CourtListener 10028782•People v. Samoata CA4/1
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Filed 8/2/24 P. v. Samoata CA4/1
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D080333
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD288011)
MATATOA SAMOATA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Kimberlee A. Lagotta, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and
remanded for resentencing.
Robert E. Boyce, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa
A. Mandel and Joseph C. Anagnos, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Matatoa Samoata lured a drug dealer to an elementary school by
agreeing to buy a pound of marijuana for $1500, only Samoata brought $700
of counterfeit money and a loaded gun. During the transaction, Samoata shot
the drug dealer and the drug dealer’s companion. The dealer was seriously
injured and the companion killed. The jury convicted him of first degree
murder and attempted voluntary manslaughter, and found true firearm
allegations and a great bodily injury allegation.
On appeal, Samoata asserts the trial court committed three errors:
(1) failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on uncharged conspiracy and use of
a coconspirator’s statements; (2) failing to exercise its discretion to dismiss
his sentence enhancements or to impose a lesser firearm enhancement; and
(3) failing to determine his ability to pay before imposing fines and fees. As
to the first claim of error, assuming without deciding the court had a sua
sponte duty to give conspiracy-related instructions under the circumstances
of this case, we conclude any error was harmless.
As to the second and third claims of error, in our prior opinion, we
declined to remand for resentencing, including because we found the trial
court was not unaware of its discretion to impose a lesser firearm
enhancement. The California Supreme Court then granted Samoata’s
petition for review and transferred it to this court, with directions to vacate
our decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v. McDavid (2024) 15
Cal.5th 1015 (McDavid). (People v. Samoata, S283319, Supreme Ct. Mins.,
June 26, 2024.) In compliance with this mandate, we vacate our prior
opinion and conclude the matter must be remanded for resentencing so the
trial court can exercise its discretion under McDavid whether to impose a
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lesser included firearm enhancement from a statute other than Penal Code1
section 12022.53. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
Trial Evidence
A. The Marijuana Deal and Shooting
On November 3, 2020,2 Samoata used his brother’s Instagram
account⎯“NoahSamoata123”⎯to set up a deal where he would buy a pound
of marijuana from Erik S. for $1500. The next day, Samoata switched to his
brother’s Snapchat account⎯“noahsamoata”⎯to ask Erik if he wanted to buy
a gun. Erik did not say anything about buying a gun, but he agreed to meet
“noahsamoata” in front of an elementary school next to the house where
Samoata lived with his family.
On November 6, Erik drove with his friend, Andrew Briseno, from
Bakersfield to San Diego to meet “noahsamoata.” Briseno rode in the front
passenger seat and, without Erik’s knowledge, brought a gun with him. The
pound of marijuana was in the car, in a plastic bag inside of a backpack.
When they got close to the elementary school, Briseno placed the backpack by
his feet on the front passenger floorboard.
Samoata was standing outside by the school. Although Erik was
actively chatting with “noahsamoata” through Snapchat, Samoata was not
using a phone. When Erik became suspicious and threatened to leave,
“noahsamoata” told Erik it was his “first time” and he had sent a friend—
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Further unspecified dates are from the year 2020 unless noted
otherwise.
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Samoata—who had the money. Erik pulled up to Samoata and asked, “You
want to buy some weed?” Samoata said “yeah” and got in the back seat of
Erik’s car, directly behind Briseno. Samoata handed money to Erik. While
Erik counted the money, the backpack with the marijuana remained next to
Briseno. Neither Erik nor Briseno ever gave Samoata the backpack.
Erik noticed the money was short and looked “weird” or “fake.” He
stopped counting and began examining the money. Then Samoata said, in an
aggressive tone of voice, “Give me that shit right now.” As Erik turned to
look back at Samoata, Samoata shot him in the left side of his face, under the
eye; another shot hit Erik in the foot. Erik immediately blacked out. When
he woke up, his car was on the sidewalk. Briseno was unresponsive in the
front passenger seat, bleeding from two gunshot wounds to the back of the
head.
A neighbor walking her dog heard three or four gunshots “right in a
row.” She then saw Samoata run back toward his house. So when the police
responded, she directed officers to Samoata’s house. Samoata barricaded
himself in the attic, ignoring the police’s commands to surrender. Hours
later, Samoata emerged and was arrested.
In the attic, the police found Erik’s backpack with the pound of
marijuana, a Beretta semiautomatic handgun loaded with five cartridges,
other assorted firearms (including a shotgun and rifle), two empty firearm
magazines, boxes of ammunition, and shotgun shells. Samoata’s and
Briseno’s DNA was on the Beretta. Ballistics testing established that the
bullets and cartridge casings recovered from Erik’s car, and from Erik’s
clothing and Briseno’s body, were all fired from the same Beretta.
Briseno’s handgun was discovered on the front passenger side
floorboard of Erik’s car with the handle facing up. There was no evidence it
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had been fired. About $700 in counterfeit hundred dollar bills was found on
the driver’s seat and center console.
Erik sustained serious injuries to his face, jaw, and foot that required
several surgeries. Briseno died after arriving at the hospital. The cause of
his death was gunshot wounds to the head. One bullet entered behind his
left ear and exited through his jaw bone in a left to right, back to front, and
downward trajectory. A second bullet that penetrated the back of his head
and became lodged inside was removed from Briseno’s scalp during the
autopsy.
B. Samoata’s Varying Accounts of the Shooting
Samoata gave varying accounts of what happened to law enforcement.
He first asserted he was home playing video games and did not hear any
gunshots. He then claimed the victims had been “threatening to kill [his]
brother,” “kidnap [his] sisters and human traffic them,” and “kill the rest of
[his family].” When he heard the front doorknob “jiggle,” he believed it was
the victims coming to harm his family. So he armed himself with the
Beretta, chased the victims to their car, opened their car door, and fired three
or four gunshots from outside of the car. After the police told Samoata they
were checking for DNA inside Erik’s car, Samoata explained he had opened
the car door “to check [the victims’] status” after he fired the gun. He claimed
he then hid the gun in a neighbor’s trash can, and failed to come out of the
attic when SWAT surrounded his house because he thought he had a
warrant.
Samoata denied the shooting was related to a marijuana deal, told the
police they would have to ask his brother because his brother uses Snapchat,
and insisted “[t]hese guys were really threatening [his] family.” When
Samoata learned one of the victims had survived the shooting, he admitted
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there had been a marijuana deal, but denied it was prearranged. Instead,
Samoata said he had been sitting on the front porch of his house when the
victims “rolled up.” They yelled to him, “Hey, hey,” so he walked over to their
car. He gave the driver fake money, and the driver started counting it. At
this point, the driver (not the passenger) reached into the driver’s side door
pocket. It was then that Samoata shot the driver and the front passenger.
Samoata admitted at trial that all of his statements to the police were
lies.
He testified he was going to “[s]cam [Erik] with fake money to get a
pound of weed,” and then “just leave.” He thought the deal “would go bad”
because he “had fake money,” so he brought a gun with him “[j]ust in case the
deal went bad.” He made sure the gun was “hot loaded,” meaning the
magazine was full and there was one round in the chamber, so it was “ready
to go.”
Samoata testified that when he got in the car and sat in the back
passenger seat, he passed the money to Erik when Erik asked for it. Then
Briseno passed him back “the bag of weed.” When Erik discovered it was
fake money, he looked at Briseno, and “then [Briseno] went to reach for
something, and [he] heard a metal clicking.” And that is when Samoata
reached for his gun and “just randomly shot.” Samoata admitted neither
Erik nor Briseno verbally threatened him, and he did not see a gun. He
claimed he “didn’t take aim on anyone,” although he acknowledged he shot
Erik directly in the face, and Briseno twice in the back of the head. He then
ran back to his house and hid because he was scared of the police.
Samoata admitted he had communicated with Erik using his brother’s
Instagram and Snapchat accounts, and he had purchased the fake money
“ahead of time” in order to “do these marijuana setup ripoffs.” Samoata and
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his brother were also communicating with other people “to do these setups
during th[e] same time frame” he set up the marijuana deal with Erik. He
further admitted he sent Erik a Snapchat message asking Erik if he wanted
to buy a “strap.” He was not really trying to sell Erik one of his guns;
instead, he was just checking to see if Erik would be armed.
II.
Verdicts
The jury found Samoata guilty of the first degree murder of Briseno
(§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a); count 1) and not guilty of the attempted
murder of Erik S. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 2) but guilty of its lesser
included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter (§§ 192, subd. (a),
664). As to count 1, the jury found true that Samoata personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm and proximately caused death (§ 12022.53,
subd. (d)). On count 2, the jury found true Samoata personally used a
firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and personally inflicted great bodily injury
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) in the commission of the attempted voluntary
manslaughter.
DISCUSSION
I.
Samoata Fails To Establish Prejudicial Instructional Error
Samoata contends the trial court committed instructional error because
it failed to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 416 (Evidence of Uncharged
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Conspiracy)3 and CALCRIM No. 418 (Coconspirator’s Statements).4
Although Samoata did not request these instructions, he asserts the court
had a sua sponte duty to give them because the court admitted evidence
pursuant to the coconspirator hearsay exception in Evidence Code section
1223.5 We review claims of instructional error de novo. (People v. Posey
3 CALCRIM No. 416 states in relevant part, “A member of a conspiracy
is criminally responsible for the acts or statements of any other member of
the conspiracy done to help accomplish the goal of the conspiracy.” It sets
forth the elements of a conspiracy, including that “[t]he defendant intended to
agree and did agree with [a coparticipant] to commit [the alleged crime]”;
“[a]t the time of the agreement, the defendant and . . . the other alleged
member[ ] of the conspiracy intended that one or more of them would commit
[the alleged crime]”; and “[the] defendant[,] [or the coparticipant,] [or
(both/all) of them] committed [at least one of] the following overt act[s] to
accomplish [the alleged crime].” (Ibid.)
4 CALCRIM No. 418 provides, in relevant part, “In deciding whether the
People have proved that [the defendant] committed [any of] the crime[s]
charged, you may not consider any statement made out of court by [a
coconspirator] unless the People have proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that: [¶] 1. Some evidence other than the statement itself
establishes that a conspiracy to commit a crime existed when the statement
was made; [¶] 2. [The coconspirator was a member] of and participating in
the conspiracy when [he] made the statement; [¶] 3. [The coconspirator]
made the statement in order to further the goal of the conspiracy; [¶] AND [¶]
4. The statement was made before or during the time that [the defendant
was] participating in the conspiracy. [¶] A statement means an oral or
written expression, or nonverbal conduct intended to be a substitute for an
oral or written expression.”
5 Evidence Code section 1223 provides: “Evidence of a statement offered
against a party is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if: [¶] (a) The
statement was made by the declarant while participating in a conspiracy to
commit a crime or civil wrong and in furtherance of the objective of that
conspiracy; [¶] (b) The statement was made prior to or during the time that
the party was participating in that conspiracy; and [¶] (c) The evidence is
offered either after admission of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of the
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(2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.) Assuming without deciding that such a sua
sponte duty existed in this case, we reject Samoata’s claim because he fails to
establish prejudice from the asserted instructional error.
A. The Evidence Assertedly Triggering a Sua Sponte Duty To Give
CALCRIM Nos. 416 and 418
The evidence assertedly triggering a sua sponte duty to give CALCRIM
Nos. 416 and 418 consisted of messages sent to and from the Instagram and
Snapchat accounts of Samoata’s brother, Noah Samoata,6 between November
3 (when Samoata admitted he first contacted Erik to set up the marijuana
deal) and November 6 (the date of the shooting).7 In its motion to admit the
evidence, the prosecution argued the messages were nonhearsay because they
were offered not for their truth but as circumstantial evidence of other
relevant matters, such as the existence of a plan and conspiracy to rob a
marijuana dealer, and to explain Erik’s actions. In the alternative, the
prosecution argued the messages were admissible under the coconspirator
hearsay exception in Evidence Code section 1223.
Specifically, the evidence admitted at trial consisted of four categories
of Instagram and Snapchat messages:
(1) All messages exchanged between Erik and Noah’s Instagram and
Snapchat accounts from November 3 through November 6. The trial court
ruled these messages were admissible for the nonhearsay purpose of
explaining Erik’s actions and as circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy to
facts specified in subdivisions (a) and (b) or, in the court’s discretion as to the
order of proof, subject to the admission of such evidence.”
6 To avoid confusion, we refer to Noah Samoata by his first name.
7 Samoata does not challenge the trial court’s decision to admit evidence
of the Instagram and Snapchat messages.
9
rob. Erik testified he received these Instagram and Snapchat messages. And
as we have mentioned, Samoata admitted at trial he sent these messages to
Erik, including the two messages asking Erik if he wanted to buy a gun for
the purpose of ensuring Erik would not be armed during the marijuana deal.
(2) Solicitations for marijuana sent from Noah’s Snapchat account to
40 to 50 other Snapchat users, during the same time frame Erik received
solicitations from Samoata through Noah’s Instagram and Snapchat
accounts.8 Some of the recipients, like Erik, were also asked whether they
wanted to buy a gun. The prosecution proffered this evidence to show
Samoata was “searching for people to set up and rob.” Again, Samoata
admitted he and his brother were also communicating with other people “to
do these setups” when he set up the marijuana deal with Erik.
(3) Videos sent from Noah’s Snapchat account to a Snapchat user
named “Eli” on November 5. Samoata testified Noah sent the videos to “Eli,”
another potential setup victim, although “Eli” backed out of the deal. One
video showed two people with what appeared to be counterfeit hundred dollar
bills. Several aspects of this video (the money, the people’s hands and
clothing, music playing in the background, and a bedspread visible in the
video) were identical to a video Erik received from Noah’s Snapchat account.
The remaining videos showed both Samoata and Noah with the murder
weapon as well as three firearms and a box of ammunition that were
recovered from Samoata’s attic after the shooting. The trial court ruled these
videos were relevant and admissible to show Samoata’s access to the murder
8 The remaining three categories of evidence were introduced through an
investigator from the District Attorney’s office who reviewed records
produced by Instagram and Snapchat in response to warrants.
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weapon and ammunition, and found they were not offered for the truth but as
circumstantial evidence of the conspiracy to commit a robbery.
(4) A Snapchat audio message sent from Noah’s account to a
Snapchat user named “Kenneth” on November 4. Samoata admitted Noah
sent a message to “Kenneth” but denied knowing why Noah sent it. In the
message, the speaker said there was going to be a “lick . . . tonight” and “he’s
gonna have a pound.”9 (Erik was initially supposed to deliver the marijuana
to San Diego on November 4, but ended up delivering it on November 6
instead.) The District Attorney’s investigator testified “lick” was street slang
that could mean “a robbery,” “to . . . come up on something,” or “to take
something from somebody else,” but “wouldn’t really refer to . . . a theft when
you’re going to sneak and take something without them knowing.” Samoata
testified his definition of a “lick” was “[c]ome up” or “[g]etting over on
somebody,” and “[g]etting over on somebody” means “[t]rying to get
something for free.” The trial court admitted the audio message as
circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy to rob Erik of marijuana.
B. Analysis
The parties dispute whether the trial court had a sua sponte duty to
instruct the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 416 and 418. Until recently, the Bench
Notes to CALCRIM No. 418 provided, “The court has a sua sponte duty to
instruct on the use of a coconspirator’s statement to incriminate a defendant
9 The message in its entirety was: “Hey yo bro, can you get back to me
bro? (unintelligible) hey so bro there’s a lick bro, tonight bro. I need you for
tonight, . . . . This thing has no strap for sure bro. I know there’s a
(unintelligible) another thing. This dude has a whole bunch of money, and
he’s gonna have a pound bro, a pound. And it’s gonna be fire - fire. So, . . . .
blood, can you come through . . . ? And if the lick (unintelligible) I’ll give you
half or a quarter of it . . . .”
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if the statement has been admitted under Evidence Code section 1223.”
(CALCRIM No. 418 (Aug. 2016 rev.) (2022 ed.) pp. 186–187, citing People v.
Jeffery (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 209, 215 and People v. Herrera (2000) 83
Cal.App.4th 46, 63.) If a court instructs a jury with CALCRIM No. 418, it
must also give either CALCRIM No. 415 (Conspiracy) or CALCRIM No. 416.
(See Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 418.) Whereas Samoata relies on this
Bench Notes guidance for his position that the court was obligated to sua
sponte instruct the jury on conspiracy and use of a coconspirator’s
statements, the People contend neither of the cases cited in the Bench Notes
(Jeffery and Herrera) stand for such a proposition.
We do not need to resolve this aspect of the parties’ dispute. In March
2023—after Samoata filed his opening brief, but before the People’s
respondent’s brief and Samoata’s reply brief were filed—the Bench Notes
accompanying CALCRIM No. 418 were revised. They now state: “It is an
open question whether the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the use
of a coconspirator’s statement to incriminate a defendant. (See People v.
Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 251–252 [(Prieto)]; People v. Sully (1991) 53
Cal.3d 1195, 1231–1232 [(Sully)].) On request, the court must give this
instruction if the statement has been admitted under Evidence Code section
1223.” (Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 418 (Mar. 2023 rev.), italics added.)
Neither side has argued the guidance from the revised Bench Notes is an
inaccurate statement of the law.
The parties also dispute whether a duty to instruct was triggered in
this case. Samoata contends it was because the trial court admitted the
Instagram and Snapchat messages sent from Noah’s account under Evidence
Code section 1223. The People contend no such duty arose because the court
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did not admit the messages under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay
rule. Rather, it admitted them as nonhearsay.
The People are correct that the trial court admitted the messages as
nonhearsay. But this does not necessarily compel the conclusion that
instructions on conspiracy and use of a coconspirator’s statements were not
required. “ ‘ “ ‘It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a
request, a trial court must instruct on general principles of law relevant to
the issues raised by the evidence’ ” and “ ‘necessary for the jury’s
understanding of the case.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Molano (2019) 7 Cal.5th 620, 667.)
In ruling the messages were admissible, the court reasoned, in part, that they
were circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy to rob. The relevance and the
nonhearsay purpose for which the messages were offered thus depended on
the existence of a conspiracy between Samoata and his brother.
The current Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 418 state there may be “a
sua sponte duty to instruct on the use of a coconspirator’s statement to
incriminate a defendant.” (Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 418 (Mar. 2023
rev.), italics added.) The quoted language does not reference Evidence Code
section 1223 or confine the possible sua sponte instructional duty to cases
involving this hearsay exception. Here, although it was established at trial
that certain Instagram and Snapchat messages originating from Noah’s
account were sent by Samoata, there was also evidence some of them were
sent by Noah. Although the messages were used to prove facts other than the
matters asserted within them, it is still the case that “a coconspirator’s
statement” was used “to incriminate” Samoata. (See Bench Notes to
CALCRIM No. 418 (Mar. 2023 rev.).) Taken to their logical conclusion, the
revised Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 418 suggest it is an “open question”
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whether a sua sponte duty to give CALCRIM No. 418 (and with it, CALCRIM
No. 416) exists in a case such as this.
Ultimately we find it unnecessary to answer this question. In Sully
and Prieto, the California Supreme Court assumed without deciding that the
trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the definition of an
uncharged conspiracy and the requirements for admissibility of a
coconspirator’s statements where such statements were admitted at trial
pursuant to Evidence Code section 1223. (Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1231;
Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 251.) We take the same approach here. That
is, even if we “ ‘[a]ssum[e] the court had a sua sponte duty to so instruct the
jury under these circumstances,’ the error was harmless.” (Prieto, at p. 251,
quoting Sully, at p. 1231.)
The failure to instruct jurors regarding coconspirator statements is
governed by the state law harmless error standard and is deemed harmless
unless it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant
would have been achieved in the absence of the error. (Prieto, supra, 30
Cal.4th at pp. 251‒252; Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1231‒1232; see People
v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) The defendant bears the burden of
demonstrating prejudice under this standard. (People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5
Cal.5th 186, 201.)
Samoata fails to carry his burden of showing there is a reasonable
probability instructing the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 416 and 418 would have
improved his results at trial. This is his theory of prejudice: The Instagram
and Snapchat messages influenced the jury’s determination whether he
intended to commit a robbery at the time of the shooting, which in turn
14
affected its decision as to whether the homicide of Briseno constituted felony
murder.10
Samoata’s prejudice arguments suffer from two fundamental flaws.
First, he broadly characterizes all of the messages sent from Noah’s
Instagram and Snapchat accounts as “text and video evidence from Noah,”
“Noah’s . . . messages,” and “Noah’s conduct and statements.” He asserts “the
arrangements [with Erik] were made by Noah sending messages over social
media.” These are not accurate characterizations of the evidence. Contrary
to Samoata’s apparent effort to portray all of the Instagram and Snapchat
messages as statements of Noah, Samoata testified at trial that he sometimes
used Noah’s Instagram and Snapchat accounts, and he specifically used them
in this case to communicate with Erik. Samoata admitted he located Erik on
Instagram; he used Noah’s account to send Erik messages through
Instagram; and he entered into an agreement via these messages for Erik to
sell him a pound of “weed” in exchange for $1500. Samoata further testified
it was his voice in the Snapchat audio messages asking Erik if he wanted to
buy a “strap,” and that he sent these messages to confirm Erik would not be
armed. Samoata also admitted he and Noah were the two people shown in
the Snapchat videos sent from Noah’s account. To the extent these videos
recorded Samoata’s verbal and nonverbal expressions, the expressions were
his own, not his brother’s. The imprecision with which Samoata
10 The jury was instructed on first degree willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder; first degree robbery murder (and, correspondingly, the
elements of robbery); justifiable homicide committed in self-defense; and
voluntary manslaughter arising from imperfect self-defense. It was also
instructed on attempted murder and attempted voluntary manslaughter
arising from imperfect self-defense.
15
characterizes the trial record undermines the persuasive value of his
prejudice arguments.
Second, and more importantly, Samoata does not meet his burden of
affirmatively establishing that instructing the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 416
and 418 likely would have made a difference in the outcome of the trial. He
merely argues that “[i]f properly instructed on uncharged conspiracy and how
to consider coconspirator statements, the jury may well have found that the
prosecution failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that either
[(1)] a conspiracy between Noah and [Samoata] existed or that [(2) Samoata]
was a member of any conspiracy when Noah was sending texts about guns or
doing a ‘lick.’ ” (Italics added.) He does not support this assertion with a
citation to legal authority, and he does not develop the argument further.
Samoata’s bare assertion about what the jury “may” have found raises only
an abstract possibility of prejudice. Arguments that raise only an abstract
possibility of prejudice do not satisfy the Watson standard. (Richardson v.
Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1050.)
Having reviewed the record, we also do not agree with Samoata’s
assertion that a jury, instructed with CALCRIM Nos. 416 and 418, would
have found insufficient evidence that “a conspiracy between Noah and
[Samoata] existed.” The evidence of a conspiracy between Noah and Samoata
was strong. Samoata admitted he found Erik on Instagram by searching for
terms like “plugs” or “weed,”11 that he messaged Erik because he was trying
to “[s]cam [Erik] with fake money to get a pound of weed,” and that he
personally procured the fake money that was to be used to pull off the
scheme. Samoata testified he became involved after Noah asked him to “do
11 As Erik explained, a “plug” means “someone who has weed.”
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the deal” because Noah was scared. Samoata specifically admitted sending
Erik the message, “Yo, you want to buy a strap,” and that his purpose in
doing so was to see if Erik would be armed. He acknowledged that asking if
the victim wanted to buy a gun was “something [Samoata] . . . or [Noah]
would do when . . . trying to do these setups.” He admitted that when Erik
arrived in San Diego, Samoata was “outside to do the setup” while Noah was
communicating with Erik. Samoata’s testimony alone amply proved a
conspiracy between him and Noah existed. (See CALCRIM No. 416 [“An
agreement may be inferred from conduct if you conclude that members of the
alleged conspiracy acted with a common purpose to commit the crime.”].)
We also do not agree with Samoata’s claim the jury would have found
insufficient evidence that “[Samoata] was a member of any conspiracy” when
the messages about guns or doing a “lick” were sent. (See CALCRIM No. 418
[People must establish that “[t]he statement was made before or during the
time that [the defendant was] participating in the conspiracy”].) The
message to “Kenneth” about a “lick” was sent on the afternoon of November
4, and the videos showing Noah and Samoata with guns were sent to “Eli” on
November 5. These communications were all sent after November 3, when
Samoata sent his first Instagram message to Erik. Samoata testified he sent
messages to Erik in order to “[s]cam him with fake money to get a pound of
weed,” and he became involved in doing the deal with Erik at Noah’s behest.
The messages about guns or a “lick” all postdated the point when Samoata
first became involved in the scheme.
Samoata’s other prejudice arguments are similarly unavailing. He
observes that in closing arguments to the jury, his trial counsel argued no
robbery was committed because Briseno handed Samoata the backpack with
the marijuana before Samoata began shooting. He points out that the jury
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sent a note asking whether the backpack changed possession when Briseno
handed it to Samoata, and contends the jury’s note shows it was focused on
whether a robbery, and therefore a robbery-murder, occurred. The difficulty
with this argument is that the social media messages had no bearing on the
jury’s determination of whether Briseno gave Samoata the backpack before
the shooting. In Samoata’s version of the events, it was Briseno who handed
the backpack over, making it Briseno’s decision whether to do so. The
Instagram and Snapchat messages sent from Noah’s account were sent by
Samoata and Noah. The messages reflected their intentions, not the mindset
of Briseno.
Finally, Samoata contends the prosecutor “leaned heavily” on the
Instagram and Snapchat messages in her closing arguments to the jury “to
prove theories of both premeditated and robbery-felony murder.” But
because Samoata does not establish there is a reasonable likelihood the jury
would have declined to consider any of the messages had it been instructed
with CALCRIM Nos. 416 and 418, this contention fails. To the extent that
Samoata complains the prosecutor told the jury the messages showed a
“plan” or “conspiracy to rob,” whereas his own counsel told the jury Samoata’s
intent was “to ‘scam,’ ” it is apparent from the record the real dispute at trial
was not whether a conspiracy existed, but whether its object was to “rob” or
to “scam” the victims. The jury was instructed on the legal definition of
robbery pursuant to CALCRIM No. 1600. It was also instructed pursuant to
CALCRIM No. 200 that it was required to follow the court’s instructions
rather than the attorneys’ comments on the law. We presume that in
deciding whether Samoata intended to commit a robbery that “the jury
followed the instructions notwithstanding the prosecution’s arguments.”
(People v. Ramirez (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 48, 62; People v. Osband (1996) 13
18
Cal.4th 622, 717 [courts of review “ ‘presume that jurors treat the court’s
instructions as a statement of law by a judge, and the prosecutor’s comments
as words spoken by an advocate in an attempt to persuade’ ”].)
II.
Samoata Is Entitled to a Remand for Resentencing
In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury found the following aggravating
sentencing factors to be true: (1) the offense involved great violence, great
bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or
callousness; and (2) Samoata was armed with or used a handgun during the
commission of “the offense.” The trial court sentenced Samoata to 25 years to
life for the first degree murder of Briseno (count 1) and 25 years to life for the
associated section 12022.53, subdivision (d), firearm enhancement. On the
attempted voluntary manslaughter of Erik (count 2), the court imposed the
middle term of three years plus the middle term of four years for the section
12022.5, subdivision (a), firearm enhancement, and the mandatory three
years for the section 12022.7, subdivision (a), great bodily injury
enhancement. All terms were run consecutively, making Samoata’s total
sentence 60 years to life.
Samoata seeks a remand for resentencing on two claims of error. First,
he contends the trial court, in imposing sentence, failed to recognize or to
exercise its discretion under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), to strike any or
all of the enhancements, or under People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688
(Tirado) to substitute his firearm enhancement under section 12022.53,
subdivision (d), with a lesser included firearm enhancement in subdivisions
(b) or (c) of section 12022.53 or subdivision (a) of section 12022.5.12 Second,
12 Section 12022.53 provides a consecutive sentence of 10, 20, or 25 years
to life for violations of subdivisions (b), (c), and (d), respectively. (§ 12022.53,
19
he contends the court failed to determine his ability to pay pursuant to People
v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, 1164; alternatively, his counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the imposition of fines and fees without a
Dueñas hearing.
In our prior opinion, we concluded Samoata failed to establish he was
entitled to a remand for resentencing on any of these grounds. After we
issued our opinion, the California Supreme Court decided McDavid, supra, 15
Cal.5th 1015, in which it held sentencing courts have discretion to substitute
a section 12022.53 firearm enhancement with a lesser included enhancement
under a law other than section 12022.53. (McDavid, at p. 1021.) Having
reconsidered our decision, we now conclude Samoata is entitled to a remand
for resentencing so the trial court can exercise its discretion under McDavid,
making it unnecessary for us to address his other claims of sentencing error.
Relevant to this issue, Samoata claims the trial court did not
understand at the time of his sentencing hearing that it had the discretion to
substitute a lesser firearm enhancement for his section 12022.53, subdivision
(d), enhancement. Specifically, he contends the court “appeared unaware” it
had the discretion to substitute his charged and adjudicated section
12022.53, subdivision (d), enhancement with a lesser included enhancement
from either subdivisions (b) or (c) of section 12022.53 or subdivision (a) of
section 12022.5. Samoata’s claim is based on the trial court’s silence on the
matter during the sentencing proceeding. The court imposed a 25-years-to-
subds. (b)–(d).) Section 12022.5 authorizes enhanced sentences for use of a
firearm in the commission of any felony, unlike section 12022.53, which
applies only to specified felonies. (See § 12022.5, subd. (a).) The sentences
available under section 12022.5 are generally shorter than the sentences
authorized by section 12022.53. (See § 12022.5, subd. (a) [providing for a
term of imprisonment in state prison of three, four, or 10 years].)
20
life sentence for the section 12022.53, subdivision (d), enhancement without
stating it had considered the possibility of substituting it with a lesser
included firearm enhancement.
On a silent record such as this, we ordinarily presume the trial court is
aware of its authority under the applicable law in existence at the time of the
hearing. (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515, 527.) Thus, in our
prior opinion, we concluded the trial court was not unaware of its discretion
to substitute Samoata’s section 12022.53, subdivision (d), enhancement with
a lesser included firearm enhancement, whether that enhancement was
contained in subdivisions (b) or (c) of section 12022.53, or subdivision (a) of
section 12022.5. We explained that in Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th 688, the
California Supreme Court held that sentencing courts have discretion under
section 12022.53 to strike or dismiss a section 12022.53, subdivision (d),
enhancement and impose one of the lesser enhancements in subdivisions (b)
or (c) of section 12022.53 even where, as here, the lesser enhancements were
not charged in the information or found true by a jury. (See Tirado, at
pp. 696, 700.) Tirado was decided in January 2022, more than two months
before Samoata’s sentencing hearing, which took place in April 2022. Based
on this timing, we reasoned the court was presumably aware of Tirado and
its potential implications at the time of sentencing.
Implicit in our reasoning was the belief that the trial court’s presumed
awareness of Tirado and its potential implications meant it was aware of all
possible sentencing alternatives—both its discretion to substitute Samoata’s
section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement with an uncharged firearm
enhancement in section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) or (c), as well as its
discretion to substitute the section 12022.53, subdivision (d), enhancement
with a lesser included firearm enhancement from a statute other than section
21
12022.53, such as section 12022.5, subdivision (a). After McDavid, supra, 15
Cal.5th 1015, it is apparent this belief was not entirely correct. It was correct
insofar as we concluded that based on Tirado, the court must have known of
its discretion to substitute a section 12022.53, subdivision (d), enhancement
with an uncharged section 12022.53, subdivision (b) or (c) enhancement; this
much was established in Tirado. (See Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 700.)
However, it was incorrect insofar as we concluded, based on Tirado,
that the trial court was also aware of its discretion to substitute a section
12022.53, subdivision (d), enhancement with a section 12022.5, subdivision
(a), enhancement. As McDavid makes clear, the discretion to substitute a
section 12022.53 enhancement with a lesser included firearm enhancement
from a statute other than section 12022.53 is derived from judicial
interpretation of different statutory text than the statutory text underlying
the holding of Tirado. (See McDavid, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 1029–1030
[explaining that Tirado relied on the first sentence of subdivision (j) of section
12022.53 as the provision authorizing the imposition of enhancements under
section 12022.53, and stating “[w]e now hold that . . . the second sentence of
subdivision (j) . . . does not bar the court from imposing a lesser included,
uncharged enhancement under a law other than section 12022.53” (italics
added)].) Therefore, the sentencing discretion identified in McDavid was not
a potential implication of Tirado. In other words, we cannot presume from
the fact Tirado was decided before Samoata’s sentencing hearing that the
trial court knew it had discretion to substitute a section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) enhancement with an uncharged enhancement from section
12022.5, subdivision (a). Further, both McDavid and the intermediate
appellate decisions holding this discretion existed (e.g., People v. Johnson
22
(2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1074, 1085–1093; People v. Fuller (2022) 83
Cal.App.5th 394, 397) were decided after Samoata’s sentencing hearing.
“Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of
the ‘informed discretion’ of the sentencing court. A court which is unaware of
the scope of its discretionary powers can no more exercise that informed
discretion than one whose sentence is or may have been based on
misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s record.” (People
v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 424 (Salazar) [cleaned up].) “In such
circumstances, . . . the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing
unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have reached the
same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.” (Ibid.
[cleaned up].)
In a supplemental response brief, the People do not dispute the trial
court was unaware of its discretion under McDavid at the time of Samoata’s
sentencing hearing.13 They contend, however, that a remand for
resentencing is not required. They observe that the trial court elected not to
strike the four-year enhancement attached to count 2 or to replace the 25-
years-to-life firearm enhancement attached to count 1 with a 20-year
13 Pursuant to California Rules of Court 8.200(b)(1), Samoata filed a
supplemental opening brief and the People a supplemental response brief. In
their supplemental response brief, the People have not renewed their
previously advanced argument that Samoata forfeited his claim of error by
failing to raise it at the time of sentencing. We agree with the People’s
implicit concession the forfeiture doctrine does not apply here. A sentencing
court’s failure to exercise informed discretion is among the classes of error
that can be reviewed even in the absence of a timely objection. (People v.
Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 912; People v. Leon (2016) 243
Cal.App.4th 1003, 1023.) Even if the forfeiture doctrine applied, we would
exercise our discretion to address the claim in the interests of justice.
23
enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (c). They argue this clearly
indicates the court would have made the same sentencing decision on the
section 12022.53, subdivision (d), enhancement even if it had been aware of
its discretion under McDavid to impose one of the lesser enhancements from
section 12022.5, subdivision (a).
Although the People’s argument has intuitive appeal, Salazar does not
support it. In Salazar, our high court repeatedly emphasized that when a
sentencing court is unaware of its discretion, the appropriate course is to
remand for resentencing unless the record clearly indicates the sentencing
court would have imposed the same sentence had it known of the full scope of
its discretionary authority. (Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 424, 425, 431,
432.) The Court stated: “When the applicable law governing the defendant‘s
sentence has substantively changed after sentencing, it is almost always
speculative for a reviewing court to say what the sentencing court would have
done if it had known the scope of its discretionary powers at the time of
sentencing. Mere reliance on the length of the original sentence and
attendant decisions, such as imposing consecutive sentences, imposing
middle or upper term sentences, or declining to strike enhancements, is not
sufficient to provide a clear indication of what a sentencing court might do on
remand if it had been fully aware of the scope of its discretionary powers.”
(Salazar, at p. 431.)
The trial court’s decision in this case not to strike the four-year firearm
enhancement attached to count 2 is precisely the kind of attendant
sentencing decision identified in Salazar as insufficient to provide the clear
indication of intent required to avoid a remand. (See Salazar, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 431.) And although we presume, given the trial court’s silence
on the topic, that it considered whether to replace Samoata’s 25-years-to-life
24
firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d) with a 20-year
enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (c) and elected not to do so,
we are not convinced this constitutes the sort of clear indication of intent
required by Salazar. When the court made its decision, it was unaware of the
full panoply of sentencing options available under section 12022.53. On this
silent record, we cannot rule out the possibility the court would have
approached its decision differently had it known of the full range of
sentencing alternatives available for Samoata’s charged and adjudicated
section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement. We therefore disagree the
record provides the clarity necessary for us to find a remand would be futile.
Consequently, we conclude the appropriate remedy is to vacate
Samoata’s sentence and remand the matter for resentencing to allow the trial
court to exercise its discretion under section 12022.53 and McDavid in the
first instance. We express no opinion on the outcome of the court’s exercise of
this discretion.14
14 On July 22, 2024, Samoata filed a motion for leave to file a second
supplemental opening brief in which he argues that a recent decision of this
court (People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215), shows the trial court
was unaware of the scope of its discretion under section 1385, subdivision (c).
We deny the motion. It is untimely under California Rules of Court, rule
8.200(b)(1), and it is rendered moot by our decision to vacate his sentence and
remand the matter for resentencing. (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857,
893; see People v. Walker (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 198, 206 [“a criminal
sentence is, like an atom, indivisible” such that “[t]he invalidity of one
component infects the entire scheme,” obligating the resentencing court to
consider pertinent circumstances that have arisen since the prior sentence
was imposed].) Samoata may raise his argument with the trial court.
25
DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded for full resentencing,
including for the exercise of the trial court’s discretion under McDavid. The
judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
DO, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
IRION, J.
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