CourtListener 10015355•People v. Mendez CA2/2
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Filed 7/26/24 P. v. Mendez CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B330826
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA058263)
v.
JOSE ALEX MENDEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. David Walgren, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Maggie Shrout, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and David A. Voet,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________
Jose Alex Mendez appeals the denial of a recommendation
by the secretary of the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) for recall and resentencing under Penal
Code1 section 1172.1.2 He contends the trial court abused its
discretion by declining to strike his sentence enhancements
without consideration of the applicable mitigating circumstances
enumerated in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)’s new guidelines.
(Senate Bill No. 81 (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1).) The People agree
that remand to the trial court is necessary, but not because the
court erred in failing to apply section 1385, subdivision (c)(2).
Rather, respondent asserts that the trial court abused its
discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard in declining to
recall appellant’s sentence, leaving the original final judgment
undisturbed. The People therefore contend that the matter
should be remanded for the trial court to apply the correct
standard under section 1172.1 in determining whether to recall
appellant’s sentence pursuant to the CDCR’s recommendation.
We agree with respondent and remand to permit the trial
court to apply the proper standard in determining whether to
recall appellant’s sentence, as set forth in section 1172.1,
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 In 2019 the CDCR made its recommendation for recall
and resentencing pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (d)(1).
Assembly Bill No. 1540 (Stats. 2021, ch. 719, §§ 1–7, effective
Jan. 1, 2022) moved the recall and resentencing provisions of
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) to new section 1170.03. (People v.
Pierce (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1074, 1078.) Effective June 30,
2022, Assembly Bill No. 200 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 9) renumbered
section 1170.03 as section 1172.1, without substantive change.
(Ibid.)
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subdivision (b)(2). Should the trial court recall appellant’s
sentence on remand, the court is further directed to apply the
considerations set forth in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), in
making its determination of whether dismissal of any of the
enhancements would be in furtherance of justice.
PROCEDURAL3 BACKGROUND
In 2008, appellant was convicted by a jury of 12 counts of
second degree robbery (§ 211) and one count of attempted second
degree robbery (§§ 664/211), with findings of personal weapon use
on 12 of the 13 counts (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). Appellant’s
sentence of 60 years 4 months consisted of 13 years 8 months on
the 13 counts of conviction, plus 46 years 8 months on the
weapon enhancements. This court affirmed the judgment in
People v. Mendez (Jul. 21, 2010, B214453 [nonpub. opn.]),
rejecting appellant’s claim on appeal that the sentence was
excessive.
In 2019, the secretary of the CDCR notified the trial court
it was authorized to modify appellant’s sentence by striking one
or more of the firearm enhancements pursuant to section
12022.53, subdivision (h). The secretary recommended a recall of
appellant’s sentence and resentencing in accordance with section
1172.1 (former section 1170, subdivision (d)). The trial court
denied the CDCR recommendation without providing the parties
notice or an opportunity to be heard. On appeal, we reversed and
remanded with instructions to allow the parties to submit
briefing and supplement the CDCR’s recommendation with
3 Because this appeal raises no issues concerning the facts
of the underlying offenses, we omit a statement of facts. (See
People v. White (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 914, 916, fn. 2.)
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additional relevant information. We further directed the trial
court, upon receipt of this information, to exercise its discretion
whether to recall appellant’s sentence.
The trial court conducted a hearing on April 28, 2023.
Following argument, the trial court again declined to recall
appellant’s sentence, declaring that recall and resentencing
would not be in the interest of justice.
DISCUSSION
I. Remand Is Required to Permit the Trial Court to
Apply the Correct Standard Under Section 1172.1 to
the Decision of Whether to Recall the Sentence
Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion and
prejudicially erred by declining to dismiss the enhancements
without giving due consideration to the mitigating factors
enumerated under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2),
subparagraphs (A) through (I). The People counter that because
the trial court refused to take the first step of recalling
appellant’s sentence, the court had no occasion to resentence
appellant or exercise its discretion to dismiss one or more of the
firearm enhancements based on any applicable mitigating
factors. (See Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 456
[under former § 1170, subd. (d), resentencing occurs only after
“the sentence and commitment have validly been recalled”].)
Nevertheless, according to respondent, although the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in failing to apply the new sentencing
factors under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), the court erred by
applying the wrong legal standard to its decision not to recall the
sentence. Remand is therefore necessary for the trial court to
determine whether to recall appellant’s sentence pursuant to the
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CDCR’s recommendation by applying the correct standard under
section 1172.1. We agree.
A. The trial court’s ruling
After hearing argument from the parties, the trial court
noted that appellant was not a youthful offender, but “a 36-year-
old grown man on felony probation when he committed these
crimes, terroriz[ing] a community for 48 days at least.” The court
observed that the jury had found under section 12022.53,
subdivision (b) that appellant personally used a gun in each of
these crimes. In recounting “the magnitude of this crime spree,”
the court also emphasized that these were 13 separate violent
acts, during which appellant often threatened the victims with
injury or death. The court stated that appellant was convicted on
all charges after denying any involvement in the crimes, and the
trial court, after hearing all the evidence, exercised its discretion
in sentencing appellant to 60 years 4 months in prison. Finally,
the court observed that despite the lengthy sentence, the CDCR
had determined appellant would be eligible for parole in
February 2027, after serving only about 18 years of his sentence.
The trial court commended appellant for his good behavior
in prison and for “taking advantage of the education programs
and the positive programming that the prison system offers.”
Nevertheless, the court explained, “I still have to determine is
this in the interest of justice where 13 people were literally
threatened with and in fear of being murdered if they didn’t turn
over the money or property requested.” The court concluded,
“[Appellant] received a just sentence that reflects the heinous
nature of the crimes that occurred over 48 days. Again, if he
served the entire 60 years, that is about four and a half years per
armed robbery where people literally felt they were about to be
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murdered. [¶] Based on all that, the court finds it would clearly
not be in the interest of justice to recall and resentence
[appellant]. The court declines to follow the recommendation of
the secretary of the CDCR, and the court denies the 1172.1
motion to recall and resentence [appellant].”
B. The trial court abused its discretion by applying an
incorrect legal standard when it declined to recall
appellant’s sentence and consider striking the
enhancements
We review the trial court’s decision not to recall a sentence
under section 1172.1 for abuse of discretion. (People v. E.M.
(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1082.) A court abuses its discretion
when it bases its decision on impermissible factors or applies an
incorrect legal standard. (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139,
156.)
Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) authorizes a court, “at
any time upon the recommendation of the secretary [of the
CDCR] . . . [to] recall the sentence and commitment previously
ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if
they had not previously been sentenced.” (People v. McMurray
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1035, 1040 [“The CDCR recommendation
furnishes the court with jurisdiction it would not otherwise have
to recall and resentence and is ‘an invitation to the court to
exercise its equitable jurisdiction’ ”].) Subdivision (b)(2) further
provides that where the recall and resentencing request
originates from the CDCR, “[t]here shall be a presumption
favoring recall and resentencing of the defendant, which may
only be overcome if a court finds the defendant currently poses an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in
subdivision (c) of Section 1170.18.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2); People
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v. Pierce, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1078.) As our Supreme
Court has explained, “ ‘ “unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety” means an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will
commit a new violent felony within the meaning of’ section 667,
subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv). (§ 1170.18, subd. (c).) The cited
subdivision of section 667 identifies eight types of particularly
serious or violent felonies, known colloquially as ‘super strikes.’ ”
(People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 351.)
In declining to recall appellant’s sentence pursuant to the
CDCR recommendation in this case, the trial court made no
finding that appellant “currently poses an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety.” Instead, after describing the facts of the
case, emphasizing that the sentence properly reflected “the
heinous nature of the crimes,” and commending appellant on his
progress in prison, the court declared its duty to determine if
recall and resentencing is “in the interest of justice.” The court
went on to conclude that, “based on the totality of circumstances,”
recall and resentencing in this case “would be contrary to justice.”
By failing to find appellant currently poses an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, the trial court
abused its discretion by applying an erroneous legal standard to
deny recall and resentencing. Remand is necessary to permit the
trial court to apply the correct standard in determining whether
recall and resentencing is warranted in appellant’s case.
II. Should the Trial Court Recall the Sentence on
Remand, It Must Then Determine Whether to
Dismiss Any of the Enhancements by Applying
the Section 1385, Subdivision (c)(2) Guidelines
In addition to the presumption in favor of recall and
resentencing where the CDCR has made a recommendation to
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the court (§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2)), section 1172.1 also provides that
“[t]he court, in recalling and resentencing under this subdivision,
shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply
any changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial
discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to
promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(2); see
People v. McMurray, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 1040 [Assembly
Bill No. 1540 “clarifie[d] the required procedures including that,
when recalling and resentencing, the court ‘shall . . . apply any
changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial
discretion’ ”].)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 81 added
subdivision (c) to section 1385 to provide: “Notwithstanding any
other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the
furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that
enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(1).) “In exercising its discretion under this subdivision,
the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence
offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating
circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of
the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly
in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds
that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public
safety.”4 (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2); see People v. Sek (2022) 74
4 Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) identifies nine mitigating
circumstances in subparagraphs (A) through (I):
8
Cal.App.5th 657, 674 [Sen. Bill No. 81 “amended section 1385 to
specify factors that the trial court must consider when deciding
whether to strike enhancements . . . in the interest of justice”].)
The statute specifically defines “ ‘Endanger public safety’ ” to
mean “there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement
would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.”
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2); Stats. 2021, ch. 721.)
“(A) Application of the enhancement would result in a
discriminatory racial impact as described in paragraph (4) of
subdivision (a) of Section 745.
“(B) Multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case. In
this instance, all enhancements beyond a single enhancement
shall be dismissed.
“(C) The application of an enhancement could result in a
sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement
shall be dismissed.
“(D) The current offense is connected to mental illness.
“(E) The current offense is connected to prior victimization
or childhood trauma.
“(F) The current offense is not a violent felony as defined in
subdivision (c) of Section 667.5.
“(G) The defendant was a juvenile when they committed
the current offense or any prior offenses, including criminal
convictions and juvenile adjudications, that trigger the
enhancement or enhancements applied in the current case.
“(H) The enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is
over five years old.
“(I) Though a firearm was used in the current offense, it
was inoperable or unloaded.”
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In the instant case, if the trial court recalls appellant’s
sentence on remand, section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(2) compels
the court to observe section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)’s guidelines in
considering whether to resentence appellant and dismiss one or
more of the enhancements.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation’s recommendation to recall
appellant’s sentence and resentence him is reversed. The matter
is remanded to the trial court with directions to reconsider the
recommendation in accordance with the requirements of Penal
Code section 1172.1.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
CHAVEZ, J.
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