CourtListener 10005826•People v. Reyes CA2/8
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Filed 7/17/24 P. v. Reyes CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B322328
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA093232)
v.
ANDRES ESTUARDO
RECINOS REYES,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. David Walgren, Judge. Affirmed.
Emry J. Allen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and David A. Wildman, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
**********
Defendant and appellant Andres Estuardo Recinos Reyes
appeals from his conviction by jury of six felony sex offenses. He
contends the court erred in failing to grant his request to substitute
counsel and that his appointed counsel provided ineffective
assistance.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
For several years defendant lived in the same home as his
half sister, P.D., a minor who was 12 years younger than defendant.
P.D. testified that defendant repeatedly sexually assaulted her (as
often as several times a month), starting when she was four years
old. The acts usually consisted of defendant “dry humping” P.D.
(laying on top of her with his clothes on and “grind[ing]” his pelvis
against hers), inserting his fingers into her vagina or orally
copulating her. P.D. did not resist because she was afraid of
defendant and he threatened to rape her if she did.
When P.D. was 12, her mother told her they were going to be
moving out and it gave P.D. the courage to resist defendant.
Defendant was angry. After P.D. and her mother moved out of the
home, defendant exchanged numerous text and Instagram
messages with P.D. acknowledging his conduct, claiming that P.D.
liked it, insulting and threatening P.D., and demanding that she
delete all the messages. Portions of the messages were played for
the jury.
At the age of 17, P.D. learned that her five-year-old nephew
would soon be living in the same home as defendant, and she was
concerned that defendant might start molesting him. P.D. made
the decision to report what defendant had done to her. After being
interviewed by the police, P.D. agreed to make a recorded phone call
to defendant. During that call, defendant told P.D. to lie to the
police.
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When defendant was interviewed by the investigating
detectives, he made various admissions about “humping” P.D. and
also blaming her, claiming that she initiated the contacts
sometimes.
Defendant was charged with 16 felony counts: five counts of
oral copulation or sexual penetration with a child 10 years old or
younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b); counts 1, 3, 5, 7 & 9),
seven counts of lewd act upon a child 14 years old or younger (§ 288,
subd. (a); counts 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 13 & 16), two counts of oral
copulation of a child under the age of 14 and more than 10 years
younger than defendant (§ 288a, subd. (c)(1); counts 11 & 14) and
two counts of sexual penetration of a child under the age of 14 and
more than 10 years younger than defendant (§ 289, subd. (j);
counts 12 & 15). Counts 1 through 10 were alleged to have occurred
when P.D. was between six and 10 years old. Counts 11 through 16
were alleged to have occurred when she was 11 and 12 years old.
On January 31, 2022, defendant made his first request to
substitute counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d
118. The court cleared the courtroom, explained to defendant how a
Marsden hearing is conducted and assured him he could speak
freely as the record of the proceedings would be sealed and kept
confidential. Defendant said he had been waiting a long time to go
to trial and his attorney did not have a good plea offer for him,
complaining that it was always the same offer of 32 years.
Defendant also said he wanted to see the discovery produced by the
prosecutor, even though “there could be consequences” to having the
documents in his cell.
Deputy public defender Anna Brief told the court she had
represented defendant for less than a year, having been assigned
the case when the attorney previously assigned to defendant’s case
went out on leave. Ms. Brief said she understood that defendant
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had waived a fair amount of time in order to be able to have the
previous attorney return to try the case. Ms. Brief said however
that once the previous attorney did return from leave, their
supervisor refused to reassign the case back to previous counsel.
Ms. Brief clarified that the 32-year offer by the prosecutor that
defendant had rejected was no longer on the table, but that she was
negotiating to get a new offer pretrial. On the issue of discovery,
Ms. Brief said she would not allow copies of discovery to be held by
an in-custody client like defendant because of the risk of other
inmates getting the documents and fabricating a story that
defendant had confessed to them. She was also concerned about
copies of discovery getting into the hands of third parties because of
the personal and private nature of the charges involving a minor
victim.
The court explained to defendant that he was facing multiple
felonies, some of which carried life terms, and that the 32-year offer
was what the prosecutor was willing to offer in light of that
exposure and not the fault of Ms. Brief. The court also told
defendant that having discovery files in his cell was extremely risky
as another inmate could see them and then, using the facts gleaned
from those records, falsely claim he had confessed to the crimes.
Defendant told the court he could give the records to his uncle.
Ms. Brief said she was concerned defendant could waive attorney-
client privilege by allowing third parties to see any case materials.
The court denied defendant’s motion.
Defendant renewed his request to substitute counsel on
April 4, 2022. Defendant raised the same two concerns that he
raised initially. He said he did not think it was fair that he was
only being offered 32 years as a plea deal, that it was a sign of
“corruption,” and that he wanted his discovery materials which he
believed he could keep private even though he slept in an area with
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96 other inmates. Ms. Brief reiterated her concerns about releasing
materials to defendant because of the potential for other inmates to
see them. She also said again that she was trying to be honest with
defendant about his exposure in light of the numerous charges and
the admissions he had already made, and that she could not be
dishonest and just tell him what he wanted to hear. The court
again denied the motion.
Defendant’s third Marsden motion was made on April 28,
2022. Defendant based his request on the same two issues. He said
Ms. Brief was “not giving [him] any hope.” Ms. Brief told the court
that she had asked a colleague in her office who had just handled a
similar case to come speak with defendant and explain to him what
was at stake, hoping defendant might be receptive to hearing an
assessment from another attorney. Ms. Brief did not believe that
had helped defendant in making a decision about considering a plea
or proceeding to trial. The court told defendant that it was
Ms. Brief’s job to be forthright with him and that the fact she was
telling him some “hard truths does not make her an ineffective
lawyer.” The motion was denied.
The case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found defendant
guilty on counts 11 through 16 and was unable to reach a verdict on
counts 1 through 10. The court declared a mistrial on counts 1
through 10 and set a new pretrial conference on those counts.
Defendant’s request to represent himself pursuant to Faretta v.
California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 was granted.
At the sentencing hearing on counts 11 through 16, the court
imposed an 18-year prison sentence, calculated as follows: an eight-
year upper term on count 11, plus consecutive two-year terms (one-
third the midterm) on each of counts 12 through 16. Defendant was
awarded 1,192 total days of presentence custody credits
(1,037 actual, 155 conduct).
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This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
1. The Marsden Motions
Where, as here, a defendant moves to substitute his
appointed counsel pursuant to Marsden, he is entitled to the
requested relief “ ‘ “if the record clearly shows that the appointed
counsel is not providing adequate representation or that defendant
and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable
conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result.” ’ ” (People
v. Ng (2022) 13 Cal.5th 448, 500.) We review a trial court’s denial
of a Marsden motion under the deferential abuse of discretion
standard. (Ng, at p. 500.) Denial is not an abuse of discretion
unless the defendant demonstrates “ ‘ “that a failure to replace
counsel would substantially impair the defendant’s right to
assistance of counsel.” ’ ” (Ibid.) We find no abuse of discretion in
the court’s denials here.
Defendant says that his counsel was unable to identify any
defense so he needed copies of the discovery materials to review and
to discuss with counsel in preparing for trial. In support of his
argument that this failure by counsel warranted Marsden relief,
defendant cites one case on ineffective assistance, Coles v. Peyton
(4th Cir. 1968) 389 F.2d 224 (Coles), and to one passage during the
second Marsden hearing where counsel explained how difficult she
expected trial to be given defendant’s numerous admissions in the
text messages to the victim, during the phone call with the victim
and during his pretrial interview with police.
Coles does not support defendant’s contention. There, the
court faulted appointed counsel for failing to discuss with the
defendant the elements of the crime of rape under Virginia law,
which required penetration. (Coles, supra, 389 F.2d at pp. 226–
227.) The defendant had apparently described his interaction with
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the victim as “ ‘trying’ to have intercourse” and the failure of
counsel to explain the law and explore the possibility of there
having been no penetration deprived the defendant of a potentially
viable defense. (Id. at p. 227.)
Here, counsel did not fail to discuss the case with defendant
but told him he could not have copies of records to take back to his
cell because of the risk of a jailhouse snitch getting them, and
defendant did not like counsel’s assessment of how difficult trial
was going to be in light of his admissions. The trial court correctly
assessed that defendant had not shown Ms. Brief was failing to
effectively represent his interests. (People v. Taylor (2010)
48 Cal.4th 574, 600 (Taylor) [“trial court reasonably could find that
counsel had properly refused to provide defendant with the police
reports in his case because of concern the documents would fall into
the hands of a would-be jailhouse informant who might use the
police reports to fabricate evidence against defendant”].) Moreover,
defendant has not cited any law supporting his contention that the
trial court should have ordered counsel to show him the discovery in
a controlled setting in lieu of allowing him copies to keep in his cell.
Defendant also says there was a complete breakdown in the
attorney-client relationship. For instance, he says counsel’s refusal
to allow him copies of his discovery was not out of concern it would
prejudice his case but because counsel believed it would
inconvenience her, making her job more difficult. This assertion
has no basis in the record. Ms. Brief was plainly concerned about
enabling a jailhouse snitch who got access to defendant’s files to
create a false confession, and she wanted to avoid prejudicing
defendant’s position at trial. The record supports the trial court’s
finding that Ms. Brief was providing competent representation by
protecting defendant’s interests and being forthcoming with him
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about the pros and cons of going to trial despite his feelings about
her.
Defendant also said he felt “intimidated” by Ms. Brief because
she did not give him any hope for trial. Ms. Brief aptly explained
that it was her job to give defendant an honest assessment and not
simply tell him something he wanted to hear. Defendant’s vague
and generalized claim of not feeling “hope” does not demonstrate
counsel was providing ineffective assistance. (Taylor, supra,
48 Cal.4th at p. 600 [“The mere ‘ “lack of trust in, or inability to get
along with,” ’ counsel is not sufficient grounds for substitution.”].)
2. The Ineffective Assistance Claim
Defendant contends he was “actually and constructively”
denied counsel because the deterioration of their relationship
resulted in counsel’s failure to provide any factual defense to the
jury, including during closing argument. Defendant cites United
States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648 (Cronic) for the proposition
that reversal is required here because counsel did not function as a
meaningful adversary to the prosecution.
Cronic held that where “counsel entirely fails to subject the
prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has
been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary
process itself presumptively unreliable.” (Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at
p. 659.) The record does not support the application of Cronic here.
Defense counsel cross-examined P.D. regarding the details of when
and how the charged acts occurred. In closing argument, defense
counsel chose not to highlight any facts but rather implored the jury
to abide by the jury instructions and hold the prosecution to its
burden of proving “each and every element” of each count beyond a
reasonable doubt. After the jury submitted a question seeking
clarification of the instruction regarding direct and circumstantial
evidence, both sides provided supplemental argument. Defense
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counsel told the jury to focus on the evidence and whether the
victim explained all the acts “with sufficient clarity and specificity
to cause you to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that all of these
acts happened.” After deliberating further, the jury was able to
reach a verdict on counts 11 through 16, but were hung on counts 1
through 10. These proceedings support our conclusion that
defendant was not actually or constructively denied effective
assistance of counsel.
Defendant also says counsel was ineffective for failing to
disclose the discovery materials to him and in failing to challenge
the admission of his pretrial statement to police. He says he was
not read his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S.
436 before he was interviewed. The probation report indicates
defendant waived his Miranda rights and agreed to speak with the
police.
The “two-prong standard governing claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel is well settled. ‘ “ ‘In assessing claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we consider whether counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms and whether the defendant
suffered prejudice to a reasonable probability, that is, a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” ’ ” (People v.
Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 653 (Johnson); Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 693–696.)
Attorneys have broad discretion in deciding trial tactics and
in choosing “the means by which to provide constitutionally
adequate representation” to their clients. (Johnson, supra,
62 Cal.4th at p. 653.) Attorneys are entitled to a presumption that
their “performance fell within the wide range of professional
competence and that [their] actions and inactions can be explained
as a matter of sound trial strategy. Defendant thus bears the
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burden of establishing constitutionally inadequate assistance of
counsel.” (People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 391.)
The record on appeal usually does not contain any
explanation of the attorney’s strategy. (Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th
at p. 653.) For this reason, the Supreme Court “long ago adopted
the rule that ‘ “[i]f the record on appeal fails to show why counsel
acted or failed to act in the instance asserted to be ineffective,
unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide
one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation, the
claim must be rejected on appeal. [Citation.]” ’ [Citations.] The
merits of such claims are more appropriately resolved, not on the
basis of the appellate record, but rather by way of a petition for writ
of habeas corpus.” (Ibid.)
The record here is inadequate to assess defendant’s claims of
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
GRIMES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
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