Simonian v. Badalian CA2/1

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Filed 7/12/24 Simonian v. Badalian CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THEOD SIMONIAN et al., B323737

Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20STCV00400)
v.

VAHE BADALIAN,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, William A. Crowfoot, Judge. Reversed.
Shegerian & Associates, Carney R. Shegerian, Anthony
Nguyen, Mark Lim, Aadil Muhammad and Iman Alamdari for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Cole Pedroza, Kenneth R. Pedroza, Cassidy C. Davenport,
Matthew S. Levinson; Packer O’Leary & Corson, Robert B.
Packer and Hilliary B. Powell for Defendant and Respondent
Vahe Badalian.
___________________________________

In a medical malpractice action arising from the death of a
post-operative patient in an ICU, the plaintiffs’ expert in critical
care medicine opined that the decedent’s cardiologist fell below
the standard of care by failing to order serial hemoglobin
monitoring, and had such monitoring been undertaken there
would have been enough time to prevent the fatal heart attack he
suffered. After finding the expert’s opinion to be inadmissible
essentially because the expert failed to list the exact cause of
death as his particular area of expertise, the trial court granted
summary judgment to the defendant. We reverse because
nothing in the record suggests an expert in critical care medicine
cannot offer an expert opinion on post-operative hemoglobin
monitoring and on the result from the failure to monitor.
BACKGROUND
Razmi Simon, age 76, who suffered from chronic
cardiovascular disease, hypertension and hyperlipidemia, was
admitted to Glendale Adventist Medical Center requiring
immediate surgery for a fractured hip. Dr. Vahe Badalian,
Simon’s cardiologist and primary care provider, examined Simon
at his bedside and contacted Michael Abdulian, a surgeon, who
performed surgery on Simon’s hip on the morning of November
20, 2018. Simon, who took aspirin and prasugrel as antiplatelet
therapy, had a preoperative hemoglobin level of 12.6 grams per
deciliter, an amount raising no medical issues. He lost only 50
milliliters of blood during the surgery, not an amount to raise
concern of excessive bleeding.
In the evening of November 21, 2018, Simon developed
tachycardia and complained about pain in his leg and chest. Dr.

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Badalian ordered a complete blood count test, which revealed
that Simon’s hemoglobin had dropped to 6.8 grams per deciliter,
reflecting critical perioperative blood loss. An electrocardiogram
was ordered, which showed Simon was suffering a heart attack.
Simon was taken to the ICU, where he underwent a series
of interventions before dying on the morning of November 23,
2018, from “cardiopulmonary arrest, cardiogenic shock, [and]
acute coronary insufficiency secondary to supply demand
mismatch.”
Lidoosh Akoupian, Theod Simonian, and Arbey Simon,
Simon’s wife and sons, sued Dr. Badalian for professional
negligence, alleging he breached the standard of care by failing to
order serial hemoglobin monitoring after Simon’s operation.
Plaintiffs alleged that failure to monitor Simon’s hemoglobin
levels caused a failure to detect that he was bleeding internally
until it was too late to prevent him from suffering a fatal heart
attack. Had Simon’s hemoglobin been checked earlier, plaintiffs
alleged, his blood loss would have been detected in time to give
him a transfusion, which would have prevented his death.
Dr. Badalian moved for summary judgment, supported by
the declaration of Fernando Roth, M.D., a cardiologist in private
practice and attending faculty member with a Clinical Professor
appointment at the Keck USC School of Medicine.
Dr. Roth opined that the standard of care does not require
hemoglobin monitoring following orthopedic surgery unless the
patient demonstrates signs or symptoms of bleeding, such as
hypotension, tachycardia, increased respirations, or frank
bleeding. Roth declared that Dr. Badalian appropriately
monitored Simon throughout his admission, because his post-
operative vitals and clinical presentation were normal and not

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suggestive of bleeding, and thus there was no indication of the
need to measure his hemoglobin levels prior to his complaints.
Roth also declared that no deviation from the standard of
care caused or contributed to Simon’s death because even if post-
operative hemoglobin monitoring had been ordered, the results
would not have predicted Simon’s sudden myocardial infarction
and other associated symptoms. This is so, Roth declared,
because there likely would have been no drop in Simon’s
hemoglobin values which would have prompted intervention,
because the infarction was a sudden, acute event caused by a
ruptured ulcer or breach of a vessel. Had Simon been
experiencing postoperative bleeding for an extended time, Roth
declared, he would have exhibited signs or symptoms of such
bleeding, such as tachycardia and hypotension, which did not
occur.
Plaintiffs opposed the motion, offering the declaration of
Kevin Shaw, M.D., an internist, pulmonologist, and critical care
specialist currently serving as the Medical Director of the
intensive care unit at Scripps Memorial Hospital in Encinitas.
Dr. Shaw declared he “routinely cared for patients with
advanced pulmonary diseases, heart transplantation, cardiogenic
shock, extracorporeal membranous oxygenation,
immunosuppression, massive trauma, septic shock, and the like,”
and currently worked 15 to 20 shifts per month caring for
critically ill patients with a variety of pathologies.
Dr. Shaw declared, “The standard of care in [Simon’s]
situation would have been serial hemoglobin monitoring in the
postoperative setting, with transfusion and potential CT imaging
of the thigh with any significant drop in hemoglobin, or pain out
of proportion to what would be expected. In the event that the

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patient’s hemoglobin was to drop, immediate transfusion of blood
products, with consideration of platelet product transfusion, or
potentially an angiographic intervention, would be able to
minimize cardiovascular consequences and could have avoided
Mr. Simon death.”
“Hemorrhagic complications from femur surgery are not
uncommon,” Dr. Shaw declared, and “can be difficult to detect
immediately because the thigh tends to be large, with deep
pockets of potential space between muscle and fatty tissue, able
to contain a large amount of blood volume before it is clinically
apparent with signs such as bruising. As a cardiologist, and as
the very prescriber of Mr. Simon’s aspirin and prasugrel therapy,
Dr. Badalian should have been intimately familiar with the
mechanism of action of these medications. Dr. Badalian was
clearly aware of the risks of Mr. Simon’s dual antiplatelet
therapy, as evidenced by his note regarding his prasugrel use.”
Dr. Shaw declared that Dr. Badalian fell below the
standard of care, by “fail[ing] to appropriately monitor the
laboratory values of Mr. Simon. Specifically, [he] failed to follow
the patient’s hemoglobin values for evidence of perioperative
blood loss. Mr. Simon was anticoagulated with dual antiplatelet
therapy, including aspirin and prasugrel. Prasugrel is well-
known to cause significant hemorrhagic complications in the
setting of the surgical procedures. Because of this, it is typically
held for 7 days prior to elective surgery. In the setting of
emergent surgery, such as the surgery of Mr. Simon, precautions
must be taken to ensure minimal risk of hemorrhagic
complications. These may include platelet transfusion, frequent
physical examination, serial laboratory monitoring, imaging as
necessary, and red blood cell transfusion.”

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Dr. Shaw declared, “A patient such as Mr. Simon, who is
known to have severe cardiovascular disease with multiple
previous interventions, is prone to myocardial ischemia with any
significant hemorrhagic episode. This . . . should have . . . been
well-understood by his cardiologist and primary physician.”
Dr. Shaw declared that by failing to meet the standard of
care, Dr. Badalian “allowed Mr. Simon’s hemoglobin to drop far
below what would be reasonable. This led to his acute coronary
syndrome, chest pain, respiratory failure, vital sign
abnormalities, and subsequently a cascade of ill-advised
interventions. This failure to meet the standard of care, as well
as Dr. Badalian’s prompting to pursue left heart catheterization
and heparin anticoagulation, resulted in Mr. Razmi Simon
developing respiratory failure, intubation, cardiogenic shock,
renal failure, and death. [¶] It is my opinion that had Dr.
Badalian . . . monitored the patient’s hemoglobin in a fashion
consistent with the standard of care, Mr. Simon would have
survived his surgery and his hospitalization, and would have
been discharged back home to his family.”
Dr. Badalian objected to Shaw’s declaration on the ground
that it lacked foundation because he failed to explain how his
training qualified him to opine on the standard of care appliable
to a cardiologist.
The trial court sustained the objection. It found that
although “Dr. Shaw demonstrate[d] that he has experience in
caring for patients with advanced pulmonary diseases, heart
transplantation, cardiogenic shock, extracorporeal membranous
oxygenation, immunosuppression, massive trauma, and septic
shock,” “there is no evidence that Decedent’s death was caused by
any of these.”

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The court found that because Dr. Shaw’s declaration was
inadmissible, plaintiffs failed to rebut Dr. Roth’s opinion that Dr.
Badalian complied with the applicable standard of care. The
court therefore found no triable issue existed as to Dr. Badalian’s
breach of the standard of care, and granted summary judgment.
Plaintiffs appeal from the resulting entry of judgment.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs contend the trial court abused its discretion in
finding Dr. Shaw’s declaration to be inadmissible, and had it
been admitted it would have established that triable issues exist
as to Dr. Badalian’s breach of the standard of care and causation.
Consequently, plaintiffs argue, the court erred in granting
summary judgment. Dr. Badalian counters that the declaration
was inadmissible, but even had it been admitted it failed to
establish a triable issue as to either breach or causation. We
agree with plaintiffs.
A. Legal Principles
1. Professional Negligence
The elements of a cause of action for medical professional
negligence are: “(1) the duty of the professional to use such skill,
prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession
commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a
proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and
the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from
the professional’s negligence.” (Powell v. Kleinman (2007) 151
Cal.App.4th 112, 122.)
“[T]he causation inquiry has two facets: whether the
defendant’s conduct was the ‘cause in fact’ of the injury; and, if
so, whether as a matter of social policy the defendant should be
held legally responsible for the injury.” (Osborn v. Irwin

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Memorial Blood Bank (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 234, 252.) To
determine causation in fact, California has adopted the
substantial factor test set forth in the Restatement Second of
Torts, section 431. (Mitchell v. Gonzales (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1041,
1052; Rest.2d. Torts, § 431 [negligent conduct is a legal cause of
harm if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm].) An
event will be considered a substantial factor in bringing about
harm if it is “recognizable as having an appreciable effect in
bringing it about.” (Rest.2d Torts, § 433, com. (d).)
In a medical negligence case, “ ‘causation must be proven
within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent
expert testimony. Mere possibility alone is insufficient to
establish a prima facie case.’ ” (Dumas v. Cooney (1991) 235
Cal.App.3d 1593, 1603.)
2. Expert Testimony
Because the standard of care in a medical malpractice case
is a matter “peculiarly within the knowledge of experts” (Sinz v.
Owens (1949) 33 Cal.2d 749, 753), expert testimony is required to
“prove or disprove that the defendant performed in accordance
with the standard of care” unless the negligence is obvious to a
layperson (Johnson v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th
297, 305; Kelley v. Trunk (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 519, 523).
A person is qualified to testify as an expert if he has
“special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education”
sufficient to qualify him as an expert on “the subject to which his
testimony relates.” (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (b).) Expert opinion
testimony must be “[b]ased on matter (including his special
knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education) perceived
by or personally known to the witness or made known to him at
or before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type

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that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an
opinion upon the subject to which his testimony relates, unless
an expert is precluded by law from using such matter as a basis
for his opinion.” (Ibid.)
“A witness testifying in the form of an opinion may state
on direct examination the reasons for his opinion and the matter
(including, in the case of an expert, his special knowledge, skill,
experience, training, and education) upon which it is based,
unless he is precluded by law from using such reasons or matter
as a basis for his opinion.” (Evid. Code, § 802.)
“[U]nder Evidence Code sections 801, subdivision (b), and
802, the trial court acts as a gatekeeper to exclude expert opinion
testimony that is (1) based on matter of a type on which an expert
may not reasonably rely, (2) based on reasons unsupported by the
material on which the expert relies, or (3) speculative.” (Sargon
Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55
Cal.4th 747, 771-772 (Sargon).)
“In order to testify as an expert in a medical malpractice
case, a person must have enough knowledge, learning and skill
with the relevant subject to speak with authority, and he or she
must be familiar with the standard of care to which the
defendant was held.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical
Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467, 470 (Avivi) [“The test for
determining familiarity with the standard of care is knowledge of
similar conditions”].) “[The expert] must have had basic
educational and professional training as a general foundation for
his testimony, but it is a practical knowledge of what is usually
and customarily done by physicians under circumstances similar
to those which confronted the defendant charged with
malpractice that is of controlling importance in determining

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competency of the expert to testify to the degree of care against
which the treatment given is to be measured.” (Huffman v.
Lindquist (1951) 37 Cal.2d 465, 478.)
“[T]he qualification of an expert witness requires exercise
of trial court discretion.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p.
472.) “A ruling that constitutes an abuse of discretion has been
described as one that is ‘so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it.’ ” (Sargon, supra, 55
Cal.4th at p. 773.)
3. Summary Judgment
A trial court properly grants summary judgment “ ‘if all the
papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A
defendant may establish his right to summary judgment by
showing that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot
be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of
action. ([§] 437c, subd. (p)(2).)” (Neiman v. Leo A. Daly Co.
(2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 962, 967.) “Once the moving defendant
has satisfied its burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show
that a triable issue of material fact exists as to each cause of
action. [Citation.] A triable issue of material fact exists where
‘the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the
underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in
accordance with the applicable standard of proof.’ ” (Ibid.)
On appeal, we apply an independent standard of review to
determine whether a trial is required—whether the evidence
favoring and opposing the summary judgment motion would
support a reasonable trier of fact’s determination in the plaintiff’s
favor on the cause of action or defense. (Aguilar v. Atlantic

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Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) In doing so we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing
summary judgment. (Id. at p. 843; Alexander v. Codemasters
Group Limited (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 129, 139.) We accept as
true the facts shown by the evidence offered in opposition to
summary judgment and the reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from them. (Spitzer v. The Good Guys, Inc. (2000) 80
Cal.App.4th 1376, 1385-1386.)
B. Plaintiffs Established that Triable Issues Exist
Here, Dr. Badalian presented the declaration of Dr. Roth to
the effect that Dr. Badalian complied with the applicable
standard of care and, even had he not, his actions were not a
substantial factor in causing Simon’s death. This evidence
carried his burden to show that the elements of breach and
causation could not be established. The burden therefore shifted
to plaintiffs to show that a triable issue of material fact existed as
to breach and causation.
They did so. Dr. Shaw declared that blood loss
complications from hip femur surgery are not uncommon and can
be difficult to detect because the thigh tends to be large, with
deep pockets of potential space between muscle and fatty tissue,
able to contain a large amount of blood volume before it is
clinically apparent with signs such as bruising. A cardiologist
such as Dr. Badalian, who was familiar with the mechanism of
the dual antiplatelet medications he prescribed, should have been
aware of the risks. The standard of care in Simon’s situation
required serial hemoglobin monitoring in the postoperative
setting. Yet Dr. Badalian failed to order such monitoring, which
allowed Simon’s blood loss to go undiagnosed until it was too late.
Had Dr. Badalian monitored Simon’s hemoglobin in a fashion

11
consistent with the standard of care, Dr. Shaw declared, Simon
likely would have survived.
This evidence created a triable issue as to Dr. Badalian’s
breach of the standard of care and causation, and thus summary
judgment was improper.
1. Dr. Shaw’s Declaration Was Admissible
Dr. Badalian argues Dr. Shaw’s declaration was
inadmissible because he was not qualified to opine on the
standard of care applicable either to Dr. Badalian “as a
cardiologist” or to Simon’s exact ailments.
Dr. Badalian fails to explain why a separate standard of
care should be applied in this case either to Dr. Badalian as a
cardiologist or to Simon’s particular ailments. It is undisputed
Simon died from complications arising from postoperative blood
loss. The record contains no suggestion that expertise in
cardiology is required to opine about monitoring postoperative
blood loss.
It is true that Dr. Badalian is a cardiologist, but that does
not mean that under the circumstances presented here, a
cardiologist is held to a standard of care different from (and less
than) any other physician about whom Dr. Shaw is qualified to
opine. Nothing in the record supports that there is a separate
standard of care for cardiologists or a separate standard
1
specifically for monitoring blood loss.
Therefore, Dr. Shaw’s declaration was admissible.

1
Dr. Badalian argues that plaintiffs allege he improperly
cleared Simon for surgery “from a cardiac standpoint,” and failed
to order tests to assess Simon’s “cardiac condition.” But he
identifies no such allegations, and we have discovered none.

12
The trial court’s finding to the contrary constituted an
abuse of discretion. The court found Dr. Shaw’s declaration to be
inadmissible because although Dr. Shaw had experience in caring
for patients with advanced pulmonary diseases, heart
transplantation, cardiogenic shock, extracorporeal membranous
oxygenation, immunosuppression, massive trauma, and septic
shock, there was no evidence that Simon’s death was caused by
any of these. That is true as far as it goes—Simon’s death was
caused by complications arising from undiagnosed blood loss.
The record, however, does not support that a physician with
experience in advanced pulmonary diseases, heart
transplantation, cardiogenic shock, extracorporeal membranous
oxygenation, immunosuppression, massive trauma, and septic
shock cannot offer an opinion about testing required to detect
blood loss.
Dr. Badalian complains that Dr. Shaw, who issued his
report on March 15, 2021, did not review Dr. Roth’s declaration,
which was generated more than a year later to support summary
judgment. No principle or precedent requires that an expert
review another expert’s opinion.
2. Dr. Shaw’s Declaration Established a Triable
Issue as to Breach of the Standard of Care
Dr. Badalian argues that even if Dr. Shaw’s declaration
was admissible, it failed to create a triable issue as to breach of
the standard of care because: (1) In opining that Dr. Badalian
allowed Simon’s hemoglobin to drop below “what would be
reasonable,” Dr. Shaw failed to define the term “reasonable”; (2)
Dr. Shaw failed to explain why laboratory tests would be required
following orthopedic surgery where the patient does not

13
demonstrate any signs or symptoms of bleeding; and (3) Dr.
Newman did not criticize Dr. Badalian.
We disagree.
Shaw used the word “reasonable” to designate a red flag,
not a quantity. He did not need to define that quantity because
he declared Simon’s physicians would have recognized the red
flag had they seen it.
Dr. Badalian incorrectly asserts that Dr. Shaw failed to
explain why laboratory tests would be required following
orthopedic surgery where the patient does not demonstrate any
signs or symptoms of bleeding. On the contrary, Dr. Shaw
declared that Dr. Badalian’s failure to monitor Simon’s
hemoglobin caused physicians to be unaware that Simon was
bleeding internally, which delayed and misdirected them, which
led to Simon’s death.
Finally, to the extent that Dr. Shaw disagreed with Drs.
Roth and Newman about breach of the standard of care, the
dispute can be resolved only by a trier of fact, not on summary
judgment.
3. Dr. Shaw’s Declaration Established a Triable
Issue as to Causation
Dr. Badalian argues that even if Dr. Shaw’s declaration
was admissible, it failed to create a triable issue as to causation
because: (1) Dr. Shaw failed to refute Dr. Roth’s opinion that
even if postoperative hemoglobin monitoring had been ordered, it
more likely than not would have failed to predict the decedent’s
anemia, sudden myocardial infarction and associated symptoms;
and (2) Dr. Newman contradicted Dr. Shaw’s opinion that cardiac
catheterization and heparin anticoagulation resulted in Simon’s
eventual death. We disagree.

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The causation dispute between Drs. Roth and Shaw is
mainly about the timing of the postoperative blood loss leading to
Simon’s heart attack. Plaintiffs theorize the bleeding was slow
enough to have been revealed by serial hemoglobin monitoring,
which would have led medical personnel to take remedial
measures that would have saved Simon’s life. Dr. Badalian
contends the bleeding was too sudden to be discovered by serial
monitoring until it was too late.
On this point, Dr. Roth declared that contrary to plaintiffs’
theory, Simon did not experience extended postoperative bleeding
because if he had, there would have been signs such as
tachycardia and hypotension, which did not occur. Instead,
Simon’s myocardial infarction was caused by a sudden, acute
event such as a ruptured ulcer or breach of a vessel. Roth
declared that such an event would not result in a detectable drop
in hemoglobin values, and thus would not have been discovered
by serial monitoring before it was too late to remedy the loss of
blood. Therefore, Roth concluded, serial monitoring would not
have predicted Simon’s sudden myocardial infarction, and
consequently Dr. Badalian’s failure to order monitoring did not
contribute to Simon’s death.
Dr. Shaw, however, declared that extended postoperative
bleeding could occur following femur surgery with no clinical
signs because thighs tend to be large, with deep pockets of
potential space between muscle and fatty tissue, and are able to
contain a large amount of blood volume before it is clinically
apparent. Dr. Badalian’s failure to monitor Simon’s hemoglobin
caused physicians to be unaware that Simon was bleeding
internally, which delayed and misdirected them, and led to
Simon’s death.

15
Although Dr. Shaw did not directly refute Dr. Roth’s
opinion that extended blood loss would have resulted in
tachycardia and hypotension, we must construe both declarations
at the summary judgment stage in favor of plaintiffs.
Essentially, Dr. Roth said Simon did not have clinical indications
suggesting there was a problem that serial monitoring would
have detected in time for intervention. Dr. Shaw opined that the
reason one needs to do serial monitoring is that femur surgery
can result in meaningful blood loss that will not present
symptomatically, and that once the patient showed the symptoms
on which Dr. Roth is focused it was too late. It is undisputed that
by the time Dr. Badalian ordered a hemoglobin test, Simon’s
values had fallen from 12.6 to 6.8 grams per deciliter, but nothing
in the record explains how fast this happened. For example,
nothing indicates the drop was instantaneous. Although Dr.
Roth declared the drop in Simon’s hemoglobin values resulted
from “sudden” and “acute” bleeding, he neither gave a time frame
for that event nor explained why it could not have been
discovered by serial hemoglobin tests.
A triable issue thus exists as to how fast Simon was
bleeding and whether one or more of the hemoglobin tests in a
serial regimen would have discovered the bleeding before the
advent of tachycardia.
Finally, to the extent that Dr. Newman disagreed with Dr.
Shaw on causation, the dispute can be resolved only by a trier of
fact, not on summary judgment.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. Appellants are to recover their
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

CHANEY, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

WEINGART, J.

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