CourtListener 10031541•People v. Randolph CA2/2
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Filed 8/5/24 P. v. Randolph CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B330824
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA183257)
v.
COLIN RANDOLPH,
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT:
Colin Randolph appeals the order of the superior court
denying his postjudgment petition for resentencing under Penal
Code1 section 1172.6. (Former § 1170.95, Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 10.) We appointed counsel to represent Randolph on appeal.
After examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief
raising no issues and requesting that we exercise our discretion
to independently review the record for arguable issues pursuant
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 228–232
(Delgadillo).
BACKGROUND
On June 8, 2001, Randolph was convicted by jury of the
first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1) of Larry Houston
on February 14, 1999, with true findings on the allegations that
during the commission of the offense Randolph personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury
and death (§§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) & (d), 12022.5, subd.
(a)(1)). The jury also convicted Randolph of two counts of
attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder
(§§ 664/187, subd. (a); counts 2 & 3), and found true the
allegations as to both counts that Randolph personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury
(§§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) & (d), 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)), and
personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of the
offense (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Randolph
to an aggregate term of 50 years to life.
On November 21, 2022, Randolph filed a section 1172.6
petition for resentencing. The superior court appointed counsel,
and the district attorney filed a response to the petition.
Randolph filed a reply in propria persona, which was adopted by
defense counsel and accepted by the superior court. The
prosecution opposed the petition on the ground that the jury
convicted Randolph of one count of first degree murder and two
counts of attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder,
with true findings on allegations as to all counts that Randolph
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great
bodily injury and death within the meaning of section 12022.53,
subdivision (d). While acknowledging that the trial court had
2
instructed with CALJIC No. 3.02 on the natural and probable
consequences theory of culpability, that instruction was modified
expressly to apply only to codefendant James Tucker. The People
further argued that Randolph was convicted of first degree
murder, and the only legal theory on which the jury was
instructed was willful, deliberate and premeditated murder
under CALJIC No. 8.20. Because the jury made clear in its
verdicts that Randolph was the actual shooter who personally
inflicted great bodily injury and death, and his murder and
attempted murder convictions did not rest on any theory of
imputed malice, he is ineligible for resentencing relief as a matter
of law.
The matter came on for prima facie review on May 12,
2023. Following argument by the parties, the superior court
announced it had reviewed the petition, the People’s response,
Randolph’s reply, the court file, the December 26, 2002 decision
on appeal from the conviction, and the abstract of judgment. The
court recited the jury’s findings as stated in its verdict, noting
that the court may deny a petition at the prima facie stage if a
specific jury finding establishes ineligibility for relief as a matter
of law.
The superior court then explained that “[a] petitioner is
ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law if the record of
conviction conclusively establishes, with no fact-finding, weighing
of the evidence, or credibility determinations that, one, the
petitioner was the actual killer; or [¶] Two, the petitioner was not
the actual killer but, with intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual
killer in the commission of murder in the first degree; or [¶]
Three, the petitioner was a major participant in the underlying
3
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life; or [¶]
Four, petitioner acted with malice aforethought that was not
imputed, based solely on participation in a crime.”
With these principles in mind, the superior court found
that Randolph had failed to make a prima facie showing of
eligibility for relief under section 1172.6. The court noted the
jury’s express findings that in committing first degree murder
and the attempted, willful, deliberate, and premeditated
murders, Randolph personally used a firearm, and personally
and intentionally discharged the firearm, proximately causing
great bodily injury and death, and he personally and
intentionally inflicted great bodily injury.
The superior court then denied Randolph’s section 1172.6
petition on the ground that he had failed to make a prima facie
showing for relief as a matter of law.
On appeal, Randolph filed his own supplemental brief in
which he asserts: (1) He was tried under a legal theory that
permitted the jury to convict him as a perpetrator or an aider and
abettor; (2) Nothing in the record of conviction establishes that
the jury convicted him as the actual killer or the person
responsible for firing the shots in the attempted murders; (3) The
true findings on the firearm enhancement allegations do not per
se render petitioner ineligible for relief under section 1172.6;
(4) The jury received additional ambiguous instructions
regarding the firearm enhancements that created a pathway for
jurors to misapply other instructions given.
In support of these contentions, Randolph submitted the
following documents:
4
(1) Exhibit A: Eight pages of reporter’s transcript from
trial proceedings in this case on May 21, 2001, regarding the
delayed discovery of certain ballistics evidence;
(2) Exhibit B: This court’s unpublished opinion in
Randolph’s direct appeal from his conviction. (People v.
Randolph (Dec. 26, 2002, B151628) [nonpub. opn.].);
(3) Exhibit C: A posttrial declaration by David Vallier,
dated September 14, 2012;
(4) Exhibit D: A letter from Demetrice Denegal to the Los
Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, dated December 3,
2018; and
(5) Exhibit E: A posttrial declaration by Demetrice
Denegal, dated February 28, 2019.
DISCUSSION
Because the instant appeal is not from his conviction,
Randolph is not entitled to our independent review of the record
pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, or its federal
constitutional counterpart, Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
738 [87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493]. (Delgadillo, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 227 [“Courts below have uniformly agreed that
Wende procedures are not constitutionally required on an appeal
from a denial of a postconviction petition under section 1172.6”];
People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 119 [independent judicial
review mandated by Anders applies only to first appeal as of
right]; see also Pennsylvania v. Finley (1987) 481 U.S. 551, 559
[107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539].)
However, although “[t]he filing of a supplemental brief or
letter does not compel an independent review of the entire record
to identify unraised issues,” we are required to address the
contentions Randolph raises in his supplemental brief.
5
(Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232 [“the Court of Appeal is
required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in [the
supplemental] brief and to issue a written opinion”].)
I. Randolf Failed to Establish a Prima Facie Case for
Relief Under Section 1172.6
A. Section 1172.6
The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) in 2018, effectively abolishing the natural and
probable consequences doctrine in cases of murder and limiting
the application of the felony-murder doctrine. (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957
(Lewis).) With one narrow exception (see § 189, subd. (f)), Senate
Bill No. 1437 effectively eliminated murder convictions premised
on any theory of imputed malice—that is, any theory by which a
person can be convicted of murder for a killing committed by
someone else, such as felony murder or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine—unless the People also prove that the
nonkiller defendant personally acted with the intent to kill or
was a major participant who acted with reckless disregard to
human life. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e).)
Senate Bill No. 1437 also enacted former section 1170.95
(now § 1172.6), which established a procedure for vacating the
murder convictions of defendants who could no longer be
convicted of murder because of the amendments to sections 188
and 189. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 957, 959, 971; People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 843.)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 amended section
1172.6 to expand its coverage to individuals convicted of
“attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
6
doctrine.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); People v. Saibu (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 709, 747.)
Section 1172.6, subdivision (c) requires the superior court
to appoint counsel when requested upon the filing of a properly
pleaded petition for resentencing. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 963, 966.) The court must then conduct a prima facie
analysis with briefing to determine the petitioner’s eligibility for
relief, and, if the requisite prima facie showing is made, issue an
order to show cause. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); Lewis, at p. 971; People
v. Nieber (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 458, 469–470.) In conducting
this review, our Supreme Court has held that the superior court
can and should look to the record of conviction. (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at pp. 970–971 [“The record of conviction will necessarily
inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6],
allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit
from those that are clearly meritless”].) And “[i]f the petition and
record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is
ineligible for relief, the [superior] court may dismiss the petition.”
(People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.)
We independently review the superior court’s prima facie
determination that a petitioner is ineligible for section 1172.6
relief as a matter of law. (People v. Berry-Vierwinden (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 921, 930.)
7
B. The record of conviction establishes that Randolph
is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of
law
1. The jury instructions and verdicts
Randolph was convicted of one count of first degree
murder.2 In order to find Randolph guilty of first degree murder,
the instructions required the jury to find the murder was a
willful, deliberate, and premediated killing with express malice
aforethought. (CALJIC No. 8.20.) The instructions defined the
terms “willful,” “deliberate,” and “premeditated” (ibid.), and
explained that “[m]alice is express when there is manifested an
intention unlawfully to kill a human being” (CALJIC No. 8.11).
With respect to the attempted murders, the jury was
instructed: “In order to prove attempted murder, each of the
following elements must be proved: [¶] 1. A direct but
ineffectual act was done by one person towards killing another
human being; and [¶] 2. The person committing the act harbored
express malice aforethought, namely, a specific intent to kill
unlawfully another human being.” (CALJIC No. 8.66.) The jury
convicted Randolph on two counts of attempted murder, and as to
each count found true the special allegation that the attempted
murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. (See CALJIC
No. 8.67.)
The trial court also instructed the jury on aiding and
abetting. CALJIC No. 3.00 explained that “[p]ersons who are
2 Randolph’s jury was also instructed on the definitions and
elements of second degree murder (CALJIC Nos. 8.30, 8.31) and
voluntary manslaughter (CALJIC No. 8.40), as well as the
distinction between murder and manslaughter (CALJIC
No. 8.50).
8
involved in committing or attempting to commit a crime are
referred to as principals in that crime. Each principal, regardless
of the extent or manner of participation is equally guilty.
Principals include: [¶] 1. Those who directly and actively commit
or attempt to commit the act constituting the crime, or [¶]
2. Those who aid and abet the commission or attempted
commission of the crime.”
CALJIC No. 3.01 instructed that “[a] person aids and abets
the commission or attempted commission of a crime when he, [¶]
1. With knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and
[¶] 2. With the intent or purpose of committing or encouraging or
facilitating the commission of the crime, and [¶] 3. By act or
advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of
the crime.”
The jury was further instructed on an aider and abettor’s
liability for murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine (CALJIC No. 3.02), but the instruction was modified to
apply only to Randolph’s codefendant, Tucker: “One who aids
and abets another in the commission of a crime is not only guilty
of that crime, but is also guilty of any other crime committed by a
principal which is a natural and probable consequence of the
crime originally aided and abetted. [¶] Under this theory, in
order to find the defendant Tucker guilty of the crime of murder as
charged in Count 1, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that: [¶] 1. The crime of murder was committed; [¶]
2. That the defendant aided and abetted that crime[ ]; 3. That a
co-principal in that crime committed the crime of murder; and [¶]
4. The crime of murder was a natural and probable consequence
of the commission of the crime of assault with [a] firearm.”
(Italics added.)
9
The trial court did not give any instruction on felony
murder or any other theory of liability under which malice could
be imputed to Randolph.
2. Randolph was not convicted of murder or attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or
any other theory of imputed malice
In his supplemental brief, Randolph asserts that “the trial
court gave the standard CALJIC No[s]. 3.00, 3.01 and 3.02
instructions without any modifications or clarifications, [and]
given the substantial role Tucker played . . . , the law permitted
and [the trial court] encouraged . . . the jury to view both
defendants as aider[s] and abettors.” Randolph argues that the
trial court’s response to a jury question during deliberations
permitted the jury to impute malice to Randolph based on these
aiding and abetting instructions. According to Randolph, “the
jury could have believed it did not need to resolve the question of
whether or not the [prosecutor] proved beyond a reasonable doubt
petitioner fired any of the bullets that struck any of the victims,
because they could convict him of murder if they believed murder
and attempted murder was the natural and probable consequence
of discharging a firearm into the air.”
However, contrary to Randolph’s assertion, CALJIC
No. 3.02 was modified, and specifically limited application of the
natural and probable consequences doctrine to Tucker’s
culpability. We find nothing in these instructions that permitted
the jury to convict Randolph under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or any other theory of imputed malice.
The trial court’s answer to the jury’s question also did not
extend the application of a natural and probable consequences
theory of liability to Randolph. During deliberations, the jury
10
submitted the following question regarding CALJIC No. 3.01: “If
a defendant knew his co-defendant intended to get into a fight
but did not necessarily know his co-defendant intended to shoot a
gun, would that constitute ‘knowledge of unlawful purpose’?”
The trial court responded first by stating that CALJIC
No. 3.01 was only one of the aiding and abetting instructions
given, and encouraged the jury to consider CALJIC No. 3.02.
Under that instruction, the court explained, “[I]f you find that as
a natural and probable consequence of certain acts, something
that was completely unknown or whatever, happens, but it is a
natural and probable consequence of what was known, you can
still find aiding and abetting. You find it under 3.02 not 3.01. [¶]
I will give you a quick example. There is law in this state that
states if it was not unreasonable and it was a natural and
probable consequence that someone who got in a fight and then
someone was shot, that person does not necessarily have to have
known that there was going to be a gun⎯provided that you find
that shooting, be it attempted murder, murder, [assault] with a
deadly weapon⎯provided that was a natural and direct
consequence of, I am going to go have a fight.”
We disagree with Randolph’s contention that the jury
instructions together with the trial court’s response to the jury’s
question permitted the jury to convict Randolph under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine where the
instructions themselves expressly precluded that possibility.
“ ‘Jurors are presumed able to understand and correlate
instructions and are further presumed to have followed the
court’s instructions.’ ” (People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327,
382.) Nothing in the court’s response to the jury’s question
altered the express limitation in the written instruction that the
11
natural and probable consequences doctrine only applied to
Tucker. We will not presume the jury misunderstood or failed to
follow the court’s instructions on the law. (People v. Buenrostro
(2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 431.)
CALJIC Nos. 3.00 and 3.01 were not so limited. But to the
extent the jury relied on aiding and abetting in order to convict
Randolph on the murder and attempted murder charges, the
instructions specifically required the jury to find Randolph acted
to promote the murder and attempted murders “with knowledge
of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator.” (CALJIC No. 3.01.)
For the first degree murder conviction, that meant the jury had
to find Randolph knew the perpetrator was acting with “express
malice aforethought.” (CALJIC No. 8.20.) And for the attempted
murder convictions, that required finding Randolph knew the
perpetrator was acting with “a clear, deliberate intent to kill.”
(CALJIC No. 8.67.) In other words, in order to convict Randolph
as an aider and abettor of first degree murder or attempted
willful, deliberate and premeditated murder, the instructions
required the jury to find the perpetrator acted with express
malice, and Randolph shared the perpetrator’s intent to kill.
Given these requirements, there is no possibility that Randolph
was convicted on a theory that imputed another’s malice to him
or that he could have assisted the perpetrator without knowing
that he intended to kill the victims.
In light of the jury instructions, the verdicts reflect all the
factual findings necessary to support the murder and attempted
murder convictions under current law, and conclusively refute
Randolph’s allegation that he could no longer be convicted of
murder and/or attempted murder because of the changes to
sections 188 and 189. (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433,
12
465.) Randolph is therefore ineligible for relief under section
1172.6 as a matter of law (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971), and
the superior court did not err in summarily denying the
resentencing petition without an evidentiary hearing (People v.
Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 233 [a defendant is not entitled
to relief, and a resentencing petition properly denied at the prima
facie stage, where the record of conviction makes ineligibility for
relief clear]).
II. Randolph’s Challenge to the Sufficiency of the
Evidence to Support the Claim He Was Convicted
Under the Natural and Probable Consequences
Doctrine Does Not Present a Valid Basis for Relief
In his supplemental brief, Randoph asserts the evidence is
insufficient to establish he was the actual killer or the person
responsible for firing the shots that struck the victims of the
attempted murders. He further maintains that the jury’s true
finding on the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm
enhancement could not support a finding that he was the actual
killer or had the requisite intent to kill, but that ambiguous
instructions regarding the gun enhancements “created a pathway
for the jurors to misapply” other instructions given. In support of
these arguments, Randolph points to evidence he claims shows he
only fired his gun into the air in self-defense after someone else
fired a gun, he never shot at anyone, and the bullets that struck
Houston and the other victims had come from the firearm(s) of
the “members of the entourage who Tucker had words with inside
the club.” He also submits posttrial declarations to the effect that
Randolph was not the man who shot any of the victims. He
concludes that “on these facts,” he could only have been convicted
13
of murder and attempted murder as an aider and abettor under
the doctrine of natural and probable consequences.
As we have discussed, the jury was not instructed it could
find Randolph guilty of murder or attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. And Randolph’s
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the only
theories on which the jury was instructed does not present a valid
basis for resentencing under section 1172.6.
“The mere filing of a section [1172.6] petition does not
afford the petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims of trial
error or attack the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
jury’s findings. To the contrary, ‘[n]othing in the language of
section [1172.6] suggests it was intended to provide redress for
allegedly erroneous prior factfinding. . . . The purpose of section
[1172.6] is to give defendants the benefit of amended sections 188
and 189 with respect to issues not previously determined, not to
provide a do-over on factual disputes that have already been
resolved.’ ” (People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947.)
Moreover, this case is not a habeas proceeding, and the new
evidence Randolph has submitted has no bearing on the superior
court’s denial of the section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie
stage. The Legislature created a specific statutory scheme for
resentencing under section 1172.6, and the statute expressly
provides that a court may consider new evidence from either
party at an evidentiary hearing after an order to show cause has
issued. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1), (3).) It says nothing about
considering such evidence before a sufficient prima facie showing
is made. The Legislature easily could have provided for the
introduction of such evidence at the prima facie stage, but it did
not. (Cf. § 1172.6, subd. (c) with § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
14
As our Supreme Court made clear in Lewis, after receiving
briefing from the parties on a facially sufficient petition the
superior court may consider the “record of conviction” in
determining whether the prima facie showing is made. (Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 971–972.) Courts have held that the
record of conviction includes the closing arguments of counsel, as
well as the jury instructions and the jury’s verdict. (People v.
Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 13 [record of conviction for
purposes of § 1172.6 includes parties’ closing arguments]; People
v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 106 [same]; see also People v.
Jenkins (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 924, 935.) Here, the prosecutor
argued in closing that there was only one shooter, and as the only
person with a gun, that shooter was Randolph. And contrary to
Randolph’s assertion, the prosecutor did not argue the jury could
convict Randolph of the murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or under another theory of imputed
malice.3
3 Randolph quotes a portion of the prosecutor’s argument to
claim the prosecutor urged the jury to find Randolph guilty under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine:
“If Mr. Tucker and/or Mr. Randolph went there that night
knowing they were probably going to shoot at people, but didn’t
know death was going to result, the natural and probable
consequence of the assault with firearm is the murder in this
case, then they are both guilty of murder under aiding and
abetting.”
However, in the next sentence, which Randolph omits, the
prosecutor made clear that the natural and probable
15
Finally, in addition to finding Randolph guilty of first
degree murder and attempted murder, the jury found Randolph
personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm causing
great bodily injury and death. Thus, the jury’s verdicts show that
it accepted the prosecutor’s argument that Randolph was the
actual shooter, and so found.
In short, because Randolph was not prosecuted and the
jury was not instructed on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or any other theory of imputed malice, he
is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. We
therefore affirm the superior court’s denial of Randolph’s petition
for resentencing under section 1172.6, and reject the claims
asserted in his supplemental brief.
consequences doctrine applied to Tucker’s liability for murder,
not to Randolph’s:
“Mr. Tucker felt, okay, I am going to bring Mr. Randolph
there, I am going to encourage him to commit assault with a
firearm, if you find he aided and abetted and it resulted in the
death of Larry Houston, he is still guilty of murder.”
16
DISPOSITION
The order of the superior court denying Randolph’s petition
for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J. ASHMANN-GERST, J. CHAVEZ, J.
17
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