Charles Edward Harris, Jr. v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 273
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CR-24-35

CHARLES EDWARD HARRIS, JR. Opinion Delivered: May 6, 2026

APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, THIRD
V. DIVISION
[NO. 60CR-08-571]
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE HONORABLE CATHLEEN V.
COMPTON, JUDGE

AFFIRMED

N. MARK KLAPPENBACH, Chief Judge

Appellant Charles Edward Harris, Jr., appeals from the denial of his pro se petition

to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-111

(Repl. 2016). On appeal, he argues that the circuit court erred in rejecting his challenge to

the legality of his sentences for first-degree battery and committing a terroristic act because

his convictions for both crimes violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. We affirm

the circuit court’s denial of Harris’s petition.

I. Background Facts and Procedural History

On April 21, 2009, a Pulaski County jury convicted Harris of committing a terroristic

act, a Class Y felony, and first-degree battery, a Class B felony. The crimes for which he was

convicted occurred on December 28, 2007, when Harris fired eight or nine gunshots into a
vehicle occupied by the victim, Leannell Robinson, and his friend. The gunshots shattered

Robinson’s back window, and Robinson, who was sitting in the driver’s seat, was struck

several times. One bullet went through his right arm. Another struck him in his right

shoulder and lodged in his chest. He was also grazed by bullets on his forehead and left

pinky finger. Following his convictions, the jury was instructed at sentencing that Harris

had previously been convicted of two felonies: possession of a controlled substance—second

offense and committing a terroristic act. Harris was sentenced as a habitual offender to

fifteen years’ imprisonment on each offense, with the sentences to run concurrently. He

filed a direct appeal in this court challenging only an evidentiary ruling. Harris v. State, 2010

Ark. App. 247, at 1. This court affirmed his convictions, and the appellate mandate issued

on March 30, 2010.

On January 19, 2023, Harris filed his “Petition to Correct a[n] Illegal Conviction and

Sentence” pursuant to section 16-90-111 in the Pulaski County Circuit Court. In that

petition, he asserted a double-jeopardy challenge to his 2009 terroristic-act and first-degree-

battery convictions and sentences. Specifically, he claimed that his convictions for both

committing a terroristic act and first-degree battery violated Arkansas Code Annotated

section 5-1-110(a)(1) (Supp. 2007), which addresses multiple-offense prosecutions. He

claimed that the first-degree battery for which he was convicted was a lesser-included offense

of committing a terroristic act and that it was impossible to commit a terroristic act without

also committing first-degree battery. He attached his April 2009 judgment and commitment

order to the petition. He further claimed that those convictions had additional adverse

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consequences because, after he was convicted of those crimes in April 2009, he pleaded guilty

to robbery and theft of property on June 26, 2009, and that his first-degree-battery conviction

was used to enhance his subsequent theft and robbery convictions. He attached his

judgment and commitment order from the June 2009 robbery and theft convictions, which

shows that Harris was sentenced as a habitual offender to forty years’ imprisonment on those

convictions, to be served consecutively to his fifteen-year-battery and terroristic-act sentences.

In response, the State argued that Harris’s illegal-sentence petition failed because his

concurrent fifteen-year sentences for committing a terroristic act and first-degree battery were

well within the sentencing ranges for those offenses. It further asserted that Harris’s double-

jeopardy argument should have been raised at trial or in a postconviction petition pursuant

to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 and that an illegal-sentence petition under

section 16-90-111 is not a substitute for raising a claim under Rule 37.1. The State further

asserted that any attempt to now bring a double-jeopardy claim is barred by the time

restrictions set forth in Rule 37.2. Finally, the State argued in the alternative that even if the

double-jeopardy claim could be brought in an illegal-sentence petition, the argument had

previously been rejected as meritless by the supreme court.

On October 25, 2023, the circuit court entered an order denying Harris’s petition to

correct an illegal sentence. The circuit court agreed with the State that Harris’s double-

jeopardy claim should have been brought in a Rule 37.1 petition for postconviction relief

instead of in an illegal-sentence petition, that the time for filing a Rule 37.1 petition had

long expired, and that Harris’s attempt to bring his double-jeopardy claim was time-barred.

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It further agreed with the State that the claim would fail as meritless under Arkansas law. It

also noted that Harris had filed an additional two documents (on August 23 and September

20) purportedly responding to the State’s response but that “[n]either additional filing

contain[ed] any arguments that would alter [the] court’s findings regarding the original

petition.” Harris filed a timely notice of appeal from that order.

II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

The circuit court’s decision to deny relief pursuant to section 16-90-111 will not be

overturned unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Woodruff v. State, 2024 Ark. 13, at 2,

682 S.W.3d 662, 664. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to

support it, the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite

and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.

Section 16-90-111(a) provides authority to a circuit court to correct an illegal sentence

at any time. Redus v. State, 2019 Ark. 44, at 4, 566 S.W.3d 469, 471. An illegal sentence is

one that is illegal on its face. Id. A sentence is illegal on its face when it is void because it is

beyond the circuit court’s authority to impose it. Id. Sentencing is entirely a matter of statute

in Arkansas. Id. Sentencing shall not be other than in accordance with the statute in effect

at the time of the commission of the crime. Hale v. Hobbs, 2014 Ark. 405, at 4, 443 S.W.3d

533, 535. The petitioner seeking relief under section 16-90-111(a) carries the burden of

demonstrating that his or her sentence was illegal. Redus, 2019 Ark. 44, at 3, 566 S.W.3d at

471. The general rule is that a sentence imposed within the maximum term prescribed by

law is not illegal on its face. McArty v. State, 2020 Ark. 68, at 7, 594 S.W.3d 54, 58.

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Additionally, in his argument on appeal, Harris relies on Arkansas Code Annotated

section 5-1-110, which states the following in relevant part:

(a) When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more
than one (1) offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for each such offense.
However, the defendant may not be convicted of more than one (1) offense if:

(1) One (1) offense is included in the other offense, as defined in subsection
(b) of this section.

....

(b) A defendant may be convicted of one (1) offense included in another offense
with which he or she is charged. An offense is included in an offense charged if the
offense:

(1) Is established by proof of the same or less than all of the elements required
to establish the commission of the offense charged[.]

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-110(a)(1), (b)(1) (Supp. 2007).

III. Discussion

For reversal, Harris challenges the circuit court’s findings that his double-jeopardy

argument should have been brought in a timely Rule 37.1 petition and that his claim, even

if cognizable in an illegal-sentence petition, lacked merit under Arkansas law. He also asserts

five additional reasons why he is entitled to relief from this court: (1) the circuit court had

the power under section 16-90-111(a) to “extend the narrow scope of review” to cover double-

jeopardy claims under the supreme court’s opinion in Gillette v. City of Fort Smith, 2023 Ark.

24; (2) the alleged error violates “fundamental safeguards” referenced by the supreme court

in Smith v. State, 343 Ark. 552, 39 S.W.3d 739 (2001), such that the court should conduct a

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plain-error review absent any timely double-jeopardy objection or motion; (3) the prohibition

against double jeopardy is a “fundamental right” sufficient to void a judgment if violated and

cannot be waived by failure to raise it at trial; (4) the circuit court had the ability to toll the

time limitations in Rule 37 and excuse any procedural default (relating to failure to pursue

the double-jeopardy claim) pursuant to the Supreme Court’s holdings in Martinez v. Ryan,

566 U.S. 1 (2012), and Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013); and (5) the denial of right to

counsel in Rule 37 proceedings is a structural error mandating automatic reversal.

Apart from Harris’s challenges to the circuit court’s two specific findings, his

additional arguments on appeal were not ruled on by the circuit court. Our supreme court

has held, in the context of section 16-90-111 appeals, that arguments raised for the first time

on appeal will not be considered, and even constitutional arguments must be raised and

ruled on in the circuit court to preserve the issues for appellate review. Carter v. State, 2023

Ark. 37, at 4, 660 S.W.3d 793, 796. Furthermore, Harris’s claim of entitlement to plain-

error review due to a violation of “fundamental safeguards” or “fundamental rights” based

on Smith, 343 Ark. 552, 39 S.W.3d 739, is unavailing. Smith was a capital-murder case in

which Smith was sentenced to death and waived direct appeal, triggering a “fundamental

safeguards” review of the entire record. Id. at 574–75, 39 S.W.3d at 753. Unlike in Smith,

Harris was not sentenced to death, and in any event, this is an appeal from the denial of an

illegal-sentence petition, not a direct appeal. Accordingly, our appellate review is confined

to the two arguments preserved for appeal—that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that

Harris’s double-jeopardy argument should have been brought in a timely Rule 37.1 petition

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and that his claim, even if cognizable in an illegal-sentence petition, lacked merit under

Arkansas law.

A. Untimely Rule 37.1 Claim

Harris first challenges the circuit court’s finding that his double-jeopardy claim is

outside the scope of an illegal-sentence petition under section 16-90-111. The circuit court

found the double-jeopardy claim not cognizable because it was based on an allegation that

his conviction and sentence violated the prohibition against double jeopardy as set forth in

section 5-1-110. It determined that the claim should have been raised at trial or in a

postconviction petition filed pursuant to Rule 37.1, and it cannot be pursued in a section

16-90-111 petition.

We see no clear error in the circuit court’s finding that Harris’s double-jeopardy claim

should have been brought in a timely Rule 37.1 petition. Our supreme court has previously

addressed this issue on several occasions. In Wesley v. State, 2019 Ark. 270, at 4, 585 S.W.3d

156, 160, and later in Dirickson v. State, 2021 Ark. 36, at 4–5, 617 S.W.3d 712, 716, it held

that a claim that multiple convictions violated the provision against double jeopardy

constitutes an assertion that the judgment was imposed in an illegal manner, not that the

judgment was facially invalid. A claim that a judgment was imposed in an illegal manner

must be raised at trial or in a postconviction petition filed pursuant to Rule 37.1. Dirickson,

2021 Ark. 31, at 5, 617 S.W.3d at 716. And an illegal-sentence petition under section 16-

90-111 is not a substitute for raising a claim under Rule 37.1. Id.

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Harris’s double-jeopardy argument, as in Dirickson and Wesley, alleges that the

judgment was imposed in an illegal manner. Thus, it should have been brought in a timely

petition for postconviction relief under Rule 37.1. Because Harris appealed from his

judgment of conviction, he was required to file his Rule 37 petition in the circuit court

within sixty days of the date the mandate was issued by the appellate court. See Ark. R. Crim.

P. 37.2(c) (2010). The mandate in Harris’s direct appeal was issued on March 30, 2010. His

time for filing a Rule 37.1 petition has long expired. Thus, the circuit court did not clearly

err in finding that Harris’s petition was untimely and that his double-jeopardy claim was

time-barred under Rule 37.2(c)(ii).

B. Merits

Additionally, even if we reached the merits of Harris’s argument, the circuit court was

correct that his claim would fail. As the State points out, Harris previously made the same

double-jeopardy argument in a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to Arkansas

Code Annotated section 16-112-101 (Repl. 2016). On appeal from the denial of that

petition, the supreme court rejected the argument as meritless. It held that

Harris next claims that his convictions for first-degree battery and a terroristic act
violate the prohibition against double jeopardy because the two offenses arose from
the same continuing course of conduct, and first-degree battery and a terroristic act
share the same elements. Harris’s double-jeopardy claim is equally unavailing. Each
gunshot fired by Harris represented a separate criminal act that supports separate
criminal charges, such as a charge of a terroristic act and first-degree battery. Lee v.
State, 2017 Ark. 337, 532 S.W.3d 43; see also McLennan v. State, 337 Ark. 83, 987
S.W.2d 668 (1999) (firing three shots into an apartment constituted three separate
terroristic acts). Because firing multiple gunshots are considered distinct criminal
acts, there is no need to decide whether the elements in different charges overlap.
Lee, 2017 Ark. 337, 532 S.W.3d 43.

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Harris v. Gass, 2024 Ark. 78, at 3–4, 687 S.W.3d 794, 797. Although the claim was bought

in a habeas corpus case and against different parties than the current illegal-sentence petition,

the double-jeopardy claim was rejected as meritless in Harris. Thus, pursuant to Harris, we

hold that the circuit court did not err in ruling that, even if Harris’s claim were cognizable,

it would fail under Arkansas law.1 Accordingly, the circuit court’s denial of relief under

section 16-90-111 was not clearly erroneous, and we affirm the circuit court’s order.

Affirmed.

GLADWIN and HIXSON, JJ., agree.

Charles Edward Harris, Jr., pro se appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Lauren Elizabeth Heil, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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Finally, we note that Harris does not assert in this appeal that his fifteen-year
sentences are facially illegal because they exceed the maximum terms prescribed by law. See
generally McArty, 2020 Ark. 68, at 7, 594 S.W.3d at 58. But even if he had made that
argument, it also would have been meritless in this illegal-sentence proceeding. When the
judgment was entered against Harris, first-degree battery was a Class B felony. See Ark. Code
Ann. § 5-13-201(c)(1) (Supp. 2007); see also Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401(a)(3) (Repl. 2006)
(stating that for a Class B felony, the sentence shall be not less than five years nor more than
twenty years). A terroristic act was a Class Y felony if the person, with the purpose to cause
physical injury to another person, causes physical injury or death to any person. Ark. Code
Ann. § 5-13-310(b)(2) (Supp. 2007); see also Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401(a)(1) (stating that for
a Class Y felony, the sentence shall be not less than ten years and not more than forty years,
or life). As a habitual offender, Harris was subject to a term of imprisonment of not less
than five years nor more than thirty years for Class B felony first-degree battery and a term
of not less than ten years nor more than sixty years, or life for Class Y felony committing a
terroristic act. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-501(a)(2) (Supp. 2007). Thus, had Harris challenged
his fifteen-year sentences, he would not have met his burden of demonstrating that those
sentences were facially illegal. See Redus, 2019 Ark. 44, at 3–4, 566 S.W.3d at 471.

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