People v. Boyd CA3

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Filed 8/6/24 P. v. Boyd CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Calaveras)
----

THE PEOPLE, C099727

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos. 19F7736,
21F8111 )
v.

KARL JOSEPH BOYD,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Karl Joseph Boyd pled guilty to 12 felony counts alleging various
forms of theft-related offenses from an elder, B.B. The charges included eight counts of
violations of Penal Code1 section 368, subdivision (d), and four counts alleging violations
of section 530.5, subdivision (a), all of which are described below. Defendant entered a

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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Cruz2 waiver but violated its terms when he did not appear for two scheduled review
hearings and failed to make a required restitution payment, resulting in the filing of
another case and the issuance of bench warrants. The trial court ultimately sentenced
defendant to an aggregate term of 10 years in state prison.
On appeal, defendant contends: 1) he did not knowingly or intelligently enter a
Cruz waiver; and 2) under section 654, the trial court erred in imposing punishment for
certain counts alleging violations of section 368, subdivision (d) alleging fraud/theft from
an elder. We conclude defendant forfeited his claim regarding the validity of the Cruz
waiver by not objecting before the trial court and that his section 654 claim fails on its
merits. We affirm the judgment.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY3
Case No. 19F7736
Defendant was charged in Calaveras County Superior Court case No. 19F7736
(19F7736) with eight counts of violating section 368, subdivision (d) (fraud/theft from an
elder) and four counts of section 530.5, subdivision (a) (identity theft). The alleged
victim in all counts was B.B. with whom defendant lived. Defendant had access to
B.B.’s personal identifying information including B.B.’s birthdate, driver’s license, and
Social Security number. B.B. had a Capital One credit card which B.B. “had used for a
series of years.” After B.B. received a letter advising B.B. that if the card was not used it
would be cancelled and unbeknownst to B.B., defendant added himself to the account
(count I). Later, using this card, defendant made a series of purchases “exceeding several
thousand dollars” (count II).

2 People v. Cruz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1247.
3 We take portions of the factual background from the stipulated factual bases of
cases Nos. 19F7736 and 21F8111.

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Defendant at some point also opened a Citibank credit card using B.B.’s personal
identifying information (count IV). He used this card to access funds from B.B. “in
excess of several thousand dollars” (count V). In addition, defendant opened a Discover
credit card in B.B.’s name (count VII) and used it to make purchases “in excess of several
thousand dollars” (count VIII). Finally, using B.B.’s personal identifying information,
defendant opened a series of PayPal accounts several of them in B.B.’s name (count X).
He used “several thousand dollars” from B.B.’s personal account to pay the PayPal
accounts which were linked to accounts belonging to defendant (count XI). B.B. was
unaware of the existence of the Citibank and Discover credit cards, as well as the PayPal
accounts.
Defendant was also charged in counts III, VI, IX, and XII with violations of
section 530.5, subdivision (a). Count III was charged alternatively to count I (Capital
One); count VI was charged alternatively to count IV (Citibank); count VII was charged
alternatively to count IX (Discover); and count XII was charged alternatively to count X
(PayPal).
Terms of the Plea Agreement
On October 20, 2020, defendant agreed in 19F7736 to plead to all 12 counts in
exchange for five years’ formal probation, 270 days in jail, to pay restitution to B.B. in
the amount of $50,000 payable in four installments in the amount of $10,000 each, and to
an eight-year suspended sentence. The first payment of $10,000 was to be paid on
October 23, 2023, with quarterly review hearings to follow.4
Defendant, who was represented by counsel, signed a plea form indicating that he
had read and understood the maximum and minimum penalties for each count. The plea
form contained a box listing the charges including counts I, II, IV, V, VII, VIII, X and

4 This payment was timely made.

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XI, all alleging a violation of section 368, subdivision (d), indicating a minimum term of
two years and a maximum term of four years. In addition, it listed counts III, VI, IX, and
XII, alleging a violation of section 530.5, subdivision (a), indicating a minimum term of
16 months and a maximum term of 3 years. Defendant advised the court the initials
beside this box were his initials. He also initialed that he had read and understood his
rights under section 1192.5, reflecting that if the court withdrew its approval of the plea
agreement that he would be allowed to withdraw his plea.
Defendant also agreed to a Cruz waiver which required that he obey all laws,
comply with a restraining order to not have contact with B.B., pay B.B. restitution as
ordered, and if he failed to appear for surrender or sentencing without a legal excuse, that
his plea would become an “open” plea and he could be sentenced to the maximum time
allowed by law. Further, defendant initialed his plea form reflecting this understanding.
The court agreed to release defendant on his own recognizance and ordered him to be
present for a review hearing on January 25, 2021. The parties stipulated that the four
counts alleged under section 530.5, subdivision (a) (counts III, VI, IX, & XII) were
alternative to the four counts alleged in counts I, IV, VII, and X, and would be subject to
section 654.
Before the conclusion of the plea hearing, defendant confirmed again that he
understood the trial court could sentence him as if there was never any plea agreement if
he: violated the terms of the Cruz waiver, failed to report when ordered to do so, violated
the restraining order, or committed a new offense. The trial court again reminded
defendant to return for his restitution review hearing on January 25, 2021, when the
second $10,000 installment payment would be due.
Defendant Fails to Appear
Defendant did not appear at the hearing on January 25, 2021. His counsel advised
the court defendant had not yet paid the scheduled installment of $10,000 that was due
that day. Defense counsel requested the hearing be continued until February 5, 2021,

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which the trial court granted. On February 5, defendant again failed to appear. Defense
counsel advised the court that he had lost contact with defendant and that defendant had
not made the required $10,000 restitution payment. The trial court issued a no-bail bench
warrant in 19F7736.
Four days later, in Calaveras County Superior Court case No. 21F8111 (21F8111),
the People charged defendant with two counts of willfully and unlawfully failing to
appear (§ 1320.5) and alleged that he was released on his own recognizance at the time of
both offenses (§ 12022.1).
Sentencing Hearing
Defendant ultimately appeared for sentencing on September 1, 2023, on 19F7736,
21F8111, and an unrelated third case. In the People’s sentencing statement for 19F7736,
the People again acknowledged that the four counts alleged in counts III, VI, IX and XII,
were subject to section 654. However, the People argued that consecutive sentences for
the remaining counts involving the Capital One (counts I & II), Citibank (counts IV &
V), and Discover credit cards (counts VII & VIII) as well as the PayPal accounts (counts
X & XI) were appropriate because the offenses occurred over long periods of time. Thus,
the People argued, defendant had the opportunity to reflect and renew his intent to steal
from B.B. The People requested an aggregate term of 11 years for 19F7736. An
amended probation report recommended that the trial court sentence defendant to seven
years in 19F7736. Defendant did not file a sentencing brief.
The trial court stated that it had reviewed the amended probation report. It
recounted that defendant was required to appear for sentencing in 19F7736 and had
agreed the court could sentence defendant as if there was no plea agreement if he failed to
appear, i.e., “it would be treated as an open plea and the Court could then sentence
[defendant] to . . . whichever the Court felt was appropriate under the circumstances.”
After suggesting that it had been “about three years” since defendant was supposed to be
sentenced and he “picked up at least two other cases” in the interim, the trial court stated

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it intended to impose a 10-year sentence in 19F7736. Defense counsel requested the trial
court follow the probation department’s recommendation but did not say anything about
the 10-year sentence mentioned by the court or the validity of the Cruz waiver.
Finding the “incidents occurred over a long period of time” and that they were all
“separate” although “[t]hey might have come across from the same mind-set,” the trial
court imposed an aggregate term of 10 years in 19F7736: the midterm of three years for
count I and a consecutive one year (one-third the midterm) as to each of the remaining
counts all alleging violations of section 368, subdivision (d).
The court also imposed sentence in 21F8111 (and the unrelated case) resulting in a total
aggregate term of 14 years 10 months. Before concluding the sentencing hearing, the
trial court asked if defense counsel had anything further to add and she responded that
she did not.
We turn first to defendant’s argument relating to the validity of the Cruz waiver.
DISCUSSION
I. Cruz Waiver
On appeal, defendant contends the Cruz waiver was not knowing or intelligent
because the trial court did not advise him 1) about the maximum possible punishment if
he failed to comply with the terms of his release, or 2) that he was giving up his right to
withdraw his plea. Thus, he contends, the trial court was obligated to impose the eight-
year prison term pursuant to the plea agreement or allow defendant to withdraw his plea.
a. Legal Background
A defendant forfeits a claim of error if he fails to object to a trial court’s
discretionary sentencing choice. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353; People v.
Sperling (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1100-1102.) The objection must be “sufficiently
specific” so as “to give the trial court a meaningful opportunity to correct any sentencing
errors.” (People v. De Soto (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1, 8-9.) However, “the objection will

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be deemed preserved if, despite inadequate phrasing, the record shows that the court
understood the issue presented.” (People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284, 290.)
Generally, under section 1192.5, a defendant may withdraw his plea if the court
decides to impose a sentence greater than the bargained-for term. A defendant who
enters a Cruz waiver, waives that right if he does not comply with presentence terms of
release or fails to appear as required. (People v. Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1247, 1254,
fn. 5.) Where a full admonishment has been given pursuant to section 1192.5 prior to
entry of a negotiated plea, “a defendant must raise his objection to punishment exceeding
the terms of the bargain at sentencing, or the objection is [forfeited].” (People v.
Victorian (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 954, 958.) The trial court may rely on a validly executed
waiver form as a sufficient advisal of rights. (People v. Cisneros-Ramirez (2018) 29
Cal.App.5th 393, 402-403; People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 360-361.)
b. Analysis
There is no question defendant failed to comply with the terms of his presentence
release and failed to appear as required. There also is no question the trial court gave him
a full admonition under section 1192.5. The trial court made clear that based on these
failures, it could sentence defendant as though there was no plea agreement restricting its
sentencing discretion. At defendant’s sentencing hearing, the court announced its
intended sentence was greater than the plea agreement and then imposed a sentence
greater than the plea agreement. Defendant did not object at any time to the imposition
of a sentence higher than specified in the plea agreement. Defendant did not claim the
court was limited to sentencing defendant to the agreed-upon term. Defendant did not
seek to withdraw his plea based on the trial court exceeding the terms of the plea. Nor
did defendant make any claim that the Cruz waiver was invalid.5

5 Anticipating that forfeiture would be an issue, defendant acknowledges in his
opening brief that “normally” a defendant must object at the time of sentencing or an

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Contrary to defendant’s claim on appeal, trial counsel’s request that the trial court
impose a seven-year term, which was consistent with the recommendation of the
probation department, did not preserve a claim that the Cruz waiver was invalid. Nothing
in this request would alert the trial court that defendant was challenging its authority to
impose a term greater than that agreed upon in the plea agreement. As a result, defendant
forfeited his claim that the Cruz waiver was invalid.6
II. Applicability of Section 654
Next, defendant alleges in 19F7736 that the trial court erred in “misapplying”
section 654 by imposing consecutive sentences in counts I and II (Capital One), counts
IV and V (Citibank), counts VII and VIII (Discover) and counts X and XI (PayPal).
Defendant asks this case to be remanded for the trial court to either sentence defendant
“as agreed in the plea bargain to eight years in prison, or to stay counts two, five, eight
and 11 pursuant to section 654 as those counts were all committed with the same criminal
intent as their counterpart counts.”
a. Legal Background and Standard of Review
“Section 654 precludes multiple punishments for a single act or indivisible course
of conduct.” (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 294.) A course of conduct is
indivisible “where the defendant ‘ “harbored a single intent.” ’ ” (People v. Mesa (2012)
54 Cal.4th 191, 199.) So “if all of the offenses were merely incidental to, or were the
means of accomplishing or facilitating one objective, [the] defendant may be found to

issue is forfeited. He argues this rule does not apply here because the trial court lacked
discretion to impose a sentence greater than eight years without providing defendant the
chance to withdraw his plea. We reject this argument.
6 Defendant appeals in both 19F7736 and 21F811 but did not obtain a certificate of
probable cause in either. Since we have concluded that defendant forfeited his claim that
the Cruz waiver was invalid, we do not address the merits of the People’s argument that
defendant was required to obtain a certificate of probable cause.

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have harbored a single intent and therefore may be punished only once.” (People v.
Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335.)
However, “a course of conduct divisible in time, although directed to one
objective, may give rise to multiple violations and punishment.” (People v. Beamon
(1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 639, fn. 11.) “This is particularly so where the offenses are
temporally separated in such a way as to afford the defendant opportunity to reflect and
to renew his or her intent before committing the next one, thereby aggravating the
violation of public security or policy already undertaken.” (People v. Gaio (2000) 81
Cal.App.4th 919, 935; People v. Kwok (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1255.)
The law gives the trial court “broad latitude” in determining “whether section 654
is factually applicable to a given series of offenses.” (People v. DeVaughn (2014) 227
Cal.App.4th 1092, 1113.) We review the trial court’s findings for substantial evidence
“ ‘in a light most favorable to the judgment,’ ” meaning we “ ‘presume in support of the
court’s conclusion the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce
from the evidence.’ ” (People v. Andra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 638, 640-641.) “This
standard of review is exceedingly deferential.” (People v. Venegas (2020) 44
Cal.App.5th 32, 38.)
b. Analysis
Viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, there was substantial evidence
upon which the trial court could find defendant had the opportunity to reflect and renew
his intent between committing each act alleged under section 368, subdivision (d), as
charged in counts I and II (Capital One), counts IV and V (Citibank), counts VII and VIII
(Discover), and counts X and XI (PayPal), justifying eight consecutive sentences. As the
trial court acknowledged, defendant harbored the same intent to steal from B.B. when he
committed each offense. But “ ‘multiple crimes are not one transaction where the
defendant had a chance to reflect between offenses and each offense created a new risk of
harm.’ ” (People v. Lopez (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 698, 717 [theft of the victim’s purse

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and later use of her credit card were temporally separated and afforded the defendant an
opportunity to reflect and renew his intent].)
There are different steps and thought processes involved in fraudulently adding
oneself to a credit card and opening fraudulent credit accounts without the victim’s
knowledge. For instance, defendant fraudulently gathered and submitted B.B.’s personal
information for approval with at least four payment method companies. However, to
commit theft by withdrawing money, defendant had to separately plan several times how
much money he wanted and when he wanted it after the fraudulent accounts were already
approved. And to commit theft by purchasing products or services, defendant
contemplated several times what items he wanted and purchased them in stores or by
inputting payment and shipping information on third party websites. Between each of
these distinct acts, there was a temporal separation that afforded defendant an opportunity
to reflect and renew his intent. Defendant could have stopped his criminal conduct after
each act of fraud, but instead he created new risk of harm by proceeding to commit each
act of theft. Because defendant had ample opportunity to reflect and renew his intent
between each act of fraud and theft, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding
that each offense was a “separate incident” and gave rise to multiple punishments.
Lastly, defendant’s reliance on our opinion in People v. Kenefick (2009) 170
Cal.App.4th 114 is misplaced. Kenefick involved a scheme to defraud the victim by
fooling him into believing he had an investment interest in a piece of property for which
the victim received forged promissory notes purporting to secure the victim’s investment.
(Id. at p. 117.) The defendant successfully argued she harbored only a single criminal
objective in committing forgery and theft — to steal the victim’s money. (Id. at pp. 124-
125.)
Unlike in Kenefick, which involved a scheme originating with a document forged
by that defendant, B.B. was immediately harmed when defendant essentially stole her
identity and either placed himself on one of B.B.’s existing credit cards or opened new

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payment cards or accounts, all of which he intended to access for his own personal gain
without her knowledge or consent. Over time, he made multiple purchases or
withdrawals which totaled thousands of dollars. The trial court made express findings
regarding the divisibility of defendant’s criminal actions involved in each theft. We
conclude these findings are supported by substantial evidence.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

/s/
WISEMAN, J.*

We concur:

/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.

/s/
MAURO, J.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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