Mohamed v. Yusuf

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

MOHAMED MOHAMED, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

SAGAL YUSUF, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0591 FC
FILED 04-01-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2024-051181
The Honorable Andrew J. Russell, Judge

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Mohamed Mohamed, Scottsdale, AZ
Petitioner/Appellee

Sagal Yusuf, Golden Valley, MN
Respondent/Appellant
MOHAMED v. YUSUF
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.

P A T O N, Judge:

¶1 Sagal Yusuf (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s legal
decision-making and parenting time portions of its dissolution decree.
Because the court did not analyze the Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”)
Section 25-408(I) factors, we vacate and remand the court’s legal decision-
making and parenting time orders for further proceedings consistent with
this decision.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mohamed Mohamed (“Father”) and Mother married in 2023,
and have one child, born in April 2024. About a month after the child’s
birth, Mother took her to live with family in Minnesota without informing
Father. Shortly thereafter, Father petitioned for dissolution of marriage
from Mother and requested temporary orders for legal decision-making
and parenting time without notice. The superior court denied his motion
on an emergency, ex parte basis but noted it would resolve the motion in
the usual course.

¶3 After a hearing in August 2024, the court entered temporary
orders awarding the parties joint legal-decision making authority, with
Mother having final say after good faith efforts. It also ordered a long-
distance parenting plan, with Mother serving as the primary residential
parent and giving Father parenting time in Minnesota on specific
weekends. The court further ordered that neither party shall relocate the
child outside of Arizona or at a distance greater than 100 miles from the
child’s current residence in Minnesota without complying with Section 25-
408.

¶4 The court scheduled the dissolution trial for June 2025, and
the parties filed their joint pretrial statement. The parties noted that
relocation of the child, among other things, was a contested issue, and
separately argued why the Section 25-403(A) and Section 25-408(I) factors
supported their respective positions on whether it was in the child’s best

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MOHAMED v. YUSUF
Decision of the Court

interests to relocate. Specifically, Father contended that Arizona is the
child’s home state, and Mother could not meet her burden to establish that
relocation was in the child’s best interests under Section 25-408(I). Mother
asked the court to affirm the temporary orders and approve the child’s
permanent relocation to Minnesota because the Section 25-408(I) factors
supported relocation.

¶5 In June 2025, the superior court entered its dissolution decree,
which analyzed the child’s best interests under the Section 25-403(A) factors
only. As relevant here, the decree awarded the parties joint legal decision-
making authority, with Mother having final say after a good faith effort in
writing to reach an agreement. It awarded equal parenting time on a
monthly basis, with the parties exchanging the child on the 15th of each
month. It required Father to pick up the child in Minnesota at the start of
his parenting time, remain in Minnesota or travel to Arizona or another
state with the child at his discretion, and return the child to Minnesota at
the conclusion of his parenting time.

¶6 In July 2025, Mother moved to vacate the decree, arguing the
court erred by failing to apply the Section 25-408(I) factors in determining
whether the parenting plan was in the child’s best interests. Two days after
filing the motion to vacate, Mother filed this appeal contending the court
erred in not considering the Section 25-408(I) factors in its decision. In
August 2025, the superior court denied Mother’s motion to vacate.
Although Mother does not mention this ruling in her opening brief, Father
contends the ruling “confirms relocation law did not apply” in his
answering brief.

¶7 The superior court lacked jurisdiction to enter its ruling
denying Mother’s motion to vacate as to issues involving the subject matter
of this appeal—i.e., relocation—once Mother filed her notice of appeal in
this court. See Burkhardt v. Burkhardt, 109 Ariz. 419, 421 (1973) (“[U]pon
perfecting of an appeal the trial court loses jurisdiction of the case.”); City of
Phoenix v. Leroy’s Liquors, Inc., 177 Ariz. 375, 381 (App. 1993) (finding the
superior court was divested of jurisdiction to rule on motion for
reconsideration because the party filed its notice of appeal before the court
ruled on it). It therefore has no bearing on this appeal.

¶8 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article
6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Sections 12-2101(A)(1) and -
120.21(A)(1).

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MOHAMED v. YUSUF
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DISCUSSION

¶9 We note at the outset that Mother's opening brief and Father’s
answering brief do not comply with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate
Procedure (“ARCAP”) 13(a). The opening brief must include an argument
containing the appellant's contentions about the issues presented, along
with supporting reasons and citations to the record and legal authority.
ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A), 13(b)(1) (applying ARCAP 13(a) requirements to
answering briefs); see also Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, 305, ¶ 62 (App.
2009). Mother provides legal authority to support her position; Father does
not. Neither party provides citations to the record. We can find arguments
waived when parties fail to cite legal authority or to the record. Polanco v.
Indus. Comm'n, 214 Ariz. 489, 491, ¶ 6 n.2 (App. 2007); see also Varco, Inc. v.
UNS Elec., Inc., 242 Ariz. 166, 170, ¶ 12 n.5 (App. 2017). The decision to find
waiver, however, is discretionary. Logan B. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 244 Ariz.
532, 536, ¶ 9 (App. 2018). Because the best interests of a child are at stake,
we decline to apply waiver and will address the merits. See Nold v. Nold,
232 Ariz. 270, 273, ¶ 10 (App. 2013).

¶10 Mother argues the court erred by not considering the Section
25-408(I) relocation factors in rendering its parenting plan. Father responds
that Section 25-408(I) did not apply because Mother never filed a relocation
petition, and even if it applied, the court’s Section 25-403 rulings satisfied
the relocation statute factors.

¶11 “We review an award of legal decision-making and parenting
time for an abuse of discretion.” Gish v. Greyson, 253 Ariz. 437, 444, ¶ 31
(App. 2022). “Whether [Section] 25-408 applies is an issue of statutory
interpretation that we review de novo.” Woyton v. Ward, 247 Ariz. 529, 532,
¶ 8 (App. 2019).

¶12 Section 25-403(A) requires a court to consider eleven factors
“relevant to the child’s physical and emotional well-being” when
evaluating the child’s best interests for purposes of legal decision-making
and parenting time. A.R.S. § 25-403(A). Section 25-408(I) applies when the
court considers whether relocation is in a child’s best interests. See A.R.S. §
25-403(A); A.R.S. § 25-408(I). And while Section 25-408(I) incorporates the
Section 25-403(A) factors, it enumerates additional best-interests factors
specific to whether relocation is in the child’s best interests. A.R.S. § 25-
408(I); see also Layne v. LaBianca in re Cnty. of Maricopa, 249 Ariz. 301, 303, ¶
6 (App. 2020).

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¶13 The superior court must analyze Section 25-408(I) factors in
all relocation cases. See Woyton, 247 Ariz. at 532, ¶ 8. When a court is “asked
to choose between the two residences to establish a single primary home
(and a home state)” for a child, the court is “effectively faced with a
relocation question.” Berrier v. Rountree, 245 Ariz. 604, 606, ¶ 8 (App. 2018).

¶14 Here, the parties raised the relocation issue in their joint
pretrial statement. Mother argued it would be in the child’s best interests
to relocate to Minnesota; Father argued it would be in the child’s best
interests to stay in Arizona. Whether the court de facto changed the child’s
home state to Minnesota by ordering the parenting time exchanges to only
occur in Minnesota, or it effectively denied Mother’s request to relocate the
child by noting Arizona was the home state in the decree and not expressly
changing that in the decree, the question of which of the two “far-flung
residences” would be the child’s primary residence (and home state) was
before the court. See id.

¶15 Because the child’s relocation was at issue here, the court had
to consider the Section 25-408(I) factors—not just the Section 25-403(A)
factors—in rendering its legal decision-making and parenting time orders.
See id.; Woyton, 247 Ariz. at 533, ¶ 12. It did not do so and thus erred.

CONCLUSION

¶16 We vacate the superior court’s legal decision-making and
parenting time portions of the dissolution decree and remand for
proceedings consistent with this decision. “While we express no opinion
as to the ultimate result in this case, any decision concerning [the child’s]
future home state must be made in accordance with [Section] 25 -408.”
Berrier, 245 Ariz. at 607, ¶ 11.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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