People v. Sanchez CA4/1

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Filed 7/30/24 P. v. Sanchez CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D081922

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN351546)

JOSUE ISRAEL SANCHEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Brad A. Weinreb, Judge. Affirmed.
Robert L. Hernandez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A.
Sevidal, Randall D. Einhorn and Susan Elizabeth Miller, Deputy Attorneys
General for Plaintiff and Respondent.

In 2016, a jury convicted Josue Israel Sanchez of forcible rape and oral
copulation and he was sentenced to 37 years in prison. At the sentencing
hearing, the trial court initially ordered Sanchez to pay $2,620 in victim
restitution pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4. However, when Sanchez’s
counsel indicated he was disputing the restitution, the district attorney
withdrew the request.
In January 2023, the district attorney filed a motion for victim
restitution, requesting repayment to the California Victim Compensation
Board (Board), which had paid the victim $2,120 for relocation expenses in
2016. The court conducted a hearing on the request, and granted the motion
over Sanchez’s objections that the request was untimely and that insufficient
evidence supported the amount requested. Sanchez appeals from that order,
arguing he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel and the trial court
erred by denying his motion for new counsel. We reject Sanchez’s arguments
and affirm the order granting the restitution motion.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
“The victim rented a bedroom in an apartment for herself and her child
from Sanchez’s mother. Sanchez and his mother also lived in the apartment
and shared the kitchen and the bathroom with the victim,” while the victim
stayed in the apartment’s only bedroom. (People v. Sanchez (May 10, 2018,
D071450) [nonpub. opn.] (Sanchez).) About a week after she moved in, after
returning to the apartment with a friend after an evening out, Sanchez
attacked the victim and forcibly raped her vaginally and orally. (Ibid.)
After the violent attack, the victim fled the apartment and called the
friend she had been with earlier that night. He came over, and when the
victim explained she had been raped, the friend called the police. (Sanchez,
supra, D071450.) Sanchez was arrested later that night near the apartment.
(Ibid.) The victim was taken to the hospital for a sexual assault examination.

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DNA testing from samples taken during the exam showed Sanchez’s sperm in
several locations on the victim’s body. (Ibid.)
Sanchez was charged with and convicted of forcible rape (Pen. Code,

§ 261, subd. (a)(2)1) and forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)). In
addition, the trial court found true allegations of a prior serious felony (§ 667,
subd. (a)) and a strike prior (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, 668). Sanchez
was sentenced to a total term of 37 years in prison. The trial court also
imposed various fines and fees. It initially ordered restitution pursuant to
section 1202.4 to the victim in the amount of $2,620. However, when
Sanchez’s counsel indicated he disputed the requested victim restitution and
asked for a hearing, the district attorney withdrew the request for restitution
and the court did not order restitution to be paid to the victim. Thereafter,
Sanchez appealed, and this court rejected Sanchez’s arguments and affirmed
the judgment. (Sanchez, supra, D071450.)
Years later, in January 2023, the district attorney filed a motion for
victim restitution, requesting compensation to the Board, which paid the
victim $2,120 for relocation expenses in 2016. The district attorney
submitted a certified record of $2,120 paid by the Board to the victim, as well
as a lease entered in 2016 showing the victim’s monthly rent of $1,060, and a
security deposit of the same amount. The motion also included a mental
health provider relocation verification form in accordance with
section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(I).

1 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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At the start of the hearing for the victim restitution motion, Sanchez

requested a Marsden hearing.2 During the closed session, Sanchez told the
court that his counsel had represented him at trial and that he was
challenging that representation as ineffective in a pending petition for habeas
corpus relief in federal court. Sanchez also stated he believed his counsel was
lying to him, that he had been wrongly convicted, and that she had “never
done her job.” Sanchez’s counsel responded that she had met with Sanchez
about the pending motion and the documents submitted by the district
attorney from the Board. She stated she intended to challenge the restitution
request on the grounds of untimeliness. She also told the court she was
aware of the habeas corpus petition filed by Sanchez, and that she had no
opposition if the court wanted to appoint a new attorney for Sanchez.
Sanchez responded that the victim had no documentation to support
the restitution that had been paid to her, he had discovered this problem, and
asserted his counsel had a conflict of interest because of his habeas corpus
petition. The trial court then denied Sanchez’s Marsden motion, finding
there was no irreparable conflict or breakdown in the attorney-client
relationship that rendered counsel “unable to perform her duties with respect
to the issue of restitution.”
When the court resumed the hearing on the restitution request, the
prosecutor explained she had submitted documentation in support of the
motion for victim restitution. Sanchez’s counsel then objected to the request
on the ground it was not timely, it was based on hearsay, and the amount
requested was not supported by the evidence. The court responded that the
timeliness argument was “an interesting issue” and asked Sanchez’s counsel

2 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 123 (Marsden)

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if she wanted a continuance to submit a written brief in opposition. Defense
counsel declined and stated she “would like to argue the issue.”
Sanchez’s counsel then argued that the People’s failure to pursue
victim restitution at the time of sentencing foreclosed its present request,
which was filed seven years after sentencing. She also asserted there was
insufficient evidence that the disbursement to the victim from the Board “was
actually connected to the conduct alleged.”
In response, the district attorney stated that the restitution request
was timely because there is no restriction on when restitution can be sought
once jurisdiction has been established, and the state constitution makes clear
that failure on the part of the prosecutor or the court at the time of
sentencing to order restitution does not defeat a victim’s constitutional right
to restitution. The district attorney explained that the documentation he
submitted showed that the Board had helped the victim with costs to relocate
to a new apartment after the attack by Sanchez in their shared apartment.
The district attorney also asserted the court had discretion to consider the
documentation provided by the Board, which was made under penalty of
perjury, and that the document was not hearsay under section 1203.1d,

subdivision (d).3
Sanchez’s counsel then argued that while a request by the actual victim
might not have a time limit to seek restitution, the Board, a government
agency, could be subject to an untimeliness challenge. She argued that while

3 That provision states that for purposes of determining the amount of
victim restitution to be ordered, “[d]ocumentary evidence, such as bills,
receipts, repair estimates, insurance payment statements, payroll stubs,
business records, and similar documents relevant to the value of the stolen or
damaged property, medical expenses, and wages and profits lost shall not be
excluded as hearsay evidence.” (§ 1203.1d, subd. (d).)

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courts should be sympathetic to compensating victims, a government agency
should be held to a higher standard. The district attorney responded that
section 1202.4 makes clear that the Board is considered a direct victim, to be
afforded the same rights as the actual victim.
The court noted that the prosecution had delayed seeking
recompensation for the restitution paid to the victim, that the district
attorney carried the burden to show the restitution sought was supported by
a preponderance of the evidence, and that the Board qualified as a victim for
restitution purpose. The court then found the delay in seeking the funds
from Sanchez did not invalidate the victim restitution required under the
law, the prosecution had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that
$2,120 was an appropriate award, and there was a nexus between the
amount requested by the Board and the expenses the victim incurred as a
result of the crimes committed against her by Sanchez. Accordingly, the
court ordered restitution in the amount of $2,120 to be paid to the Board.
Sanchez filed a timely notice of appeal from the court’s order.
DISCUSSION
I
Sanchez first contends his trial counsel was ineffective at the
restitution hearing because she failed to file a written brief on the issue of the
timeliness of the restitution request and failed to challenge the amount of
restitution sought by the district attorney. The Attorney General responds
that Sanchez has not shown ineffective assistance of counsel because there is
no existing law that supports Sanchez’s assertion that the district attorney’s
restitution motion was untimely, and the evidence presented by the district
attorney in support of the motion was sufficient to support the court’s order.
We agree with the Attorney General.

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A
“Under both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and article I, section 15, of the California Constitution, a criminal defendant
has the right to the assistance of counsel.” (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43
Cal.3d 171, 215.) That right “entitles the defendant not to some bare
assistance but rather to effective assistance.” (Ibid.) A defendant claiming
ineffective assistance of counsel has the burden to show: (1) counsel’s
performance was deficient, falling below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and (2) the deficient
performance resulted in prejudice. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S.
668, 687; Ledesma, at pp. 216, 218.) Prejudice is shown when “there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Strickland,
at p. 694.)
Both the California Constitution and the Penal Code mandate
restitution for victims of crime for losses that are incurred as a result of a
defendant’s criminal conduct. (Cal. Const., art I, § 28; § 1202.4.) The
defendant has a right to a hearing on the amount of such restitution. At that
hearing the person seeking restitution has the burden of showing the
justification for restitution. Once a proper showing has been made the
burden shifts to the defendant to refute the claim for restitution. (People v.
Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 664; People v. Fulton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th
876, 886–887.) The burden of proof at a restitution hearing is a
preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Holmberg (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th
1310, 1319–1320.)

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B
Sanchez argues his trial counsel was constitutionally deficient in her
representation of him at the restitution hearing because she did not
adequately prepare for the hearing, and she declined the court’s offer to
submit a written brief on the issue of the timeliness of the motion for
restitution. Sanchez also asserts that his attorney was ineffective because
she did not challenge the amount of restitution sought. Sanchez contends
there was no “conceivable tactical justification for” these failures, and that he
was prejudiced by them.
In response to these arguments, the Attorney General contends
Sanchez’s trial counsel was not ineffective because there is no law supporting
his claim that the restitution request was untimely, a fact made clear by his
appellate briefing, which does not provide legal support for that claim.
Further, the failure of trial counsel to provide additional argument on this
issue is explained by the fact that victim restitution is mandatory under the
state’s constitution. Finally, the Attorney General contends that Sanchez’s
trial counsel could have reasonably decided to focus on timeliness and
hearsay at the hearing, and not the amount of restitution at issue since the
documentation submitted by the district attorney made challenging the
amount futile. These arguments are well taken.
With respect to the timeliness of the district attorney’s motion, the
California Constitution mandates victim restitution “ ‘in every case ... in
which a crime victim suffers a loss.’ (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28,
subd. (b)(13)(B).)” (People v. Baudoin (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1184, 1188.) The
statute implementing this constitutional mandate, section 1202.4, contains
no time limitation on this requirement. Further, any sentence without such
an award is invalid, and correctable at any time under section 1202.46. The

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statute provides that “a victim, the district attorney, or a court on its own
motion” may request a “correction, at any time, of a sentence when the
sentence is invalid due to the omission of a restitution order or fine pursuant
to Section 1202.4.” (§ 1202.46.)
Further, as the Attorney General points out, Sanchez’s briefing
concedes he is “not aware at this time of any authority for the proposition
that a victim restitution claim may be time barred, other than in the case of
the restitution being imposed as a condition of probation.” Given this
absence of authority, it was reasonable for Sanchez’s trial counsel to make
the tactical decision not to request additional time to brief the issue of
timeliness. Thus, her failure to do so did not constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel. (See People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 936 [to succeed on
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “[i]t must ... appear that the
omission or omissions were not attributable to a tactical decision which a
reasonably competent, experienced criminal defense attorney would make”].)
Likewise, with respect to the amount of restitution requested, sufficient
evidence presented by the district attorney supported the request; it was
reasonable for Sanchez’s counsel to avoid this issue. The documentation
provided by the Board showed that the victim moved out of the apartment
where Sanchez lived and where the crimes occurred for her safety and mental
well-being. The lease showed her new monthly rent and security deposit in
the amount requested ($2,120), and the request was verified in 2016 by a
mental-health treatment provider as required by section 1202.4,

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subdivision (f)(3)(I).4 The mental health provider stated relocation was
necessary to prevent the victim from “living in fear” and continuing to
“experience the effects of the trauma,” including “hypervigilance, sleep
problems, loss of appetite, depression symptoms, and headache.” Given these
facts, the failure of Sanchez’s trial counsel to challenge the amount of
restitution requested was reasonable. Accordingly, we reject Sanchez’s
assertion that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective.
II
Sanchez next contends that the trial court erred by denying his request
for a different appointed attorney. The Attorney General responds that
Sanchez has not shown the court’s denial of his request was an abuse of its
discretion. Again, we agree with the Attorney General.
A criminal defendant has no absolute right to substitute appointed
counsel. (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 803, citing Marsden,
supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 123.) A party is entitled to a new attorney following a
Marsden motion if he or she shows (1) his or her attorney is not providing
adequate representation or (2) the party and his or her counsel have
developed such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is
likely to result. (People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 599 (Taylor).) A
court hearing a Marsden motion has broad discretion in determining whether

4 That provision states in full: “Expenses incurred by an adult victim in
relocating away from the defendant, including, but not limited to, deposits for
utilities and telephone service, deposits for rental housing, temporary lodging
and food expenses, clothing, and personal items. Expenses incurred pursuant
to this section shall be verified by law enforcement to be necessary for the
personal safety of the victim or by a mental health treatment provider to be
necessary for the emotional well-being of the victim.” (§ 1202.4,
subd. (f)(3)(I).)

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the defendant has established either inadequate representation or
irreconcilable conflict. (People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 696.)
When a defendant seeks to discharge appointed counsel, and have
another attorney appointed, the trial court must let the defendant explain the
basis of the contention and relate specific instances of the attorney’s
inadequate performance. (Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 124.) We review
the court’s denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion. (Taylor, supra, 48
Cal.4th at p. 599.) “Denial is not an abuse of discretion ‘unless the defendant
has shown that a failure to replace counsel would substantially impair the
defendant’s right to assistance of counsel.’ ” (Ibid.; see also People v. Panah
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 431.)
Here, the trial court concluded there was not a breakdown in Sanchez’s
relationship with his trial counsel that impaired her ability to assist Sanchez
with respect to the restitution hearing. This decision was not an abuse of the
court’s discretion. Rather, the record before this court shows that Sanchez’s
counsel met with him before the hearing and went over the documents
submitted by the Board showing the disbursement to the victim of $2,120 in
2016. Defense counsel also told Sanchez she was planning on challenging the
restitution request on grounds of untimeliness and hearsay. While counsel
acknowledged that Sanchez had raised an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim against her based on her representation at trial, she did not state that
this prevented her from representing Sanchez zealously with respect to the
very narrow issue of victim restitution.
Sanchez also asserts that the court’s denial of his Marsden motion
violated his fundamental right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. This
argument is also not well-taken. When an indigent defendant is appointed
counsel, preference for a different lawyer is insufficient to support a federal

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constitutional claim unless a conflict between counsel and client is so great
that it “resulted in a total lack of communication or other significant
impediment that resulted in turn in an attorney-client relationship that fell
short of that required by the Sixth Amendment.” (Schell v. Witek (9th Cir.
2000) 218 F.3d 1017, 1026.) Mere friction between counsel and client or
disagreement on strategy does not constitute a “ ‘total lack of communication
such that the defendant [is] unable to present a defense.’ ” (United States v.
McDaniel (C.D.Cal. 1998) 995 F.Supp. 1095, 1097.) Here, Sanchez makes no
argument that there was a lack of communication with his counsel or that his
counsel impaired his ability to present his defense with respect to victim
restitution.
In sum, the court was well within its discretion to reject Sanchez’s bare
assertion that the relationship between himself and defense counsel was so
impaired that counsel could not represent him in this proceeding.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

RUBIN, J.

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