In re A.L. CA2/6

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Filed 7/16/24 In re A.L. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re A.L., a Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B333748
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Super. Ct. No. 2018009981)
(Ventura County)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.L.,

Defendant and Appellant.

A.L. appeals from the juvenile court’s order transferring
him to criminal court. (See Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 801, subd. (a).)
He contends insufficient evidence supports the transfer order,
and remand is required for the court to consider his history of
childhood trauma and sexual abuse. We affirm.

1 Unlabeled statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In March 2018, Juan Gutierrez was shot in the head. He
died a few days later. A subsequent investigation revealed that
A.L., then 16 years old, was robbing two men at gunpoint when
Gutierrez rode by on his bicycle. The two exchanged words, and
A.L. shot Gutierrez. A.L. then fled the scene. The handgun used
to kill Gutierrez was found in A.L.’s possession when police
arrested him later that week.
In an interview with police, A.L. denied knowing Gutierrez
and denied that he was present at the scene of Gutierrez’s
murder. A.L. later said that Gutierrez had threatened him
previously, and admitted he was present at Gutierrez’s shooting.
He also admitted he was a member of a local gang.
In a section 602 petition, prosecutors alleged that A.L.
murdered Gutierrez. They moved to transfer A.L.’s case to adult
criminal court pursuant to section 707.
A.L. opposed the transfer motion because his “background,
family history, [and] trauma . . . strongly support[ed] his
amenability to juvenile court treatment.” A.L.’s childhood was
“chaotic and unpredictable.” His parents argued and threw
objects at each other. His mother used methamphetamine and
was frequently under the influence of alcohol. He and his
siblings had to ask neighbors for food. County social workers
were often called to their house.
A.L. suffered a hairline fracture to his skull after he was
hit by a car at age four. When he was seven, his mother’s
boyfriend touched his “weenie.” A.L. later told a social worker
that the boyfriend also “grabbed his private” in front of his
mother.

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The juvenile court transferred A.L.’s case to criminal court
in October 2019. In January 2023, the criminal court remanded
A.L.’s case in light of Assembly Bill No. 2361 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.), which requires that transfer decisions be supported by
clear and convincing evidence (Stats. 2022, ch. 330, § 1; see § 707,
subd. (a)(3)).
A second transfer hearing occurred between August and
October 2023. At that hearing prosecutors introduced transcripts
from the 2019 transfer hearing. They also introduced probation
reports prepared for that hearing and updated for the 2023
hearing.
The probation reports did not discuss programs that would
be available to A.L. should he remain in the juvenile system. But
they did note that A.L. had “not sought out the services or
conducted himself in a manner that would suggest a true interest
in rehabilitating himself.” They recommended transferring A.L.
to criminal court.
One of the reports said that A.L. accrued 72 write-ups
while at the juvenile facility between July 2018 and October
2019. Ten of those were for fighting, with others for gang-related
graffiti, threatening staff, failing to follow directives, refusing to
attend school, and possessing contraband.
A.L. accrued another 87 write-ups between October 2019
and April 2023, including for communicating with inmates
outside his housing unit, possessing altered razors, and
destroying property. He had also been involved in 11 fights.
A.L. accrued another six write-ups in the following four
months, including one for an assault that led to the victim’s
hospitalization.

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Dr. Blake Carmichael, a psychologist at the University of
California–Davis, testified at the transfer hearing. He said that
he evaluated A.L. prior to his 2019 transfer hearing and
determined that his potential for rehabilitation in the juvenile
system was “[u]nlikely given the time frame [sic].” Dr.
Carmichael’s opinion in 2023 remained the same: He did not
think there was a “substantial chance” A.L. could be rehabilitated
by age 25.
In Dr. Carmichael’s opinion, the closure of the Division of
Juvenile Justice posed challenges for implementing programming
in county facilities. His understanding was that implementation
of Ventura County’s programs was “still in progress or under
development.” He admitted that he had not spoken with program
providers, however, but was “provided with a listing as of
January [2023] of what [was] available at the juvenile facility.”
He also spoke “with someone in the Ventura County system
about those services.” That person was not involved in providing
services, “but they were familiar with the programming at the
juvenile facility.”
The juvenile court granted the transfer motion, concluding
that clear and convincing evidence supported transferring A.L. to
criminal court. It found that two of the five criteria set forth in
section 707, subdivision (a)(3) supported retaining juvenile court
jurisdiction: A.L. had minimal contact with law enforcement and
had not failed at prior rehabilitation attempts. But the other
three factors weighed in favor of transferring the matter to
criminal court: A.L. was in the middle of robbing two people when
he shot Gutierrez, and later lied about his role in the murder.
These facts showed a considerable degree of criminal
sophistication and underscored the gravity of A.L.’s offense. But

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“what stood out the most” to the court was A.L.’s “significant
disciplinary history and lack of programming”—including
write-ups accrued just weeks before the 2023 transfer hearing.
This indicated that A.L. could not be rehabilitated in the three
years before the juvenile court’s jurisdiction expired. The court
thus concluded that A.L.’s “case remains a criminal matter for
the adult court.”
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of the evidence
A.L. contends insufficient evidence supports the juvenile
court’s transfer order. He maintains the prosecutor “did not
present evidence demonstrating that existing programs at the
Ventura [secure youth treatment facility] were unlikely to result
in [his] rehabilitation, why those specific programs were unlikely
to work in this particular case, or that they would take more than
three years to accomplish the task of rehabilitating him.” We
disagree.
When prosecutors allege that a minor aged 16 years of age
or older has committed a felony, they may request that the
juvenile court transfer the minor to criminal court. (§ 707, subd.
(a)(1).) Before the court can grant such a request, prosecutors
must prove “by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is
not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3); Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.770(a).) This requires the court to consider: (1) the minor’s
“degree of criminal sophistication,” (2) “[w]hether the minor can
be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction,” (3) “[t]he minor’s previous delinquent history,” (4)
the “[s]uccess of previous attempts by the juvenile court to
rehabilitate the minor,” and (5) “[t]he circumstances and gravity

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of the offense alleged . . . to have been committed by the minor.”
(§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E).)
We review the juvenile court’s findings on these five
criteria and its “ultimate finding ‘that the minor is not amenable
to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court’ ” for substantial evidence. (In re Miguel R. (2024) 100
Cal.App.5th 152, 165 (Miguel R.).) This requires us to
“ ‘determine whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could
have made the finding of high probability demanded by’ the clear
and convincing evidence standard.” (Ibid.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s transfer
order. Dr. Carmichael reviewed the programs that would be
available to A.L. in Ventura County and opined that they would
be “unlikely” to rehabilitate him in three years. Dr. Carmichael’s
review of these programs stands in contrast to the cases on which
A.L. relies, in which there was no description or consideration of
the programming potentially available to the minors there. (See
Kevin P. v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 199-200;
J.N. v. Superior Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 706, 721-722.) A.L.
faults Dr. Carmichael for not identifying the “ARISE” program
when forming his opinion. But the ARISE program is “the secure
youth treatment facility in San Bernardino County.” (Miguel R.,
supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 161.) There was thus no need for
Dr. Carmichael to consider it; his review of Ventura County
programs provided a sufficient basis for his opinion that A.L. was
not amenable to rehabilitation while under the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction. (Cf. In re S.S. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1286-
1287 [highlighting need for expert opinion on programming
available to minors].)

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Childhood trauma and sexual abuse
A.L. contends the matter must be remanded for the
juvenile court to consider the effect of his childhood trauma,
involvement in the child welfare system, and sexual abuse on his
degree of criminal sophistication. We again disagree.
As set forth above, when a juvenile court is deciding
whether to grant a transfer request, one of the criteria it must
consider is “[t]he degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by
the minor.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(i).) At the time of A.L.’s 2023
transfer hearing, the court was permitted to “give weight to . . .
the effect of the minor’s family and community environment and
childhood trauma on the minor’s criminal sophistication.”
(Former § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).) Pursuant to Senate Bill No.
545 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.), the court now must give weight to the
effect of childhood trauma when evaluating the minor’s degree of
criminal sophistication. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).) The court
must also give weight to “the minor’s involvement in the child
welfare” system and their status as a victim of sexual abuse.
(Ibid.)
Senate Bill No. 545 applies retroactively to cases that are
not yet final on appeal. (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at pp.
169-170.) But we do not believe it requires remanding the case
here. “ ‘ “[Minors] are entitled to [transfer] decisions made in the
exercise of the ‘informed discretion’ of the [juvenile] court.
[Citations.] A court [that] is unaware of the scope of its
discretionary powers can no more exercise that ‘informed
discretion’ than one whose [transfer decision] is or may have been
based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a
[minor]’s record.” [Citation.] In such circumstances . . . the
appropriate remedy is to remand for [a new transfer hearing]

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unless the record “clearly indicates” that the [juvenile] court
would have reached the same conclusion “even if it had been
aware that it had such discretion.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v.
Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 424, alterations omitted.)
The record here reveals such a clear indication. In
opposing the transfer motion, A.L. detailed his childhood trauma,
involvement in the child welfare system, and sexual abuse. The
juvenile court considered this evidence, which would have been
relevant to A.L.’s degree of criminal sophistication. (See Miguel
R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 170 [effect of minor’s family and
community environment and childhood trauma were factors for
the court to consider in analyzing the minor’s degree of criminal
sophistication prior to Senate Bill No. 545].) A.L. does not
explain why he believes the court would reach a different transfer
decision if it considered this evidence again.
Additionally, when explaining why it ordered A.L.
transferred to criminal court, the juvenile court emphasized that
the most significant of the five factors set forth in section 707,
subdivision (a)(3) was the limited time A.L. would remain under
its jurisdiction. The court did not believe that three years was
sufficient time to rehabilitate A.L. given his significant
disciplinary history while in custody. That timeframe has now
been shortened. We are thus persuaded that the record clearly
indicates that the juvenile court would order A.L. transferred
under the current version of section 707.

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DISPOSITION
The November 8, 2023, order transferring A.L. from
juvenile court to criminal court is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.

9
Gilbert A. Romero, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Claudia Y. Bautista, Public Defender, and Thomas
Hartnett, Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A. Lieberman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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