CourtListener 10031443•People v. Vasquez CA2/5
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Filed 8/2/24 P. v. Vasquez CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B329637
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA128424)
v.
SALVADOR VASQUEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, David C. Brougham, Judge. Affirmed as
modified.
Richard D. Miggins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Nicholas J. Webster and Michael C.
Keller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted defendant Salvador Vasquez of second
degree murder (Pen. Code1, § 187, subd. (a), count 1), two counts
of possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1), counts
2 and 3), and one count of carrying a loaded firearm in public by a
felon (§ 25850, subd. (a), count 4). The jury also found true the
allegation that defendant personally used a firearm during the
commission of the murder. (§ 12022.5, subd. (a).) Following
defendant’s admission that he previously sustained a serious or
violent felony conviction within the meaning of section 667,
subdivision (d) and section 1171.12, subdivision (b), the trial
court sentenced him to 39 years and 4 months to life in prison.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court failed to
properly inquire about a juror’s potential misconduct; made
errors in its evidentiary rulings; and prejudicially failed to
instruct the jury regarding the limited purpose of gang evidence.
Finally, defendant contends that the court abused its discretion
by failing to stay the sentence on either count 3 or 4 pursuant to
section 654.
We will modify the judgment to stay the sentence on
count 3. As so modified, we affirm the judgment.
1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise indicated.
2
II. BACKGROUND
A. Trial
1. Prosecution
a. June 22, 2021, Firearm Offenses
On June 22, 2021, Pomona Police Department Detective
Alex Nguyen and his partner were on patrol in an unmarked
vehicle when they observed a speeding car. The officers turned
on their lights and sirens and followed. Defendant, who was the
driver of the speeding car, initially tried to evade the patrol car
by running red lights and stop signs for several blocks before
stopping suddenly. The detective then walked the path that had
just been traveled by defendant and recovered a loaded magazine
and a firearm. When asked about the firearm, defendant
admitted, “‘Yes, I tossed it,’” and “‘Let’s get this over with.’”
Later forensic analysis determined that defendant’s DNA was on
the gun.
b. August 23, 2021, Murder and Possession of
Firearm by Felon
On August 23, 2021, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department Detective Brian Rex responded to the La Puente
Motel and observed a car stopped in the center divider of the
street. The murder victim, Pedro Guerrero, was in the driver’s
seat of the car and a woman was in the passenger seat. Guerrero
had sustained a gunshot wound to his chest and was
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unresponsive. The police did not recover any weapons from
Guerrero, the woman, or the scene of the shooting.
Detective Eric Saavedra reviewed security video from the
La Puente Motel and recognized defendant as the person depicted
in the video. Saavedra had previously encountered defendant six
times between May and July of 2021 and knew that he had a
large letter tattooed on the back of his head, as well as tattoos on
the left side of his neck and his left arm.
On August 25, 2021, Detective Nathan Abarca and his
partner were on patrol in La Puente when they encountered
defendant driving a Dodge Charger. Abarca knew that defendant
was the subject of an arrest warrant and pursued the car. The
deputies temporarily lost sight of defendant’s vehicle but
eventually located it parked on the street. Sheriff’s deputies
found defendant hiding under a van and arrested him.
Detective John Duncan, who was assigned to investigate
Guerrero’s death, compiled surveillance video from the La Puente
Motel from the day of the shooting. The prosecution introduced
the compilation video as evidence at trial.2 Detective Duncan
identified defendant as the shooter in the video. The shooter had
a tattoo of the letter P on the back of his head, as well as tattoos
on the left side of his neck and left arm. Those tattoos matched
the tattoos that Detective Duncan observed on defendant
following his arrest. The shooter in the video also had a mark on
his left cheek, which matched a mark that Detective Duncan
2 The 15-second video shown to Saavedra was admitted as
People’s Exhibit 1B. The compilation video created by Duncan
was marked as People’s Exhibit 1A and was 11 minutes 43
seconds long. The exhibits are comprised of high quality video
that clearly depict the shooter’s face, build, clothing, and tattoos.
4
observed on defendant following defendant’s arrest. By the time
of trial, defendant had obtained a tattoo that covered the mark.
During his testimony, the detective described certain
portions of the video, which the prosecutor played to the jury.
The video showed that when Guerrero drove into the parking lot,
defendant was smoking a cigarette at the motel. Guerrero then
had an “animated” conversation with a woman in front of a motel
room before he returned to his car and began driving away.
Defendant subsequently made several movements with his hand
towards his waistband and walked towards the passenger side of
Guerrero’s car as the car drove toward the driveway of the motel
parking lot. Defendant pulled out a firearm from his waistband
as he approached Guerrero’s car, which stopped at the edge of the
driveway. After defendant reached the vehicle, he spoke briefly
with the car occupants, placed his left hand on the top door frame
of the passenger window, stepped back, raised the gun, fired once
into the car, and ran away. Guerrero’s car then rolled toward the
center divider in the street.
Duncan recovered a cigarette butt from the location where
the video depicted defendant dropping his cigarette. Subsequent
DNA testing indicated it contained defendant’s DNA.
2. Defense
Defendant testified and admitted that he shot Guerrero.
He asserted, however, that he did so in self-defense. On the day
of the shooting, defendant went to the motel to “hang out” with
some women who could be seen in the video. Defendant had a
firearm in his waistband for protection. At the motel, defendant
witnessed Guerrero speaking aggressively to defendant’s friend.
5
Although defendant wished to leave the motel, he heard Guerrero
yell “‘What’s up?’” at him aggressively. Defendant approached
Guerrero’s car with gun in hand and said, “‘What’s up?’”
Guerrero then said, “‘Who the fuck do you think you’re looking
at?’” And, when defendant responded that he did not know
Guerrero, Guerrero replied, “‘That’s right. You don’t know
me. . . . I’ll fucking smoke you.’” Defendant saw Guerrero raise
something black in his hand. Believing the item to be a gun,
defendant raised his gun and fired once, striking Guerrero.
During his direct examination, defendant admitted to
having been previously convicted of attempted robbery and being
a member of the La Puente criminal street gang.3
On cross-examination, defendant testified that the La
Puente Motel was part of the La Puente gang’s territory and gang
members would hang out there. Defendant conceded that
members from other gangs would not be allowed in his gang’s
territory.
B. Verdict and Sentence
Following the jury’s finding of guilt, defendant admitted
that he had a prior serious or violent felony conviction within the
meaning of the Three Strikes law. The trial court sentenced
defendant to 39 years and 4 months to life, consisting of: for
count 1, 15 years to life, doubled to 30 years to life because of one
strike, plus 4 years for personal use of a firearm; for count 2, 8
months (one-third the middle term of 24 months), doubled to 16
3 As we explain below, prior to defendant’s testimony, the
trial court ruled that the prosecution could cross-examine
defendant about his membership in the La Puente gang.
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months for the one strike, to be served consecutively; for count 3,
2 years, doubled to 4 years for the one strike, to be served
concurrently; and for count 4, the principal determinate term, 2
years, doubled to 4 years for the one strike, to be served
consecutively.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Juror Misconduct
Defendant contends that the trial court prejudicially erred
by failing to properly inquire into juror misconduct during trial.
1. Background
On January 10, 2023, the parties delivered opening
statements and the following witnesses testified: Saavedra,
Nguyen, and Abarca. Rex then began his testimony. Following
the lunch break, and outside the presence of the other jurors,
Juror No. 12 reported to the trial court that she had experienced
feelings of anxiety in the morning. She stated, “I just felt like it
was kind of fogging my thoughts, I guess, to fully listen here
because I’m trying to calm myself down on the inside. [¶] . . . [¶]
It was kind of interfering with things.” Juror No. 12 added that
she took an antianxiety pill during the lunch break.
The trial court asked the juror, “How are you doing now?”
to which the juror responded, “I’m doing okay now.”
The trial court and the juror then engaged in the following
exchange:
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“The Court: Okay. So just, you’ll let us know if there is
any—
“Juror No. 12: Right. That’s what I was going to ask. I
kind of wanted to see what your recommendation was.
“The Court: Yes. Well, my recommendation is you
continue to take care of yourself. Do you have a doctor you see?
“Juror No. 12: I do, typically, yes. I haven’t in about six
months because I’ve tried to go away from any of that.
“The Court: If at any point you believe it is going to
interfere or it is interfering with your ability to do your jury
duties, tell me.
“Juror No. 12: Okay. Perfect.
“The Court: And then we’ll have a hearing.”
Neither party raised an objection.
2. Analysis
As our Supreme Court has explained: “Section 1089
provides in part: ‘If at any time . . . a juror dies or becomes ill, or
upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to
perform his or her duty, or if a juror requests a discharge and
good cause appears therefor, the court may order the juror to be
discharged . . . .’ In construing this statute, we have held that
‘“[o]nce a trial court is put on notice that good cause to discharge
a juror may exist, it is the court’s duty ‘to make whatever inquiry
is reasonably necessary’ to determine whether the juror should be
discharged.”’ [Citations.] [¶] ‘But not every incident involving a
juror’s conduct requires or warrants further investigation. “The
decision whether to investigate the possibility of juror bias,
incompetence, or misconduct—like the ultimate decision to retain
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or discharge a juror—rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court.”’ [Citations.] ‘“[A] hearing is required only where the
court possesses information which, if proven to be true, would
constitute ‘good cause’ to doubt a juror’s ability to perform his
duties and would justify his removal from the case.”’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 941–942.)
Defendant contends that Juror No. 12’s description of
feeling “foggy” during the morning proceedings constituted an
admission of potential misconduct and merited further
investigation. As an initial matter, because defendant failed to
object during trial, he has forfeited his argument on appeal. (See
People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 289 [defendant forfeited
claim regarding sleeping juror where he “neither objected to [the
juror’s] continued service nor requested a mistrial on the ground
of juror misconduct”]; see also People v. Holloway (2004) 33
Cal.4th 96, 124 [“defendant forfeited this issue [of alleged juror
misconduct] by failing to seek the juror’s excusal or otherwise
object to the court’s course of action”].)
Even assuming, however, that defendant had not forfeited
his argument on appeal, we would reject it on its merits. Juror
No. 12 reported that after she felt foggy, she took antianxiety
medication. She also agreed to notify the trial court if she
believed her anxiety would interfere or had interfered with her
ability to serve as a juror. She did not so notify the court. On
this record, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion
when it declined to conduct further inquiry.4
4 Because we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion,
we also reject defendant’s alternative argument that his counsel
provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the court’s
purportedly inadequate inquiry. (See In re Long (2020) 10
9
B. Detective Duncan’s Testimony
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by
allowing Detective Duncan to testify during the review of the
compilation video from the motel, that defendant was the shooter.
1. Background
At a pretrial hearing on motions in limine, the prosecutor
moved to allow Detective Saavedra to testify, that prior to the
shooting, he had several encounters with defendant and
recognized defendant in the surveillance video from the La
Puente motel. Defendant objected and argued that “police
identification of [defendant] on the video” should be excluded at
trial. The trial court overruled defendant’s objection5 and ruled
that Saavedra could so testify, reasoning that anyone who was
familiar with defendant could testify that he was the person
depicted in the video.
Cal.5th 764, 773 [to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel,
defendant must show prejudice, in other words, “‘a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different’”].)
5 The Attorney General contends that defendant forfeited his
argument on appeal by failing to “argu[e] that Duncan should be
treated differently from Saavedra.” We disagree. Defendant’s
objection was sufficiently broad to encompass video identification
by the police in general.
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2. Analysis
Defendant contends that the trial court prejudicially erred
when it permitted Detective Duncan to testify that defendant was
the person depicted in the compilation video because Duncan did
not have prior familiarity with defendant. We review evidentiary
rulings for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Leon (2015) 61
Cal.4th 569, 600 (Leon).)
We find no abuse of discretion. “[Duncan] was familiar
with defendant’s appearance around the time of the [murder].
Their contact began when defendant was arrested . . . .
Questions about the extent of [Duncan’s] familiarity with
defendant’s appearance went to the weight, not the admissibility,
of his testimony.” (Leon, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 601.)6
C. Cross-Examination on Defendant’s Gang Affiliation
Defendant next contends the trial court prejudicially erred
by allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine him about his gang
affiliation.
6 We note that defendant does not challenge on appeal
Saavedra’s identification of defendant in the 15-second video.
And, Duncan testified that the compilation video depicted the
same events as in the video shown to Saavedra, but from a
different angle. Defendant did not object to this testimony.
Thus, even assuming the trial court erred, any such error was
harmless. (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 671.)
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1. Background
Prior to trial, the prosecutor made a motion in limine to
introduce in its case-in-chief, evidence that defendant was a
member of the La Puente criminal street gang. Then, at trial, the
prosecutor explained that it sought to introduce Saavedra’s
testimony that he previously spoke to defendant “about gang
activity and/or knows him as a gang member.” The trial court
denied the motion, ruling that the minimal relevance of the
evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of undue
prejudice. (Evid. Code, § 352.)
Outside the presence of the jury, and prior to defendant’s
testimony, defense counsel moved to preclude the prosecution
from cross-examining defendant about his gang affiliation. The
prosecutor objected and argued that if defendant were to testify
that he acted in self-defense, his motive for the crime would be
“extremely relevant.” The prosecutor noted that Guerrero was
killed in La Puente gang territory. The trial court ruled that it
would allow the cross-examination.
During closing argument, the prosecutor asserted,
“[defendant] told us that outsiders, people that are not part of his
gang shouldn’t be in [the motel.]”
2. Analysis
“The People are generally entitled to introduce evidence of
a defendant’s gang affiliation and activity if it is relevant to the
charged offense. [Citation.] ‘Evidence of the defendant’s gang
affiliation—including evidence of the gang’s territory,
membership, signs, symbols, beliefs and practices, criminal
12
enterprises, rivalries, and the like—can help prove identity,
motive, modus operandi, specific intent, means of applying force
or fear, or other issues pertinent to guilt of the charged crime.’
[Citation.] Even when it is relevant, however, ‘courts should
carefully scrutinize evidence of a defendant’s gang membership
because such evidence “creates a risk the jury will improperly
infer the defendant has a criminal disposition and is therefore
guilty of the offense charged.”’ [Citations.] We review the trial
court’s ruling for abuse of discretion. [Citations.]” (People v.
Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 31 (Chhoun).)
Here, defendant testified that he shot Guerrero in self-
defense. Evidence of defendant’s gang affiliation therefore was
probative of a contrary motive. (Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 31.) Moreover, the probative value of that evidence was not
substantially outweighed by undue prejudice as evidence of
defendant’s gang membership was limited: defendant was the
only witness to testify about his gang membership, which
consisted of testimony that he was a member of the La Puente
criminal street gang; the La Puente Motel was part of the gang’s
territory; gang members would frequent the motel; people from
other gangs were not permitted in defendant’s gang’s territory;
and defendant did not know Guerrero or whether he was in a
gang. (Cf. People v. Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th 36, 65 [finding
probative value not substantially outweighed by undue prejudice
because, among other things, “[n]o gang expert testified, and
there was no evidence of any other gang-related activity other
than this shooting”].) Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.
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D. Jury Instruction on Gang Evidence
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by
failing to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 1403, concerning
the limited purpose of gang evidence. Alternatively, defendant
contends defense counsel was ineffective in failing to request the
instruction.
A trial court has no sua sponte duty to give a limiting
instruction on gang evidence. (People v. Hernandez (2004) 33
Cal.4th 1040, 1051 (Hernandez); Evid. Code, § 355 [“When
evidence is admissible as to one party or for one purpose and is
inadmissible as to another party or for another purpose, the court
upon request shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and
instruct the jury accordingly” (italics added)].) The trial court
therefore did not err by failing to deliver the instruction.
As to defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we
find it meritless. “‘To establish ineffective assistance, defendant
bears the burden of showing, first, that counsel’s performance
was deficient, falling below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Second, a
defendant must establish that, absent counsel’s error, it is
reasonably probable that the verdict would have been more
favorable to him.’ [Citation.] ‘If the record does not shed light on
why counsel acted or failed to act in the challenged manner, we
must reject the claim on appeal unless counsel was asked for and
failed to provide a satisfactory explanation, or there simply can
be no satisfactory explanation.’ [Citation.]” (Hernandez, supra,
33 Cal.4th at pp. 1052–1053.)
“On this record, we cannot say that counsel [was] deficient
for not requesting a limiting instruction. ‘A reasonable attorney
14
may have tactically concluded that the risk of a limiting
instruction . . . outweighed the questionable benefits such
instruction would provide.’ [Citations.]” (Hernandez, supra, 33
Cal.4th at p. 1053.) Here, a reasonable attorney could have
concluded that it was unduly risky to highlight defendant’s gang
affiliation given the minimal evidence of that affiliation during
trial. Accordingly, we find no ineffective assistance of counsel.
E. Stay of Count 3
Finally, defendant contends the trial court abused its
discretion by imposing a concurrent sentence on counts 3 and 4,
when it should have stayed one of the sentences. The Attorney
General agrees, as do we.
A person may be convicted of more than one crime for the
same act, but section 654 proscribes multiple punishments for the
same act. (§§ 654, 954; People v. Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331,
337.) Here, defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by
a felon (count 3) and carrying a loaded firearm in public by a
felon (count 4) for the same act committed on June 22, 2021.
Defendant can only be punished once for this single incident.
(See People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 357 [“a single
possession or carrying of a single firearm on a single occasion
may be punished only once under section 654”].) The proper
“‘procedure is to sentence defendant for each count and stay
execution of sentence on certain of the convictions to which
section 654 is applicable.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 353.)
As for the remedy, we agree with the Attorney General that
remand is unnecessary. The punishment is the same for counts 3
and 4 (§ 18), and a remand would have no practical impact on
15
defendant’s sentence. We will therefore modify the judgment to
stay the sentence on count 3. (See People v. Alford (2010) 180
Cal.App.4th 1463, 1473 [exercising authority under section 1260
to modify judgment rather than remand as remedy for trial
court’s failure to impose and stay sentence].)
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IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to stay the sentence on count 3.
The trial court is directed to prepare an amended and corrected
abstract of judgment as described by this opinion and to forward
a copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. As
so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM, J.
We concur:
BAKER, Acting P. J.
LEE, J.
Judge of the San Bernardino Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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