People v. Evans CA2/2

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Filed 7/24/24 P. v. Evans CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B334585

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA135675)
v.

DWIGHT EVANS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Laura R. Walton, Judge. Affirmed.

Sally Patrone, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, David E. Madeo, and Chung L. Mar,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

******
Dwight Evans (defendant) appeals the trial court’s
summary denial of his petition for relief under Penal Code section
1172.6.1 Because the record of conviction conclusively establishes
that defendant was the shooter of the intended murder victim
and was convicted based on his own malice in carrying out the
shooting, we affirm the summary denial of relief.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. The underlying crime
Defendant, his wife, and Antonio Barnes (Barnes) had
known each other for decades, and defendant’s wife and Barnes
had an on-again, off-again romantic relationship. Defendant and
Barnes grew up together and had both belonged to the same
gang, the Bounty Hunter Bloods.
On the municipal election day in March 2013, defendant
took his wife to the polling place where she and Barnes were to
work that day and waited for Barnes to show up. When Barnes
arrived, defendant greeted him by saying, “what’s up, player,
player” and invited him to “step outside.” Mere seconds after
Barnes followed defendant out the door, a gun was fired three
times. Moments later, Barnes stumbled back through the door,

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6, with no change in text (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10).
We therefore refer to the law formerly codified at section 1170.95
as section 1172.6.

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bleeding profusely and crying out for help. He said the shooter
was his “girl’s old man” and that he should not have been
“messing around” with her.
B. Charging, conviction, and appeal
The People charged defendant with attempted murder. (§§
187, subd. (a), 189, 664).2 The People also alleged that the
attempted murder was premeditated, that defendant personally
discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53,
subd. (d)), and that he personally inflicted great bodily injury (§
12022.7, subd. (a)).
The matter proceeded to trial. The trial court instructed
the jury (1) on the crime of attempted murder, including the
requirement that the jury find that “defendant intended to kill”
the victim; and (2) on the allegation of premeditation, including
the requirement that the jury find that “defendant acted willfully
if he intended to kill when he acted.”
A jury found defendant guilty, and found true the
allegations that the attempted murder was premeditated, that
defendant personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily
injury, and that defendant personally inflicted great bodily
injury.
The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for 50 years
to life, comprised of a base sentence of 25 years to life for the
attempted murder plus an additional 25 years to life for the

2 The People also charged defendant with being a felon in
possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and alleged that
defendant suffered three prior convictions for which he
served prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Because those
allegations are not implicated in this appeal and do not affect the
overall length of defendant’s sentence, we will not discuss them
further.

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firearm enhancement. The court struck the enhancement for the
infliction of great bodily injury and struck all three prison priors.
We affirmed the conviction on appeal, but modified the
sentence to reflect that defendant was sentenced to life with the
possibility of parole, plus 25 years to life. (People v. Evans (Feb.
2, 2017, B269394) [nonpub. opn.].)
II. Procedural Background
On April 14, 2022, defendant filed a petition seeking
resentencing under section 1172.6 and was appointed counsel.
The People filed an opposition and attached copies of the jury
instructions, the verdict forms, and this court’s 2017 opinion.
Defendant then filed a brief in support of his petition.
On September 14, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on
defendant’s petition for resentencing and denied it. The court
found defendant had not demonstrated a prima facie case that he
qualified for relief under the statute because (1) “the jurors were
not instructed on” either the “natural and probable consequences”
theory of liability, nor “felony-murder” liability; and (2) defendant
was the “actual shooter.”
Defendant filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying him
relief under section 1172.6.
In 2018, our Legislature amended the definition of
“murder” in our State to preclude a jury from “imput[ing]” the
“[m]alice” element of that crime “based solely on [a defendant’s]
participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) Our Legislature’s
purpose was to ensure that “[a] person’s culpability for murder
[is] premised upon that person’s own actions and subjective mens
rea.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (g).) As amended, liability

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for murder is limited to persons (1) who are the actual killer; (2)
who aided and abetted the actual killer in the murder (that is,
who acted with the intent to kill); or (3) who were a major
participant in the underlying felony that resulted in the killing,
but only if they also acted with reckless indifference to human
life. (§§ 118, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e).)
Section 1172.6 is the procedural vehicle by which persons
convicted of murder and of attempted murder in now-final
judgments can seek to vacate convictions that do not satisfy the
currently permissible theories for homicide liability. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a).) In assessing whether a defendant seeking relief
under section 1172.6 has made out a prima facie case warranting
an evidentiary hearing, a trial court must take the petition’s
factual allegations as true and ask “‘“whether the petitioner
would be entitled to relief if [those] allegations were proved.”’”
(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971 (Lewis).) “‘However, if
the record, including the court’s own documents [from the record
of conviction], “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in
the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner.”’” (Ibid.)
Here, the trial court properly determined that defendant
did not establish a prima facie entitlement to relief under section
1172.6 for two reasons. First, the record of conviction
conclusively establishes that defendant was the sole person
involved in the charged crime, and the jury specifically found that
defendant was the sole perpetrator when it found that he—and
not anyone else—personally discharged a firearm causing great
bodily injury. Where, as here, “the record makes clear that [a
defendant] was the actual killer [or attempted killer] and the
only participant in the killing [or attempted killing],” that

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defendant is not entitled to relief under section 1172.6 as a
matter of law. (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 233;
People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 973.) Second, the
jury found that defendant personally harbored the intent to kill
(and hence intent was not imputed to defendant by virtue of
someone else’s act). Before authorizing the jury to convict
defendant of attempted murder or to find that he acted with
premeditation, the jury instruction required the jury to find that
defendant acted with the intent to kill. The jury was never
instructed on a theory by which defendant was not the actual
attempted killer (and hence was not the person acting with the
intent to kill): There was no instruction on direct aiding and
abetting, no instruction on felony murder, and no instruction on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Where, as here,
the record does not permit conviction on a theory of imputed
malice, the defendant is not entitled to relief as a matter of law.
(E.g., People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666, 677.)
Defendant makes what boils down to three arguments in
response.
First, defendant urges that the jury instructions in his case
make it theoretically possible for his attempted murder
conviction to rest on malice imputed from the actual killer
because (1) the court instructed the jury that it could “consider
evidence of gang activity . . . for the limited purpose of deciding
whether . . . [o]ther persons had a motive and opportunity to
commit the crimes charged”; and (2) cases like People v. Langi
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972 and People v. Maldonado (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 1257 have held that summary denial of a section
1172.6 petition is inappropriate where there is a possibility the
conviction rests on imputed malice. We are unpersuaded. To be

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sure, in both Langi and Maldonado, the courts held that jury
instructions that did not explicitly allow a jury to convict the
defendant by imputing malice could do so implicitly. (Langi, at
pp. 975, 981, 983; Maldonado, at pp. 1259-1263, 1266.) But both
Langi and Maldonado involved crimes with multiple perpetrators
and jury instructions authorizing the defendant’s conviction as a
direct aider and abettor that—in light of other ambiguities in the
jury instructions—did not definitively require a finding by the
jury that the defendant personally harbored the requisite
malicious intent. Here, however, there was only one perpetrator
acting alone and no instruction authorizing the conviction of
defendant unless the jury found he was the actual shooter of the
intended victim who acted with the intent to kill. In this factual
context, any possible ambiguity in the jury instructions does not
create a possibility that the jury imputed someone else’s malice to
defendant. Section 1172.6 is a means of providing relief when a
defendant has been actually convicted on the basis of an invalid
theory of homicide; it is not an invitation to flyspeck jury
instructions in the abstract.
Second, defendant cites a number of other cases that he
asserts support his position. He is wrong. He cites People v.
Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588 for the proposition that the
jury’s finding that he personally discharged a firearm causing
great bodily injury is not conclusive proof that he acted with the
intent to kill. This is true, but doubly irrelevant because the
finding on this sentencing enhancement is conclusive proof that
he was the actual shooter, and because the jury’s conviction of
attempted murder as well as its finding that the attempted
murder was premeditated were based on a finding of intent to
kill. Defendant cites People v. Montes (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1001

7
for the proposition that being convicted of attempted murder does
not necessarily mean that he personally harbored an intent to
kill. This is true, but irrelevant because Montes—unlike this
case—involved multiple perpetrators and a natural and probable
consequences instruction; where, as here, the jury was presented
with a single perpetrator and instructed that conviction was
permissible only if that perpetrator acted with the intent to kill,
the ensuing conviction necessarily means that the defendant
personally harbored the intent to kill.
Third and lastly, defendant accuses the trial court of
making factual findings at the prima facie stage. It did not. The
court permissibly examined the record of conviction to see if that
record conclusively established that defendant was the actual
shooter and acted with the intent to kill. This was entirely
permissible under Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952 and, contrary to
what defendant belatedly asserts in his reply brief, does not
offend due process.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:

_________________________, P. J.
LUI

_________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

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