CourtListener 10004699•In re M.R. CA3
Texto completo
Filed 7/16/24 In re M.R. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yolo)
----
In re M.R. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile C099304
Court Law.
YOLO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN (Super. Ct. Nos. JV20221201,
SERVICES AGENCY, JV20221202)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
D.R. et al.,
Defendants;
N.R. et al.,
Appellants.
Minors M.R. and N.R. (minors) appeal from the juvenile court’s orders made at
the six-month review hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.21, subd. (e), 395.)1 Minors
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
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contend that the juvenile court abused its discretion in reducing visitation with their
father and requiring that visitation with him be supervised. M.R.’s opening brief also
challenges the juvenile court’s decision to assign educational rights to his caregivers.
Having reviewed the record, we find adequate support for the juvenile court’s decision to
restrict visitation with father. We need not address M.R.’s challenge regarding
educational rights, because, as his reply brief argues, that claim is moot following the
juvenile court’s decision to restore those rights to his parents at the 12-month review.
BACKGROUND
On August 5, 2022, the Yolo County Health and Human Services Agency
(Agency) filed a dependency petition under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (c) with
respect to minors N.R. and M.R. The petition alleged that minors’ father D.R. (father)
failed to provide adequate care, support, and supervision to minors in that he engaged in
“persistent and pervasive” parental alienation of minors’ mother, J.R. (mother). Father
undermined mother’s authority, encouraged minors to leave her home at great physical
peril, and refused to coparent with her. N.R., who was then 13 years old, and M.R., who
was then 16, engaged in dangerous and concerning behavior as a result. For example,
while at mother’s home, minors stabbed her couch and bed with a knife, cut electronic
cords, and held a knife to her. They ran away from her home repeatedly, refused to go to
school, ran down the freeway, and scratched themselves in bushes to make it appear that
mother had abused them. An evaluator appointed by the family court in a contentious
custody dispute between the parents concluded that minors had been “overwhelmingly
damaged.” The evaluator opined that father “pathologically alienated” minors and that
minors’ relationship with mother had been significantly impaired, “perhaps even
irrevocably.” The Agency alleged that mother was unable or unwilling to provide
adequate care for her children in that minors’ behavior was beyond her control.
When minors were interviewed by the Agency, they provided identical answers
and spoke in a robotic tone. M.R., who has autism, looked to N.R. before answering.
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Minors could not identify any friends, family members, or when they last attended
school; they did not know what food or activities they liked. Minors responded to
questions by staring blankly, tipping their head sideways, repeating the question, and
saying, “I don’t know,” in a very robotic tone.
On August 25, 2022, the juvenile court ordered services for both parents and a
minimum of one hour per week of supervised therapeutic visits with each of them. A
video visit with father was terminated early when he discussed the case with minors in
violation of visitation guidelines and engaged in other disruptive behavior.
At a hearing the following month, minors and father requested that the juvenile
court lift the requirement that visits be therapeutic. The court denied the request, stating,
“I’m not prepared to lift the therapeutic visits for the parents. The parents have caused all
this issue as far as I’m concerned.”
In October 2022, the Agency informed the juvenile court that there had been no
therapeutic visits with mother because both minors were refusing to call or visit with her.
The court directed the Agency to schedule at least one therapeutic visit between mother
and minors.
The following week, the Agency filed a section 388 petition with respect to each
minor, requesting that the juvenile court find father’s visits were detrimental. The
petitions alleged that minors were exhibiting concerning behavior due to father’s
alienation, father was inappropriate during a visit, father had failed to address unresolved
mental health issues, and he did not appreciate the impact of his behavior on his sons.
At the hearing on the Agency’s petitions, a social worker testified that both minors
refused to go to school and N.R. refused to go to the doctor or dentist. She also reported
concerns arising from two incidents in which minors refused to listen to directions (once
when a visit ended and once when N.R. was being transported to his placement). Minors
became nonresponsive and ignored staff requests for more than an hour. The social
worker also testified that father made inappropriate comments during supervised
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telephone calls with N.R. She confirmed that the Agency had tried to set up in-person
therapeutic visits for minors but the therapist had concerns about father’s behavior and
did not want to jeopardize the therapeutic relationship.
After the hearing, the juvenile court found father’s visits with minors to be
detrimental. It suspended visits with father until both parents underwent psychological
evaluations and minors had engaged in individual therapy.
The juvenile court held a jurisdiction/disposition hearing on November 3, 2022.
The social worker testified that father had not demonstrated any insight into the reasons
why minors were removed and had not changed his behaviors. He expressed no
willingness to engage in services and refused to coparent with mother. The social worker
was concerned that father had coached minors, as evidenced by their near-identical
responses when interviewed.
The juvenile court ordered both minors removed from parental custody. It found
that they were suffering psychologically and that it was not safe to return them to either
parent’s home. The court ordered reunification services for both parents.
At a December 2022 review hearing, the Agency reported that M.R. was refusing
to go to school or the doctor without father present. The social worker stated, “I’m
hoping father can support the children attending school.” Father’s counsel responded,
“No comment, Your Honor.”
In February and March 2023, minors filed section 388 petitions asking the juvenile
court to lift the detriment finding as to visitation with father, allow supervised visits of six
hours per week, and provide the Agency with authority to change visitation to include
unsupervised and overnight visits. The petitions alleged that father had attended medical
appointments with N.R. without incident and that father was participating in services.
A visiting judge presided over the hearing on minors’ petitions. The Agency did
not object to minors’ request but asked the juvenile court to allow only three hours of
supervised visitation. The visiting judge lifted the detriment finding, ordered three hours
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of supervised visits for father per week, and granted the Agency authority to make
whatever appropriate visitation was in minors’ best interests.
At a May 2023 meet and confer, over mother’s objection, the parties agreed to
increase visitation with father to six hours per week.
The regularly assigned judge held the six-month review hearing on August 7,
2023. A social worker testified that father had completed counseling services and a
parenting course, but still did not want to participate in a coparenting class. He also
failed to show insight into his part in the parental alienation leading to the Agency’s
intervention. The Agency continued to believe that minors could not safely be returned to
his care.
The social worker testified that mother was participating regularly in counseling
and had completed parenting and coparenting classes. Mother reportedly had a strong
understanding of the class curriculum, but struggled to use the skills she had learned in
therapy, had not expressed accountability for her part in the circumstances leading to the
children’s removal, and continued to bring up her own trauma and talk about the past.
With respect to visitation, the juvenile court heard testimony that minors continued
to refuse contact with mother, notwithstanding repeated encouragement from therapists
and social workers. Father was participating in unsupervised visits, including a few
overnight. The social worker testified that visits with father had been going well and that
the Agency’s decision to allow unsupervised and overnight visitation reflected a “natural
progression.”
The social worker also testified that minors’ case plan required them to attend
school in person, but N.R. attended online and M.R. did not attend at all. M.R. was
unwilling to go to school, and his individual education plan, which recommended that he
attend in person, was not signed by parents despite the Agency’s efforts to have them do
so. When asked by the juvenile court why the Agency had allowed the children to refuse
to attend school, the social worker stated that the Agency “can’t physically force [minors]
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to do anything.” With respect to M.R., the Agency “would have physically had to
remove him, and foster care w[as] not able to do that.”
The juvenile court issued its ruling on August 21, 2023. As relevant here, the
court declined to return either minor to his parents after finding that return posed a
substantial risk of detriment. It ordered continued reunification services for both parents.
The juvenile court also imposed new limits on father’s visitation. It capped
visitation at three hours of supervised visitation per week, admonishing the Agency:
“You must not let [father] have unsupervised visits with [minors] until their behavior
changes. [Father] is still controlling these children, and if it doesn’t stop, the Agency is
not addressing the problem that got us here in the first place.” The court observed that
minors still refused to see their mother or attend medical or dental appointments without
father and M.R. continued to refuse to go to school. With respect to N.R., the court
“believe[d] that he continues to refuse to visit his mother in order to please his father, and
he’s not going to tell us that.” The court stated: “What [father] has done to these boys is
terrifying. Just watching the interaction between them in court is unsettling.”
The juvenile court additionally found that M.R.’s educational needs were not
being met, and it awarded educational rights for M.R. to his caregivers. The court stated:
“[M.R.] also needs to attend school. I would suggest that while you can’t physically drag
him there, you can remove every privilege that he gets until he goes to school. The
Agency needs to be creative and not just acquiesce to [M.R.] He’s not in charge, the
adults are. [¶] I think you also need to stop considering online school and get both
[minors] in in-person learning . . . .”
Minors filed timely appeals from the juvenile court’s August 21, 2023 orders.
DISCUSSION
I
Both minors contend that the juvenile court abused its discretion in restricting their
visitation with father to three hours of supervised visits per week.
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It is well established that “[v]isitation is an essential component of any
reunification plan.” (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 972.) Visitation
generally must “be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child.”
(§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A).) “ ‘While visitation is a key element of reunification, the court
must focus on the best interests of the children “and on the elimination of conditions
which led to the juvenile court’s finding that the child has suffered, or is at risk of
suffering, harm . . . .” ’ ” (Serena M. v. Superior Court (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 659, 673.)
“[I]f visitation is not consistent with the well-being of the child, the juvenile court has the
discretion to deny such contact.” (In re T.M. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1214, 1219.) The
well-being of the child includes both physical and emotional health. (Ibid.) The juvenile
court may “revisit the appropriateness of visitation in light of new circumstances,
including progress in individual counseling.” (Id. at p. 1220.)
We review visitation orders for abuse of discretion. (In re Brittany C. (2011)
191 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1356.) We do not reweigh the evidence, and when two or more
inferences can reasonably be drawn from the facts, we will not substitute our judgment
for that of the juvenile court. (In re J.P. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1123; In re
Emmanuel R. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 452, 465.)
Having reviewed the record in this case, we are unable to conclude that the
restrictions on visitation imposed by the juvenile court were an abuse of discretion. It is
true that the Agency expressed no safety concerns with minors’ increased and
unsupervised visitation with father and that the social worker believed the visits had gone
well. But the record contains sufficient support for the juvenile court’s conclusion that
continuation of that level of visitation was not in minors’ best interest because it risked
perpetuating the conditions leading to minors’ removal. (Serena M. v. Superior Court,
supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 673.)
As explained above, minors in this case were initially removed from their parents’
custody as a result of father’s persistent parental alienation of mother, which had caused
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minors to suffer serious emotional damage. The father’s alienating behavior had led
minors to engage in harmful and dangerous activities, such as stabbing mother’s furniture
with a knife and running on a freeway to reach father’s house. At the six-month review,
the social worker testified that father had demonstrated no insight into his role in creating
the conditions leading to this behavior. He continued to refuse to attend coparenting
classes. And minors continued to refuse visitation with mother—a state of affairs that the
juvenile court, after having presided over this dependency proceeding for more than
12 months, attributed to father’s ongoing negative influence and control over his sons. In
light of this record, we cannot conclude that the juvenile court abused its discretion in
restricting visitation with father in an effort to promote reunification with both parents
and to address the conditions leading to minors’ removal.
We are not persuaded by minors’ contention that the visitation order was aimed at
punishing minors instead of serving their best interests. In support of this argument,
minors point to two statements made by the juvenile court. In the first, the court
responded to comments from N.R.’s lawyer that N.R. wanted his mother to apologize to
him before he could reestablish a relationship with her. The court said: “[w]hat’s mom
supposed to apologize for, being unable to handle bad behavior? I’ve never heard N.R.
apologize, or even show any remorse for his bad behavior.” In context, this statement
does not support a conclusion that the juvenile court reduced visitation with father as a
means to punish N.R. for not apologizing to his mother. Rather, the statement was made
as part of the court’s explanation for its concern that the causes of minors’ alienation from
mother had not been addressed.
In the second statement, the juvenile court said that M.R. “needs to attend school,”
adding that, while the Agency could not physically drag him to school, it could remove
his privileges until he attends. The record demonstrates that the court was not referring to
visitation; the court did not suggest that M.R.’s visitation with father was a privilege that
could or should be removed as a penalty for failing to attend school.
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For these reasons, this case is different from In re N.M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
1090, on which minors rely. In that case, the juvenile court awarded sole physical
custody to mother to avoid rewarding father’s failure to complete his case plan. (Id. at
p. 1095.) The Court of Appeal deemed the order an abuse of discretion because a custody
order “must serve the best interests of the children, not reward or punish one parent or
another for failing to comply with the case plan.” (Ibid.) Here, the challenged visitation
order reflects the juvenile court’s effort to address the cause of minors’ removal and to
foster minors’ reunification with both parents.
We also reject minors’ analogy to In re David D. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 941.
There, the juvenile court suspended the mother’s visitation and thereafter terminated
parental rights without considering how an abrupt end to visits would affect the minors
and without finding that visitation would be detrimental to them. (Id. at pp. 953-954.) In
this case, the juvenile court maintained visitation between father and his sons, only
reverting to more limited and supervised visits after concluding that expanded and
unsupervised visitation was impeding resolution of the issues underlying the Agency’s
intervention in this case.
Minors also invoke the constitutional protection for family integrity. Minors did
not object to the August 2023 visitation order on constitutional grounds in the juvenile
court. Any claim grounded in the Constitution is therefore forfeited on appeal. (Kevin R.
v. Superior Court (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 676, 686.) In any event, while minors are
correct that the Constitution protects the parent-child relationship (In re Marilyn H.
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 306), they do not dispute that a juvenile court may, consistent with
the Constitution, restrict a parent’s visitation when the court acts within its lawful
discretion based on the record before it. For the reasons explained above, the juvenile
court’s visitation order satisfied that standard.
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II
M.R.’s opening brief challenges the juvenile court’s decision to transfer
educational rights from his parents to his caregivers. His reply brief, filed after the 12-
month review hearing, argues that the issue is no longer justiciable because the juvenile
court restored educational rights to his parents after that hearing.
We agree that the challenge is moot. In light of the juvenile court’s order at the
12-month review, there is no effective relief that we could grant M.R. beyond what the
juvenile court has already provided. (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60-62; In re
Pablo D. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 759, 761.)2
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
/s/
Feinberg, J.
We concur:
/s/
Mauro, Acting P. J.
/s/
Mesiwala, J.
2 We grant minors’ request for judicial notice of the juvenile court’s December 28, 2023,
order only insofar as it relates to the court’s restoration of parents’ educational rights over
M.R. To the extent that minors refer to or rely on the December 28, 2023, order to
support their challenge to the juvenile court’s visitation order, the request is denied. The
facts and circumstances in existence at the time of that hearing were not before the
juvenile court at the six-month review and are therefore irrelevant to our disposition of
minors’ current claim regarding visitation with father.
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