WEBB v. KNIGHT

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

SAMANTHA WEBB, an adult individual, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

COLLIN REED KNIGHT and JANE DOE KNIGHT, husband and wife;
COCONINO COUNTY, a governmental entity; SHERIFF JIM DRISCOLL,
an adult individual; COCONINO COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, a
governmental entity, Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0401
FILED 05-15-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County
No. S0300CV202300466
The Honorable Brent Davidson Harris, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

COUNSEL

Sweet James Lawyers, LLC, Phoenix
By Jeffrey J. Spamer
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Jellison Law Offices, PLLC, Scottsdale
By James M. Jellison
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
WEBB v. KNIGHT, et al.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett and Judge Angela K. Paton joined.

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1 Samantha Webb appeals from the superior court’s order
dismissing her complaints against Coconino County Deputy Collin Knight
and former Coconino County Sheriff Jim Driscoll under Arizona Rule of
Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, we affirm the
grant of dismissal against Knight, vacate the dismissal against Driscoll, and
remand for proceedings consistent with this decision.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 On September 14, 2022, Knight rear-ended Webb while
driving a Coconino County Sheriff’s Office (“CCSO”) vehicle. In March
2023, Webb’s process server delivered notices of claim against Knight and
Driscoll to front desk staff at the CCSO. In September 2023, Webb filed a
complaint alleging direct negligence claims against Knight and vicarious
liability claims against Driscoll, Coconino County, and the CCSO.

¶3 In January 2025, the defendants moved to dismiss Webb’s
complaint on the grounds that 1) Knight was improperly served with the
notice of claim, 2) the notice of claim against Driscoll did not satisfy the sum
certain requirement, 3) Coconino County could not legally be liable for a
deputy, and 4) the CCSO was a non-jural entity which could not be sued.
With their motion, the defendants attached the notices of claim and an
affidavit from Knight stating that he did not know the front desk employee
and never authorized her, nor anyone else, to accept a notice of claim on his
behalf.

¶4 Webb filed a response, attaching her own exhibits showing
the front desk employee told Webb’s process server the employee was
authorized to accept service for deputies, and that deputies had been served
in this manner before. Webb also requested discovery into whether the
CCSO front desk staff were in fact authorized by the Sheriff to accept
service for deputies. Webb agreed Coconino County and the CCSO should
be dismissed, and the court dismissed them with prejudice.

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WEBB v. KNIGHT, et al.
Decision of the Court

¶5 After a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the court dismissed
Webb’s claims against Knight and Driscoll. Webb has timely appealed the
dismissal, and we have jurisdiction. A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

¶6 When the defendants filed their motion to dismiss, they
attached documents outside Webb’s complaint. In her response, Webb also
attached documents. These “matters outside the pleadings,” which the
court necessarily considered in the hearing, converted the motion to
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(d); Vasquez
v. State, 220 Ariz. 304, 308, ¶ 8 (App. 2008).

¶7 Accordingly, “in reviewing an order granting summary
judgment, we construe all facts in support of the opponent of the motion
and will affirm only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Yollin v. City of Glendale,
219 Ariz. 24, 27, ¶ 6 (App. 2008); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We review de novo
whether the notice of claim complied with the notice of claim statute,
Arizona Revised Statutes Section 12-821.01. Vasquez, 220 Ariz. at 308, ¶ 8.

II. Service of Notice of Claim on Knight

¶8 The notice of claim statute requires claims against a public
employee to be filed “with the person or persons authorized to accept
service for the . . . public employee as set forth in the Arizona rules of civil
procedure.” A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). When serving a notice of claim against
individuals, the general service rules under Rule 4.1(d) apply. Simon v.
Maricopa Med. Ctr., 225 Ariz. 55, 61, ¶ 20 (App. 2010). The parties agree that
Knight was not served personally or at his residence. See Ariz. R. Civ. P.
4.1(d)(1)–(2). They only dispute whether Knight was properly served under
Rule 4.1(d)(3), which allows an individual to be served through “an agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service” on behalf of the
individual.

¶9 Webb contends that service was proper because Driscoll
appointed the front desk employee as his deputies’ agent. Knight argues
that he, as the principal, was the only one who could authorize an agent on
his behalf, and that he never appointed the front desk employee as his
agent.

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WEBB v. KNIGHT, et al.
Decision of the Court

¶10 For purposes of service under Rule 4.1(d)(3), an agent must
have “actual authority to accept service or . . . apparent authority to do so
based on the principal’s actions.” Stanwitz v. Reagan, 245 Ariz. 344, 351, ¶ 26
(2018). Knight, not Driscoll, is the principal. The record contains no
evidence that Knight ever conferred such authority on the front desk
employee. On the contrary, Knight submitted an affidavit stating he did not
know the front desk employee, much less authorize her as his agent. Webb
insists the court cannot rely on Knight’s self-serving affidavit, yet she
alleges no facts to dispute it because her argument rests entirely on Driscoll
being the one who authorized service. See Simon, 225 Ariz. at 61–62, ¶¶ 20–
22 (summary judgment in favor of individual police officers was proper
when plaintiff provided no evidence contradicting the officers’ affidavits
that they had not been served).

¶11 Webb’s reliance on Sanchez v. Maricopa County, __ Ariz. __, 572
P.3d 101 (2025) is misplaced. She argues Sanchez creates an exception to this
rule by holding the Sheriff alone controls and disciplines the deputies.
Thus, she argues, it “logically follows” that the Sheriff can appoint agents
to accept service on the deputies’ behalf.

¶12 But Sanchez assessed control in the context of a sheriff’s
vicarious liability for deputies, not the power to appoint agents for
deputies. Id. at __, ¶¶ 1–2, 572 P.3d at 104. Put differently, Sanchez holds
that Webb may sue Driscoll for the negligence of Knight but does not hold
that Driscoll can authorize service for Knight.

¶13 Nor does such a conclusion “logically follow,” as Webb urges.
A person with a claim against a public employee “must give notice of the
claim to both the employee individually and to his employer.” Crum v.
Superior Court, 186 Ariz. 351, 352 (App. 1996). Reliance on an internal office
policy to forward a notice of claim to the proper party is insufficient under
Rule 4.1. Falcon ex rel. Sandoval v. Maricopa County, 213 Ariz. 525, 530, ¶ 27
(2006). If a sheriff could appoint an agent to accept service for his deputies,
without his deputies’ knowledge, then a plaintiff aggrieved by a deputy
could satisfy the notice of claim statute without the deputy ever learning of
the claim. Webb’s proposed interpretation would thwart the purposes of
the notice of claim statute: to provide both the public employer and
employee “notice . . . and an opportunity to investigate and assess []
liability, to permit the possibility of settlement prior to litigation, and to
assist in fiscal planning or budgeting.” Johnson v. Superior Court, 158 Ariz.
507, 508 (App. 1988); see A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A).

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WEBB v. KNIGHT, et al.
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¶14 Webb has not alleged any facts showing that Knight
authorized the front desk employee to accept service for him. There is thus
no genuine dispute that Knight was improperly served.

¶15 Webb also argues the superior court abused its discretion by
denying her motion to conduct limited discovery into whether Driscoll
appointed the front desk employee as Knight’s agent. But whether Driscoll
told the employee she was generally authorized to accept service is
immaterial because the relevant inquiry is whether Knight told the
employee she was authorized to accept service for him individually. The
court did not abuse its discretion in denying additional discovery.

III. Sufficiency of the Facts in Driscoll’s Notice of Claim

¶16 Webb next argues the court erred in dismissing her claim
against Driscoll. Claimants must strictly comply with Section 12-821.01(A).
Swenson v. Pinal County, 243 Ariz. 122, 125, ¶ 7 (App. 2017). A notice of claim
shall “contain facts sufficient to permit the public entity . . . to understand
the basis on which liability is claimed” and “contain a specific amount for
which the claim can be settled and the facts supporting that amount.” A.R.S.
§ 12-821.01(A). The Sheriff is a “public entity” for purposes of the notice of
claim statute. Sanchez, __ Ariz. at __, ¶ 31, 572 P.3d at 110–11.

¶17 To strictly comply with the notice of claim statute, Webb had
to assert “facts sufficient to permit the [Sheriff]” to understand the basis of
his office’s potential liability. A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). Driscoll argues Webb’s
notice of claim did not sufficiently put him on notice because it was directed
at the CCSO, a non-jural entity that cannot sue or be sued, see Sanchez, __
Ariz. at __, ¶ 27, 572 P.3d at 110, and not Driscoll individually. But Driscoll
is the head of the CCSO. It is an “administrative creation of the sheriff”
through which he conducts his business. Id. at __, ¶ 31, 572 P.3d at 111.
Webb naming the CCSO instead of the Sheriff is not dispositive as to
whether Driscoll had sufficient notice of his potential liability when he is
the head of the CCSO and is the only public entity who could be vicariously
liable for Knight’s negligence. Compare with Harris v. Cochise Health Sys., 215
Ariz. 344, 351–52, ¶ 26 (App. 2007) (the director of a county agency was not
properly put on notice of a claim against her by a notice of claim directed
to the county—a proper jural entity—when the notice of claim alleged torts
committed by generic “[county agency] officials”).

¶18 Here, Webb alleged liability against Knight’s employer and
served the notice of claim against Knight’s employer. She addressed her
notice of claim to Driscoll in his official capacity as the Coconino County

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WEBB v. KNIGHT, et al.
Decision of the Court

Sheriff. She alleged, in detail, that one of his deputies negligently crashed
his county vehicle into her car while acting in the course and scope of his
employment with the sheriff’s office. These facts were sufficient to permit
Driscoll to understand his potential liability.

¶19 And Webb’s notice of claim satisfied Section 12-821.01(A)’s
sum certain requirement. Driscoll concedes that Webb clearly and
unequivocally included “a particular and certain amount of money” for
which the CCSO, and by extension the Sheriff, could settle her claim. City
of Mesa v. Ryan, 258 Ariz. 297, 300, ¶ 10 (2024). “No more is required.”
Donovan v. Yavapai Cmty. Coll. Dist., 244 Ariz. 608, 611, ¶ 9 (App. 2018).

¶20 Webb alleged facts sufficient for Driscoll to understand the
basis upon which she claimed liability. She made a sum certain demand for
which her claim could be settled. And she properly served the notice of
claim on Driscoll through his appointed agent. Accordingly, Webb strictly
complied with the notice of claim statute. The superior court erred by
dismissing her claim against the Sheriff.

CONCLUSION

¶21 We affirm Knight’s dismissal. We vacate the dismissal of the
Coconino County Sheriff and remand for additional proceedings. Because
Driscoll has retired, his successor is automatically substituted as a party. See
Ariz. R. Civ. P. 25(d); Sanchez, __ Ariz. at __, ¶ 31, 572 P.3d at 110.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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