acquittal of count three, felony resisting
an executive officer, under section 1118.1 at the close of the prosecution’s
case. The trial court granted the motion but allowed the prosecutor to amend
the information to add the lesser included offense of misdemeanor resisting
arrest (§ 148; count three).
In ruling on the motion for acquittal, the trial court stated: “I’m just
looking at this from the standpoint of a [section] 69, and I don’t think I’ve
ever had a charge go forward just when some[one] was not complying with
putting their hand behind their back. [¶] Normally, this is when the
defendant is fight[ing] against the officer, oftentimes trying to punch them,
bite them, resisting where they have to put them in a wrap, all those sorts of
things. [¶] And here, it sounded like, yes, he wasn’t complying with putting
his hand behind his back, but it didn’t sound like it was a felony [section] 69.
[¶] So I’m going to grant the request at this point.”

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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Immediately after this statement, the prosecution responded, “Your
Honor, if that’s the Court’s ruling, then I would ask leave of the Court to
amend the Complaint to add a violation of Penal Code Section 148.” The trial
court responded, “Okay. You do have the right to make an amendment at
any time during the trial.” Rojas’s counsel objected to the amendment, noting
that the prosecution had rested, and that it would require him to “essentially
completely recalibrate the defense strategy.” The court responded: “I’ll give
you time to recalibrate. But to bring up a [section] 148, I think [the
prosecutor] has the right to do that. Especially based upon the Court’s ruling
on granting the [section] 1118.” The court then asked if Rojas’s counsel
needed time to address the issue, to which he responded affirmatively, and
the court took a recess.
The jury found Rojas guilty of evading an officer with willful disregard
(count one) and resisting an officer (count three), but acquitted him of
evading an officer against traffic (count two). The trial court suspended
imposition of sentence and granted a two-year probation.
II. DISCUSSION
“In a case tried before a jury, the court on motion of the defendant . . . ,
at the close of the evidence on either side and before the case is submitted to
the jury for decision, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one
. . . of the offenses charged in the accusatory pleading if the evidence then
before the court is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense . . . on
appeal.” (§ 1118.1.) An acquittal under section 1118.1 “is a bar to any other
prosecution for the same offense.” (§ 1118.2.)
The court’s authority to allow amendment of the information following
a motion for acquittal is a question of law which we review de novo. (See
People v. Garcia (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1056, 1067 (Garcia); In re Corrine W.

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(2009) 45 Cal.4th 522, 529 [on appeal, questions of law are reviewed de
novo].)
Granting a section 1118.1 motion for a particular count is an acquittal
of the crime charged and all lesser included offenses, unless explicitly stated
otherwise. (Garcia, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 1069; People v. McElroy
(1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1415, 1424 (McElroy), disapproved in part on other
grounds in People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 901, fn. 3.) However, the
trial court retains “discretion to substitute a lesser included offense upon a
finding of insufficient evidence as to the greater offense.” (People v. Powell
(2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 304, 311 (Powell).)
Rojas argues that when the trial court granted the prosecution’s motion
to amend immediately after granting his motion to acquit, it violated his
constitutional right against double jeopardy because the court “never
reserved jurisdiction to allow the charge in Count 3 to be amended to a lesser
included offense.” We disagree.
A trial court does not need to expressly reserve jurisdiction when, like
here, the prosecution immediately seeks to substitute a lesser included
offense when the court announces its ruling to acquit defendant of the greater
offense. (Powell, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 311–313.) Unlike Garcia and
McElroy, which Rojas relies on, here there was no “recess or consideration of
matters other than the motion for acquittal” that would have provided Rojas
“a modicum of repose from prosecution.” (Powell, at pp. 313, 312.) Rojas
“ignores the unbroken nature of the proceeding within which the court
ordered the dismissals and stated its intent to instruct on the lesser included
offenses.” (Id. at p. 313.) Here, as in Powell, the prosecution moved to amend
the information to add the lesser included offense immediately after the court
pronounced its ruling on Rojas’s section 1118.1 motion.

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Rojas attempts to distinguish Powell by emphasizing that in Powell
“ample notice” of the lesser included offense was provided because the
prosecution had submitted jury instructions for it. We are not persuaded.
The Powell analysis turns on the timing of the request to add the lesser
included offense, not the sufficiency of notice of the charge. Moreover, when a
defendant is charged with an offense, he is notified of the need to potentially
defend against any lesser included offenses. (People v. Birks (1998)
19 Cal.4th 108, 118 [“the stated charge notifies the defendant, for due process
purposes, that he must also be prepared to defend against any lesser offense
necessarily included therein, even if the lesser offense is not expressly set
forth in the indictment or information”].)
Thus, the trial court did not err when it allowed the prosecution to
amend the information to add misdemeanor resisting arrest (§ 148)
immediately after granting Rojas’s motion to acquit on the greater offense of
resisting an executive officer (§ 69). Since there was no error, we need not
reach Rojas’s claim of double jeopardy. (Garcia, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 1067–1068.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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SIGGINS, J.*

WE CONCUR:

HUMES, P. J.

BANKE, J.

A168293
People v. Rojas

* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate

District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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