People v. McCreary CA2/2

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Filed 7/17/24 P. v. McCreary CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

B327302
THE PEOPLE,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Superior Ct. No. NA110819)

v.

THOMAS TERRELL
MCCREARY,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, James D. Otto, Judge. Affirmed.
Waldemar D. Halka, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and Charles S. Lee, Deputy
Attorneys General.
Thomas McCreary (defendant) challenges his conviction of
first degree murder, arguing the trial court made prejudicial
errors in instructing the jury, the evidence was insufficient to
support first degree murder, and the transferred intent doctrine
underlying his conviction is not a valid theory of murder in
California. We conclude the court properly instructed the jury,
substantial evidence supports the conviction, and transferred
intent remains a valid doctrine under California Supreme Court
precedent. We affirm the judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The shooting
In the early morning of December 1, 2018, defendant, his
nephew Bryson Garrett, and friend Jovan “Headache” Harris
were part of a group going to their cars in a Long Beach parking
lot. Jacob Cisneros, sisters Jacqueline and Stephanie Herrera,1
and Breanna Alexander were in a Prius. Anna Perez was in
another group in a Mercedes.
After Cisneros and Jacqueline were seen leaning on
defendant’s Impala, defendant’s group confronted Cisneros’s
group. A fight broke out, during which Harris punched Cisneros,
and struck Stephanie when his fist glanced off Cisneros. The two
groups returned to their vehicles, but Alexander, angry that
Stephanie had been hit, grabbed a skateboard, ran back, and
struck defendant’s Impala several times.
From inside his Impala defendant yelled “get down” to
Garrett, then fired a shot, which hit the Impala’s ceiling.

1 As some participants share the same last name, we will
refer to them by first name. No disrespect is intended.

2
Defendant got out and fired four more shots at Alexander as she
fled. One bullet fatally struck Perez in the chest. After the
shooting, defendant got into his car and drove off.
The charges, trial, and sentencing
Defendant was charged with first degree murder and
possession of a firearm by a felon. At trial, defendant called no
witnesses. In closing argument, his attorney did not dispute
defendant was the shooter or the shooting resulted in Perez’s
death. Instructions on self-defense and defense of others were
requested and denied.
Defendant was found guilty of first degree murder and
possession of a firearm by a felon. The firearm allegation was
found true. Defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life for
murder, which was tripled to 75 years to life pursuant to the
“Three Strikes” law, plus an additional 10 years for a firearms
enhancement. For the possession of a firearm by a felon charge,
defendant received two years, doubled to four years pursuant to
the Three Strikes law. The result was a sentence to prison for 89
years to life.
Defendant filed a timely appeal of the first degree murder
conviction.2

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
Defendant contends the court erred by (1) misdescribing
the malice element when instructing the jury, (2) failing to
instruct on assault, (3) failing to instruct on involuntary
manslaughter, (4) failing to instruct on attempted voluntary

2 Defendant is not challenging his conviction for possession
of a firearm.

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manslaughter, and (5) denying defense instructions on self-
defense and imperfect self-defense. Defendant also argues the
transferred intent doctrine is unconstitutional and the
cumulative effect of these errors requires reversal.

DISCUSSION
I. There was no error in the malice instructions
Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to
instruct the jury that malice cannot be imputed solely based on
participation in a crime. Because the evidence showed defendant
was the actual shooter and not participating in the crime by
aiding and abetting another, there was no error in omitting this
instruction.
A. Standard of review
We review de novo whether a jury instruction correctly
states the law. (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.) The
trial court has a duty to instruct on general principles of law
relevant to the issues raised by the evidence and necessary for
the jury’s understanding of the case. (People v. Breverman (1998)
19 Cal.4th 142, 154 (Breverman), disapproved on another ground
by People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 260, fn. 7.)
An appellate court’s task is to decide if the trial court fully
and fairly instructed the jury on the applicable law. (People v.
Bates (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1, 9.) The correctness of jury
instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the
trial court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or a
particular instruction. (Ibid.) If reasonably possible, instructions
are interpreted to support the judgment rather than to defeat it.
(Ibid.)

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B. Analysis
It was the prosecution’s theory defendant personally
murdered Perez, under the doctrine of transferred intent, either
by shooting at Alexander with the intent to kill (express malice)
or by shooting at Alexander with a conscious disregard for life
(implied malice). The record showed defendant repeatedly firing a
gun at Alexander from close range as she fled, ultimately striking
Perez.
The jury was instructed on express and implied malice with
CALCRIM No. 520, which explained a defendant was guilty of
murder if he committed an act that caused death with “malice
aforethought,” either express or implied. The jury was also
instructed with the definition of first degree murder, CALCRIM
No. 521, and transferred intent, CALCRIM No. 562. The
instruction states the law necessary for the jury to determine
whether defendant personally harbored express or implied malice
when he shot at Alexander but killed Perez. CALCRIM No. 562,
the transferred intent instruction, explained proof that the
defendant personally acted with the intent to kill, i.e., malice,
was required.
The jury received no instruction that suggested they could
find defendant guilty of murder for participating in another’s
crime, for example, a theory of aiding and abetting liability or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine.
Section 188, subdivision (a)(3) provides “[m]alice shall not
be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in
a crime.” The plain language and legislative intent behind this
provision show it was meant to eliminate the imputation of
malice to an aider and abettor based solely on their participation
in an underlying crime under the natural and probable

5
consequences doctrine. (See People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th
830, 838-839, 842-843, superseded by statute on other grounds as
stated in People v. Glukhoy (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 576, 584.)
Section 188, subdivision (a)(3) uses the phrase
“participation in a crime,” which is naturally read to refer to
crimes committed by multiple participants. If the Legislature
meant for the provision to apply to a lone perpetrator, it could
have simply stated malice shall not be imputed “based solely on
the commission of a crime.” Instead, the statute refers to
“participation,” which implies involvement with others in an
offense. (See Black’s Law Dict. (10th ed. 2014) p. 1294, col. 1
[defining “participation” as “[t]he act of taking part in something,
such as a partnership, a crime, or a trial”].)
Here, the evidence showed defendant acted alone in the
shooting. He was the sole perpetrator, not an aider and abettor or
coparticipant. Because section 188, subdivision (a)(3) was
intended to eliminate natural and probable consequences liability
for aiders and abettors who participate with others in an
underlying crime, instructing on it would have been improper in
that it had no application to the facts of this case.
Accordingly, there was no instructional error, and the jury
was properly instructed on the mental state required for murder,
which is an intent to kill (express malice) or conscious disregard
for life (implied malice). The instructions given allowed the jury
to evaluate whether defendant personally harbored the requisite
malice. No further instruction based on section 188 was required.
II. The evidence did not warrant instructions on assault
Defendant argues the trial court erred by failing to instruct
sua sponte on assault. Assault is “an unlawful attempt, coupled

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with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of
another.” (§ 240; see People v. Licas (2007) 41 Cal.4th 362, 366.)
A trial court must instruct the jury on general principles of
law relevant to issues raised by the evidence. (Breverman, supra,
19 Cal.4th at p. 154.) However, the court is not obligated to
instruct on theories that lack substantial evidentiary support.
(Id. at p. 162.)
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to
defendant, the record lacks support for the claim he committed
an assault without an intent to kill. After Alexander struck
defendant’s car with a skateboard, defendant yelled “get down” to
his passenger, suggesting he intended to shoot at Alexander from
inside the vehicle and had formed a plan to use lethal force in
response to his car being hit by a skateboard.
Then after firing the initial shot from inside the car,
defendant got out and continued firing multiple shots at
Alexander as she ran away. One of those shots struck Perez in
the chest, killing her. The shots were fired at a level trajectory
that endangered human life. The evidence shows defendant’s act
of shooting multiple times at Alexander at close range while she
fled was an act that by its nature would foreseeably and likely
result in a fatal injury. Defendant’s actions in repeatedly
shooting at a fleeing person at a height dangerous to human life
indicates defendant acted with a purpose to kill, rather than
some other intent.
Thus, this evidence—even viewed in a light favorable to
defendant—shows he acted with an intent to kill, not to merely
commit an assault. The court did not err by omitting instructions
on assault because that theory lacked substantial evidentiary

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support. The jury was properly instructed on murder and
manslaughter, the theories that were supported by the evidence.
III. The evidence did not warrant instructions on
involuntary manslaughter
Defendant also contends the trial court erred by failing to
instruct on the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter. A
killing without malice “‘in the commission of an unlawful act, not
amounting to [a] felony’” is involuntary manslaughter. (People v.
Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 814.) The crime is a lesser
included offense of malice murder. (Id. at p. 813.) The mens rea
for involuntary manslaughter is criminal negligence. (People v.
Butler (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 998, 1006.) This exists when the
defendant engages in conduct that is “‘“aggravated, culpable,
gross, or reckless”’”; i.e., conduct that is “‘“such a departure from
what would be the conduct of an ordinarily prudent or careful
man under the same circumstances as to be incompatible with a
proper regard for human life, or, in other words, a disregard of
human life or an indifference to consequences.”’” (Id. at p. 1008.)
The trial court must instruct, sua sponte, on all theories of
a lesser included offense which find substantial support in the
evidence. (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 162.) However, the
trial court is not obligated to instruct on theories that have no
such evidentiary support. (Ibid.) “‘Substantial evidence’ in this
context is ‘“evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable
[persons] could . . . conclude[]”’ that the lesser offense, but not the
greater, was committed.” (Ibid.) We review the issue de novo and
independently determine whether a lesser included offense
instruction should have been given. (People v. Avila (2009) 46
Cal.4th 680, 705.)

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The record does not contain substantial evidence defendant
killed without malice in the course of a criminally negligent
unlawful act. Instead, the record shows defendant purposely fired
multiple shots at close range at Alexander as she fled in a public
parking lot. Such conduct created a high risk of death and
showed defendant acted with a deliberate intent to kill. He did
not shoot by accident while waving a loaded gun at Alexander but
purposefully acted to take her life. There is no substantial
evidence that defendant acted without any realization his
conduct posed a risk to life.
It was thus not error to omit an involuntary manslaughter
instruction.
IV. An instruction on attempted voluntary manslaughter
was not warranted by the evidence
Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to
instruct the jury if they found defendant attempted to engage in
the voluntary manslaughter of Alexander, his criminal liability
for Perez’s death would be voluntary manslaughter under the
transferred intent doctrine.
A trial court is required to instruct the jury on general
principles of law relevant to issues raised by the evidence.
(Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 154.) However, the court is
not obligated to instruct on theories that lack substantial
evidentiary support. (Id. at p. 162.)
Voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of
murder when the requisite mental element of malice is precluded
by heat of passion or an unreasonable self-defense. (People v.
Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 133.) The jury here was instructed
on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter and transferred
intent. Thus, if the jury had found defendant acted under heat of

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passion when he shot at Alexander under the instructions given,
it would have reduced the murder to voluntary manslaughter.
The killing of Perez then would have been voluntary
manslaughter under the transferred intent as it defines the crime
as the “same as if the intended person had been killed.”3 No
further instruction was required.
The jury was thus instructed on the pertinent theories of
murder and manslaughter as supported by the evidence. There
was no instructional error.
V. It was not error to deny defendant’s request for self-
defense and imperfect self-defense instructions
Defendant contends the court should have instructed on
self-defense because the evidence showed Alexander committed
felony assault with a deadly weapon by striking his car with a
skateboard, allowing defendant to defend himself and his
passengers from the ongoing threat posed even as Alexander fled.
This argument lacks merit.
A. Applicable legal principles
“For killing to be in self-defense, the defendant must
actually and reasonably believe in the need to defend.” (People v.
Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082.) “If the belief
subjectively exists but is objectively unreasonable, there is
‘imperfect self-defense,’ i.e., ‘the defendant is deemed to have
acted without malice and cannot be convicted of murder,’ but can
be convicted of manslaughter.” (Ibid.)

3 CALCRIM No. 562 provides “[i]f the defendant intended to
kill one person, but by mistake or accident killed someone else
instead, then the crime, if any, is the same as if the intended
person had been killed.”

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“The subjective elements of self-defense and imperfect self-
defense are identical. Under each theory, the appellant must
actually believe in the need to defend himself against imminent
peril to life or great bodily injury. To require instruction on either
theory, there must be evidence from which the jury could find
that appellant actually had such a belief.” (People v. Viramontes
(2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1262.)
“A trial court has no duty to instruct the jury on a
defense . . . unless the defense is supported by substantial
evidence.” (People v. Curtis (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1355.)
B. No substantial evidence of self-defense or
imperfect self-defense
The trial court properly denied instructions on self-defense
and imperfect self-defense because the record lacked substantial
evidence to support these theories. What the evidence established
was after a verbal confrontation between the two groups,
Alexander hit the windows of defendant’s car, but did not break
them. In response, defendant yelled “get down” to his passenger,
fired a shot inside the car, exited, and then rapidly fired multiple
shots at Alexander as she fled.
There was no evidence that Alexander’s act of striking
defendant’s car with a skateboard caused defendant to fear
imminent death or great bodily injury requiring an immediate
lethal response or that Alexander verbally threatened defendant,
displayed any weapons besides the skateboard, or had any ability
to inflict serious harm on the occupants inside the car.
No evidence was presented that defendant subjectively
feared for his life when he shot at Alexander. Moreover,
defendant continued shooting at Alexander after she ran away,
when any conceivable threat had ceased. Defendant argues he

11
was still justified in shooting at Alexander as she fled because
she had not left the scene and could have returned with armed
associates. This argument rests on sheer speculation. There is no
evidence Alexander said or did anything suggesting she would
return with others to attack.
Defendant also contends he was shooting merely to frighten
Alexander rather than kill her. However, firing multiple
gunshots at a fleeing person at a level and angle endangering
human life does not support a reasonable inference defendant
was merely trying to scare Alexander rather than shoot her. On
this record, we find no substantial evidence defendant actually
believed in the need for self-defense, either reasonably or
unreasonably. Objectively, the circumstances showed defendant
faced no imminent threat of death or great bodily injury, and no
evidence suggested he subjectively feared such harm.
Accordingly, the court did not err by refusing to instruct on self-
defense or imperfect self-defense.
VI. Sufficient evidence supports the first degree murder
conviction
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence of
premeditation and deliberation to support his first degree murder
conviction. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the
judgment, we conclude otherwise, that substantial evidence does
support the jury’s first degree murder verdict.
A. Standard of review
For first degree murder, the prosecution is required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted with
premeditation and deliberation. (§ 189, subd. (a) [defining first
degree murder to include “any other kind of willful, deliberate,
and premeditated killing”].) “‘“Deliberation” refers to careful

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weighing of considerations in forming a course of action;
“premeditation” means thought over in advance.’” (People v.
Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 424.) “‘“The process of
premeditation and deliberation does not require any extended
period of time. ‘The true test is not the duration of time as much
as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each
other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be
arrived at quickly.’”’” (Ibid.)
The California Supreme Court has identified three
guideposts bearing on whether a defendant has acted with
premeditation and deliberation: (1) the defendant’s motive, (2)
any planning activity, and (3) the manner of killing. (People v.
Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th 256, 276.) In evaluating whether there is
sufficient evidence to sustain a jury’s findings of premeditation
and deliberation, we examine whether the record, viewed in the
light most favorable to the verdicts, contains “evidence which is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value from which a rational
trier of fact could find [the] defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (Cage, at p. 275.)
B. Analysis
Here, there is substantial evidence of all the necessary
factors supporting the jury’s finding that defendant acted with
premeditation and deliberation.
1. Motive
First, prior to the shooting, defendant had confronted
Cisneros and Jacqueline for merely leaning against his car.
Defendant’s hostile reaction to this relatively minor infringement
on his property showed his quick temper and willingness to
escalate conflict. Alexander then engaged in the more serious act
of intentionally striking the windows of defendant’s car with a

13
skateboard. From this, the jury could reasonably infer that
defendant, already outraged by others touching his car, was
provoked to use lethal force by Alexander’s attack on his car. The
evidence of defendant’s propensity for violence provides a motive
for defendant’s decision to shoot at Alexander and kill Perez.
2. Planning
Second, rather than immediately firing on Alexander in an
unconsidered impulse, defendant first took steps suggesting he
was weighing his course of action. Defendant readied his firearm
and shouted a warning to “get down” so his nephew could duck.
The jury could reasonably find this conduct reflected a plan to
ensure his nephew was out of the line of fire so defendant could
clearly aim and shoot at Alexander. Moreover, defendant then got
out of the vehicle to continue shooting at Alexander. The jury
could reasonably deduce defendant used this pause between shots
to position himself for a more clear and accurate angle to fire and
thus ensure he could hit his target. This sequence of events, with
defendant readying his gun, warning his passenger, moving into
a better shooting position, support the conclusion defendant was
planning and reflecting on his intention to shoot and kill
Alexander, rather than acting rashly.
3. Manner of killing
Third, the manner of shooting showed a preconceived
design to take Alexander’s life. Although Alexander posed no
threat to defendant once she fled, defendant nevertheless fired
multiple shots at her retreating figure. He specifically shot at a
level trajectory endangering human life, resulting in a bullet
striking Perez in the chest. From the evidence of defendant
continuing to fire at a fleeing victim even after the first shot, the
jury could reasonably conclude he was acting with a

14
predetermined plan to kill Alexander. The firing of multiple shots
specifically directed at the fleeing Alexander, rather than a single
shot in the heat of passion, also showed a considered design to
kill her. Therefore, substantial evidence supports the jury’s
finding defendant acted with premeditation and deliberation.
VII. Transferred intent doctrine is well established
Defendant contends that in California the transferred
intent doctrine is unconstitutional because it is not codified in
any statute. As the doctrine is well-established in California case
law, we reject this contention.
Transferred intent is a common law doctrine that “‘survived
the enactment of California’s murder statute.’” (People v. Bland
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 320.) No statute purports to abrogate the
transferred intent doctrine. The California Supreme Court has
affirmed that transferred intent is a recognized theory of murder
liability that “connotes a policy” that a “defendant who shoots at
an intended victim with intent to kill but misses and hits a
bystander instead should be subject to the same criminal liability
that would have been imposed had he hit his intended mark.”
(People v. Scott (1996) 14 Cal.4th 544, 546, 551.) We are bound by
this clear precedent. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) Accordingly, we reject defendant’s
contention his murder conviction under a transferred intent
theory violated his constitutional rights. The jury properly found
him guilty of first degree murder upon finding he harbored
express malice, an intent to kill, as to his intended target, which
transferred to the unintended victim under well-established
California law. Defendant’s constitutional challenge fails.

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VIII. The cumulative error doctrine does not apply
Defendant argues the cumulative prejudicial effect of the
alleged instructional and other errors requires reversal. As we
have found no errors and that sufficient evidence supports the
first degree murder conviction and the transferred intent doctrine
is constitutional, there are no individual errors to accumulate.
The cumulative error doctrine does not apply.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

________________________
CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

________________________
LUI, P. J.

________________________
ASHMANN-GERST, J.

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