CourtListener 10045058•In re S.A. CA2/7
Texto completo
Filed 8/16/24 In re S.A. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
In re S.A., a Person Coming B331365, B323792, B321528
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
_______________________________ (Los Angeles County Super.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Ct. No. 19CCJP00325A)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
PATRICIA A.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Philip L. Soto, Judge. B331365, affirmed; B323792,
affirmed as modified; B321528, dismissed.
Patricia A., in propria persona, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Law Office of Amir Pichvai and Amir Pichvai for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
________________________________
Patricia A. appeals from three of the juvenile court’s orders
pertaining to the juvenile dependency case for her biological son,
Samuel A.
In the first of the three appeals, B323792, Patricia contends
the court issued an overbroad restraining order under Welfare
and Institutions Code1 section 213.5 protecting Samuel and his
foster parents. The second appeal, B321528, concerns the
juvenile court’s summary denial of Patricia’s section 388 petition
filed on June 6, 2022, seeking additional reunification services
and visitation with Samuel. In the third appeal, B331365,
Patricia challenges the order terminating her parental rights
pursuant to section 366.26.
We affirm the order terminating Patricia’s parental rights.
We dismiss as moot Patricia’s appeal from the denial of the 388
petition. Because we agree the restraining order was, in part,
overbroad, we modify it and affirm the order as modified.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
The dependency case involving Samuel stems from a
petition filed by the Los Angeles County Department of Children
1
Further references to code sections are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code, unless otherwise stated.
2 We recount only those facts and portions of the procedural
history that are pertinent to the issues before us. Extensive
discussions of the factual and procedural history, pre- and post-
disposition, can be found in the earlier decisions In re Samuel A.
(2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1; In re Samuel A. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th
67; and In re Samuel A. (Nov. 14, 2022, B316997, B317751, and
B318877 [nonpub. opn.]); see also In re Samuel A. (Dec. 6, 2021,
B312480 [nonpub. opn.]) and In re Samuel A. (Dec. 6, 2021,
B310032 [nonpub. opn.]).
2
and Family Services (DCFS) on January 16, 2019, when Samuel
was approximately two and a half years old. The case spans over
five years of proceedings, during which time Patricia had at least
10 different attorneys and filed 13 appeals or petitions for writ
relief, not including the three appeals before us now.
On March 20, 2019, the juvenile court took jurisdiction over
Samuel pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1), finding
Patricia’s unresolved history of alcohol abuse left her unable to
care for Samuel; Patricia suffered from untreated mental health
issues, including anxiety and depression; Patricia self-medicated
with alcohol to alleviate her suffering; and Patricia’s alcohol
abuse and untreated mental health issues placed Samuel at
substantial risk of serious physical harm. (In re Samuel A.
(Nov. 14, 2022, B316997, B317751, and B318877 [nonpub. opn.].)
The court declared Samuel a dependent child of the court
and removed him from Patricia’s custody, finding by clear and
convincing evidence there would be substantial danger to
Samuel’s physical health and safety if he were returned to
Patricia. The court placed Samuel in the care and custody of
DCFS and ordered family reunification services for Patricia.3
Reunification efforts were not successful.
After several years of proceedings before the juvenile court
and this court, the juvenile court terminated Patricia’s
reunification services on February 23, 2022, following a contested
hearing. The court set the matter for a hearing pursuant to
3 Samuel’s father was never identified in these proceedings;
Patricia contends Samuel was conceived using an anonymous
sperm donor.
3
section 366.26 to select and implement a permanent plan for
Samuel.4
On September 16, 2022, the court granted a three-year
restraining order against Patricia protecting Samuel and his
foster parents.
On June 6, 2023, the court summarily denied Patricia’s
section 388 petition seeking to reinstate reunification services
and visitation with Samuel.
On August 16, 2023, the juvenile court terminated
Patricia’s parental rights and set adoption as the permanent plan
for Samuel following a contested section 366.26 hearing.
Patricia timely appealed all three orders.
This court granted Patricia’s motion to represent herself in
all three appeals. She filed her opening brief in B331365 in
propria persona, but her previously appointed counsel filed
opening briefs on her behalf in B321528 and B323792, before
Patricia sought to represent herself. Patricia did not avail herself
of the permission we gave her to file supplemental opening briefs
in the latter two cases, but she filed reply briefs in propria
persona in all three appeals.
We denied DCFS’s request to consolidate the three separate
appeals but ordered they could be considered concurrently for the
purposes of oral argument and decision.
4 On November 14, 2022, we denied Patricia’s petition for
extraordinary writ relief from the juvenile court’s order
terminating her reunification services, setting a selection and
implementation hearing, and denying her visitation. (In re
Samuel A., supra, B316997, B317751, and B318877.)
4
DISCUSSION5
1. Restraining Order
Patricia contends the juvenile court granted a restraining
order that was not narrowly tailored and infringes her First
Amendment rights in its prohibition on social media postings
regarding Samuel and his foster parents.
A. Procedural history
On June 23, 2022, DCFS filed a request for restraining
order on behalf of Samuel and his foster parents. In addition to
500-yard stay away and no contact orders and an anti-
5 We decline to address Patricia’s forfeited arguments that
(1) are not presented under a separate heading in her opening
briefs; (2) are not supported by legal authority as well as
appropriate citations to the record; or (3) are raised for the first
time in her reply briefs. (Barber Group, Inc. v. New Motor
Vehicle Bd. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1036, fn. 4 [issues
discussed but not identified by a separate heading are forfeited;
arguments raised for the first time in reply are generally
forfeited]; Nielsen v. Gibson (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 318, 324
[“[A]n appellant must not only present an analysis of the facts
and legal authority on each point made, but must also support
arguments with appropriate citations to the material facts in the
record. If he fails to do so, the argument is forfeited.”].) Patricia
filed reply briefs in B321528 and B323792 that purport to correct
alleged factual and procedural inaccuracies in the opening briefs
filed by her court-appointed appellate counsel in those appeals.
However, we may not consider those purported corrections
because (1) new issues may not be raised on reply and (2) Patricia
failed to provide citations to the record to support her alleged
corrections. As noted, Patricia did not file supplemental opening
briefs in B321528 and B323792.
5
harassment order, DCFS requested the juvenile court order
Patricia not to “post or cause to be posted any postings, messages,
comments, photographs, videos, or other information pertaining
to the foster parents, or either of them, and to the child on any
social media account.”
The request alleged that Patricia “has accused the foster
father of child stealing and trafficking as well as child abuse on
her social media page, and has included a link to the foster
father’s LinkedIn account . . . . Such reckless accusations cause
the foster parents serious damage and loss of reputation in their
personal and business communities, and impact their ability to
peacefully care for the child, potentially jeopardizing the
placement of the child in their home, much to the child’s
detriment.” The request further alleged Patricia “has refused to
take down social media postings depicting the child in violation of
the court’s orders of December 17, 2021. . . . Such failure on the
part of Patricia [] constitutes a violation of the child’s right to
privacy and right to confidentiality of these dependency
proceedings, and has the potential for divulging private
information to the public much to the child’s humiliation and
further detriment.”
With the request, DCFS submitted copies of social media
postings by Patricia. These included a May 25, 2022 post by
Patricia in a Facebook group titled “Pasadena Moms,” in which
Patricia shared the LinkedIn page of the foster father, identifying
him by name. Patricia’s post stated, “This licensed California
attorney is involved in child trafficking and abuse. He signed up
with what they name a FAA agency to steal children from happy
and healthy families! We won our appeals and we have the
media rights! Please get in touch with me for more information.”
6
DCFS also submitted a minute order from December 17, 2021,
ordering Patricia to remove all postings regarding Samuel and
the foster parents and demonstrate proof of such removal to the
DCFS caseworker.
DCFS also attached a JV-290 “Caregiver Information
Form” completed by the foster mother, stating the foster mother
discovered Patricia’s May 25, 2022 post on June 8, 2022, when
she logged in to the “Pasadena Moms” Facebook page, a private
group for people in their local community. The foster mother
stated she was “concerned these posts will be seen by someone in
Sam’s life, whether that is the parent of another student in his
class, teachers, or school administrators. We are also concerned
that this could pose a safety risk to Sam and all of us when we
are out in public, in the community. Sam’s photos are also
displayed in numerous posts. Further, our names, location, and
all other identifying information was supposed to be redacted and
remain confidential throughout this case. Despite those
protections . . . [Patricia] has clearly been able to identify and
locate us.” The foster mother also attached an article posted by
Patricia on medium.com that included a YouTube link with a
video of a visit between Patricia and Samuel, showing Samuel’s
face. The article also included a photograph capturing a portion
of Samuel’s genital area. The article included inflammatory
accusations about attorneys, social workers, and others involved
in Samuel’s dependency case.
Samuel’s counsel joined the request for a restraining order.
His counsel contended that despite repeated admonishments by
the court, Patricia had “disclosed underlying information about
Samuel’s dependency status, his likeness, pictures of intimate
areas of his body, names of various professionals working with
7
Samuel, as well as unrelated (and incendiary) information about
judicial staff and personnel.” Counsel further contended Patricia
had violated multiple court orders prohibiting her from disclosing
information that was confidential under section 827, which
protects the juvenile case file and related information from
disclosure to the public. Samuel’s counsel included a link to a
TikTok video available on the internet that purportedly showed a
“sobbing Samuel, visibly uncomfortable with being video-taped
while being repeatedly prompted to give the mother a kiss, tell
her that he loves her and misses her.”
Patricia submitted a response to the DCFS request,
acknowledging portions of her postings violated section 827 by
disclosing confidential case information, but arguing she had
taken the offending posts down and for some time refrained from
posting similar offending content on her social media. Further,
she argued the requested order was unconstitutionally overbroad
and violated her First Amendment rights. Patricia argued she
had a right to air general grievances about DCFS and the
dependency system. She suggested that if the court were to issue
a restraining order, it should be narrowly tailored to order only
that she not disclose on social media the names of the foster
parents or any case information protected by section 827.
On July 28, 2022, the court granted the temporary
restraining order protecting Samuel and the foster parents and
set the hearing on the issuance of a permanent restraining order.
DCFS submitted additional exhibits in support of the
restraining order request, including an October 2, 2019 DCFS
report documenting that Patricia had made threats against
Samuel’s former foster father while in an agitated state, stating,
“I just want to murder him; I just want to murder him; I want
8
him dead.” The report also stated Patricia had located this
former foster father’s home address and accosted him there while
Samuel was present. Due to growing safety concerns, Samuel
was moved on an emergency basis to “respite care” and then
ultimately placed with different foster parents. The report
indicated that DCFS was “requesting that ALL information
remain confidential so mother cannot find the minor or the
current caregiver. All three moves for the child have been
sudden and due to safety concerns from mother finding the foster
home,” despite safety precautions in place to prevent Patricia
from locating the caregivers.
DCFS also requested the court take judicial notice of its
October 3, 2019 restraining order naming Patricia as the
restrained party and protecting the former foster father and the
supervising social worker. That restraining order included the
special order that Patricia “not disseminate or publish in any
form, including but not limited to social media, any personal
information, including but not limited to home addresses or
photographs, of protected persons.”
DCFS also submitted its report from January 12, 2022,
stating that in August 2021, the new caregivers received an email
from Patricia informing them that “she had started a Kickstarter,
YouTube and Change.org petition in Sam’s name. Shortly after
receiving that email, the caregiver’s social media was hacked and
the account was taken off the private setting. There were then
23 comments on the caregiver’s account and on some of
caregiver’s friend’s accounts. These comments are believed to be
from [Patricia] based on the fact that it appeared under her
Instagram account with her photo appearing as the icon. The
comments stated, ‘They are wanting to steal my son.’ ‘My son is
9
held by these people in a fraudulent case.’ Links to her YouTube
page named Sam’s voice, GoFundMe and Change.org were
attached to each comment.” In addition, DCFS reported Patricia
“has pictures of Samuel on her social media accounts, which is in
violation of his right to privacy and confidentiality. [Patricia]
has posted videos on YouTube where she mentions the caregiver’s
names and stated that she hired private detectives and has
people approach the caregivers on the streets.”
In the same report, DCFS updated the court on its efforts
to follow up with Patricia regarding the court’s December 17,
2021 order that she take down all offending internet posts. The
caseworker emailed Patricia on January 25, 2022, as follows:
“[T]he court ordered you to demonstrate that all postings in the
internet be removed and show such removal to the [caseworker].
[¶] Please let me know what you have done to comply with the
court’s orders.” In response, Patricia emailed, in pertinent part:
“The appellate court granted me media rights over my appeals
that I won. If the court wants specific posts removed, the court
needs to give us the specific web links and I have this reviewed
by our lawyers.” DCFS reported that a subsequent search by a
caseworker revealed that Patricia’s posts referencing Samuel’s
dependency case and including his photo were still available
online.
On September 16, 2022, the hearing on the permanent
restraining order went forward. Patricia’s counsel indicated
Patricia did not object to a “narrowly tailored” restraining order,
including an order that she not engage in postings or comments
about the foster parents and not violate the confidentiality
requirements of section 827.
10
After admitting all the evidence submitted by the parties
and taking judicial notice of the October 3, 2019 restraining order
protecting the former foster father, the court issued a three-year
restraining order under section 213.5, naming Samuel and the
current foster parents as protected persons and listing Patricia as
the restrained party.6
In its ruling from the bench, the court ordered Patricia to
stay 500 yards away from the protected persons and to not
attempt to find out where they lived. Patricia was prohibited
from having any contact with the protected parties, direct or
indirect, and was ordered not to harm, annoy, or molest them in
any fashion, including by making unsubstantiated claims about
them or harassing them on any kind of media, social media, or
anywhere else. The court ordered Patricia could not post or
disclose any confidential information about Samuel or the foster
parents. The court stated Patricia retained the right to voice her
opinion and complaints about DCFS and about how DCFS had
treated her and her case, so long as “it is not threatening [to
anyone] or in violation of any law.” The court ordered Patricia
not to publicize Samuel’s likeness on social media or any other
media.
The JV-255 “Restraining Order – Juvenile” that was filed
on September 16, 2022, and that will expire on September 16,
2025, repeated the language in the temporary restraining order
that Patricia was ordered not to “post or cause to be posted any
postings, messages, comments, photographs, videos, or other
information pertaining to the foster parents, or either of them,
6 We denied Patricia’s petition for writ of mandate seeking
relief from the order granting the restraining order.
11
and to the child on any social media account.” The minute order
additionally reflected the court’s order that Patricia “take down
all photographs of the child posted on social media, specifically
the photograph showing the child’s genitalia.”
B. Applicable law
Section 827 prohibits dissemination of the juvenile case file
and any information relating to its contents to anyone who is not
specifically authorized to receive such confidential information.
(§ 827, subd. (a)(4) [“A juvenile case file, any portion thereof, and
information relating to the content of the juvenile case file, may
not be disseminated . . . to a person or agency [not] authorized to
receive documents pursuant to this section.”]; see Super. Ct. L.A.
County, Local Rules, rule 7.2(a)(4) [“A person or entity entitled to
inspect and copy a juvenile case file may disseminate a document
or information from that file only . . . to other persons or entities
that are also entitled to inspect and copy the file”]; In re B.F.
(2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 811, 818; In re Tiffany G. (1994)
29 Cal.App.4th 443, 450-451 (Tiffany G.).) The confidentiality
provisions of section 827 are “intended to protect the privacy
rights of the child” who is the subject of dependency proceedings.
(§ 300.2.) Permitting a parent to disseminate confidential
information about a minor’s dependency proceedings violates the
minor’s constitutionally protected privacy rights under Article I,
section 1 of the California Constitution, and a juvenile court may
properly order a parent not to do so. (Tiffany G., at p. 451.) An
intentional violation of the confidentiality provisions of section
827 is a misdemeanor offense. (§ 827, subd. (b)(2)(C).)
Restraining orders issued pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 213.5 serve important governmental
purposes of protecting privacy rights in addition to preventing
12
violence and harassment. (See In re Brittany K. (2005)
127 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1512; cf. Brekke v. Wills (2005)
125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1412 [purpose of civil harassment orders
under Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6 is “to protect the [protected
person]’s right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy as
guaranteed by the California Constitution”].) “Under section
213.5, . . . a juvenile court has the authority to issue a restraining
order lasting up to three years that protects a dependent ‘child,’
‘any other child in the household,’ as well as ‘any parent, legal
guardian, or current caretaker of the child’ from harassment by a
parent. (§ 213.5, subds. (a) & (d); Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.630(a).) A court may issue such an order if it finds that the
person to be restrained has ‘ “disturbed the peace” ’—that is,
engaged in conduct that destroys a person’s mental or emotional
calm—of the person to be protected. [Citation.] Neither
‘evidence’ of prior physical abuse nor ‘a reasonable apprehension
of future physical abuse’ is required.” (In re Lilianna C. (2024)
99 Cal.App.5th 638, 643-44; see, e.g., Brittany K., at p. 1512
[“[p]articularly when considered in the larger context of [a
parent’s] relentless and unceasing attempts to remove the minors
from their caregivers’ home,” juvenile court properly issued
restraining order protecting dependent minor and caregivers
where parent “surreptitiously searched out and located the
confidential location of the foster residence, in violation of their
intended privacy” and “proceeded to make defamatory
accusations about the foster parents to school authorities and
attempted to make unauthorized contact with the minors”;
parent’s conduct “unquestionably interfered with caregivers’
attempts to stabilize and nurture their relationship with the goal
of permanency and adoption”].)
13
In reviewing the issuance of a restraining order under
section 213.5, “ ‘we view the evidence in a light most favorable to
the respondent, and indulge all legitimate and reasonable
inferences to uphold the juvenile court’s determination. If there
is substantial evidence supporting the order, the court’s issuance
of the restraining order may not be disturbed.’ ” (In re Bruno M.
(2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 990, 996-97.) “We engage in a further
analysis when a restraining order is alleged to infringe on
constitutional rights of expression.” (Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016)
5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1226 (Parisi), overruled on another ground
by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989.) We review de
novo whether a restraining order is overbroad or vague and thus
unconstitutional. (Parisi, at p. 1226; Harris v. Stampolis (2016)
248 Cal.App.4th 484, 497.)
“ ‘ “[P]rior restraints on speech and publication are the
most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First
Amendment rights.” [Citation.] “The term prior restraint is used
‘to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain
communications when issued in advance of the time that such
communications are to occur.’ [Citation.] . . . [P]ermanent
injunctions—i.e., court orders that actually forbid speech
activities—are classic examples of prior restraints.” [Citation.]
. . . “The special vice of a prior restraint is that communication
will be suppressed, either directly or by inducing excessive
caution in the speaker, before an adequate determination that it
is unprotected by the First Amendment.” ’ ” (Parisi, supra,
5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1230; accord, DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. v.
Bunner (2003) 31 Cal.4th 864, 886.) A restraining order
prohibiting an individual from posting on social media may
constitute an invalid prior restraint, depending on the
14
circumstances. (See Molinaro v. Molinaro (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th
824, 833.)
However, “ ‘an injunctive order prohibiting the repetition of
expression that ha[s] been judicially determined to be unlawful
[does] not constitute a prohibited prior restraint of speech’ ” and
does not offend the First Amendment. (Parisi, supra,
5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1230, italics added; accord, Balboa Island
Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1141, 1153.) A
juvenile court order that a parent not disseminate information
deemed confidential under section 827 is thus not an invalid prior
restraint. (Tiffany G., supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 451.)
Even if an injunction does not constitute an impermissible
prior restraint, “a court must tread lightly and carefully when
issuing an order that prohibits speech. . . . ‘An order issued in
the area of First Amendment rights must be couched in the
narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective
permitted by constitutional mandate and the essential needs of
the public order. In this sensitive field, the State may not employ
“means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when
the end can be more narrowly achieved.” [Citation.] In other
words, the order must be tailored as precisely as possible to the
exact needs of the case.’ ” (Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc., supra,
40 Cal.4th at p. 1159; see People ex rel. Reisig v. Acuna (2017)
9 Cal.App.5th 1, 22 [injunction may not burden constitutional
rights more than necessary to serve the significant governmental
interest at stake]; R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181, 192
[restraining order’s “incidental infringement” of speech “can be
justified only to the extent that it is no broader or more
restrictive than is necessary” to prevent harassment].)
15
C. The restraining order’s social media
prohibition is overbroad
Patricia does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the permanent restraining order. Rather, she
contends the restraining order constituted a “prior restraint” on
her speech and was “not narrowly tailored to merely address
confidential records or information from the dependency case, or
legitimate privacy concerns of the protected persons.” At issue is
the order prohibiting Patricia from “post[ing] or caus[ing] to be
posted any postings, messages, comments, photographs, videos,
or other information pertaining to the foster parents, or either of
them, and to the child on any social media account.” Patricia
contends this order is overbroad, and that the court may not
restrain her from “airing grievances” against the dependency
system. Counsel for DCFS responds that the restraining order
needed to be broadly phrased because, “[a]bsent an absolute strict
order, [Patricia] cannot be trusted that she will self-regulate and
exercise restraint in her postings.” Counsel for DCFS also
asserts that the restraining order does not prevent Patricia from
exercising her First Amendment rights and “airing grievances” as
to DCFS and Patricia’s experiences so long as she does not
address Samuel and his foster parents.
A restraining order that prohibits posting confidential
juvenile case information protected by section 827 is not an
invalid prior restraint, because there has already been a
determination by the Legislature (and again specifically by the
court here in prior orders) that such information may not be
disclosed. (See Tiffany G., supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 452.)
However, we examine whether the restraining order is overbroad
16
in that it encompasses speech that would not be prohibited by
section 827 or otherwise should not properly be enjoined.
With respect to information regarding the foster parents,
Patricia argues “the only social media content that was properly
subject to restriction was the disclosure of the full names of the
foster parents.” However, any reference by Patricia to Samuel’s
foster parents, even without using their full names, would impart
information related to Samuel’s confidential juvenile case file.
That is because Patricia has no relationship with the foster
parents except by virtue of the fact that DCFS placed Samuel
with them and the juvenile court designated them as Samuel’s
prospective adoptive parents. Any social media post or message
by Patricia about them would necessarily fall within the ambit of
confidential juvenile case information protected from disclosure
by section 827, subdivision (a)(4). Patricia does not have a
legitimate interest in publishing information or opinions about
the foster parents that would outweigh the foster parents’ privacy
interests. Given Patricia’s lengthy history of problematic
behavior with respect to both the former and current foster
parents (finding where they lived and coming to their homes,
threatening them, hacking into their social media, and posting
defamatory social media posts and messages about them related
to Samuel’s case), we agree with DCFS a bright-line rule is
appropriate as to the foster parents. (See People v. Borrelli
(2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 703, 716 [the right to free speech “does not
include the right to repeatedly invade another person’s
constitutional rights of privacy and the pursuit of happiness
through the use of acts and threats that evidence a pattern of
harassment”].) Thus, the order is not overbroad in prohibiting
17
any mention on social media of Samuel’s foster parents, even in
generic terms and without using their names.
With respect to Samuel, however, we agree with Patricia
that the social media restriction is problematic as worded, in that
it prohibits any mention of Samuel, even if only by reference to
her “son” or “child.” Unlike her relationship with or knowledge of
the foster parents, Patricia’s relationship with Samuel obviously
was not created by virtue of the dependency proceedings.
Patricia should be able to post her feelings about, experiences
with, and memories of her “son” or “child,” so long as she does not
divulge information protected under section 827 or otherwise run
afoul of the law, even now that her parental rights have been
terminated. The prohibition on posting anything about Samuel
on social media is thus overbroad. (See Molinaro v. Molinaro,
supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 833 [while family court could lawfully
order husband not to disparage his ex-wife in the children’s
presence, restraining order that prohibited husband from posting
any information about his divorce case on Facebook was
overbroad].)
The juvenile court’s oral findings suggest it intended only
to prevent Patricia from posting photographs, videos, location
information, specific identifying information, or confidential
dependency case information pertaining to Samuel on social
media. That was a narrower prohibition than the language that
was copied from the temporary restraining order and repeated on
the permanent restraining order. Thus, the restraining order
should be modified to prohibit Patricia from posting on social
media any likenesses of Samuel (either photographs or videos), or
any references to Samuel’s full name, location, school, or specific
18
identifying information, as well as any information related to the
confidential juvenile case file involving Samuel.
We reiterate, as did the juvenile court, that Patricia
remains free to air her grievances about DCFS and her
experiences with the dependency system, so long as she respects
the prohibitions in the restraining order, refrains from
disseminating any information relating to Samuel’s dependency
case file, and abides by all other laws, including protections
against harassment.
2. Due Process at Hearing Regarding Termination of
Patricia’s Parental Rights
Patricia asserts her due process rights were violated at the
section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing in three
ways: (1) the court did not permit her to introduce an audio
recording Patricia made of the visit with Samuel that was
observed by experts conducting bonding studies for purposes of
determining whether the parental-benefit exception to adoption
applied; (2) Patricia was not permitted to testify at the hearing;
and (3) Patricia’s attorney did not subpoena witnesses and
present evidence that Patricia believed was important.7
7 Although Patricia contends in passing that both her
substantive and procedural due process rights were violated, the
crux of her argument is that she was precluded from testifying,
subpoenaing witnesses, and presenting evidence at the section
366.26 hearing. Thus, her contentions allege violations of her
right to procedural, not substantive, due process. Patricia does
not challenge whether substantial evidence supported the
juvenile court’s determination that she did not demonstrate the
parental-benefit exception applied. Accordingly, we do not
19
A. Procedural history
The section 366.26 hearing to consider the permanent plan
for Samuel was held on August 15 and 16, 2023. DCFS and
minor’s counsel recommended the court terminate Patricia’s
parental rights and place Samuel for adoption with his foster
parents, with whom Samuel had resided since September 30,
2019.
Prior to the hearing, Patricia requested a bonding study to
have neutral experts examine the nature of the bond between
Patricia and Samuel and opine whether it would be detrimental
to Samuel to terminate the parent-child relationship. Patricia’s
counsel requested Dr. Ronald Banks be appointed as an expert
evaluator, and DCFS and Samuel’s counsel recommended Ms.
Nataly Valenzuela-Meza. The court ultimately appointed both
experts, who observed Patricia and Samuel interact on June 12,
2023, at the DCFS offices. Ms. Valenzuela-Meza authored a
report opining that termination of the parent-child relationship
between Patricia and Samuel would not be detriment to Samuel.
Dr. Banks opined in his report that Patricia “appeared to have a
poor bond with Samuel” and opined that “the harm of losing the
relationship with his biological mother would be minimal, at best,
and short lived.” DCFS submitted the two reports as exhibits for
the section 366.26 hearing, among other documents.
Patricia requested two documents be admitted into
evidence: (1) her trial brief and (2) an audio recording of her
June 12, 2023 visit with Samuel conducted for purposes of the
undertake to catalogue the evidence considered by the court in
deciding that issue.
20
bonding study. The court admitted the trial brief and its exhibits
and excluded the audio recording, as discussed below.
After conducting the section 366.26 hearing, the court
concluded Patricia had not maintained consistent visitation with
Samuel, and that Samuel would not suffer detriment if the
parent-child relationship was severed. Thus, the court concluded
the parental-benefit exception did not apply. The court
terminated Patricia’s parental rights and declared the foster
parents the prospective adoptive parents.
B. Applicable law
“[T]he goal at the section 366.26 hearing is ‘specifically . . .
to select and implement a permanent plan for the child.’ ” (In re
Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630 (Caden C.).) The court must
first determine whether the child is likely to be adopted. (Ibid.)
If so, and if a parent’s reunification services have previously been
terminated, “the court shall terminate parental rights to allow for
adoption.” (Ibid.) “But if the parent shows that termination
would be detrimental to the child for at least one specifically
enumerated reason, the court should decline to terminate
parental rights and select another permanent plan. (See
§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)–(vi), (4)(A).)” (Caden C., at pp. 630-
631.) One such circumstance is the so-called parental-benefit
exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Patricia sought to prove
this exception to adoption applied.8
“[T]he parent asserting the parental benefit exception must
show, by a preponderance of the evidence, three things. The
parent must show regular visitation and contact with the child,
taking into account the extent of visitation permitted. Moreover,
8 Patricia did not contest whether Samuel was adoptable.
21
the parent must show that the child has a substantial, positive,
emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment
implying that the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship. And the parent must show that terminating that
attachment would be detrimental to the child even when
balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive
home. When the parent has met that burden, the parental-
benefit exception applies such that it would not be in the best
interest of the child to terminate parental rights, and the court
should select a permanent plan other than adoption. (See
§ 366.26, subd. (c)(4)(A).)” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 636-637.)
A parent has due process rights at the section 366.26
hearing. (In re J.S. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1071, 1081; In re Carl
R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1068.) “Due process during a
dependency hearing generally requires that parents be given the
right to present evidence, to cross-examine adversarial witnesses,
and for counsel to be provided the opportunity to argue the
merits of an issue.” (In re L.J. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 741, 753-
754 (L.J.).) However, a parent only has the right to present
“ ‘relevant evidence of significant probative value to the issue
before the court.’ ” (Ibid.; accord, In re J.S., at p. 1081.)
“Section 706 provides the court shall receive in evidence the
social study of the children and such other relevant and material
evidence as may be offered. ‘[T]he provisions of Evidence Code
section 352 (allowing the court to limit relevant evidence if it is
cumulative, time wasting, or likely to confuse the issues) are
necessarily implied in . . . section 706.’ [Citation.] ‘Trial courts
are afforded discretion to work within existing guidelines to
22
determine the admissibility of evidence.’ ” (L.J., supra,
89 Cal.App.5th at p. 751.)
“ ‘Ordinarily, parties have the right to testify in their own
behalf [citation], and a party’s opportunity to . . . proffer
admissible evidence is central to having his or her day in court.’ ”
(Guardianship of A.H. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 155, 159 (A.H.),
quoting Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1357
(Elkins).) “At the same time, however, ‘ “[i]t is . . . well
established that courts have . . . inherent power to control
litigation before them. [Citation.] . . . ‘. . . That inherent power
entitles trial courts to exercise reasonable control over all
proceedings connected with pending litigation . . . in order to
insure the orderly administration of justice. [Citation.]’ ”
[Citation.]’ (Elkins, [ ] at p. 1351.) ‘The state’s strong interest in
prompt and efficient trials permits the nonarbitrary exclusion of
evidence.’ ” (A.H., at p. 159; see Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967 [“Courts have inherent power to
control litigation before them.”].) In dependency cases, courts are
additionally charged with “control[ling] all proceedings during
the hearings with a view to the expeditious and effective
ascertainment of the jurisdictional facts and the ascertainment of
all information relative to the present condition and future
welfare of the person upon whose behalf the petition is brought.”
(§ 350, subd. (a)(1).)
Evidence Code section 766 provides, “A witness must give
responsive answers to questions, and answers that are not
responsive shall be stricken on motion of any party.” Courts may
strike unresponsive and inadmissible answers on their own
motion, as the responsibility of conducting the trial “regularly
and expeditiously” rests on the judge. (People v. Dad (1921)
23
51 Cal.App. 182, 185-186; see People v. Viray (2005)
134 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1208 [“The court may of course exclude
evidence on its own motion, but it will ordinarily do so only if it
finds the evidence wasteful of judicial resources because, e.g., it is
redundant or irrelevant.”].)
“The trial court can exclude evidence—even when its
purpose is to promote the interest in prompt and efficient trials—
only if the exclusion is not arbitrary.” (A.H., supra,
83 Cal.App.5th at p. 160; see People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th
243, 293 [although court has broad discretion to control the
conduct of trial, “discretion must be exercised impartially in order
to protect . . . constitutional rights to due process and to a fair
trial”].) We review for abuse of discretion both a court’s decision
to exclude evidence and its exercise of its authority to control
proceedings. (L.J., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 751; People ex rel.
Reisig v. Acuna, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at pp. 23-24.) The
nonarbitrary exercise of discretion to exclude evidence does not
infringe a parent’s due process rights. (See In re Jordan R.
(2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 111, 133 [ordinary rules of evidence do
not impermissibly infringe on parents’ rights to present their
case, and due process does not require the admission of all
evidence which may tend to support parents’ positions]; People v.
Garcia (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 961, 969 [“Although a defendant
has a ‘ “general [constitutional] right” ’ to offer a defense through
the testimony of his or her witnesses, a state court’s exclusion of
defense evidence under ordinary rules of evidence—including
Evidence Code section 352—generally does not infringe upon this
right.”].) Thus, if we find the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion under the ordinary rules of evidence in excluding
24
evidence, we necessarily find no due process violation as a result
of that exclusion.
C. Patricia’s due process rights were not violated
1) The court did not err in excluding the audio
recording
Patricia contends she was denied her due process right to
introduce into evidence the audio recording of the visit between
Patricia and Samuel that took place at the DCFS offices on
June 12, 2023. Dr. Banks and Ms. Valenzuela-Meza had
observed this visit, and they both relied on their observations to
form their opinions that Samuel would not be detrimentally
affected if Patricia’s parental rights were terminated. Patricia
had audio-recorded the session using her cellphone, and wanted
the recording admitted into evidence at the section 366.26
hearing because she believed it would contradict the experts’
conclusions.
When Patricia sought to admit the audio recording, DCFS
objected and proffered evidence that Patricia made the partial
recording of the confidential proceeding surreptitiously, without
the permission of the other participants. DCFS submitted a
photo of the reception window where visitors must sign in,
showing a sign posted with large, bold words stating, “NO
FILMING, VIDEOGRAPHY, PHOTOGRAPHY, OR
RECORDING.” Underneath, the sign states, “No filming,
videography, photography, or recording (including audio . . .) . . .
is permitted anywhere on the premises, including in the lobby.”
The juvenile court concluded that Patricia secretly recorded
the visit without the permission of the court-appointed evaluators
or Samuel (by his counsel or by his foster parents whom the court
25
had designated as Samuel’s de facto parents). Based on the
evidence submitted by DCFS that everyone who entered the
DCFS building “clearly knew there were to be no types of
recording,” the court determined that both the evaluators and
Samuel had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Thus, pursuant
to Penal Code section 632, the court found the recording was
inadmissible in the juvenile court proceedings, including for
impeachment purposes.9
Our colleagues in the Third Appellate District recently
addressed a virtually identical issue in L.J., supra,
89 Cal.App.5th 741. In that case, the mother of the dependent
minor at issue contended the juvenile court “violated her
constitutional right to due process by excluding the audio/video
recording she made of herself” visiting with the minor. (Id. at
p. 751.) The mother claimed the exclusion of this evidence
prevented her from meeting her burden to show the parental-
benefit exception applied. (Ibid.)
On appeal, the court in L.J. noted that “Penal Code section
632 expressly forbids the recording of confidential
communications without the consent of all parties and makes
such recordings inadmissible ‘in any judicial, administrative, or
other proceeding.’ For the purposes of Penal Code section 632, a
confidential communication ‘means any communication carried
on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that any party to
the communication desires it to be confined to the parties thereto,
9 Penal Code section 632 prohibits recording confidential
communications and bars the admission of such unlawful
recordings in judicial proceedings. (Pen. Code, § 632, partially
abrogated as to criminal proceedings, as stated in People v.
Guzman (2019) 8 Cal.5th 673, 679-684.)
26
but excludes a communication made in a public gathering or in
any legislative, judicial, executive, or administrative proceeding
open to the public, or in any other circumstance in which the
parties to the communication may reasonably expect that the
communication may be overheard or recorded.’ ” (L.J., supra,
89 Cal.App.5th at p. 752; see Pen. Code, § 632.)
The court held that the minor’s counsel, not the parent, had
the authority to consent to a recording on behalf of the minor in
this setting, because in dependency proceedings, the minor’s
counsel serves as the minor’s guardian ad litem. (L.J., supra,
89 Cal.App.5th at p. 752.) Given there was a sign posted in the
lobby stating the visits were not to be recorded, and the visit was
held in a private visitation room, the court disagreed with the
mother’s assertion that there was no objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in the visit. (Id. at p. 753.) Thus, the court
concluded the visits “qualified as confidential communications
between mother and the minor” for purposes of Penal Code
section 632. (L.J., at p. 753.) The court determined the
recordings were properly excluded, and that the mother’s due
process rights were not violated by their exclusion. (Id. at
pp. 753-754.)
We likewise find no error or due process violation in
Patricia’s case based on the juvenile court’s decision to exclude
the audio recording of the bonding study visit. “ ‘A conversation
is confidential if a party to that conversation has an objectively
reasonable expectation that the conversation is not being
overheard or recorded.’ ” (Mezger v. Bick (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th
76, 89.) As in L.J., the evidence demonstrates that all visitors to
the DCFS offices were advised by a clear and conspicuous sign
that recording was prohibited. Thus, we cannot accept Patricia’s
27
unsupported contention that “there was no limitation to taking
photos or videos and also audio recordings” at the bonding study
visit, and that she was never told not to record. Neither Samuel’s
attorney (his guardian ad litem) nor his de facto parents
consented to the recording. Therefore, the juvenile court
correctly determined the recording by Patricia was unlawful
under Penal Code section 632, and properly excluded it from
evidence at the section 366.26 hearing.
2) The court did not err in limiting Patricia’s
testimony
Patricia also contends her due process rights were violated
when the court struck her answer to the first question asked of
her, and then did not allow any further testimony by her.
At the section 366.26 hearing that commenced on
August 15, 2023, Patricia appeared remotely. When the court
unmuted her to begin her testimony, Patricia immediately began
interrupting the court and directing disrespectful comments to
the court, including telling the court, “You’re not following your
own rules.” The court gave Patricia repeated warnings that her
testimony would not be permitted if she could not behave in a
respectful way, cease making rude comments, and simply answer
the questions asked by her attorney. The court several times
struck Patricia’s non-responsive answers to her counsel’s
question as to whether Patricia had maintained regular contact
with Samuel (to address the first prong of the parental-benefit
exception to adoption). After her answer was stricken the first
time, Patricia told the court, “That is crazy. You know, you’re
going to be in trouble for that, Judge.” When her attorney re-
asked about her contact with Samuel, Patricia answered as
follows:
28
“[Patricia]: I had my last visit June 12th during a bonding
study. And my visit before that, 17 months earlier, on December
22nd, 2021. It is not due to my fault that I was not allowed
visits. It’s entirely due to the fault of the attorneys on this case,
Pichvai [counsel for DCFS] who is a criminal, Ramey [counsel for
Samuel] who is criminal, and you [Patricia’s own counsel] are a
criminal, and the judge is a criminal because you keep doing this
over and over again where you’re child trafficking of children that
are healthy and normal to put them in the system, you know,
completely destroy them, completely try to destroy the parents,
and then actually give them away to people who are completely,
completely inadequate and abusive and neglectful of children.
That’s what I’m going to say, and it’s already out there. It’s
already out there in court. And you know what? I don’t really
care what anyone on this particular panel, if you want to call it
that, says because all they do is lie.”
The court struck her answer and, citing its “ability to
operate its court in a judicious fashion,” indicated it would not
permit Patricia to provide any further testimony. The court
explained, “I’m not not letting her testify. What I am not letting
her do is to go off on a tirade like she just did, calling everyone
including the court a criminal.” The court noted it had given
Patricia several warnings, but Patricia had refused to obey the
court’s directives. The court ruled that Patricia could submit a
declaration answering her counsel’s questions in lieu of live
testimony. At Patricia’s request, the court subsequently agreed
to admit into evidence a lengthy declaration that Patricia had
prepared to support a section 388 petition.
We find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s
decision to strike Patricia’s non-responsive answers during her
29
direct examination, and then to preclude further testimony after
Patricia escalated her insulting and disrespectful language and
called all the attorneys as well as the trial judge “criminals.”10
The record demonstrates that the juvenile court exercised
patience and restraint in dealing with Patricia at this hearing
and attempted to give her her day in court. But ensuring
Patricia received due process did not require the court to allow
her to berate the court or the attorneys and to waste the court’s
time with diatribes. (Cf. A.H., supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 162
[preventing party and sole witness from testifying as sanction for
failure to provide witness list was abuse of discretion, where
there was no “defiant or disrespectful behavior”].) The court had
the authority, and an obligation, to exercise its inherent power to
control the section 366.26 hearing in order to “insure the orderly
administration of justice.” (Elkins, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1351;
see § 350, subd. (a)(1).)
Further, the court allowed Patricia to submit a declaration
that could include all the testimony she wished to use to meet her
burden of proving the parental-benefit exception to adoption
applied. While “[o]rdinarily, written testimony is substantially
less valuable [than oral examination] for the purpose of
evaluating credibility” (Elkins, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1358), in
this instance the juvenile court made a reasonable decision to
allow Patricia to provide a declaration, given it had proven
10 The first part of Patricia’s answer, stating the dates of her
last two visits with Samuel, was responsive to her attorney’s
question and thus should not have been stricken along with the
non-responsive portions that followed. However, any error in
striking this testimony was harmless because the information
about Patricia’s visits had already been introduced into evidence.
30
impossible for Patricia to provide oral testimony in an orderly
and respectful fashion.
3) Patricia did not receive ineffective assistance of
counsel
Patricia contends her due process rights were violated
when she was not permitted to subpoena witnesses and propound
discovery requests. Because she takes issue with the judgment
calls made by her court-appointed lawyer, as opposed to any
decision of the juvenile court, as Patricia acknowledged during
her oral argument, her claim is more appropriately categorized as
a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.
Patricia contends her court-appointed attorney, Lakeshia
Adeniyi-Dorsey (Dorsey), refused to subpoena witnesses and
make discovery requests in preparation for the section 366.26
hearing. Patricia suggests she wished to subpoena DCFS
caseworkers Lee and Castellano, minor’s counsel’s investigator
Kovalsky (who attended Patricia’s last visit with Samuel on
December 21, 2021), and Samuel’s foster parents. She also
contends she wished to subpoena a 2021 report from Samuel’s
therapist but her attorney refused.
At the section 366.26 hearing, Dorsey told the court, “I have
to call the witnesses that I think are relevant to the issues before
the court today . . . that [Patricia] maintained regular contact
with Samuel to the extent permitted by this court; that Samuel
and her have a relationship that he would benefit from
continuing to keeping that relationship . . . and then I have to
prove that – by a preponderance of the evidence that termination
of the relationship would impose a detriment to Samuel.” Dorsey
stated to this end she ultimately decided to call three witnesses:
Patricia, Samuel, and Dr. Banks, one of the two bonding experts.
31
The court ruled that Patricia’s counsel could call Patricia and Dr.
Banks to testify.11 Ultimately, Dorsey did not call Dr. Banks to
testify.
“A parent in a dependency proceeding is entitled to
competent counsel and to judicial review of claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. (See § 317.5; In re Kristin H. (1996)
46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1660.) A parent seeking to establish
ineffective assistance of counsel must show both that counsel
failed to act in a manner to be expected of a reasonably
competent attorney practicing in the field of dependency law, and
that it is ‘ “reasonably probable that a result more favorable to
the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of
the error.” ’ ” (In re M.F. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 86, 108-109;
accord, In re A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 234, 251-252.) “ ‘Unless the
record affirmatively establishes counsel had no rational tactical
purpose for the challenged act or omission, we must affirm the
judgment.’ ” (In re N.S. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 816, 843; see In re
M.F., at pp. 108-109 [“When a parent seeks to assert ineffective
assistance of counsel on direct appeal (as opposed to by writ of
habeas corpus), appellate courts . . . limit their review to consider
only those claims ‘ “where ‘there simply could be no satisfactory
explanation’ for trial counsel’s action or inaction.” ’ ”].)
11 Samuel’s counsel and DCFS objected to Samuel being
called as a witness as to whether he wished to be adopted, and
the court determined Patricia could not call him, after weighing
the probative value of Samuel’s testimony against the likelihood
of retraumatizing him by requiring him to testify on this subject.
On appeal, Patricia does not contend the court violated her due
process rights in ordering she could not call Samuel as a witness.
32
Patricia cannot show that Dorsey had “no rational tactical
purpose” for not subpoenaing the witnesses Patricia wanted her
to call or not propounding discovery requested by Patricia.
Dorsey explained to the court that she determined that she would
call only those witnesses whose testimony was relevant to the
issues at the section 366.26 hearing—that is, whether Patricia
maintained regular contact with Samuel and whether it would be
detrimental to Samuel to no longer have a relationship with
Patricia. It is thus apparent that Dorsey made the judgment call
that the witnesses Patricia wished to call and the discovery
Patricia wished to request would not be relevant to or favorably
support Patricia’s attempt to meet the requirements of the
parental-benefit exception.
When a party is represented by professional counsel, “ ‘that
counsel is “captain of the ship” and can make all but a few
fundamental decisions for the [party].’ ” (People v. Welch (1999)
20 Cal.4th 701, 729.) The fact that Dorsey made tactical choices
with which Patricia vehemently disagreed does not demonstrate
that Dorsey’s representation fell below the standard of care of a
reasonably competent attorney practicing dependency law.
Patricia has not demonstrated that she received ineffective
assistance of counsel in connection with the section 366.26
hearing.
3. Denial of Patricia’s Section 388 Petition
On June 6, 2022, Patricia filed a request under section 388
to have the juvenile court reinstate reunification services and
visitation for Patricia, vacate the order setting the section 366.26
hearing, order Patricia’s trial counsel to be relieved (an order
repeatedly requested), and set a further six-month reunification
hearing date. Patricia alleged that circumstances had changed
33
that justified a change in orders, because the Court of Appeal had
issued an order to show cause and stayed the section 366.26
proceedings pending its decision on Patricia’s petition for
extraordinary writ challenging the juvenile court’s order setting
the section 366.26 hearing. Patricia noted our order specified
that the Court of Appeal’s stay “does not preclude the juvenile
court from ordering additional family reunification services in the
interim.” Patricia asserted it was in Samuel’s best interests to
reunify with her.
On June 8, 2022, the juvenile court denied Patricia’s
section 388 petition without a hearing, concluding (1) the request
did not state new evidence or a change of circumstances; (2) the
proposed change of order did not promote the best interest of the
child; and (3) the same matter was pending before the Court of
Appeal and thus the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to hear the
matter until the appeal was resolved.
On November 14, 2022, this court denied Patricia’s petition
for extraordinary writ relief. (In re Samuel A., supra, B316997,
B317751, and B318877.) In denying the petition, this court found
substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s decision
terminating reunification services and “effectively affirm[ed] the
juvenile court’s finding that further visitation would be
detrimental to Samuel.” (Id. at p. *8.) The section 366.26
hearing went forward in the juvenile court on August 16, 2023,
and Patricia’s parental rights were terminated.
Thus, the purported change of circumstances relied on by
Patricia as the basis for her June 6, 2022 section 388 petition—
namely, that this court had stayed the section 366.26 hearing
pending its decision on Patricia’s petition for extraordinary writ
challenging the juvenile court’s order setting the section 366.26
34
hearing—no longer exists. Subsequent events have made it
impossible for this court to afford Patricia effective relief on her
section 388 petition. (See In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276
[“A case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[ ] it impossible for
[a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant
him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ ”].) Accordingly, Patricia’s appeal
from the denial of her section 388 petition is dismissed as moot.
(See In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 58-59; In re E.T. (2013)
217 Cal.App.4th 426, 436.)
DISPOSITION
The order granting the restraining order is affirmed as
modified. Paragraph 10 of the restraining order filed on
September 16, 2022, is modified to state that Patricia may “not
post or cause to be posted any postings, messages, comments,
photographs, videos, or other information pertaining to the foster
parents, or either of them, on any social media account,” and “not
post or cause to be posted on social media any likenesses of
Samuel A. (either photographs or videos), or any references to
Samuel’s full name, location, school, or specific identifying
information, or any information related to the confidential
juvenile case file involving Samuel.” In all other respects, the
order granting the restraining order is affirmed. The juvenile
court is directed to enter the restraining order as modified.
///
///
35
The court’s order terminating Patricia’s parental rights is
affirmed. The appeal from the June 6, 2022 order denying
Patricia’s section 388 petition is dismissed as moot.
STONE, J.
We concur:
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
FEUER, J.
36
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