People v. Aston CA4/1

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Filed 7/25/24 P. v. Aston CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D081963

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. Nos.
SCD244270, SCD223882)
PATRICK DANIEL ASTON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Eugenia A. Eyherabide, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Cindi Mishkin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Charles C.
Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, Collette C. Cavalier and James
Spradley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In September 2019, while appellant Patrick Daniel Aston was serving a
23-year eight-month prison sentence for solicitation of murder, among other
crimes, the Office of the Secretary for the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (the CDCR) recommended recall of his
sentence and resentencing under former Penal Code1 section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1). The following month, the trial court summarily denied the
recommendation without notifying the public defender’s office or holding a
hearing. In 2023, Aston renewed his request for resentencing under the same
code section, prompting additional proceedings in the trial court, including
the appointment of counsel for Aston. However, the trial court issued a
minute order taking the matter off calendar, reasoning it had denied the
CDCR’s recommendation in 2019. Aston appealed from that order, and
subsequently asked this court to construe his notice of appeal as being taken
from the 2019 denial order.
Between the 2019 denial and the 2023 proceedings in Aston’s case, the
Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats.
2021, ch. 719, §§ 1-7), which amended former section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)
and added former section 1170.03, requiring the trial court to notify a
defendant of any resentencing requests, set a status conference within 30
days of receipt of the request, and appoint counsel for the defendant. Section

1170.03 was later recodified as section 1172.1. (§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(1).)2 The
legislation also created “a presumption favoring recall and resentencing of
the defendant, which may only be overcome if a court finds the defendant
currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in
subdivision (c) of Section 1170.18.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2).)

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 “Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) . . . ‘moved the recall
and resentencing provisions of former section 1170[, subdivision] (d)(1) to new
section 1170.03.’ [Citation.] Section 1170.03 was later recodified without
substantive change as section 1172.1.” (People v. Vaesau (2023) 94
Cal.App.5th 132, 142.) We refer to the statute as section 1172.1 throughout
this opinion.
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We construe the notice of appeal as being taken from the 2019 order
and accept the Attorney General’s concession that Aston is entitled to
additional proceedings in the trial court under section 1172.1. The order is
reversed and the matter remanded with directions set forth below.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2011, Aston pleaded guilty to four burglaries. In 2013, he pleaded
guilty to solicitation of murder. In 2014, the court sentenced him to a
stipulated prison term of 23 years eight months on the two cases as follows:
for solicitation of murder, the mid-term of six years, doubled to 12 years
because of the prior strike under the “Three Strikes” law; consecutive terms
of two years eight months for one burglary; 16 months each for the other
three burglaries; and five years for a prior serious felony conviction.
In September 2019, the CDCR sent the trial court a letter granting it
authority to resentence Aston under section 1172.1. It explained that after
Aston’s sentence was imposed, the Legislature provided trial courts with
discretion “to strike prior serious felony convictions for purposes of
enhancement [under section 667, subdivision (a)(1)], or to strike the
punishment for the enhancement under this section pursuant to section
1385.” It further recommended that “Aston’s sentence be recalled and that he
be resentenced.”
On October 10, 2019, the court summarily denied the recommendation.
It directed that a copy of its order be served on the CDCR, the district
attorney, the public defender, and Aston. However, the public defender and
Aston did not receive the copy.
In February 2023, Aston renewed his motion for resentencing. The
trial court did not consider the motion. Instead, in March 2023, it took the
matter off calendar because it had “previously ruled on” it in October 2019.

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Aston appealed from that order. He subsequently requested that this
court deem his notice of appeal as constructively filed within the statutory
period to appeal from the October 10, 2019 denial order. We issued an order
denying the request as unnecessary, construing Aston’s notice of appeal from
the March 2023 minute order, and to include “any orders or judgments
related to it.”
The Attorney General in his responsive brief requests that we dismiss
this appeal, arguing the superior court’s jurisdiction to resentence Aston
expired once it issued the October 10, 2019 denial order and, therefore, the
2023 minute order taking the matter off calendar was not appealable. He
also argues, “Here, the order was final in 2019, was not appealed, and thus
was not subject to the legislative amendments in 2022. Nothing that
occurred in 2023 altered that finality.”
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law
“ ‘ “It is settled that the right of appeal is statutory and that a judgment
or order is not appealable unless expressly made so by statute.” ’ ” (Teal v.
Superior Court (2014) 60 Cal.4th 595, 598.) “[S]ection 1237, subdivision (b),
provides that a defendant may appeal from ‘any order made after judgment,
affecting the substantial rights of the party.’ ” (Ibid.) Under the common
law, trial courts traditionally lost jurisdiction over a criminal matter once
execution of the sentence began. (Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442,
455.) The predecessor statute to section 1172.1, in place when the CDCR
made its September 2019 recommendation, created a limited exception to this
rule. (Ibid.) The provision authorized a trial court, “within 120 days of the
date of commitment on its own motion, or at any time upon the
recommendation of the [CDCR] or the Board of Parole Hearings in the case of

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state prison inmates . . . [to] recall the sentence and commitment previously
ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if he or she had
not previously been sentenced, provided the new sentence, if any, is no
greater than the initial sentence.” (Former § 1170, subd. (d)(1).)
Under the predecessor statute, a defendant had no standing to request
resentencing. (People v. McCallum (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 202, 217
[defendant “could not invite the trial court to recall his sentence absent a
recommendation by the [CDCR]”].) Further, some Courts of Appeal held that
the statute did not require appointment of counsel (People v. Frazier (2020)
55 Cal.App.5th 858, 865-868) or a hearing (McCallum, at pp. 215-216) after
the trial court received a recommendation from the CDCR to recall and
resentence an inmate.
Several Courts of Appeal held, however, that due process required the
court to provide the parties notice of the CDCR recommendation, and an
opportunity to submit relevant evidence. (See, e.g., People v. Mendez (2021)
69 Cal.App.5th 347, 355; People v. Williams (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 828, 833-
834; People v. McCallum, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at pp. 218-219.) Decisional
law also established an inmate could appeal an order denying the CDCR’s
recommendation for resentencing because such a denial affected his or her
substantial rights. (People v. Frazier, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 863, fn. 2;
cf. People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1167 [inmate may appeal denial of
recommendation for compassionate release under section 1170, subd. (e)].)
Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 1540 clarified the
procedural requirements provided by the statute in response to Court of
Appeal decisions that limited its application. Under the amended statute,
“[t]he court, in recalling and resentencing under this subdivision, [must]
apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any changes in

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law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.1,
subd. (a)(2).) Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(5), sets forth a list of factors—
some permissive and some mandatory—for the court to consider in recalling
the defendant’s sentence and resentencing.
Further, under the new statute, “[r]esentencing shall not be denied, nor
a stipulation rejected, without a hearing where the parties have an
opportunity to address the basis for the intended denial or rejection.”
(§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(9).) Moreover, the trial court must provide notice to the
defendant, set a status hearing within 30 days of receiving the CDCR’s
recommendation, and appoint counsel to represent the defendant. (Id.,
subd. (b)(1).) The statute includes a presumption favoring recall and
resentencing, which may only be overcome if the court finds the defendant
currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as defined in
section 1170.18 subdivision (c). (§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2).)
II. Dismissal Request
We first consider the Attorney General’s request to dismiss Aston’s
appeal from the March 2023 minute order. The Attorney General argues that
once the trial court denied the CDCR’s resentencing recommendation on
October 10, 2019, it lost jurisdiction to rule on Aston’s motion for
resentencing. The Attorney General further asserts the minute order is not
appealable under section 1237, subdivision (b) as an order made after
judgment, affecting Aston’s substantial rights. He also argues Aston failed to
show that any deficiency in the 2019 proceedings extended the court’s
jurisdiction to the 2023 minute order.
We agree the trial court’s March 2023 minute order taking the matter
off calendar is not an appealable order. Once execution of Aston’s sentence

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began after his resentencing in 2014, the court lacked jurisdiction over his
case. The court regained jurisdiction when it received the letter from the
CDCR recommending it resentence Aston. But after it summarily denied the
CDCR’s recommendation, its jurisdiction again terminated. (See People v.
Magana (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 1120, 1127-1128 [rejecting assertion that
letter from the CDCR identifying a technical error in sentence in abstract of
judgment constituted a recommendation for resentencing under section 1170,
subdivision (d) and dismissing appeal from order correcting sentence].)
III. Aston’s Request for Constructive Filing of Notice of Appeal
We next revisit our prior order denying Aston’s request to deem his
notice of appeal as constructively filed within the statutory period to appeal
from the October 10, 2019 order denying the CDCR’s recommendation. (See
Delmonico v. Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 81, 83, fn. 1
[“An appellate ruling will not become the ‘law of the case’ in a pending appeal
unless it reflects a decision on the merits considered by a panel of three
justices, ultimately acquiesced in by a majority”].) We grant Aston’s
unopposed request that we deem the notice of appeal as constructively taken
from the October 10, 2019 order.
California Rules of Court, rule 8.308(a) requires a notice of appeal be
filed within 60 days after judgment has been rendered. (In re Chavez (2003)
30 Cal.4th 643, 649.) Despite this requirement, the California Supreme
Court has recognized the need for exceptions and developed the doctrine of
constructive filing of a late notice of appeal. The doctrine was first
established to protect inmates who had done everything in their power to
timely appeal, but were thwarted by the actions of prison officials. (See
People v. Slobodion (1947) 30 Cal.2d 362, 366; In re Benoit (1973) 10 Cal.3d
72, 86; see also People v. Dailey (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 101, 104; People v.

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Calloway (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 504, 506-507.) Subsequent cases recognized
the injustice of denying an appeal to a defendant who failed to timely file a
notice of appeal only because he or she was “compelled to rely on prison
authorities to assist in the preparation and mailing of his [or her] notice” and
also extended the doctrine to cases where the untimeliness of the appeal was
the result of counsel’s negligence. (In re Benoit, at p. 86; see also In re Jordan
(1992) 4 Cal.4th 116, 119 [“The prison-delivery rule ensures that an
unrepresented defendant, confined during the period allowed for the filing of
an appeal, is accorded an opportunity to comply with the filing requirements
fully comparable to that provided to a defendant who is represented by
counsel or who is not confined”].)
These decisions reflect the importance of the right to appeal. “ ‘In
California, the right . . . is granted by law to every convicted person; it is one
of the most important rights possessed by a convicted defendant, and every
legitimate element should be exercised in its favor.’ ” (In re Pickett (1972) 25
Cal.App.3d 1158, 1166.) “This state has a ‘strong public policy in favor of
hearing appeals on their merits and of not depriving a party of his right to
appeal because of technical noncompliance where he is attempting to perfect
his appeal in good faith.’ ” (Seeley v. Seymour (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 844,
853-854.) “[A]ppellate courts have the power to grant relief from default in
filing notices of appeal in proper cases. This power is to be liberally
construed to protect the right to appeal.” (People v. Ribero (1971) 4 Cal.3d 55,
65; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.821(a)(2) [“The notice of appeal must be
liberally construed”].)
Aston was precluded from filing a timely notice of appeal from the
October 10, 2019 denial of the CDCR’s recommendation to recall the sentence
and resentence him because the court failed to notify him or his counsel of the

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proceedings. Similar to the usual scenario where counsel untimely files or
entirely fails to file a notice of appeal, Aston’s untimely notice of appeal
resulted from an institutional failure on the part of the trial court. Despite
the notation in the minute order from the hearing on the CDCR’s letter
recommending resentencing, which stated, “A copy of: 1) this Minute Order
shall be served on Department of Corrections, [District Attorney, Public
Defender], and Defendant,” a copy of the order was not sent to Aston or the
public defender’s office. The record makes clear that it was not until 2023
that the public defender’s office learned of the denial.
This case is similar to those where failures of prison and court officials
resulted in an undue restriction on a defendant’s right of reasonable access to
the courts. (See In re Vallery (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1130 [incarcerated
defendant entitled to relief because the court clerk’s unawareness of
defendant’s correct address caused his mail to arrive late or not at all,
interfering with his ability to retain counsel and prosecute appeal]; In re
Fierro (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 543, 547-548 [incarcerated defendant entitled to
relief because the CDCR failed to develop procedures for promptly notifying
its own identification bureau of prisoners’ changes of address and the court
clerk failed to determine his correct address, thus he was not timely notified
his appeal was about to be dismissed]; People v. Hickok (1949) 92 Cal.App.2d
539, 541 [criminal appeal was mistakenly dismissed after notice of default
was sent to wrong attorneys].)
In one such case, People v. Olgin (1955) 137 Cal.App.2d 286, 287, 289,
the court held that an institutional, clerical error merited application of
constructive filing principles. The superior court clerk had delayed in
mailing a notice of an order, thus denying the defendant’s petition for writ of
error corum nobis. The notice did not arrive at the prison until the last day

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for filing a notice of appeal and the defendant himself did not receive the
notice until more than 10 days after the deadline had expired. (Olgin, at pp.
288-289.) The defendant promptly filed a notice of appeal and the court held
the notice constituted a constructive filing within the prescribed time limit.
(Id. at p. 289.) The court granted relief, reasoning “[o]bviously, [the
defendant] was powerless to do other than he did until he received notice of
the adverse decision, and this, through no fault of his own.” (Ibid.)
Like the defendant in People v. Olgin, supra, 137 Cal.App.2d 286, Aston
was notified of the order from the resentencing hearing only after the
deadline to file a notice of appeal had expired. In 2023, after his appointed
trial counsel notified Aston of the decision, they worked promptly to obtain
relief and filed a notice of appeal from the 2023 minute order taking the
matter off calendar. Put simply, Aston’s failure to timely file a notice of
appeal resulted from an institutional failure of the court, not any action or
inaction on his part. Accordingly, we agree with Aston that his late notice of
appeal with respect to the October 10, 2019 order should be construed as
constructively filed within the statutory time period. (See Silverbrand v.
County of Los Angeles (2009) 46 Cal.4th 106, 113-114 [“We long have
recognized a ‘well-established policy, based upon the remedial character of
the right of appeal, of according that right in doubtful cases “when such can
be accomplished without doing violence to applicable rules” ’ ”].)

IV. Merits of the Claim
Having construed the notice of appeal as applying to the trial court’s
October 10, 2019 order, we reach the merits of Aston’s challenge to that
order. Aston contends he is entitled to section 1172.1’s protections:
“Assembly Bill No. 1540 is an ameliorative law which applies retroactively to

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cases which are not final under In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740
principles.” The Attorney General concedes that if we decline to dismiss the
appeal entirely, the case should be remanded for resentencing. We accept
this concession, which has merit.
The legislative history of Assembly Bill No. 1540, shows that bill “was
intended to clarify certain aspects of former section 1170[, subdivision] (d)(1)
that the appellate courts had incorrectly interpreted, including that, ‘when a
sentence is recalled or reopened for any reason, in resentencing the defendant
trial courts must apply [“]any changes in law that reduce sentences or
provide for judicial discretion.” ’ ” (People v. McMurray (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th
1035, 1041.)
“[T]he Legislature repeatedly indicated that Assembly Bill [No.]
1540 was intended to ‘make clarifying changes’ to former section
1170[, subdivision] (d)(1), including specifying the required procedure and
guidelines when the CDCR recommends recall and resentencing. These
changes were adopted in 2021, thereby promptly addressing appellate
decisions from 2020 that had interpreted the Legislature’s intent regarding
former section 1170[, subdivision] (d)(1).” (People v. McMurray, supra, 76
Cal.App.5th at p. 1041.) Under the amended law, Aston was entitled to
notice of the CDCR’s recommendation and an opportunity to participate in
the court’s consideration of the recommendation, including the appointment
of counsel and a hearing. Accordingly, “Under the circumstances, the
appropriate remedy is to reverse and remand the matter, so that the trial
court can consider the CDCR’s recommendation to recall and resentence
[Aston] under the new and clarified procedure and guidelines of section
[1172.1].” (McMurray, at p. 1041.) “Given our conclusions, we need not

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address whether we also must reverse and remand pursuant to In re Estrada,
supra, 63 Cal.2d 740.” (McMurray, at p. 1042.)
DISPOSITION
The October 10, 2019 order declining to recall and resentence Aston is
reversed. The matter is remanded with directions that the trial court
conduct additional proceedings in accordance with section 1172.1 and
exercise its discretion to determine whether to strike the prior serious felony
enhancements under sections 667, subdivision (a)(1) and 1385.

O’ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

CASTILLO, J.

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