People v. Saenz CA2/4

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Filed 7/15/24 P. v. Saenz CA2/4

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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B328596

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA172684)
v.

JOSE LUIS SAENZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Larry P. Fidler, Judge. Affirmed.
Kathy R. Moreno, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Amanda V. Lopez,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury found appellant Jose Saenz guilty of the 1998
kidnapping, rape, sodomy, and murder of the mother of his child.
It also found him guilty of a 2008 murder and attempted murder,
and found true numerous firearm enhancements and felony
murder and multiple murder special circumstance allegations.
The trial court found that appellant suffered a prior strike
conviction as a juvenile, denied his Romero1 motion to strike the
strike and firearm enhancements, and sentenced him to 113
years to life, plus two consecutive terms of life without the
possibility of parole.
The trial court denied appellant’s motion to sever trial of
the 1998 and 2008 charges. It also denied a joint motion to
dismiss and withdraw the enhancement and special circumstance
allegations, and overruled appellant’s objection to testimony
regarding efforts to locate him during his periods of absence from
the Los Angeles area. Appellant contends these rulings and the
denial of his Romero motion were erroneous and prejudicial. We
disagree and affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The People filed an initial information against appellant in
March 2014. The operative third amended information, filed
during trial in September 2022, charged appellant with the July
1998 murders (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))2 of Josue Hernandez
(count 1) and Leonardo Ponce (count 2); the August 1998 murder
(count 3), kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a), count 4), forcible rape
(§ 261, subd. (a)(2), count 5), and sodomy by use of force (§ 286,
subd. (c)(2)(A), count 8) of Sigreda Fernandez; the October 2008

1 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

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murder of Oscar Torres (count 6); and the October 2008
attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder of
Anthony L.3 (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, count 7).
The third amended information alleged that all four
murders were committed willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation (§ 189, subd. (a)); that appellant committed
multiple murders (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)); and that the 1998
murder of Fernandez was committed during the course of the
kidnapping, rape, and/or sodomy (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). The
operative information further alleged that appellant personally
and intentionally discharged a firearm and proximately caused
great bodily injury or death while committing the murders and
attempted murders charged in counts 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7
(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and personally used a handgun while
committing the kidnapping and sexual assault offenses charged
in counts 4, 5, and 8 (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). It also alleged that
appellant suffered a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i),
1170.12, subd. (a)) and a one-year prison prior (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
Appellant moved to sever trial of the 1998 charges from the
2008 charges. The People opposed the motion, which the trial
court denied. The trial court also denied the People’s motion to
dismiss and withdraw all firearm, gang,4 and special

3 We refer to the living victim and witnesses using initials to
protect their privacy. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).)
4 The original and first amended informations alleged that
the 1998 crimes were committed for the benefit of, at the
direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang with
the specific intent to promote, further, and assist in criminal
conduct by gang members. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) The second
amended information is not in the appellate record, so it is
unclear whether it contained gang allegations. However, the

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circumstance allegations pursuant to Los Angeles County District
Attorney George Gascón’s Special Directives 20-08 and 20-08.1,
which appellant joined. Appellant proceeded to jury trial in June
2022; the trial continued intermittently through September 2022.
The jury found appellant guilty of the 1998 crimes against
Sigreda Fernandez, the 2008 murder of Oscar Torres, and the
2008 attempted murder of Anthony L. It also found true the
firearm enhancements related to these crimes, the felony murder
special circumstance, and the multiple murder special
circumstance. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on counts 1
and 2, the 1998 murders of Josue Hernandez and Leonardo
Ponce. The trial court declared a mistrial of counts 1 and 2 and
later granted the People’s motion to dismiss those counts in the
interest of justice. The court also granted the People’s motion to
dismiss the prison prior. It denied appellant’s motion for new
trial on the other counts.
In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found that
appellant suffered a prior strike, a juvenile robbery adjudication
from 1992. The court denied appellant’s Romero motion to strike
the strike and the firearm enhancements and expressed an intent
to impose the maximum possible sentence. It accordingly
sentenced appellant to life without the possibility of parole
(LWOP) for the murder of Sigreda Fernandez (count 3), plus 25
years to life for the related firearm enhancement. The trial court
sentenced appellant to a consecutive term of LWOP for the

record indicates that the trial court granted appellant’s motion to
bifurcate trial of the gang enhancements and granted the
People’s motion to dismiss the gang allegations before the third
amended information was filed. The third amended information
does not include gang allegations.

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murder of Oscar Torres (count 6), plus 25 years to life for the
related firearm enhancement. It sentenced appellant to seven
years to life for the attempted murder of Anthony L. (count 7),
doubled to 14 years to life due to the strike, plus 25 years to life
for the related firearm enhancement. After finding true several
aggravating factors under California Rules of Court, Rule 4.421,
the court imposed the high term of eight years on the kidnapping
(count 4), doubled to 16 years due to the strike; and two years
(one-third of the six-year midterm), doubled to four years, on the
rape and sodomy counts (counts 5 and 8), all to run consecutively.
The court imposed and stayed sentence on the firearm allegations
related to counts 4, 5, and 8. It imposed fines and fees, and
awarded appellant 3,715 days of custody credit.
Appellant timely appealed.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. 1998 Crimes
A. Hernandez and Ponce Murders5
Adrian Parga, a Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)
officer and gang expert, testified that in 1998, appellant and
another individual, Johnny Prado, were admitted members of the
Cuatro Flats gang. Parga testified that appellant, who was in his
early 20s at the time, was in the “upper echelon” of the gang, and
he and Prado both had reputations for being very violent.
Another officer, Marcos Saenz (no relation to appellant), also
testified that appellant was “one of the well known names in the
area that younger members looked up to.” That area included
the Pico Gardens housing project, which was proximate to other

5 Because appellant was not convicted of the murders of
Hernandez or Ponce, we limit our discussion of the evidence
related to these crimes.

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public housing projects controlled by other gangs. The gangs
were generally very territorial, and Cuatro Flats had rivalries
with the gangs who controlled the other projects. One of those
rivals was the East L.A. Trece or East L.A. 13 Dukes, which
controlled the Aliso Village projects north of Pico Gardens.
Around 5:00 a.m. on July 25, 1998, two members of the
East L.A. Trece gang, Josue Hernandez and Leonardo Ponce,
were shot to death in the Aliso Village projects. Hernandez
sustained four gunshot wounds, including two fatal shots to the
head. Ponce suffered three fatal gunshot wounds to the back and
torso. During an interview with LAPD detectives, witness
Martin P. said he saw two perpetrators and heard “[l]ike, six”
shots. Martin P. further told detectives that he heard the
shooters belonged to Cuatro Flats. During trial, Martin P.
testified that he did not see any perpetrators and did not
remember making statements to detectives. Martin P. also
denied making certain statements to Rogelio G., who testified
that Martin P. told him appellant was one of the shooters.
B. Fernandez Kidnapping, Sexual Assault, and
Murder
In 1998, Sigreda Fernandez lived in the Aliso Village
housing projects with her mother, Elia Rodriguez, and her infant
daughter, Natalie. Appellant was Natalie’s father. Appellant did
not live with Fernandez and Natalie; he lived with his
grandmother, Annie Honeycutt, several miles away from Aliso
Village.
Rodriguez was deceased at the time of trial and her
previous testimony was read into the record. She stated that she
overheard Fernandez talking to appellant on the phone at some
point prior to Fernandez’s death. Fernandez appeared sad and

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stressed, and cried during the conversation. Rodriguez heard
Fernandez say “[t]hat she didn’t want to know anything” or “be
told anything” three times. Rodriguez also testified that
Fernandez said appellant told her he did “something bad” during
the phone conversation.
On August 5, 1998, Fernandez’s cousin, Pedro A., and his
girlfriend, Zaida C., were staying at Fernandez’s and Rodriguez’s
home. In the early morning hours of August 5, 1998, Pedro A.
and Zaida C. were asleep on living room couches downstairs, and
Rodriguez, Fernandez, and Natalie were asleep upstairs. Pedro
A. awoke to appellant knocking on the door, yelling to get inside.
Pedro A. let appellant inside, and appellant went upstairs. Pedro
A. returned to the couch to go back to sleep. Shortly thereafter,
Pedro A. heard appellant and Fernandez yelling and arguing;
Fernandez was crying, and Pedro A. got the impression that
Fernandez wanted appellant to leave.
About five or 10 minutes later, appellant and Fernandez
came downstairs. Appellant was behind Fernandez and had a
black gun in his hand, which Pedro A. previously told detectives
was pointed at Fernandez’s head. Pedro A. previously told
detectives that appellant said to him, “Your cousin threw a rat on
me,” which Pedro A. understood to mean that Fernandez had
“snitched” on appellant to police. Pedro A. asked Fernandez if
she was okay, and she said she was. She told Pedro A. that she
was going to talk to appellant and asked Pedro A. to watch
Natalie. Zaida C. testified that Fernandez had a “ghost face,” or
blank expression, when she left, and was not wearing any shoes.
Zaida C. previously told detectives that appellant had a gun and
was “kind of dragging” Fernandez down the stairs, but she denied
both during trial.

7
Rodriguez testified that she heard appellant and Fernandez
arguing but stayed in bed for a while. When Rodriguez got up,
she saw that Fernandez was not there and had left in her
pajamas; Rodriguez thought this was “odd.” Pedro A. told
Rodriguez that Fernandez had left with appellant, who had
“forced her out.” Pedro A. testified that Rodriguez began making
phone calls and left the home, apparently in an effort to find
Fernandez.
Carol Vildosola was a neighbor and friend of appellant’s
grandmother, Honeycutt. Vildosola was deceased at the time of
trial; her previous testimony was read into the record, and a
previous interview was played for the jury. According to
Vildosola, Honeycutt and Vildosola went to Vildosola’s house on
the morning of August 5, 1998 because appellant told Honeycutt
he needed to speak with Fernandez. Vildosola testified that she
and Honeycutt went back to Honeycutt’s house to get Honeycutt’s
cigarettes at some point, but appellant would not let them in; he
handed Honeycutt her cigarettes through the door. Later,
Honeycutt received a phone call from appellant, who told her not
to go back to her house because he had done “something bad.”
Vildosola and Honeycutt immediately went back to the
house. The door was unlocked and appellant was gone. Vildosola
saw a pair of men’s pants on the floor in the front room. She then
went to appellant’s room, where she found Fernandez lying in
bed. Vildosola called her name and tickled her feet, but
Fernandez did not respond. Vildosola removed a cover from
Fernandez’s face and saw that she was dead. Vildosola ran next
door and called the police.
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD) deputy
Robert Gray responded to the call. He testified that Fernandez

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was lying in bed with an “apparent gunshot wound to her left
temple.” Fernandez was unclothed above the waist, and was
wearing unzipped shorts below the waist. A pair of women’s
underwear was lying on the floor. Gray found 31 unfired .357
cartridges on top of the VCR, and a handwritten note on the
dresser. The note said, “The guey that drove me did . . . not have
nothing to do with anything or my grandma. I kicked her out. So
fuck you, putos. . . . I love you, grandma.” Gray explained that
“guey” was slang for “fool,” and “putos” “is another way of saying,
like ‘fuck you, little bitches.’” The name “Doreen” and “a little
smiley face” were on the other side of the paper; Gray testified
that Doreen was appellant’s aunt. There was a second message
handwritten on the wall: “Take care of Natalie. I love you,
grandma, with all my heart. You’re my one and only.”
A Los Angeles County deputy medical examiner testified
that Fernandez was killed by a close-range gunshot to the head.
The medical examiner further testified that Fernandez had a
fresh laceration to her lip and bruising and abrasions on her
arms and hand. She also had “an area of slight redness at the
back of the vagina” that “may or may not be trauma,” and tearing
to the anus that “suggests the possibility” that something had
been inserted. The medical examiner took swabs of Fernandez’s
vagina and rectum. A senior criminalist later determined that
both samples contained sperm cells consistent with appellant’s
DNA.
II. 2008 Crimes
A. Torres Traffic Stop
On August 6, 2008, Nicholas Lineback, a sheriff’s deputy in
St. Charles County, Missouri, conducted a traffic stop of a car on
Interstate 70, a cross-country throughfare. The driver identified

9
himself as “Sam Palazzola,” and the passenger identified himself
as “Louie Sanchez.” Lineback later learned that Sam Palazzola’s
true name was Oscar Torres.
Lineback noticed that both Torres and the passenger
seemed nervous, and when separated they give disparate
explanations for their cross-country travel in a rental vehicle.
Lineback accordingly walked a K-9 officer around the car; after
the dog alerted, Lineback and his partner searched the car and
found approximately 55 vacuum-sealed packages of cash wrapped
in dryer sheets6 hidden inside the car doors. Some of the
packages were labeled “EZ,” and one was labeled “Toro” or “Toro
Mix.” Appellant used the nickname “Toro.”
Lineback testified that there was a total of approximately
$610,000 in the packages, and Torres and the passenger each had
$5,000 in their pockets. Torres and the passenger denied any
knowledge that there was money in the doors, and signed
disclaimers to that effect. Lineback and federal Drug
Enforcement Administration officers seized the money but did
not arrest Torres or the passenger.
B. Torres Murder and Anthony L. Attempted
Murder
Deputy Gray testified that Oscar Torres was “one of the
leaders” and “main money men through narcotics” of the Lott
Stoners gang in Los Angeles. He went by the names “Easy O,”
“Easy,” and “Sam.” Louie Sanchez, the passenger stopped with
Torres in Missouri, was also a member of the Lott Stoners. The
Lott Stoners trafficked drugs from Mexico to the Chicago

6 Lineback testified that vacuum sealing and dryer sheets
are both used to disguise drug odors.

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suburbs, then “out toward L.A.” The Lott Stoners had “sort of an
alliance and definitely not a rivalry” with Cuatro Flats.
Torres owned and operated businesses that rented bounce
houses and limousines. On the night of October 4, 2008, Torres
asked his friend, Anthony L., to drive some friends of Torres’s
around in a black Hummer limousine. Anthony L. picked up a
“small group” of men in Boyle Heights. Torres mentioned that
another man named “Toro” might call as well, and later called
Anthony L. to see if he had. Toro—appellant—did call, and
Anthony L. picked him up in the parking lot of a bar. Anthony L.
drove appellant and the other men around through Hollywood
and to various bars and nightclubs.
At some point in the early morning hours of October 5,
2008, appellant directed Anthony L. to drive to Torres’s house in
Whittier. When they arrived, appellant and another man, later
identified as Johnny Prado, got out of the limo and went to
Torres’s door. Anthony L. joined them, intending to use the
restroom.
Maria D., who was dating Torres and had stayed at his
house that night, testified that she heard people knocking on the
door and calling Torres’s name around 4:00 or 5:00 a.m. She
woke up Torres, who looked at surveillance camera monitors in
the bedroom. Torres “saw who it was and then he went back to
bed.” The knocking continued; Maria D. testified that it became
louder and “more insistent.” Torres looked at the monitors again.
Maria D. looked too, and saw people standing on the porch.
Around that time, Jesus “Rabbit” T., who was renting a room in
the house, heard people banging on the door and windows and
saying “Easy.” Rabbit knocked on Torres’s bedroom door and told
him people were there for him. Torres got up and went to the

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front door of the house wearing only his boxer shorts. Maria D.
testified that he did not take a gun with him; she had never seen
guns in the house.
Torres opened the door. Anthony L. testified that he did
not appear agitated or angry. Appellant entered the house first,
followed by Anthony L. and Prado. Anthony L. testified that
appellant and Prado immediately drew guns. Torres did not have
a gun or any other weapon. Torres said something to appellant,
and Anthony L. stepped between them, “trying to calm
everything down.” Appellant told Torres, “You gotta go,” which
Anthony L. understood to mean that appellant wanted to hurt
Torres. Anthony L. said something like, “What the hell” and told
appellant to relax.
The conflict then “escalated to a different level,” and
Anthony L. began wrestling with Prado over Prado’s gun.
Anthony L. closed his eyes because he was scared. He felt
someone hitting him on the back of the head “until it cracked my
head open.” Anthony L. heard someone say, “Dome him,” which
he understood to mean “kill him” and Gray testified means “to
shoot someone in the head.” Anthony L. was subsequently shot
twice in the lower back.
Rabbit testified that after he woke up Torres, he went back
to bed. He heard Torres answer the door and say something like,
“What the f are you doing here.” He then heard “a fight or
something,” and then one or two gunshots. When he heard
gunfire, Rabbit jumped out the window of his bedroom, ran across
the backyard, and jumped over a wall into a neighboring yard.
He heard about seven or eight more gunshots as he was running,
and then heard a car leave. After about 20 or 30 minutes, he
returned to the house and saw Anthony L. lying on the couch.

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Rabbit testified that Anthony L. told him, “they shot us”;
Anthony L. recalled telling Rabbit that Toro shot him. Rabbit
also further testified that Anthony L. said something like “Oscar
is outside, open the door.” Rabbit opened the door and saw
Torres lying in the front yard, apparently dead. He called 911.
Anthony L. said he saw someone lying on the ground outside
when paramedics transported him to an ambulance.
Maria D. testified that she heard Torres open the door. She
then heard conversations that escalated to arguing and what
sounded like pushing and shoving. She got dressed and hid in
the bedroom closet. Maria D. then heard Torres say, “No, Toro,
no,” and heard “gunshots, and then running around, commotion,
more gunshots.” She heard footsteps near her and all over the
house, and then “heard the limo take off.” Maria D. got out of the
closet when she heard Rabbit’s voice. She saw Anthony L. “lying
on the sofa bleeding and Rabbit asking him what had happened,
who had done it, and then Anthony said it was Toro.” Maria D.
then left the house through the front door, and she saw Torres
lying on the front lawn.
Torres was dead. A deputy medical examiner testified that
Torres suffered six gunshot wounds to the back side of his body,
including his back, buttocks, and legs; four gunshot wounds to
the face; and one to the top of the head. The gunshot wounds to
the face and head were immediately fatal and were surrounded
by stippling, indicating the gun was within two feet when it was
fired. The gunshot wounds to the back were “potentially fatal,”
but not immediately so; the medical examiner opined that one
near Torres’s spine could have paralyzed him and prevented him
from continuing to run.

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LASD homicide detective Linda Muse responded to the
scene. During her search of the home, she found a “DVD system”
in the closet of Rabbit’s bedroom; Rabbit testified that the system
was not his and he “assumed” it was Torres’s. The DVD tray was
open and empty, but a “tech person” was able to download video
from the system’s hard drive. The video, from the home’s
surveillance cameras, was played for the jury. It showed the limo
arrive; appellant, Prado, and Anthony L. approach and enter the
house; Torres run out of the house approximately 30 seconds
later; appellant shoot Torres multiple times as Torres ran away;
and appellant stand over Torres’s fallen body and shoot him at
close range.
In addition to the video footage, law enforcement recovered
between $8,000 and $9,000 in cash from Torres’s home. They
also found several guns inside the bench of a sauna in Torres’s
bedroom and “pay and owe sheets” recording drug transactions.
One of the pay and owe sheets had several dates in June and July
2008 and said “Toro.” Another included a sticky note that said,
“Toro cooked” and “37,200”; Gray testified that “cooked” meant
the manufacture of methamphetamine. Law enforcement did not
find any drugs, but Gray testified that the Lott Stoners typically
kept drugs in “safe houses” or “stash houses” separate from their
own residences to avoid detection from law enforcement.
Around noon on October 5, 2008, a black Hummer
limousine was found in Norwalk. The rear passenger door was
open, and the lights were on. A responding LASD deputy ran the
license plates, learned that the limo had been “involved in a
particular incident,” and called the crime lab while another
officer cordoned off the area with crime scene tape. A senior
criminalist responded to the scene and swabbed the limo for

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DNA. Later testing of the swab from the limo’s door handle
showed four contributors. None of the contributors was in the
DNA database at the time. Later, in 2022, a different criminalist
obtained a reference DNA sample from appellant. Appellant was
then identified as one of the four contributors to the DNA sample
taken from the limo door.
III. Efforts to Locate Appellant
Appellant was identified as a suspect within days of the
Hernandez and Ponce shootings, but officer Saenz testified that
he and other law enforcement officials were unable to locate
appellant. Parga also testified that he never saw appellant in the
projects or Los Angeles area after these shootings. Gray, who
was assigned to the Fernandez case, also was unable to locate
appellant. Muse, who was assigned to the Torres case, received
numerous tips that led her to nightclubs and other locations
around Los Angeles, as well as to El Paso, Texas and Lafayette,
Louisiana. Her search also proved unsuccessful.
Scott Garriola testified that he was a retired FBI special
agent who had been assigned to the “fugitive task force.” As a
member of the task force, he assisted local homicide detectives in
locating suspects. In 2001, an LASD detective asked Garriola for
assistance in locating appellant, who had been identified as a
suspect in the 1998 murders of Hernandez, Ponce, and
Fernandez. Garriola initiated a “routine fugitive investigation,”
pursuant to which he and the task force located appellant’s
family members, friends, and associates in an effort to obtain
information about appellant’s whereabouts. Garriola also
surveilled locations in the Los Angeles area, including appellant’s
grandmother’s house, funerals of Cuatro Flats members, and
Fernandez’s gravesite. The task force put up billboards in Los

15
Angeles, issued press releases, and featured appellant on local
and national television shows, including “America’s Most
Wanted.”
In 2008, an FBI agent based in El Paso, Texas contacted
Garriola and told him that “the detectives are here talking about
a case involving one of your fugitives.” Garriola then learned
that appellant was a suspect in the Torres murder, of which he
had been unaware. Garriola watched the surveillance video from
Torres’s home and recognized appellant and Prado. Garriola
then “intensified” the search for appellant, doing more publicity
and speaking with Cuatro Flats members. Through these efforts,
Garriola obtained “very good information” that appellant was
traveling between Mexico and Guatemala. Garriola made six
trips to Mexico, two trips to Guatemala, and one trip to El
Salvador to look for appellant.
In 2012, Garriola and the task force “were able to finally
pin him down to an area of Guadalajara, Mexico.” Garriola spent
about two weeks in Guadalajara, working with a “specialized”
team of Mexican agents. After he returned to the United States,
Garriola received word that Mexican police had arrested
appellant. Garriola returned to Mexico, and he and another
agent escorted appellant back to the United States.
DISCUSSION
I. Motion to Sever
A. Background
On October 7, 2021, appellant filed a motion to sever trial
of the 1998 charges and the 2008 charges. He argued that
severance was required for three reasons. First, the evidence
underlying the charges was not cross-admissible. Second, the
1998 crimes were “vastly more inflammatory” than the 2008

16
crimes because they involved alleged “gang animosity” and the
murder of his child’s mother in his grandmother’s house. By
contrast, appellant asserted that the 2008 crimes “arose out of a
dispute over the proceeds of a drug deal,” a scenario “so
commonplace . . . that it would not be entirely surprising if the
jurors struggle to stay awake during the presentation of the
evidence related thereto.” Third, appellant asserted that he
wanted to testify that he acted in self-defense during the 2008
crimes, but had “a strong need to refrain from testifying on the
other counts, because doing so will permit him to be impeached
with prior convictions, thereby prejudicing him before the jury.”
The People opposed severance. They argued that joinder
was proper under section 954 because the 1998 and 2008 crimes
were of the same class. They further argued that cross-
admissibility of evidence was not required for joinder, and “one
murder is no more inflammatory than the next.” The People also
asserted that appellant had not carried his burden of showing
that he had important testimony for the 2008 crimes, and that
they could impeach him with the 1998 crimes even if trial were
severed.
The court heard the motion on February 4, 2022. Appellant
offered to make an in-camera disclosure of his proposed
testimony related to the 2008 crimes. He also argued that the
crimes occurred 10 years apart and had no evidence in common.
The People responded that appellant “created this lapse in time”
by fleeing, that the murders shared a similar modus operandi,
and that judicial economy supported joinder of the charges.
Appellant replied that the prejudice to him of trying the crimes
together outweighed any judicial economy.

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Citing the “clear” preference for keeping “counts and
similar charges together,” the court concluded the 1998 and 2008
crimes should be tried together. However, the court stated that
its ruling was without prejudice, and invited appellant to file
under a seal a declaration of his proposed testimony related to
the 2008 charges.
Appellant subsequently submitted a declaration under seal.
He argued that severance was necessary in light of that proposed
testimony. The People reiterated their previous arguments in
favor of joinder. The court again denied the motion to sever,
stating it was “satisfied that the counts are properly joined and
should be joined.” It also stated that it would revisit the issue if
appellant had anything further to present.
Appellant raised the issue of his proposed testimony at the
conclusion of the People’s case. He requested that he be allowed
to testify regarding the 2008 charges only, “and that there be no
questioning of him of the other incidents.” Over the People’s
objection, the court ruled that appellant could “testify as to
whatever counts he wants,” and the People “can’t go anywhere
beyond that” in cross-examination, including using “the other
acts in this case as prior bad acts.” Appellant did not testify.
B. Analysis
Under section 954, a trial court may consolidate or join two
or more accusatory pleadings that charge offenses “of the same
class of crimes or offenses.” (§ 954.) There is no dispute this
requirement was satisfied here; appellant concedes the 1998 and
2008 incidents all involved “assaultive crimes against the
person.” (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 188 [rape and
murder are assaultive crimes against the person].) “Because it

18
ordinarily promotes efficiency, joinder is the preferred course of
action.” (People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 469.)
However, the court “in the interests of justice and for good
cause shown, may in its discretion order that the different
offenses or counts set forth in the accusatory pleading be tried
separately or divided into two or more groups and each of said
groups tried separately.” (§ 954.) We review the court’s decision
not to sever trial of joined charges for abuse of discretion. (People
v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 798 (Thomas).) “In order to
establish an abuse of discretion, defendant must make a ‘clear
showing of prejudice.’” (Ibid.; see also People v. Simon (2016) 1
Cal.5th 98, 123 (Simon).)
Whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying
severance depends on the particular circumstances of each case,
as they were known to the court at the time of its ruling. (Simon,
supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 123; Thomas, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 798.)
We consider four primary factors in assessing the court’s exercise
of discretion: “(1) whether the evidence relating to the various
charges would be cross-admissible in separate trials, (2) whether
any of the charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury
against the defendant, (3) whether a weak case has been joined
with a strong case or with another weak case, and (4) whether
one of the charges is a capital offense or the joinder of the charges
converts the matter into a capital case.” (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th
at p. 123.) The first factor, cross-admissibility of evidence, may
be determinative: “if evidence underlying the offenses in question
would be ‘cross-admissible’ in separate trials of other charges,
that circumstance normally is sufficient, standing alone, to dispel
any prejudice and justify a trial court’s refusal to sever the
charged offenses.” (Alcala v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th

19
1205, 1221.) However, the converse is not true. (See § 954.1
[“evidence concerning one offense or offenses need not be
admissible as to the other offense or offenses before the jointly
charged offenses may be tried together before the same trier of
fact”].) The “complete absence of cross-admissibility does not, by
itself, demonstrate prejudice from a failure to order a requested
severance.” (Ibid.; see also id. at pp. 1221-1222 [collecting
cases].) “In the absence of cross-admissibility, we turn to the
remaining factors to assess whether the trial court abused its
discretion.” (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 123-124.)
Appellant contends there was no cross-admissible evidence
concerning the 1998 and 2008 crimes because they “took place a
decade apart,” had “no common witnesses or codefendants,” and
had “entirely different” motives. The People respond that
evidence of appellant’s flight and law enforcement efforts to
locate him was cross-admissible, as was evidence of appellant’s
modus operandi of confronting his victims early in the morning
and shooting them in the head, and his “common plan . . . to
perpetrate attacks that were callous, violent, and unprovoked.”
The People further assert that evidence of the common features
of the crimes was cross-admissible to demonstrate identity, and
to refute appellant’s assertion that he acted in self-defense in
2008.
We agree with the People that evidence regarding the
common features of the 1998 and 2008 crimes was cross-
admissible. Under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b),
evidence of criminal acts may be admitted if the acts are
“relevant to prove some fact ... other than [the defendant’s]
disposition to commit [a criminal] act.” Evidence admitted under
subdivision (b) may be used to prove motive, intent, common

20
design or plan, and identity. (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th
380, 402-403 & fn. 6.) Here, all of the charged crimes were
committed in the early morning hours and involved shootings to
the head and/or back. The similarities between the 1998 and
2008 crimes called into question appellant’s argument that he
acted in self-defense on the latter occasion.
Even if there were no cross-admissible evidence, however,
we would find no abuse of the court’s discretion in denying the
motion to sever because the other two relevant factors weigh in
favor of joinder. As to the second factor, whether certain charges
were more inflammatory than others, appellant asserts that the
1998 crimes against Fernandez were “unquestionably more
inflammatory” than the 2008 crimes because they were heinous
and involved the mother of his child, while the 2008 crimes
involved “one drug dealer shooting another.” As the People point
out, however, appellant “overlooks the viciousness of the Torres
murder, where appellant woke his victim up from his sleep to
shoot him 11 times in his front yard as he ran for his life in his
underwear.” Appellant also overlooks the other two charged 1998
crimes, which were more similar in kind to the 2008 crimes. The
jury failed to reach a verdict on those crimes despite their
proximity in time to the crimes against Fernandez and the
People’s argument that appellant killed Fernandez to prevent her
from telling anyone about his involvement in them, indicating
that the nature of the Fernandez crimes did not cause undue
prejudice.
Appellant also argues that the third factor, whether a weak
case has been joined with a strong case, “is similar,” because the
evidence in the Fernandez case “is significantly stronger than the
evidence of the murder of Oscar Torres.” He focuses particularly

21
on the evidence that he was the perpetrator, which he asserts
was “much weaker” in the Torres murder than in the Fernandez
crimes. “In order to demonstrate the potential for a prejudicial
spillover effect, defendant must show an ‘extreme disparity’ in
the strength or inflammatory character of the evidence.” (People
v. Ybarra (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1420, 1436.) Appellant has not
made that showing here. Video evidence depicted appellant
shooting Torres, both as he ran away and as he lay on the
ground. DNA evidence also linked appellant to the limousine, and
multiple witnesses placed him at the scene. Moreover, appellant
again ignores the other 1998 crimes; the jury’s inability to reach
a verdict suggests that the evidence of those crimes was weaker
than the evidence in the Torres case. As none of the relevant
factors indicates severance was improper, we conclude that
appellant failed to carry his burden of demonstrating the clear
prejudice necessary to establish an abuse of discretion.
Appellant finally argues that even if the trial court properly
denied his motion to sever, reversal of the convictions on the 2008
charges is required because the joinder resulted in gross
unfairness amounting to a denial of due process. (See People v.
Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 783; Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p.
123.) We may reverse on this ground “only if it is reasonably
probable that the jury was influenced by the joinder in its verdict
of guilt.” (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 129-130.) The burden of
establishing that a trial was grossly unfair thus is a heavy one,
and appellant has failed to carry it. (See People v. Soper, supra,
45 Cal.4th at p. 783.)
Appellant contends that joinder of the 1998 and 2008
charges “resulted in the admission at trial of a plethora of gang-
related expert testimony, exploited by the prosecutor to

22
appellant’s detriment in closing argument to the jury.”7
Specifically, he asserts that the evidence regarding appellant’s
gang membership and the gang-related motives for the
Hernandez and Ponce murders improperly tainted trial of the
2008 crimes, because “there was no evidence that appellant killed
Torres for a gang-related reason” and the evidence regarding the
2008 charges was relatively weak. “The danger here,” he argues,
“was that the jury would consider appellant guilty of the Torres
charges because they had heard that he and Prado were violent
gang members who should be punished despite the weakness of
the evidence.”
As discussed above, the evidence in the 2008 cases was
quite strong: DNA placed appellant in the limo, witnesses placed
him at the scene, and video showed him shooting Torres multiple
times. Maria D. testified that she heard Torres say “No, Toro,
no,” before the first gunshots were fired, and she and Anthony L.
both testified that Anthony L. said Toro shot him. The evidence
also showed that Torres was a high-ranking gang member who
trafficked in narcotics and lost a substantial sum of drug money
during the traffic stop in Missouri, some of which was earmarked
for appellant. That renders this case distinguishable from People
v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, in which the court
concluded that much of the “panoply of incriminating gang
evidence” had “no legitimate purpose in [the] trial.” (Id. at pp.
227, 230.)
The trial court also instructed the jury that the gang
evidence was admitted only for the limited purposes of deciding
whether appellant “acted with the intent, purpose, and
knowledge that are required to prove [he] had a motive to commit

7 Appellant did not object to the prosecutor’s argument.

23
the crimes charged,” and whether he “actually believed in the
need to defend himself.” The jury was expressly instructed to
“not consider this evidence for any other purpose,” and to “not
conclude from this evidence that the defendant is a person of bad
character or that he has a disposition to commit crime.” We
presume the jury followed these limiting instructions. (Simon,
supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 130.) That presumption is bolstered here
by the jury’s failure to convict appellant of the Hernandez and
Ponce murders alleged to be gang-motivated. “Where the jury
returns a guilty verdict of a lesser crime, or, as here, fails to
convict at all on some charges, we are confident the jury was
capable of, and did, differentiate among defendant’s crimes.”
(People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 927.)
Appellant has not shown that it is reasonably probable the
jury relied on gang evidence instead of the strong evidence
warranting conviction of the 2008 charges. We accordingly find
no gross unfairness or violation of due process due to joinder.
II. Evidence of Efforts to Locate Appellant
A. Background
Before detective Muse took the stand, appellant objected to
testimony concerning “her efforts to find Mr. Saenz” as
“irrelevant” and unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section
352. The People argued that Muse’s efforts were relevant “for the
purpose of flight and consciousness of guilt and
. . . why he wasn’t apprehended until November of 2012.” They
also asserted that Muse’s testimony was “a high-level overview of
what efforts she made, meaning she didn’t give up looking for
him.” The court overruled appellant’s objection after confirming
that the People planned to introduce evidence that appellant was
apprehended in Mexico. Muse testified about her efforts to locate

24
appellant, including her consultation with Garriola and her trips
to Texas and Louisiana without further objection from appellant.
Later, before the People called Garriola, appellant objected
to his testimony under Evidence Code section 352 as “hugely
prejudicial and not probative.” Appellant specifically objected “to
any questioning about putting up billboards and $100,000
rewards, $20,000 rewards” and appellant’s appearances on
“America’s Most Wanted” and the FBI’s ten most wanted list as
“highly prejudicial.” The People responded that appellant had
stated in interviews that he had seen himself on “America’s Most
Wanted” and “knew they were looking for him.” They further
stated that they wanted Garriola to testify about billboards
placed in Los Angeles, in case there was “any suggestion that he
was in Los Angeles.” The court ruled that “billboard testimony
can come in, as can America’s Most Wanted. The ten most
wanted list, no. That stays out under 352.” Garriola testified as
summarized above without further objection from appellant.
B. Analysis
Appellant contends the court erred in permitting Garriola
to testify about the efforts he and the fugitive task force
undertook to locate appellant. He argues that Garriola’s
testimony was not “relevant to demonstrate appellant’s
consciousness of guilt,” because Muse “had already established
that appellant had ‘flown the coop’ and that was evidence of
flight.” He further asserts that Garriola’s “graphic testimony . . .
tended to prove nothing about appellant’s consciousness of guilt”
because it did not relate “to appellant, his actions, or his state of
mind.” Appellant also argues that Garriola’s testimony violated
his due process rights, because it portrayed him as “dangerous
and ‘evil’ (as the prosecutor argued) in a way that overshadowed

25
the evidence in the case and encouraged the jury to convict him,
particularly on the Torres case, based on his status as a ‘Most
Wanted’ criminal, rather than on the evidence properly admitted
against him.”
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency in reason to
prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.) All relevant
evidence is admissible unless excluded by statute or
Constitutional requirement. (Evid. Code, § 351; People v. Carter
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1166 (Carter).) “The trial court has broad
discretion in determining the relevance of evidence [citations] but
lacks discretion to admit irrelevant evidence.” (Carter, supra, at
pp. 1166-1167.) The trial court also has broad discretion to
exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a)
necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial
danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of
misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) Evidence is not unduly
prejudicial merely because it is damaging to a party. Instead,
evidence should be excluded as unduly prejudicial when it is
likely to inflame the emotions of the jury and cause the jury to
use it for an illegitimate purpose. (People v. Doolin (2009) 45
Cal.4th 390, 439.) We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings
for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 437.)
We find no abuse of that discretion here. Evidence of a
defendant’s flight, avoidance of apprehension, and whereabouts
prior to his or her arrest is “highly probative of his [or her]
participation in the crimes and of his [or her] consciousness of
guilt.” (People v. Neely (1993) 6 Cal.4th 877, 896-897.) “Evidence
showing consciousness of guilt, such as flight or escaping from

26
jail, is generally admissible within the trial court’s discretion.”
(People v. Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 391.) Appellant
acknowledges this, but asserts that law enforcement efforts to
locate him during his flight “tended to prove nothing about his
consciousness of guilt.” We disagree. Although law enforcement
efforts to locate appellant did not speak directly to his
consciousness of guilt, they tended to show that appellant went to
great lengths to elude law enforcement for an extended period of
time. The jury could infer a greater consciousness of guilt from
this evidence, particularly given the severity of the crimes with
which appellant was charged. Appellant suggests that if he “did
not know he was fleeing from the FBI, his actions cannot be said
to prove consciousness of guilt.” Appellant does not cite any
authority for this proposition, which we find unpersuasive.
“[T]he existence of alternate explanations for the defendant’s
behavior does not necessarily defeat the court’s discretion to
admit consciousness-of-guilt evidence.” (Ibid.)
We are similarly unpersuaded by appellant’s contentions
that the evidence was unduly prejudicial or violative of his due
process rights. The trial court excluded evidence that appellant
was on the FBI’s ten most wanted list. It also instructed the jury
that “evidence that the defendant fled cannot prove guilt by
itself,” and “it is up to you to decide the meaning and importance”
of appellant’s flight-related conduct.” We presume the jury
followed these instructions. (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 130.)
To the extent there was any error in admitting the
evidence, we would find it harmless. “[T]he application of
ordinary rules of evidence like Evidence Code section 352 does
not implicate the federal Constitution, and thus we review
allegations under the ‘reasonable probability’ standard” of People

27
v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (People v. Marks (2003) 31
Cal.4th 197, 227.) However, even if we were to apply the
“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, as appellant urges, we would
reach the same conclusion. The evidence implicating appellant in
the 1998 crimes against Fernandez and the 2008 crimes against
Torres and Anthony L. was strong. Appellant does not challenge
the admission of Muse’s and other law enforcement officers’
testimony regarding appellant’s flight and their inability to locate
him. Any error in admitting Garriola’s testimony to the same
effect was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, even
after hearing Garriola’s testimony, the jury was unable to reach a
verdict on the Hernandez and Ponce murders, indicating that it
did not rely on prejudice. Because we have rejected appellant’s
claims of error and prejudice, we also reject his claim of
cumulative prejudice. (See People v. Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th 36,
75.)
III. Denial of Romero Motion
A. Background
After the jury returned its verdicts, the court held a bench
trial at which it found that appellant suffered a prior strike, a
juvenile robbery adjudication from 1992. In his motion for new
trial, appellant requested that the court strike the strike
pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (a) and Romero, supra, 13
Cal.4th 497 . Appellant argued that he was 16 years old at the
time of the conviction, which itself was 30 years old. He also
argued that he faced multiple life sentences even without the
strike, such that his prospects “for committing future crimes are
virtually nil” and there was no societal interest in using the
strike to lengthen his sentence further. At the hearing on the

28
motion, appellant reiterated his contention that the base
sentenced he faced was “more than sufficient for these particular
crimes.” The court denied the Romero motion and used the strike
conviction to double appellant’s determinate sentences. It found
while sentencing appellant that there were several aggravating
factors warranting imposition of high term sentences and no
mitigating factors. The court also found that appellant deserved
the “maximum amount of time” for the crimes, which were “cold-
blooded,” “brutal,” and supported by overwhelming evidence.
B. Analysis
A trial court must decide whether to strike a prior strike by
considering factors that are intrinsic to the Three Strikes law’s
sentencing scheme. (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148,
161 (Williams).) These factors include: (1) the nature and
circumstances of the current conviction; (2) the nature and
circumstances of the prior strike conviction; and (3) the
defendant's “background, character, and prospects.” (Ibid.) If the
defendant falls outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law, the
court may, in furtherance of justice, treat the defendant “as
though he [or she] had not previously been convicted of one or
more serious and/or violent felonies.” (Ibid.; see also Romero,
supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 529-530; § 1385, subd. (a).) We review a
trial court’s denial of a Romero motion for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 373.) “[A] trial court
does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or
arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Id. at
p. 377.)
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in declining to strike appellant’s strike. The court properly
considered the nature and circumstances of the current

29
convictions, all of which involved violent, assaultive crimes. It
also considered appellant’s character, including his continued
disrespect during the proceedings. The court reasonably could
conclude that the constellation of these circumstances supported
imposition of the maximum sentence, including the strike.
Appellant contends the remoteness of his prior strike
warranted striking it. We disagree. The trial court is not
obligated to “simply consult the Gregorian calendar with blinders
on.” (People v. Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 809, 813.) An
older prior strike conviction may “wash out” if a defendant has
demonstrated rehabilitation in the intervening years. But if a
defendant “has led a continuous life of crime after the prior, there
has been no ‘washing out’ and there is simply nothing mitigating
about a 20-year-old prior.” (Ibid.) The court need not “overlook
the fact defendant consistently committed criminal offenses.”
(People v. Philpot (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 893, 906.) Here,
appellant suffered the strike in 1992. He suffered two additional
convictions in 1994 and 1995, only three years before he
committed the 1998 crimes against Fernandez. Appellant
subsequently fled, returning only to commit further crimes in
2008 before fleeing again until 2012. This conduct “as a whole
was a strong indication of unwillingness or inability to comply
with the law” (ibid.), not rehabilitation.
Appellant also contends that the trial court abused its
discretion because he faced a life sentence even without the
strike. He asserts “there was no ‘interests of justice’ in using the
30-year-old prior to double the determinate sentences to run
consecutively with the life sentence.” Appellant relies on People
v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 500 (Garcia), which states that
“a defendant’s sentence . . . is the overarching consideration

30
because the underlying purpose of striking prior conviction
allegations is the avoidance of unjust sentences.” Appellant also
cites Garcia for the proposition that once a defendant was
sentenced to a term of 30 years to life on one burglary conviction,
“his ‘prospects’ for committing future burglaries diminished
significantly.” (Ibid.)
Appellant’s reliance on Garcia is misplaced. In Garcia, the
issue was “whether, and in what circumstances, a trial court in a
Three Strikes case may strike prior conviction allegations as to
one count, but not as to another.” (Garcia, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p.
496.) The defendant in Garcia was convicted of two burglaries,
and the trial court struck his prior strikes when imposing
sentence on one burglary conviction but not the other. (Id. at pp.
494-495.) The Supreme Court held that a trial court “may find
adequate justification for striking one or more prior conviction
allegations, but may deem appropriate the sentence that results
from striking the prior conviction allegations as to only some
counts. When a proper basis exists for a court to strike prior
conviction allegations as to at least one current conviction, the
law does not require the court to treat other current convictions
with perfect symmetry if symmetrical treatment would result in
an unjust sentence.” (Id. at p. 500.) It is in this context that the
court observed that “once the trial court had sentenced defendant
to a term of 30 years to life for the [first] burglary, his ‘prospects’
for committing future burglaries diminished significantly” and
the trial court properly could rely on that circumstance to strike
the defendant’s strikes when imposing sentence for the second
burglary. (Ibid.)
Contrary to appellant’s suggestion, Garcia does not hold
that a trial court abuses its discretion by declining to strike a

31
strike when the defendant faces a lengthy sentence. It instead
holds that the trial court need not use prior strikes uniformly
when sentencing a defendant on multiple counts, and that “a
defendant’s sentence is also a relevant consideration when
deciding whether to strike a prior conviction allegation.” (Garcia,
supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 500.) Here, the trial court considered the
length of appellant’s potential sentence and concluded that “the
maximum sentence that the law allows” was warranted. This
was not an abuse of discretion under the circumstances of this
case.
IV. Denial of Joint Motion to Withdraw Allegations
A. Background
On January 6, 2021, the People filed a motion to dismiss
and withdraw all firearm, gang, and special circumstance
allegations pursuant to section 1385 and Los Angeles County
District Attorney George Gascón’s Special Directives 20-08 and
20-08.1. The trial court preliminarily denied the motion the same
day, ruling that “it takes my permission” for the prosecution to
dismiss enhancement and special circumstance allegations after
the information is filed. However, it noted that it was “supposed
to look at the interest[s] of justice” to the defendant and the
public before making a final decision, and invited the parties to
submit further filings about why dismissal of the allegations
would serve the interests of justice.
Appellant subsequently filed a written joinder to the
motion, in which he argued that the People had “sole” and
“absolute” discretion to “elect which charges or enhancements to
prosecute,” and the trial court was prohibited from interfering
with this discretion. After reviewing that filing and holding a

32
hearing, a reporter’s transcript of which is not in the appellate
record, the court denied the motion.
B. Analysis
Appellant argues that the court erred in denying the
motion because the People have the sole discretion to charge and
prosecute crimes, and the court lacks authority to limit that
discretion. We disagree.
A “prosecutor’s motion to dismiss an enhancement under
section 1385 is not ‘a constitutionally protected exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.’” (Nazir v. Superior Court (2022) 79
Cal.App.5th 478, 499.) “[O]nce a district attorney files charges
and invokes the court’s jurisdiction, only the court, not the
district attorney, can dismiss an action or enhancement under
section 1385.” (Id. at pp. 499-500.) The court must “exercise its
discretion in determining whether dismissal furthers the
interests of justice.” (Id. at p. 501.) That requires the court to
undertake a case-specific assessment as to whether dismissal of
enhancement and special circumstance allegations is warranted.
(Ibid.) Relevant factors include “circumstances specific to the
crime and the defendant’s criminal history, as well as . . . broader
societal objectives” and the policies underlying the Special
Directives. (Id. at pp. 485, 497, 501-502.) We review the trial
court’s discretionary ruling for abuse of its discretion.
Aside from his assertion that the trial court lacked the
authority to deny the motion, appellant has raised no argument
that the trial court abused its discretion. Even if he had, we
would find no error. Nothing in the record indicates the court
misunderstood the scope of its discretion or failed to consider
appropriate factors in exercising that discretion. To the contrary,
the court acknowledged that its discretion turned on the interests

33
of justice, and it invited the parties to file additional briefing on
that topic. The record also reflects that the court considered that
briefing as well as the parties’ oral arguments before making its
final ruling.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, ACTING P. J.

We concur:

MORI, J.

ZUKIN, J.

34

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