In Re: Mh 2024-008892

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE: MH2024-008892

No. 1 CA-MH 24-0209
FILED 4-28-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. MH2024-008892
The Honorable Elisa C. Donnadieu, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Sean M. Moore
Counsel for Appellee

Office of the Legal Defender, Phoenix
By Robert Shipman, Lindsay Ficklin
Counsel for Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge James B. Morse Jr. and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.
IN RE: MH 2024-008892
Decision of the Court

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1 Bowery B. (“Patient”) challenges the superior court’s order
finding him persistently or acutely disabled and directing him to undergo
involuntary mental health treatment. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In September 2024, a psychiatric nurse practitioner filed an
application for an involuntary mental health evaluation (“Application”) of
Patient. The superior court ordered Patient detained and evaluated. Two
doctors evaluated Patient, diagnosed him with a mental health disorder,
and recommended involuntary psychiatric treatment. One of the doctors
petitioned for court-ordered treatment, attaching an affidavit and a
psychiatric evaluation report from himself and the other doctor who
evaluated Patient. The court ordered that Patient be detained, appointed
counsel to represent him, and set a hearing on the petition for court-ordered
treatment.

¶3 At the hearing, Patient stipulated to the admission of the
doctors’ affidavits and evaluation reports. The State called two
acquaintance witnesses. One of them was a licensed counselor who
evaluated Patient at a rehabilitation center before the Application was filed.
They met only once, for approximately 40 minutes, and did not maintain
any relationship afterwards.

¶4 On October 8, 2024, the court granted the petition and ordered
Patient to undergo involuntary mental health treatment “for a period time
of not to exceed a total of 365 days.” Patient timely appealed, and we have
jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 12-2101(A)(1), 36-546.01.

DISCUSSION

¶5 We recognize this appeal is now moot because the treatment
order has since expired. While appellate courts generally do not consider
moot questions, Slade v. Schneider, 212 Ariz. 176, 179, ¶ 15 (App. 2006), we
may choose to do so at our discretion when the order at issue will continue
to have collateral consequences for any of the parties, Cardoso v. Soldo, 230
Ariz. 614, 617–18, ¶ 9 (2012). We will consider the merits of this appeal
because of the potential impact the involuntary treatment order may have
on Patient’s future interests. See In re MH2007-001236, 220 Ariz. 160, 165, ¶
12 n.3 (App. 2008) (deciding the merits of the appeal from an expired
involuntary treatment order because of the patient’s interests at stake as a
result of having that order on her record).

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IN RE: MH 2024-008892
Decision of the Court

¶6 To prevail on a petition for court-ordered treatment, the
petitioner must provide: (1) testimony from “two or more witnesses[]
acquainted with the patient at the time of the alleged mental disorder”
(“acquaintance witnesses”), and (2) testimony or affidavits from the two
physicians or other healthcare professionals who evaluated the patient.
A.R.S. § 36-539(B) (2024).

¶7 We note that on March 31, 2025, while this appeal was
pending, the legislature amended Arizona Revised Statutes Section
36-539(B), adding the following bolded language:

The evidence presented by the petitioner or the patient shall
include the testimony of two or more witnesses, regardless of
the witnesses’ professional licensure, if any, who observed
or were acquainted with the patient at the time of the alleged
mental disorder before the submission of the current
application for evaluation pursuant to [Section] 36-520 or, if
after the submission of the current application, who were
not formal participants in the evaluation process.

2025 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 20 § 1 (1st Reg. Sess.) (emphasis added). But this
change has no bearing on this appeal because the version of the statute in
effect at the time of the involuntary commitment hearing applies. See e.g.,
In re MH2023-004502, __ Ariz. __, __, ¶¶ 13–14, 583 P.3d 744, 748 (2026)
(applying the version of Section 36-539(B) in effect at the time of the
involuntary commitment hearing).

¶8 The only issue Patient raises on appeal is whether the licensed
counselor qualified as an acquaintance witness. Patient argues that the
counselor could not testify as an acquaintance witness because she
evaluated him as part of the commitment process. Patient also argues that
the counselor did not qualify because she only met him in the context of a
medical evaluation and thus “[her] testimony could not offer a separate and
distinct perspective than the evaluating doctors’ affidavits.” The State
counters that the counselor could testify as an acquaintance witness because
she evaluated Patient outside of the statutory evaluation process—before
that process had begun.

¶9 We stayed this appeal pending a decision in
In re MH2023-004502 because that appeal addressed the same issue:
whether a health professional can testify as an acquaintance witness based
on her evaluation of the patient before the Application was filed.

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IN RE: MH 2024-008892
Decision of the Court

¶10 In MH2023-004502, a behavioral health professional
evaluated a patient at a hospital then, based on that assessment, applied for
an involuntary evaluation of the patient under Section 36-520. __ Ariz. at
__, ¶ 6–7, 583 P.3d at 747. This Court held that the behavioral health
professional improperly testified as an acquaintance witness because her
only contact with the patient—an evaluation that led to the initiation of the
commitment process—was functionally part of the commitment process. In
re MH2023-004502, 258 Ariz. 556, 561, ¶¶ 17, 19 (App. 2024) (citing In re
Coconino Cnty. No. MH 1425, 181 Ariz. 290, 292 (1995) (“[N]o person whose
primary contact with the patient was to examine the patient during his or
her commitment evaluation process may testify at the hearing as one of the
required acquaintance witnesses.”)). But our supreme court reversed,
clarifying that only evaluations pursuant to Section 36-533 are part of the
commitment process, and therefore, only health professionals who perform
those specific evaluations may not testify as acquaintance witnesses.
MH2023-004502, __ Ariz. at __, ¶ 14, 583 P.3d at 748.

¶11 Accordingly, in Patient’s supplemental brief, he withdrew his
argument that the counselor’s evaluation in this case was part of the
commitment process. Instead, Patient maintains that the counselor was not
qualified because Section 36-539(B) requires acquaintance witnesses to
provide a perspective that is distinct from a medical evaluation. Otherwise,
requiring two categories of testimony would be meaningless. Patient
argues that acquaintance witnesses must provide information about a
patient’s “informal, day-to-day behaviors” when they are not being
scrutinized by a health professional. This argument fails because it “reads
requirements into the statute that do not exist in its plain language.” In re
MH 2008-002596, 223 Ariz. 32, 35, ¶ 13 (App. 2009).

¶12 Patient relies heavily on MH 1425, which noted that the
legislature intended for acquaintance witnesses to provide a perspective of
how patients behave “in situations other than commitment evaluation
interviews.” MH 1425, 181 Ariz. at 292 (emphasis added). But the Court
clarified that it did “not mean to suggest that medical personnel who are
not part of the evaluation process become ineligible to testify as
acquaintance witnesses merely because of their expertise.” Id. at 293. Only
medical personnel who “participated in the psychological evaluation of the
patient for commitment purposes,” may not serve as acquaintance
witnesses. Id.

¶13 Section 36-539(B) does not set a specific length of time or
particular “manner in which the witness’s familiarity with the patient must
be acquired.” MH2008-002596, 223 Ariz. at 26, ¶ 17. Section 36-539(B) only

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IN RE: MH 2024-008892
Decision of the Court

requires that the witness has personal knowledge of the patient at the time
of his or her alleged mental disorder. In re MH2012-002480, 232 Ariz. 421,
423, ¶ 9 (App. 2013). Even testimony based on limited interactions with
patients will be upheld. See e.g., MH2008-002596, 223 Ariz. at 36–37, ¶ 19
(acquaintance witness qualified to testify based on a single 15-minute
phone call with patient). Because the counselor had personal knowledge of
Patient’s mental disorder, and her evaluation preceded the commitment
process, she was qualified to testify as an acquaintance witness.

CONCLUSION

¶14 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JT

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