CourtListener 10045131•People v. Muro CA4/1
Texto completo
Filed 8/19/24 P. v. Muro CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D084020
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. FSB1204121)
GILBERT MURO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Ronald M. Christianson, Judge. Reversed and remanded with
directions.
Justin Behravesh, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Appellant and Defendant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Randall
D. Einhorn, Arlene A. Sevidal, and Arlyn Escalante, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Gilbert Muro appeals the trial court’s denial of his request for a
Franklin proceeding to preserve youth-related mitigating evidence relevant
to his parole suitability, and his related request for the appointment of
counsel. (People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin).)1
Additionally, Muro asserts he should be given the opportunity on remand to
argue he is eligible for the discretionary resentencing procedure under
recently enacted Assembly Bill No. 600 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly
Bill 600) (Stats. 2023, ch. 446).
The Attorney General concedes Muro is eligible for a Franklin
proceeding under Penal Code section 4801, subdivision (c),2 and that he is
entitled to the appointment of counsel to represent him during the
proceedings. However, it disagrees with Muro’s contention that he is eligible
for resentencing under Assembly Bill 600. The Attorney General additionally
contends that regardless of Muro’s eligibility for relief under Assembly Bill
600, his claim is an improper request for an advisory opinion from this court
because he has not yet raised his claim in the trial court.
1 Although Muro refers to the Franklin proceeding as a “hearing” in his
briefing on appeal, our high court has described the process as a “proceeding”
rather than a hearing. (See In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 449, fn. 3 (Cook)
[“Franklin processes are more properly called ‘proceedings’ rather than
‘hearings.’ ”].)
2 Penal Code section 4801, subdivision (c) provides: “[w]hen a prisoner
committed his or her controlling offense . . . when he or she was 25 years of
age or younger, the [Board of Parole Hearings], in reviewing a prisoner[’]s
suitability for parole pursuant to Section 3041.5, shall give great weight to
the diminished culpability of youth as compared to adults, the hallmark
features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the
prisoner in accordance with relevant case law.” Further unspecified
statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
As we shall discuss, we conclude Muro’s contention related to Assembly
Bill 600 is premature because the legislation was not in effect at the time of
the order from which he appeals, and the record does not demonstrate that he
made a request for such relief in the trial court. His claim amounts to a
request for this court to issue an advisory opinion, which we may not do.3
However, we agree with the parties that Muro is entitled to a Franklin
proceeding, as well as the appointment of counsel to assist him during the
proceeding. Accordingly, the order denying Muro’s request for a Franklin
proceeding is reversed, and the matter shall be remanded to afford Muro the
opportunity to make a record of youth-related mitigating evidence for future
parole hearings. The trial court is directed to appoint him counsel on
remand.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND4
In 2013, Muro pleaded guilty to one count of second degree robbery
(§ 211). Muro admitted he committed the offense for the benefit of a criminal
street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)), that he personally used a deadly or
dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and that he was previously
convicted of a strike prior offense (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d), 667,
subds. (a)–(i)). The trial court sentenced him to a stipulated term of 15 years
in state prison. Muro was 24 years old at the time of the conviction offense.
In 2023, Muro filed a postjudgment motion that included several
requests. First, citing to our high court’s 2016 decision in Franklin, supra,
3 As indicated in our discussion, we take no position on whether he is
eligible for resentencing under Assembly Bill 600, or the manner in which the
trial court should exercise its discretion in this regard.
4 Muro’s claims on appeal relate solely to the trial court’s denial of his
postjudgment request for a Franklin hearing, and we limit our discussion of
the factual and procedural background accordingly.
3
Muro moved for a Franklin proceeding to establish a record of youth-related
mitigating evidence. Additionally, he requested a bifurcated trial pursuant to
recent legislative changes to the criminal street gang enhancement under
Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333). Finally,
Muro requested the appointment of counsel to assist him in the proceedings.
The trial court denied Muro’s requests. The court found he was “not
eligible for [a] youth offender parole hearing,” and therefore he was not
entitled to a Franklin proceeding or the appointment of counsel. The court
also declined to grant Muro a bifurcated trial to determine the truth of the
gang allegation that he admitted during his change of plea. The court
concluded that because Muro had resolved his case by plea, and “there was no
trial, the bifurcation requirement for the gang allegation [was] not
implicated,” nor was the bifurcation requirement under Assembly Bill 333
“retroactive to cases that are final.”
Muro timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I.
Muro Is Entitled to a Franklin Proceeding
In 2013, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 260 (2013–2014
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 260) to “establish a parole eligibility
mechanism . . . by which growth and maturity of youthful offenders can be
assessed and a meaningful opportunity for release established.” (Stats. 2013,
ch. 312, § 1.) Senate Bill 260 added section 3051 and amended section 4801
to effectuate its purpose. (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, §§ 4, 5.) Under section 3051,
4
offenders 25 years and younger at the time of their controlling offense5 are
entitled to a youth offender parole hearing (YOPH) for early parole
consideration. (§ 3051, subd. (a).)
In Franklin, our high court held that in anticipation of a YOPH,
offenders are entitled to a proceeding in the trial court to “make a record of
information relevant to [an] eventual [YOPH].” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th
at p. 284.) “The goal of any such proceeding is to provide an opportunity for
the parties to make an accurate record of the juvenile offender’s
characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense so that the Board
[of Parole Hearings], years later, may properly discharge its obligation to
‘give great weight to’ youth-related factors (§ 4801, subd. (c)) . . . .” (Ibid.)
However, offenders convicted under California’s “Three Strikes” law are
statutorily ineligible for a YOPH. (§ 3051, subd. (h) [“This section shall not
apply to cases in which sentencing occurs pursuant to Section 1170.12,
subdivisions (b) to (i) . . . .”].) Nonetheless, our sister court in People v.
Delgado (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 95 (Delgado) extended the availability of
Franklin proceedings to offenders who are otherwise statutorily ineligible for
a YOPH due to their conviction under the Three Strikes law. The Delgado
court relied on section 4801, subdivision (c), which states: “[w]hen a prisoner
committed his or her controlling offense . . . when he or she was 25 years of
age or younger, the [Board of Parole Hearings], in reviewing a prisoner[’]s
suitability for parole pursuant to Section 3041.5, shall give great weight to
the diminished culpability of youth as compared to adults, the hallmark
features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the
prisoner in accordance with relevant case law.” Interpreting the statute’s
5 A controlling offense is “the offense or enhancement for which any
sentencing court imposed the longest term of imprisonment.” (§ 3051,
subd. (a)(2)(B).)
5
textual reference to section 3041.5,6 the Delgado court concluded it was the
Legislature’s intent that “the criteria set forth in section 4801, subdivision (c)
to apply broadly to all parole hearings, not just YOPHs.” (Delgado, supra, at
p. 103.) Thus, offenders who will not receive a YOPH remain entitled to a
Franklin proceeding under section 4801, subdivision (c). (Id. at p. 104.)
Muro concedes his conviction under the Three Strikes law statutorily
bars him from receiving a YOPH. However, the parties agree that because
Muro was 24 at the time of the controlling offense, the Board of Parole
Hearings will nonetheless be obliged to consider the youth-related criteria set
forth in section 4801, subdivision (c), when determining his parole eligibility.
Thus, pursuant to our sister court’s decision in Delgado, supra, the parties
assert the matter should be remanded to permit the trial court to conduct a
Franklin proceeding.
Reviewing Muro’s claim of eligibility for a Franklin proceeding
pursuant to section 4801, subdivision (c) de novo, we agree with the court in
Delgado that Muro is entitled to present evidence of youth-related mitigating
evidence in the trial court for the purpose of his future parole hearings. (See
Goodman v. Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327, 1332 [“[T]he interpretation of a
statute [is] a question of law that we review de novo.”].) Here, Muro was
24 years old at the time of the controlling offense, and as the Attorney
General remarks in its briefing on appeal, he did not make a record of
youth-related mitigating evidence during his original sentencing.
Accordingly, we shall reverse the court’s order denying Muro’s request for a
Franklin proceeding.
6 Section 3041.5 enumerates the procedures that are applicable in “all
hearings” pertaining to an inmate’s parole suitability. (§ 3041.5, subd. (a).)
6
Relatedly, the parties agree that a Franklin proceeding constitutes a
critical stage of a criminal proceeding, thereby triggering Muro’s right to the
appointment of counsel. (See People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, 362
[”[T]he . . . right to the assistance of counsel applies at all critical stages of a
criminal proceeding in which the substantial rights of a defendant are at
stake.”].) Although the trial court has discretion to determine the manner
and extent of a Franklin proceeding (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 459), we
agree with the parties that given the critical nature of Franklin evidence in
determining Muro’s future parole suitability, he is entitled to counsel during
the proceedings. (See People v. Bauer (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 150, 155 [the
“right to counsel ‘applies at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding in
which the substantial rights of a defendant are at stake,’ ” and it is
well-settled that “[a] sentencing hearing is one such stage”]; People v. Hall
(1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1102, 1105 [“It is fundamental that the right to
counsel applies at all stages in a criminal proceeding where substantial
rights of an accused may be affected.”].) Thus, we direct the trial court to
appoint Muro counsel on remand to assist him in the Franklin proceeding.
II.
Muro’s Contention Related to Assembly Bill 600
Is Not Ripe for Appellate Review
Under section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) (formerly section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1)),7 a trial court may recall a defendant’s sentence and
resentence the defendant “within 120 days of the date of commitment,” or at
7 “Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) . . . (Stats. 2021, ch. 719, §§ 1–7) renumbered the recall and
resentencing provisions of former section 1170(d)(1) and amended the
language governing the procedural requirements, which are now set forth in
section 1172.1.” (People v. E.M. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1088.)
7
any time “upon the recommendation of the secretary or the Board of Parole
Hearings . . . , the county correctional administrator . . . , the district attorney
of the county in which the defendant was sentenced, or the Attorney
General.” Effective January 1, 2024, Assembly Bill 600 amended
section 1172.1 to expand the trial court’s ability to resentence felony
offenders. Under section 1172.1, the trial court may, on its own motion,
recall an offender’s sentence “at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at
the time of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory
authority or case law.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1), italics added, as amended by
Stats. 2023, ch. 446, § 2.) Thus, after the effective date of Assembly Bill 600,
the trial court is not limited by the 120-day constraint in section 1172.1,
subdivision (a)(1), if there has been a change in the applicable sentencing
laws.
Here, Muro contends he should be given the opportunity on remand to
argue he is eligible for the discretionary resentencing procedure described by
section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1). According to Muro, recent legislative
changes to the criminal street gang enhancement under Assembly Bill 3338
constituted a change in the applicable sentencing laws at the time of his
original sentence. Thus, Muro contends he should “be given the opportunity
on remand to argue that the trial court’s newfound discretion under
Assembly Bill 600 applies to his arguments regarding [the gang enhancement
under] Assembly Bill 333.”
The issue of Muro’s eligibility for resentencing under Assembly Bill 600
has not been contemplated by the trial court and is therefore not yet ripe for
8 Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill 333 amended section 186.22
and added section 1109 to allow for an alleged gang enhancement to be tried
in separate phases, upon the request of the defense. (See § 1109, subd. (a);
Stats. 2021, ch. 699, §§ 3–5.)
8
appellate review. “The ripeness requirement, a branch of the doctrine of
justiciability, prevents courts from issuing purely advisory opinions.” (Pacific
Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 170.) The
doctrine is rooted in “the recognition that judicial decisionmaking is best
conducted in the context of an actual set of facts so that the issues will be
framed with sufficient definiteness to enable the court to make a decree
finally disposing of the controversy.” (Ibid.) As such, “ ‘[t]he rendering of
advisory opinions falls within neither the functions nor the jurisdiction of this
court.’ ” (Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 119.)
Here, because Muro first raised his claim related to Assembly Bill 600
on appeal rather than in the trial court, the trial court has yet to have the
opportunity to evaluate Muro’s eligibility for resentencing under
section 1172.1. Nor has the trial court determined if it would exercise its
resentencing discretion if Muros is, in fact, eligible for relief under the
statute. Without findings on these issues from the trial court, there is no
available remedy for this court to provide and the issue is premature. (See
People v. Slayton (2001) 26 Cal 4.th 1076, 1084 [adhering to the prohibition
against advisory opinions where “the factual record [was] inadequate” to
properly evaluate a party’s contention].) Moreover, Muro does not cite to
anything in the record or otherwise that suggests he is precluded from at
least raising the issue on remand.9 As such, we take no position on Muro’s
ability to be resentenced and decline to reach the merits of his contention.
9 In any event, we note that had Muro moved the trial court for
discretionary relief under Assembly Bill 600, the trial court was not obliged
to consider his request. (See § 1172.1., subd. (c) [“A defendant is not entitled
to file a petition seeking relief from the court under this section. If a
defendant request consideration for relief under this section, the court is not
required to respond.”].)
9
DISPOSITION
The order denying Muro’s request for a Franklin proceeding is
reversed. The matter is remanded, and the trial court is directed to provide
Muro a Franklin proceeding and appoint him counsel to assist in the matter.
IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:
O'ROURKE, Acting P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
10
Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude
Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.