Bridget Reesnes v. Paul Reesnes

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 356
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISIONS I & II
No. CV-25-64

Opinion Delivered May 27, 2026

BRIDGET REESNES APPEAL FROM THE WHITE
APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 73DR-09-437]
V.
HONORABLE DANIEL C. BROCK,
PAUL REESNES JUDGE
APPELLEE

REVERSED AND REMANDED

KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge

This is the third appeal in this domestic-relations case, and the issues on appeal

pertain to the division of CAC Properties, LLC (CAC Properties), which is a marital asset

that appellee Paul Reesnes omitted in the parties’ property settlement agreement (PSA) and

was not divided upon their divorce in 2009. Ten years after the divorce decree was entered,

appellant Bridget Reesnes filed a motion to modify the divorce decree alleging that Paul had

committed constructive fraud in failing to disclose his ownership interest in CAC Properties

during the divorce proceedings. On May 4, 2020, the trial court entered an order finding

that Paul had committed constructive fraud in failing to disclose the property upon divorce

and endeavored to award Bridget her equal share of the property. Both parties appealed

from that order, and in Reesnes v. Reesnes (Reesnes I), 2022 Ark. App. 462, 655 S.W.3d 722

(2022), we held that the trial court correctly found it had jurisdiction to modify the divorce
decree but that the trial court’s distribution of the property was inequitable and must be

reversed and remanded for further proceedings. After our remand, the trial court entered a

nonfinal interlocutory order from which Bridget appealed, and that appeal was dismissed by

this court without prejudice on November 9, 2023. After our dismissal of the second appeal,

the trial court entered a final judgment on December 2, 2024, that awarded Bridget

$318,163 for her interest in the property.

Bridget now appeals from the December 2, 2024 order. Bridget argues that the trial

court erred in its distribution of CAC Properties, erred in denying her request for

prejudgment interest, and erred in denying her request for attorney’s fees. We agree with

each of these arguments, and we reverse and remand.

I. Introduction

During the divorce proceedings in 2009, Paul was represented by an attorney while

Bridget was not. The PSA drafted by Paul and his attorney, which was incorporated into the

divorce decree, provided, inter alia, that “Husband and Wife agree that it is the intention of

the Husband and Wife that this Agreement constitutes a full and complete settlement of all

property rights, both real, personal and mixed, occurring to them by reason of said marriage.”

The divorce decree signed by the parties provides that “each party hereby warrants and

affirms that each of them has disclosed any and all property, whether marital or not, to the

other party.” Let’s be clear—as found by the trial court—Paul committed constructive fraud

when he omitted CAC Properties from the PSA, which he and his attorney drafted and

2
filed.1 Paul defrauded his wife, his attorney,2 and the trial court. Paul continued his fraud

when, within a few months of entering into the PSA and filing the divorce decree, he received

$100,000 in dividend distributions from CAC Properties and, over the course of the next

ten years, when he continued to receive, at a minimum, an additional $725,000 in dividend

distributions, none of which were shared with his now ex-wife. In Reesnes I, in an unusual

6–0 six-judge opinion, we concluded: “We therefore reverse and remand for the trial court

to distribute the ownership of Paul’s interest in CAC Properties one-half to each party as of the date of

divorce and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” Reesnes I, 2022 Ark. App.

462, at 17, 655 S.W.3d at 731 (emphasis added).

On remand, the trial court did not distribute the ownership of Paul’s interest in CAC

Properties one-half to each party as of the date of the divorce as ordered. Paul owned 50

percent of CAC Properties; therefore, on remand, the trial court should have awarded

Bridget 25 percent of CAC Properties and Paul 25 percent of CAC Properties. In Reesnes I,

we included the phrase “as of the date of divorce” so the trial court would not order Bridget’s

ownership to commence from the date of the trial court’s 2020 order or the date of the court

of appeals opinion. Bridget’s interest attached on the date of the 2009 divorce decree when

she was defrauded; otherwise, Paul would have benefited from ten years of fraudulent

conduct. To summarize our disposition of this matter, we hold the following:

1
See Reesnes I for additional details.
2
Paul’s attorney testified at an earlier hearing that in preparing the PSA, Paul did not
inform him of Paul’s interest in CAC Properties.

3
1. The trial court shall enter an order granting Bridget a 25 percent membership interest
in CAC Properties, effective August 13, 2009.

2. The trial court shall enter a judgment in favor of Bridget against Paul in the amount
of $50,000 plus prejudgment interest accruing from the date Paul received the
$100,000 dividend distribution from CAC Properties.

3. The trial court shall enter a judgment in favor of Bridget against Paul in the amount
of $362,500 plus prejudgment interest accruing from the respective dates Paul
received the $725,000 in dividend distributions from CAC Properties.

4. On remand, if the trial court determines that Paul received any additional dividend
distributions, then the trial court shall enter a judgment in favor of Bridget against
Paul in the amount of one-half of any such distributions received plus prejudgment
interest accruing from the dates Paul received the additional distributions.

5. The trial court shall order Paul to provide an accounting for all the distributions and
the sale(s) of any CAC Properties assets commencing on August 13, 2009, to the
present.

6. The trial court shall order Paul to pay Bridget reasonable attorney’s fees to be
determined by the court.

Finally, we acknowledge that our disposition of this matter may result in other future

consequences, such as amended tax returns or causes of actions. Those matters, if any, are

outside the scope of this opinion and are not discussed herein.

II. Discussion

Bridget raises three arguments in this appeal. First, Bridget argues that the trial court

erred in its distribution of CAC Properties and that the amount of the award was

inequitable. Next, she contends that the trial court erred in not awarding her prejudgment

interest. Finally, Bridget argues that the trial court erred in not awarding her attorney’s fees

and costs. We agree, and we reverse the trial court’s order.

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A summary of our decision in Reesnes I is necessary for our review of this appeal.

When the parties divorced in 2009, as described above, the parties executed a PSA wherein

both parties warranted that they had disclosed all their property.3 The PSA addressed Paul’s

50 percent ownership of Custom Aircraft Cabinets, Inc. (CA Cabinets), and provided that

Bridget would receive half of Paul’s dividend distributions from this company and that her

right to receive these dividends would continue until the business was sold, in which event

Bridget would receive 50 percent of the sale proceeds of Paul’s ownership interest. However,

during the divorce proceedings, Paul did not disclose his 50 percent ownership in a separate

entity, CAC Properties, so that company was not mentioned in the parties’ PSA or divided

upon divorce.

Paul made his annual payments to Bridget from 2009 to 2016, when he stopped

making the annual payments emanating from CA Cabinets. In 2019, Bridget retained an

attorney and filed a motion for contempt against Paul generally alleging that Paul failed to

make these annual distribution payments as agreed in the PSA. Bridget discovered during

Paul’s deposition in the contempt proceeding that Paul owned a 50 percent interest in a

separate company, CAC Properties, LLC, during their marriage, which rendered Paul’s

ownership interest in CAC Properties marital property at the time of the divorce. Bridget

then filed a motion to modify the divorce decree alleging fraud and asking for an equitable

division of that property. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order on May 4, 2020,

3
The PSA was incorporated, but not merged, into the divorce decree.

5
finding that Paul had committed constructive fraud, and it awarded Bridget $180,000 for

her marital interest in Paul’s ownership interest in CAC Properties as of the time of divorce,4

plus $33,333 for her interest in a $100,000 distribution paid from CAC Properties to Paul

in 2009, for a total judgment of $213,333.

Paul appealed from the May 4, 2020 order, and Bridget cross-appealed. Paul argued

on appeal that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the divorce decree. In her cross-

appeal, Bridget argued that the methodology used by the trial court in arriving at her share

of CAC Properties resulted in an inequitable division of marital property. This was Reesnes

I.

In Reesnes I, we cited Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(4) and held that the trial

court had jurisdiction to modify the divorce decree based on Paul’s constructive fraud for

failing to disclose his ownership interest in CAC Properties. In addressing Bridget’s cross-

appeal concerning the trial court’s distribution of the property, we noted that Paul’s

constructive fraud deprived Bridget of her interest in CAC Properties for more than ten

years and that testimony at the hearing showed that since the parties’ divorce, Paul had been

paid a total of $825,000 in dividend distributions from that company. We agreed with

Bridget’s argument that the trial court’s methodology in dividing CAC Properties resulted

in an unequal distribution to Bridget. We reversed the trial court’s methodology on cross-

4
The award of $180,000 was derived from the testimony of Paul’s accountant, who
testified that at the time of divorce, the value of CAC Properties before discounts was
$720,000, which would make Paul’s interest $360,000.

6
appeal and stated that, in arriving at its judgment on remand, the trial court should consider

all evidence relevant to the value of Bridget’s interest in CAC Properties, including the

distributions generated by CAC Properties after the parties’ divorce. Our opinion

concluded:

We reverse the trial court’s decision because we are left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed in its property division. To allow
Paul to receive all of his interest in CAC Properties—a $360,000 value—in addition to
ten plus years of dividend distributions totaling $825,000—as compared to Bridget
receiving only $180,000 for her interest in CAC Properties would result in an
inequitable division of marital property, which we hold was clearly erroneous.

....

We therefore reverse and remand for the trial court to distribute the ownership of Paul’s
interest in CAC Properties one-half to each party as of the date of divorce and for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reesnes I, 2022 Ark. App. 462, at 17, 655 S.W.3d at 731 (emphasis added).

Following our remand in Reesnes I—on December 16, 2022—Bridget filed a motion for

entry of amended and substituted order in conformity with the court of appeals mandate. In

that motion, Bridget asked to be awarded one-half of Paul’s 50 percent interest in CAC

Properties as of the date of divorce and requested a judgment for 50 percent of all

distributions Paul received from 2009 through the present. Bridget also requested

prejudgment interest and attorney’s fees. On January 3, 2023, Paul responded to Bridget’s

motion.

On March 7, 2023, the trial court circulated to the parties a draft order and asked the

parties to share their thoughts about the draft. The draft order would have awarded Bridget

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a 50 percent interest in Paul’s 50 percent interest in CAC Properties as of the date of the

divorce and would have awarded Bridget one-half of the $825,000 in dividend distributions

paid to Paul from 2009 through 2018, as well as one-half of any dividends paid to Paul since

2019. On March 17, 2023, Bridget responded and generally agreed with the draft order in

addition to again requesting prejudgment interest and attorney’s fees.

On March 21, 2023, Paul responded and objected to the draft order in various

respects. Paul stated that at the time of the divorce in 2009, CAC Properties consisted of a

building on Firestone Lane leased to CA Cabinets, some adjacent land, and some cash with

a total value of $720,000. Paul stated that three years after the divorce, in 2012, CAC

Properties purchased a much larger building on Landers Road that was primarily financed

by loans personally guaranteed by Paul and his business partner and resulted in increased

rental income received by CAC Properties. Paul stated that funds to pay the CAC Properties

distributions were in part generated from the sale of some of the real estate existing at the

time of the divorce as well as rental income from the Landers Road property, which he

argued should be deducted from Bridget’s share of the distributions. Paul also asserted that

in arriving at Bridget’s interest in CAC Properties, the trial court should consider the tax

consequences of the dividend distributions. On March 21, 2023, Bridget responded to

Paul’s objections to the draft order, stating that Paul’s proposals were contrary to our

mandate in Reesnes I to award her a 50 percent interest in Paul’s interest in CAC Properties

without any reductions.

8
On May 1, 2023, the trial court entered an amended and substituted order that largely

aligned with Paul’s proposals. In that order, the trial court made these findings:

1. At the time of divorce, CAC’s assets consisted primarily of a building on
Firestone Lane, adjacent land in the Marche area of Pulaski County, a lease of the
Firestone Lane Property and some cash (collectively, the “CAC Assets”) worth
$720,000.00. [Bridget’s] share was valued at $180,000 (Bridget’s Share).

2. Bridget was deprived of the use of Bridget’s Share for more than 10 years
due to [Pauls’] constructive fraud and is entitled to be compensated for the loss of use
in addition to receiving Bridget’s Share.

3. Bridget is awarded a 25% equitable interest in CAC (“Equitable Interest”).
The Equitable Interest does not include the real property and building located on
Landers Road in North Little Rock (“Landers Road Property”) nor any rental income
derived therefrom. The Landers Road Property was acquired after the divorce.
Defendant played no role in acquisition, preservation or operation and no CAC
Assets were used to acquire this property.

4. Equitable Interest shall consist of:

(a) Bridget’s Share;

(b) $50,000.00 from the $100,000.00 CAC distribution made to Paul in
2009 (“2009 Distribution”);

(c) One-half of the $725,000.00 in CAC distributions received by Paul after
the 2009 Distribution through December 31, 2018 ($725,000.00
Distributions”), excluding the amount of such distributions attributable to
proceeds from the sale of any CAC assets; and

(d) One-half of any CAC distributions received by Paul after the
$725,000.00 Distributions (“Future Distributions”), excluding the amount
of such distributions attributable to proceeds from the sale of any CAC
assets.

Provided, however, the amounts excluded from the $725,000.00 Distributions
and Future Distributions for amounts attributable to the sale of CAC Assets in
subsections (c) and (d) above shall not exceed the amount of Bridget’s Share.

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5. Bridget’s Equitable Interest shall be reduced by:

(a) Any taxes Bridget would have paid on Bridget’s part of the 2009
Distribution or the $725,000.00 Distributions;

(b) Any taxes Bridget would have paid on Bridget’s part of Future
Distributions Paul received prior to 2021 (the parties and CAC can file
amended tax returns for the 2021 and subsequent tax years);

(c) Any amounts attributable to rentals received from Landers Road
Property.

In the amended and substituted order, the trial court also ordered Paul to provide an

accounting for all the distributions and the sale of any CAC Properties assets, after which

Bridget’s interest in the company would be reduced to a judgment.

On May 20, 2023, Bridget filed a notice of appeal from the May 1, 2023, amended

and substituted order. However, Bridget later filed a motion in this court to dismiss the

appeal without prejudice because the trial court had ordered an accounting and had not yet

fixed the amount of the judgment, thus rendering the order nonfinal for purposes of appeal.

We agreed with Bridget, and on November 9, 2023, we dismissed that appeal without

prejudice, and the proceedings resumed in the trial court.

In compliance with the May 1, 2023, amended and substituted order, Paul filed an

accounting.5 This accounting contained a single-page accounting summary that purported

to calculate Bridget’s interest in CAC Properties, and it included in the calculation her

$180,000 share in the value of the company as of the time of divorce as well as the

5
Paul’s accounting was filed in the trial court on June 29, 2023.

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postdivorce dividend distributions. It also contained reductions for dividend distributions

attributable to CAC asset sales, dividend distributions attributable to Landers Road

property, and taxes attributable to amounts received before 2021. With these

considerations, the accounting summary put the total value of Bridget’s interest in CAC

Properties at only $318,163.

After our dismissal of the second appeal—on February 7, 2024—Bridget filed a motion

to reconsider and revise the May 1, 2023, amended and substituted order before issuance of

a final judgment. In her motion to reconsider, Bridget asked the trial court to revise the

amended and substituted order and award Bridget her entire 50 percent interest in Paul’s

50 percent interest in CAC Properties without reductions, which included one-half of all of

Paul’s dividend distributions. In that motion, Bridget also requested prejudgment interest

and attorney’s fees. On March 11, 2024, Paul responded to Bridget’s motion to reconsider.

In his response, Paul asked that Bridget’s motion be denied and that Bridget’s interest in

CAC Properties be reduced to a final judgment consistent with the trial court’s May 1, 2023,

amended and substituted order and Paul’s accounting.

On December 2, 2024, the trial court entered a final judgment pursuant to amended

and substituted order wherein it denied Bridget’s motion for reconsideration and

incorporated the amended and substituted order into the judgment. In the final judgment,

the trial court noted that Bridget had no objection to the accuracy of Paul’s accounting, and

it attached Paul’s single-page accounting summary to the judgment. The trial court credited

and tracked this summary in arriving at Bridget’s equitable interest in CAC Properties. As

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set forth in the accounting summary, Bridget was awarded $180,000 as her interest in the

value of the company as of the time of divorce. Bridget was awarded $50,000 as her half of

the $100,000 distribution received by Paul in 2009. She was also awarded one-half of the

$725,000 in distributions received by Paul from 2010 through 2018 ($362,500), but that

amount was reduced by $177,9826 in distributions attributable to CAC Properties asset sales

during that period, resulting in a net award of $184,518 for those distributions. Bridget was

awarded one-half of the $400,000 in distributions received by Paul from 2019 through 2022

($200,000), but that amount was reduced by $2018 due to distributions attributable to CAC

Properties asset sales during that period and other adjustments, resulting in a net award of

$197,982 for those distributions. The account summary then reduced Bridget’s interest in

the distributions by an additional $233,426, which correlated to one-fourth of the

distributions attributable to the Landers Road property between 2011 and 2022. Finally,

Bridget’s interest was further reduced by the taxes attributable to the distributions prior to

2021, which totaled $60,911. Adding all the credits and then subtracting the reductions, as

reflected on the accounting summary, the trial court arrived at $318,163 as Bridget’s

equitable interest in CAC Properties. In the final judgment, the trial court awarded Bridget

a judgment against Paul for $318,163 plus postjudgment interest. The trial court denied

Bridget’s request for prejudgment interest and attorney’s fees without comment.

6
In this calculation and in other calculations on the account summary, the reduction
represented one-fourth of the total distributions to account for Bridget’s 25 percent interest
(with respect to this figure of $177,982, the total distributions attributable to CAC
Properties asset sales were $711,926).

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Bridget timely appealed from the December 2, 2024 final judgment. On appeal,

Bridget raises these three arguments: (1) the trial court erred in its distribution of CAC

Properties and the amount of the award was inequitable; (2) the trial court erred in not

awarding her prejudgment interest; and (3) the trial court erred in not awarding her

attorney’s fees and costs.

A. The Trial Court’s Distribution of Bridget’s Ownership Interest in CAC Properties

Bridget’s first argument is that the trial court erred in its distribution of her interest

in CAC Properties. She asserts that our mandate in Reesnes I ordered the trial court on

remand to distribute Paul’s interest in the company one-half to each party as of the date of

divorce and that the trial court failed to adhere to our mandate. Bridget argues that the

reductions from the CAC Properties distributions that were argued by Paul on remand and

adopted by the trial court violated the law-of-the-case doctrine. She argues that instead of

awarding her one-half of Paul’s interest in CAC Properties as of the date of divorce and

entering a judgment in her favor for one-half of all distributions paid to Paul since their

divorce in 2009, the trial court awarded Bridget only an “equitable interest,” which

drastically reduced her interest in CAC Properties and was contrary to our mandate. Bridget

argues that she should have been awarded one-half of all of Paul’s dividend distributions.7

7
We note that under this point Bridget also argues that, to the extent the trial court
relied on an amended and restated operating agreement of CAC Properties that purported
to restrict Paul from transferring his interest in the company, this was erroneous and resulted
in prejudice. However, it is not apparent that the trial court relied on this document in
arriving at its decision, nor was it discussed in its orders being appealed.

13
We begin our discussion by addressing the law-of-the-case doctrine because it is

dispositive. The venerable doctrine of law of the case prohibits a court from reconsidering

issues of law and fact that have already been decided on appeal. Ozarks Elec. Coop. Corp. v.

Stanley, 2025 Ark. App. 469, 725 S.W.3d 219. The doctrine serves to effectuate efficiency

and finality in the judicial process. Cadillac Cowboy, Inc. v. Jackson, 347 Ark. 963, 69 S.W.3d

383 (2002). The doctrine provides that a decision of an appellate court establishes the law

of the case for the trial on remand and for the appellate court itself on subsequent review.

Id. On the second appeal, the decision of the first appeal becomes the law of the case and is

conclusive of every question of law or fact decided in the former appeal and also of those

that might have been, but were not, presented. Id. The law-of-the-case doctrine is conclusive

only where the facts on the second appeal are substantially the same as those involved in the

prior appeal and does not apply if there was a material change in the facts. Turner v. Nw. Ark.

Neurosurgery Clinic, P.A., 91 Ark. App. 290, 210 S.W.3d 126 (2005).

Applying the law-of-the-case doctrine to this case, we hold that on remand from

Reesnes I, the trial court erred in its distribution of CAC Properties. In Reesnes I, we directed

the trial court on remand to distribute the ownership of Paul’s interest in CAC Properties

one-half to each party as of the date of the divorce. We did not direct the trial court to

distribute the value of CAC Properties or determine Bridget’s equitable interest. Recall that

at the time of the divorce, Bridget was unaware that CAC Properties (which was undisputedly

marital property) even existed and was certainly unaware that Paul had a 50 percent

ownership of the company. In Reesnes I, we did not address Paul’s accountant’s $720,000

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valuation of CAC Properties (and the corresponding one-fourth award of $180,000 to

Bridget), stating that the issue was moot and irrelevant given our disposition of the appeal

and our directions on remand. We held that, regardless of what CAC Properties was worth,

Bridget was entitled to a one-fourth ownership interest, which was the law of the case and

was binding on the trial court on remand.

After the case was remanded, Bridget filed a motion requesting an order that

distributed the ownership of Paul’s 50 percent interest in CAC Properties one-half to each

party as of the date of divorce. Bridget claimed entitlement to one-half of the $825,000 in

postdivorce distributions received by Paul from 2009 through 2018 as well as one-half of any

distributions paid to Paul since 2019. This was consistent with our directive in Reesnes I and,

in fact, was what the trial court had proposed in its original draft order submitted to the

parties for comment. However, after Paul objected to the proposed order and raised various

objections, the trial court changed direction and drastically reduced Bridget’s one-half share

in the distributions. We hold that this conflicted with our mandate in Reesnes I and was

precluded by the law-of-the-case doctrine.

We agree with Bridget that the law-of-the-case doctrine requires the trial court to

award her a 25 percent membership interest in CAC Properties as of the date of the divorce.

Therefore, we reject the trial court’s methodology in distributing Bridget’s ownership interest

and we remand for the trial court to award Bridget one-half of the $825,000 in distributions

received by Paul from 2009 to 2018 as well as one-half of any additional distributions

received by Paul since then. And, as explained in section B below, Bridget’s share of the

15
distributions shall also bear prejudgment interest from the date of each distribution. To this

end, the trial court shall order Paul to provide an accounting for all the distributions and

the sale(s) of any CAC Properties assets commencing on August 13, 2009, to the present.

B. Prejudgment Interest

Bridget’s next argument is that the trial court erred in denying her request for

prejudgment interest. Bridget argues that prejudgment interest should have been awarded

on her share of each distribution received by Paul because these amounts were definitely

ascertainable by mathematical computation. We agree that prejudgment interest should

have been awarded with respect to Bridget’s share for each of these distributions.

Arkansas Code Annotated section 6-65-114(a)(1) (Repl. 2021) provides that a

judgment entered by a court shall bear postjudgment interest and, if appropriate under the facts

of the case, prejudgment interest. In DWB, LLC v. D&T Pure Trust, 2018 Ark. App. 283, at 15,

550 S.W.3d 420, 431, we recited the following law on prejudgment interest:

Prejudgment interest is intended to be compensation for recoverable damages
wrongfully withheld from the time of the loss until judgment. Dorsett v. Buffington,
2013 Ark. 345, 429 S.W.3d 225. The test for whether an award of prejudgment
interest is proper is whether there is a method to determine the value of the property
at the time of the injury. Lovell v. Marianna Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 267 Ark. 164, 589
S.W.2d 577 (1979). Prejudgment interest “is only allowable if the amount of damages
is definitely ascertainable by mathematical computation, or if the evidence furnishes
data that make it possible to compute the amount without reliance on opinion or
discretion.” See Howard W. Brill, Arkansas Law of Damages § 10:3, at 175 (6th ed.
2014). If damages are not by their nature capable of exact determination, both in time
and amount, prejudgment interest is not an item of recovery. Lovell, supra. The award
of prejudgment interest is a question of law to be decided by the court on a de novo
review. Spann v. Lovett & Co., Ltd., 2012 Ark. App. 107, 389 S.W.3d 77.

Howard W. Brill, Arkansas Law of Damages § 10:3, states:

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The justification for prejudgment interest is that an injured party is entitled to have
the use of his money (or property) from a particular day. Deprived of that use, he has
suffered a loss that can only be compensated by substitutionary relief in the form of
interest.

Prejudgment interest must be allowed for any injury where, at the time of loss, damages are

immediately ascertainable with reasonable certainty. TB of Blytheville, Inc. v. Little Rock Sign

& Emblem, Inc., 328 Ark. 688, 946 S.W.2d 930 (1997). Where prejudgment interest is

collectible at all, the injured party is always entitled to it as a matter of law. Id.

In its final judgment, the trial court denied Bridget’s request for prejudgment interest

without explanation. In our de novo review, we conclude that this was erroneous because

these distributions are capable of exact determination, both in time and amount. The

amount to be awarded Bridget for each distribution is ascertainable by mathematical

computation without reliance on opinion or discretion. Accordingly, on remand we direct

the trial court to award prejudgment interest on Bridget’s one-half interest in the

distributions accruing from the date Paul received each distribution.

C. Attorney’s Fees and Costs

Bridget’s remaining argument is that the trial court abused its discretion in denying

her request for attorney’s fees and costs. Bridget asserts that this is a postdivorce domestic-

relations proceeding in which the trial court had the inherent authority to award attorney’s

fees and that it should have done so under the circumstances of this case, particularly in light

of Paul’s fraudulent failure to disclose the existence of CAC Properties during the parties’

divorce. We agree that the trial court erred in denying Bridget’s request for attorney’s fees.

17
It is well settled that the trial court has the inherent power to award attorney’s fees in

domestic-relations proceedings. Hargis v. Hargis, 2019 Ark. 321, 587 S.W.3d 208. Our

supreme court has held that we are to generally recognize the trial court’s superior perspective

in determining whether to award attorney’s fees due to its intimate acquaintance with the

record and the quality of services rendered. Id. There is no fixed formula for determining

what constitutes a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees, and pertinent considerations can

include the attorney’s judgment, learning, ability, skill, experience, and professional

standing; the relationship between the parties and the importance of the subject matter of

the case; the nature, extent, and difficulty of services; and the research, anticipation of

defenses, and means of meeting them. Goodson v. Bennett, 2018 Ark. App. 444, 562 S.W.3d

847. Additionally, the relative financial ability of each party is a consideration, but it is not

determinative. Id. The decision to award attorney’s fees is accordingly a matter within the

trial court’s discretion. Baber v. Baber, 2011 Ark. 40, 378 S.W.3d 699. We will not disturb

a trial court’s decision regarding attorney’s fees absent an abuse of discretion. Vice v. Vice,

2016 Ark. App. 504, 505 S.W.3d 719. Discretion is abused when it is exercised

improvidently, thoughtlessly, and without due consideration.

After the trial court entered the judgment in the first round of litigation in Reesnes I,

Bridget filed a motion for attorney’s fees and alleged that her counsel had spent 324.7 hours

on the postdivorce proceedings and that she had incurred a total of $82,920.50 in attorney’s

fees. Attached to her motion was an affidavit of a local attorney stating that the fee amount

was fair and reasonable. However, no attorney’s fees were awarded at that time.

18
After our remand in Reesnes I for reconsideration of Bridget’s interest in CAC

Properties, Bridget filed multiple pleadings wherein she again requested attorney’s fees.

Notably, in a motion filed on February 7, 2024, Bridget requested attorney’s fees and argued,

“[T]his court has clear authority to award Bridget her attorney’s fees, and should award

Bridget’s attorney’s fees and costs in this matter, as it was Paul’s constructive fraud that led

to Bridget’s incurrence of substantial fees when CAC Properties should have been disclosed

and divided in the Decree in 2009.” In the trial court’s final judgment entered on December

2, 2024, it simply denied Bridget’s request for attorney’s fees without comment.

Under the unique circumstances presented herein, we hold that Bridget’s request was

denied improvidently, thoughtlessly, and without due consideration. One of the

fundamental purposes behind an award of attorney’s fees is to place the burden of litigation

expenses upon the party who made it necessary. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. Gerard,

2018 Ark. 97, 541 S.W.3d 422 (citing Cleek v. Great S. Metals, 335 Ark. 342, 981 S.W.2d

529 (1998)). Had Paul not fraudulently concealed the existence of his interest in CAC

Properties at the time of the parties’ divorce in 2009, the property would have been divided

then, and none of this multiyear litigation would have been necessary. As a result of Paul’s

constructive fraud—and in order to acquire her rightful interest in the company—Bridget had

to file a new action; litigate the issues therein, which included Paul’s claim that the trial court

lacked jurisdiction to modify the decree; appeal the trial court’s original judgment; prevail

in the first appeal; and then continue to litigate her interest in the company on remand.

And to date, Bridget has been awarded zero attorney’s fees associated with this litigation.

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The only reason Bridget retained an attorney for this litigation was because Paul

fraudulently took advantage of his unrepresented wife in the divorce proceedings. And Paul

enjoyed the benefits of his fraud for ten years before Bridget became aware of the fraudulent

conduct. As set forth above, one of the fundamental purposes behind an award of attorney’s

fees is to place the burden of litigation expenses upon the party who made it necessary. See

Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. Gerard, 2018 Ark. 97, 541 S.W.3d 422 (citing Cleek v. Great S.

Metals, 335 Ark. 342, 981 S.W.2d 529 (1998)). Paul clearly made all of Bridget’s litigation

fees and expenses necessary, and on remand, we direct the trial court to award Bridget a

reasonable attorney’s fee.8

III. Conclusion

In conclusion, we hold that the trial court’s distribution of Bridget’s ownership

interest in CAC Properties was contrary to the law of the case as established by this court in

Reesnes I, and therefore, that the trial court erred in its distribution. Furthermore, we hold

that the trial court erred in denying Bridget’s requests for prejudgment interest and

attorney’s fees. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with the following instructions to the

trial court: (1) enter an order granting Bridget a 25 percent membership interest in CAC

Properties, effective August 13, 2009; (2) enter a judgment in favor of Bridget against Paul

in the amount of $50,000 plus prejudgment interest accruing from the date Paul received

8
In awarding the attorney’s fees, we direct the trial court to our recent discussion and
holding in Hopping v. Scarborough, 2026 Ark. App. 303, regarding attorney’s fees in domestic-
relations cases.

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the $100,000 dividend distribution from CAC Properties; (3) enter a judgment in favor of

Bridget against Paul in the amount of $362,500 plus prejudgment interest accruing from the

dates Paul received the $725,000 in dividend distributions from CAC Properties; (4) if the

trial court determines on remand that Paul received any additional dividend distributions,

then the trial court shall enter a judgment in favor of Bridget against Paul in the amount of

one-half of any such distributions received plus prejudgment interest accruing from the dates

Paul received the additional distributions; (5) order Paul to provide an accounting for all the

distributions and the sale(s) of any CAC Properties assets commencing on August 13, 2009,

to the present; and (6) order Paul to pay Bridget reasonable attorney’s fees to be determined

by the court.

Reversed and remanded.

KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and VIRDEN, HARRISON, and TUCKER, JJ., agree.

GLADWIN, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.

ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with

the majority that the circuit court erred in its distribution of CAC Properties and in its denial

of Bridget Reesnes’s request for prejudgment interest, and we must reverse and remand for

those purposes. However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the circuit court

abused its discretion in denying Bridget’s request for attorney’s fees.

This decision is especially disturbing in the wake of this court’s recent decision,

Hopping v. Scarborough, 2026 Ark. App. 303, at 5–6. In Hopping, the majority reversed and

remanded the circuit court’s award of attorney’s fees on the basis of an insufficient record

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because the order did “not provide this court with any reasoning on which the court’s fee

award [could] be effectively evaluated”; and I dissented. Here, the circuit court denied

Bridget’s motion for attorney’s fees without any findings, but the majority has no

compunction in holding that “Bridget’s request was denied improvidently, thoughtlessly,

and without due consideration” and then directing the circuit court “to award Bridget a

reasonable attorney’s fee[].” If the record in Hopping did not provide a sufficient basis for our

review, how can that be reconciled with the majority’s decision here—substituting its

judgment for that of the circuit court—concluding that the circuit court must award Bridget

attorney’s fees? Further, if the circuit court on remand awards Bridget $500 in attorney’s

fees, will this case be before the court yet again on the reasonableness of the award?

As I stated in my dissent in Hopping, the majority here has likewise substituted its

judgment for the circuit court’s and further compounds the confusion as to what constitutes

a reviewable basis for attorney’s-fee awards. From these two cases, I am left with the

impression that despite well-established precedent––attorney’s fees in domestic-relations

cases are not awarded as a matter of right but only at the circuit court’s discretion––this court

not only declines to defer to the circuit court’s superior ability to determine whether

attorney’s fees should be awarded but also chooses to substitute its opinion whenever it

wishes. If we conclude that the findings are insufficient, we will reverse and remand for more

specific findings; if we conclude that despite any findings at all, the court abused its

discretion and must award attorney’s fees, we will reverse with instructions that the court

award “reasonable” attorney’s fees.

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The majority also states that the appellee, Paul Reesnes, “clearly made all of Bridget’s

litigation fees and expenses necessary” as the result of his fraud; thus, he should bear some

portion of the expense. This conclusion does not consider the fact that, in the prior appeal,

this court recognized the circuit court’s order that “Paul to pay Bridget $2,500 in attorney’s

fees as a sanction for contempt” in the underlying contempt proceedings. Reesnes v. Reesnes,

2022 Ark. App. 462, at 3, 655 S.W.3d 722, 725–26. Accordingly, Paul has borne some

portion of the litigation expense. Without specific findings, we cannot know whether the

circuit court took this into consideration in denying attorney’s fees after remand; yet the

majority holds that attorney’s fees must be awarded because Paul deserved it.

My concern, both here and in Hopping, is that the court has created more confusion

for the bench and bar. We no longer credit the superior perspective of the circuit court to

observe the parties, their level of cooperation, and their obedience to court orders over the

entire proceedings; instead, we stand in the shoes of the circuit courts and afford their

findings, or lack thereof, no consideration.

For the foregoing reasons, I concur in part and dissent in part.

The Applegate Firm, PLLC, by: Kayla M. Applegate; and James, House, Swann & Downing,

P.A., by: Patrick R. James, for appellant.

Wright, Lindsey & Jennings LLP, by: Gary D. Marts, Jr.; Stan D. Smith; Lance R. Miller;

and Timothy Frith, for appellee.

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