People v. Vera CA5

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Filed 8/6/24 P. v. Vera CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, F086383

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. VCF039282-97)

v.
MODIFICATION OF OPINION AND
WILLIAM VERA, DENIAL OF REHEARING
Defendant and Appellant. [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed on July 9, 2024, be modified as follows:

1. On page 6, at the end of the sentence that states: “We invited appellant to
submit additional briefing, and he filed a supplemental brief and letters raising several
issues,” add the following footnote No. 4:

In his letter brief on appeal, appellant cites numerous legislative
enactments and statutes, without analysis or discussion, that purportedly
support his appellate contentions. These provisions are not relevant to a
section 1172.6 petition for resentencing and are not cognizable in this
appeal from the trial court’s denial of that petition.

This modification does not effect a change in judgment.
The petition for rehearing is denied.

FRANSON, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

SMITH, J.

DE SANTOS, J.

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Filed 7/9/24 P. v. Vera CA5 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F086383
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. VCF039282-97)
v.

WILLIAM VERA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Melinda Myrle
Reed, Judge.
Jeffrey S. Kross, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Franson, Acting P. J., Smith, J. and DeSantos, J.
INTRODUCTION
In 1997, appellant and defendant William Vera (appellant) was convicted after a
jury trial of first degree murder and assault with great bodily injury and a deadly weapon,
with prior conviction allegations. The trial court granted his motion to reduce the
first degree murder conviction to second degree murder, and imposed the second strike
term of 12 years plus 30 years to life.
In 2023, the trial court denied appellant’s motion for resentencing of his
second degree murder conviction pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.6 for failing to
state a prima facie case. On appeal, appellate counsel filed a brief that summarized the
facts and procedural history with citations to the record, raised no issues, and asked this
court to independently review the record pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022)
14 Cal.5th 216 and People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Appellant filed a
supplemental brief. We have reviewed his contentions and affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 10, 1997, an information was filed in the Tulare County Superior Court
charging appellant with committing the following offenses on or about March 2, 1997:
count 1, murder of Abel Castro (§ 187, subd. (a)), with the special allegation that
appellant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon, a knife, in the commission of
the offense (§ 12022, subd. (b)); and counts 2 and 3, assault with great bodily injury and a
deadly weapon, a knife, on, respectively, AC and NC (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). It was further
alleged he had one prior strike conviction (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)) and one prior serious
felony conviction enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)).
On September 8, 1997, appellant’s jury trial began.

1 All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

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Instructions2
The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.10, that defined murder with
malice aforethought; CALJIC No. 8.11, that defined express and implied malice;
CALJIC No. 8.20, that defined willful, premeditated, and deliberate first degree murder;
and CALJIC No. 8.30, that unpremeditated murder was second degree murder.
The jury was instructed that second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and
involuntary manslaughter were lesser included offenses of first degree murder;
manslaughter based on sudden quarrel or heat of passion; and that the actual but
unreasonable belief in self-defense could reduce murder to manslaughter.
The jury was also instructed on the special allegation as to count 1, murder, that
appellant personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon, and that he must have
“intentionally displayed a weapon in a menacing manner … or intentionally struck or hit
a human being with it.”
The jury was instructed on the complete defenses of justifiable homicide,
self-defense, and defense of another.
The jury was not instructed on the felony-murder rule, aiding and abetting, the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, target or nontarget offenses, or any other
theories of imputed malice.
Verdict and Sentencing
On September 24, 1997, appellant was convicted of count 1, first degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)), and that he personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon (§ 12022,
subd. (b)); and count 2, assault with great bodily injury and a deadly weapon on AC. He
was found not guilty of count 3, assault on NC. After a bifurcated trial, the trial court
found the prior conviction allegations true.

2 The jury instructions from appellant’s trial are part of the instant record on appeal.

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On October 14, 1997, appellant filed a motion and argued there was insufficient
evidence of premeditation to support first degree murder, and moved for either a new trial
or modification of count 1 to second degree murder. The People filed opposition.
On October 22, 1997, the trial court denied appellant’s motion for new trial but
granted his motion to modify the verdict, and reduced his first degree murder conviction
to second degree murder.
On October 27, 1997, the trial court denied appellant’s motion to dismiss the prior
strike conviction. Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate determinate term of 12 years
plus 30 years to life as follows: as to count 2, the midterm of three years, doubled to
six years as the second strike term, plus five years for the prior serious felony
enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)); and as to count 1, a consecutive term of 15 years to life,
doubled to 30 years to life as the second strike term, plus one year for the deadly weapon
enhancement.
Direct Appeal
On January 19, 2000, this court filed the nonpublished opinion in appellant’s
direct appeal. (People v. Vera, Jan. 19, 2000, F029675.) We rejected appellant’s claims
of evidentiary and instructional errors, and prosecutorial misconduct. We agreed with the
parties that appellant’s prior strike allegation was based on a juvenile adjudication, and
remanded for retrial on that allegation and possible resentencing.
Remand and Resentencing
On October 13, 2000, the trial court held another bifurcated trial on the truth of the
prior strike conviction allegation, and found it was true.
On October 19, 2000, the trial court denied appellant’s motion to dismiss the
prior strike conviction, and reimposed the same second strike sentence of 12 years plus
30 years to life. On August 23, 2001, the court filed an amended abstract of judgment to
correct the calculation of appellant’s credits. The judgment was affirmed on appeal, and

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appellant’s petition for review was denied. (People v. Vera (Jan. 24, 2003, F037358)
[nonpub. opn.].)
PETITION FOR RESENTENCING
On November 7, 2022, appellant filed, in propria persona, a petition for
resentencing of his second degree murder conviction pursuant to Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) and other legislation. Appellant alleged he was not “personally
responsible” for the offenses, he received a “disproporti[o]nate sentence” because he had
“a [m]edical condition that was not properly handled,” and he was prosecuted under the
felony-murder rule. Appellant also asserted he was actually innocent, there were
numerous evidentiary errors at his jury trial, and he was subject to a vindictive and
retaliatory prosecution by the prosecutor and the judge.
On December 20, 2022, the trial court appointed the public defender to represent
appellant and set the matter for a hearing.3
The Prosecution’s Opposition
On April 3, 2023, the prosecution filed opposition and argued appellant was
ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law because the jury instructions showed he was
convicted based on his own intent to kill, and the jury was not instructed on the
felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
On April 5, 2023, the trial court granted the public defender’s motion to withdraw
because of a conflict, appointed conflict counsel to represent appellant, and continued the
matter.

3 Appellant previously filed three petitions for resentencing, in propria persona.
The trial court did not make any legal determinations or prima facie findings on the prior
petitions, but summarily denied them because appellant failed to comply with proof of
service requirements.

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The Trial Court’s Denial of the Petition
On April 13, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on appellant’s petition and the
parties submitted that matter. The court denied the petition for failing to state a prima
facie case, and found the jury was not instructed on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine and appellant was convicted as the actual perpetrator.
On June 2, 2023, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
As explained above, appellate counsel filed a brief with this court pursuant to
Delgadillo and Wende. The brief also included counsel’s declaration that appellant was
advised he could file his own brief with this court. We invited appellant to submit
additional briefing, and he filed a supplemental brief and letters raising several issues.
I. Trial, Evidentiary and Sentencing Issues
In his supplemental brief, appellant raises numerous evidentiary and procedural
allegations about his jury trial, conviction, and sentence; that there was no evidence to
show he was the actual killer or that he handled the weapon; his fingerprints were not on
the weapon; witnesses gave inconsistent, inaccurate, and false testimony; appellant was
not allowed to testify at trial; alibi evidence was not considered; physical evidence was
introduced that was the result of fraud and deceit; the prior strike conviction should have
been dismissed; his plea in the underlying prior conviction was the result of duress; and
various attorneys were “bribed” by Tulare County.
Appellant’s allegations arising from his trial, conviction, and sentencing are not
cognizable in a section 1172.6 petition. “The mere filing of a section [1172.6] petition
does not afford the petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims of trial error or attack the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s findings. To the contrary, ‘[n]othing in
the language of section [1172.6] suggests it was intended to provide redress for allegedly
erroneous prior factfinding.… The purpose of section [1172.6] is to give defendants the

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benefit of amended sections 188 and 189 with respect to issues not previously
determined, not to provide a do-over on factual disputes that have already been
resolved.’ ” (People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947; People v. DeHuff (2021)
63 Cal.App.5th 428, 438.)
II. The Trial Court’s Prima Facie Finding
Also in his supplemental brief, appellant contends the trial court improperly
denied his section 1172.6 petition for resentencing by making factual findings that he was
the actual killer, in violation of People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972 (Lewis).
“A petitioner is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law if the record of
conviction conclusively establishes, with no factfinding, weighing of evidence, or
credibility determinations, that (1) the petitioner was the actual killer, or (2) the petitioner
was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission
of murder in the first degree, (3) the petitioner was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, or (4) the petitioner acted with
malice aforethought that was not imputed based solely on participation in a crime.”
(People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14 (Lopez).)
In making the prima facie determination, a petitioner is ineligible for resentencing
“as a matter of law if the record of conviction conclusively establishes, with no
factfinding, weighing of evidence, or credibility determinations,” that the petitioner could
still be convicted after the amendments to sections 188 and 189. (Lopez, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 13–14.) “In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this
preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the
weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 972.)

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“The record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie
inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential
merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) The
record of conviction includes the jury instructions and verdicts. (Lopez, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 13–14; People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 99; People v.
Jenkins (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 924, 935.)
To demonstrate prejudice from the denial of a section 1172.6 petition before the
issuance of an order to show cause, the petitioner must show it is reasonably probable
that, absent error, his or her petition would not have been summarily denied without an
evidentiary hearing. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 957, 974–975; People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
Analysis
The record of conviction in this case consists of the jury instructions and verdicts,
and establishes appellant was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. Appellant
was charged with murder. The jury was instructed on first and second degree murder,
express and implied malice, and the defense theories of justification and self-defense.
The jury was not instructed on the felony-murder rule, aiding and abetting, the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, target or nontarget offenses, or any other theories of
imputed malice. The jury convicted appellant of first degree murder. Appellant moved
to reduce the conviction to second degree murder and argued there was insufficient
evidence of premeditation. The trial court granted the motion and reduced the offense to
second degree murder.
At the prima facie hearing on appellant’s petition, the trial court stated it was
denying the petition because the jury was not instructed on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, and appellant was convicted as the actual perpetrator. The court
could have reached the conclusion that appellant was convicted as the actual perpetrator

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based on the instructions and verdict since there were no instructions on aiding and
abetting. However, to the extent the court erroneously made any factual findings when it
denied appellant’s petition, the error was not prejudicial because he was ineligible for
resentencing as a matter of law since the jury was not instructed on any imputed malice
theories. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 957, 974–975; People v. Watson, supra,
46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
III. Appellant’s Pending Motions
During the pendency of this appeal, appellant has filed, in propria persona,
several motions and letters requesting free copies of various trial transcripts and records,
which this court has denied.
On April 9, 2024, we denied appellant’s motion for judicial notice of certain
transcripts because he failed to show the relevance of the transcripts, and we further
ordered that he was not entitled to free copies. On May 13, 2024, appellant filed a
petition for review of this ruling with the Supreme Court. On June 18, 2024, the
Supreme Court denied his petition for review.
On May 31, 2024, appellant filed a motion with this court to take judicial notice of
certain pages from the transcript of his trial for the testimony of a certain witness. On
June 13, 2024, while his petition for review was pending, appellant filed another motion
with this court, again complaining that his prior requests for free copies of certain records
had not been granted.
We hereby deny both pending motions. As explained above, appellant cannot use
a section 1172.6 petition to raise claims of evidentiary or legal errors that allegedly
occurred at his trial, and his request for judicial notice of trial testimony is not relevant in
this appeal. We have already denied his previous motions for free copies of certain
records, the Supreme Court denied his petition for review of those prior rulings, and we
again deny his request.

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DISPOSITION
Appellant’s motion for judicial notice of excerpts from the trial record, and
requests for free copies of the records, are denied.
The trial court’s order of April 13, 2023, denying appellant’s petition for
resentencing, is affirmed.

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