George Rothwell v. Terry Rothwell

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 613
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CV-24-320

GEORGE ROTHWELL Opinion Delivered December 10, 2025

APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SIXTH
V. DIVISION
[NO. 60DR-23-28]
TERRY ROTHWELL
APPELLEE HONORABLE SHAWN J. JOHNSON,
JUDGE

SUBSTITUTED OPINION

PETITION FOR REHEARING
GRANTED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN
PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED
IN PART

BART VIRDEN, Judge

George Rothwell (“Ben”) appeals the amended and substituted divorce decree ending

his forty-year marriage to Terry Rothwell (“Terry”). Ben’s appeal challenges seven of the

court’s findings valuing and dividing the couple’s marital property. We affirm in part and

reverse and remand in part.1

1
On September 17, 2025, this court issued its opinion found at 2025 Ark App. 431,
___ S.W.3d ___. On October 3, appellant filed a petition for rehearing arguing, inter alia,
that the court of appeals erred in holding that the appellant failed to preserve the issue of
the distribution of $13,907 in attorney’s fees. We agree with appellant that the issue was
preserved on appeal and hereby grant the appellant’s petition in part and vacate the opinion
found at 2025 Ark App. 431, ___ S.W.3d ___, and issue this substituted opinion therefor.
I. Facts and Procedural History

The parties married in 1981. They do not have children. In 1986, they founded

Celerit Corporation (“Celerit”), an S corporation that provides information-technology

consulting services to banks.2 Terry is the sole shareholder and the CEO of Celerit, but the

parties do not dispute that Celerit is marital property. Ben had limited involvement in

Celerit during the marriage and served on the company’s board of directors until 2020, when

Terry removed him from the board and barred him from the Celerit building. Celerit

constitutes the majority of the parties’ marital estate. The parties also own CRE Holdings,

LLC, a real estate holding company, which leases an office building and data center to

Celerit.

During their marriage, Terry focused on running Celerit, and Ben managed the

couple’s personal finances and investments. The parties’ principal disputes include two of

Ben’s investments: his creation in 2016 of Eskimo & Tucker’s Gold, LLC, a gold-mining

venture, and his investment in a treasure-hunting venture in the Philippines, which began

in 2017. These investments never produced any income or profit.

On June 15, 2020, Ben filed a complaint for divorce, 3 and on August 5, the circuit

court entered an agreed temporary order pending the outcome of the divorce to address the

2
The parties also own Celerit Solutions Corporation, which was not profitable at the
time of the divorce and was being consolidated with Celerit.
3
The case was initially filed in Cleburne County Circuit Court but was transferred to
Pulaski County Circuit Court in December 2022.

2
parties’ use of three jointly owned lines of credit (“LOCs”); their two primary homes—one in

Heber Springs and one in Little Rock; their bank accounts; and Celerit. The order stated in

relevant part that, although both parties have equal and open access to the LOCs because

both parties’ names are on them, LOC1, a $1 million business LOC, would continue to be

used by Celerit for business purposes only; LOC2, a $2 million LOC, could be used by Terry

to draw up to $250,000 pending the divorce; and LOC3, a recently opened $1 million LOC,

could be used by Ben to draw up to $250,000 pending the divorce. The temporary order

required the parties to agree in writing to any funds drawn by either party over $250,000.

The parties acknowledged that any assets acquired or liabilities incurred were marital in

nature and would be adjudicated by the court at the final hearing. The order further

provided that Celerit employee Karen Johns would continue paying all the Rothwell’s

personal expenses from their joint checking account and that the Celerit operating account

would “maintain up to $600,000.” Terry was to pay any operating-account funds in excess of

$600,000 toward the outstanding balance of LOC2. The order also required Terry to provide

Ben with Celerit’s monthly financial reports. Finally, the parties agreed that Terry could

withdraw up to $250,000 from LOC2 to complete renovations on the Little Rock home.

In December 2022, Ben filed a motion to show cause, a motion to amend the

temporary order, and a motion to compel the sale of Celerit. Relevant to this appeal, Ben

alleged that Terry violated the temporary order by refusing to “sweep” the Celerit operating

account to pay down LOC2 when the amount exceeded $600,000, by refusing to provide

him with Celerit’s monthly financial reports, and by instructing Ms. Johns not to pay the

3
expenses for the treasure-hunting venture. In January 2023, Ben filed a motion for attorney’s

fees, alleging that Terry had restricted his access to marital funds, leaving him no money to

pay “bills” that included several invoices for his attorney’s fees and costs that he had

submitted to Ms. Johns for payment but she did not pay. Ben alleged that the LOCs were

“maxed out” and that the joint checking account was empty. He also requested the court to

award him past and future attorney’s fees and costs.

At a hearing on his motion for attorney’s fees, Ben’s attorney clarified that Ben was

not requesting attorney’s fees from Terry. Rather, he was asking the court to give him access

to marital funds in order to pay his attorney. Terry argued that Ben did have marital funds

to pay his attorney but had paid a treasure hunter over $50,000 in the previous four months

instead. Ben acknowledged that Ms. Johns had paid his living expenses but said that she did

not pay an invoice from his attorney, for the ongoing expenses of the treasure-hunting

venture, or for his maid. He said they had paid $12,600 a month for the venture since 2017,

claimed that he had individually been paying it since Ms. Johns stopped paying it four

months earlier, and admitted that he had funded the venture rather than paying his attorney.

The court denied Ben’s motion for attorney’s fees.

On March 6, Terry filed a motion for contempt and to modify the temporary order,

alleging that Ben violated the temporary order by withdrawing funds in excess of $250,000

from LOC3 as well as the other LOCs without her agreement and stating that the LOCs

were “maxed out.” The court held a hearing on May 8 on Terry’s motion and on Ben’s

remaining motions.

4
At the May hearing, Ben testified that Terry, through Ms. Johns, paid for all his living

expenses, three credit cards that he used regularly, various home repairs, and several

vacations; that he had two retirement accounts he could draw from but chose not to; and

that he was educated and in good health. He said he earned approximately $5,000 per month

from rental income and oil and gas leases. Regarding the gold-mining and treasure-hunting

ventures, Ben said that he had invested in gold-mining leases in 2016 and had also purchased

over one million dollars’ worth of gold-mining equipment. He explained that he began the

treasure-hunting venture in 2017 by paying Nathanial Ellis $150,000 a year to hunt for

treasure in the Philippines, that Mr. Ellis was a truck driver before Ben hired him, that there

was no written contact between him and Mr. Ellis, that Ben had never been to the

Philippines to check on the progress Mr. Ellis was making, that Mr. Ellis had not found any

treasure in the seven years that Ben had been paying him, and that Ben had paid Mr. Ellis

over $900,000 since the venture began. Ben said that he started the venture without Terry’s

knowledge in 2017 because she had recently suffered a heart attack. He said that Terry

stopped authorizing the $12,600 monthly payment to Mr. Ellis for the venture in November

2022; thus, he (Ben) had made the payments himself since that time. He testified that he

made the payments with cash from his safe, which contained the oil and gas revenues he had

been saving for years. Finally, he said that he had also invested money in another treasure-

hunting venture called Seafarer and had recently purchased approximately $60,000 in boat

motors for that venture from a marine dealership in Fort Lauderdale. He admitted that Terry

had not agreed to the purchase.

5
Terry testified that she provided Ben with quarterly reports from Celerit, explaining

that the accounting firm no longer prepares monthly reports. She said that the three LOCs

were maxed out with a total owed of $4,000,000. She understood that the temporary order

required her to sweep the Celerit account to pay down the LOCs but said that she had not

done so in order to preserve the marital estate. She claimed that if she swept the account to

pay down the LOCs, Ben would “take all of the money within days.” She said that she had

not known about Ben’s treasure-hunting investment and monthly payments to Mr. Ellis until

2020 when she was looking at Ms. Johns’s computer after Ben filed for divorce. After she

learned from Ben’s deposition that Mr. Ellis was a truck driver, that they were wiring $12,600

to him in Idaho every month, that there was no written contract between Mr. Ellis and Ben,

and that it was unclear what happened to the money after it was wired to Mr. Ellis, she asked

Ms. Johns to stop making the monthly payments. She said that she had no involvement in

any of their investments: her responsibility was the company, and Ben’s was investments.

She testified that neither the Philippines investment nor the gold-mining investment nor the

Seafarer investment had ever produced income.

Ms. Johns testified that she was an employee of Celerit and paid all the personal

expenses of the parties. She said that in 2022, Ben’s living expenses were $361,529.18, and

Terry’s were $135,613.77. In addition to living expenses, she testified that since the

temporary order was entered in August 2020, Ben had withdrawn $895,720 from LOC2;

$115,000 from LOC3; and $24,600 from LOC1. She said that the “vast majority” of these

expenses were related to treasure hunting or stock purchases. She said that Terry had spent

6
a total of $1 million renovating their home in Little Rock, $404,996.32 of which was spent

since entry of the temporary order.

On May 16, the court entered an order denying the parties’ motions for contempt

and their motions to modify the temporary order; however, the court ordered Terry to pay

Ben $154,996.32 from the Celerit operating account as an “early property settlement.” The

court found that this amount represented the difference between the amount the temporary

order authorized Terry to spend completing renovations to the parties’ Little Rock home

($250,000) and the actual cost of the post-temporary-order renovations ($404,996.32). The

court stated that the $154,996.32 “shall be accounted for and credited to” Terry in the final

division of property. The court also forbade Ben from accessing any funds from the LOCs.

Finally, the court reserved Ben’s motion to compel the sale of Celerit for the final hearing.

After mediation in July 2023, the parties entered into an agreed order on August 3

regarding the division of many of their marital assets and debts and agreed that the principal

issues left for the court to decide included the valuation of Celerit and Celerit’s and Celerit

Solutions’ office buildings. The agreed order further provided that “[n]othing in this order

negates any arguments regarding marital waste or financial responsibility which may impact

the division of marital property and credits to be issued.”

A final hearing was held on August 3. At this hearing, Terry testified that the parties

started Celerit in 1986 to provide temporary IT consultants to various businesses. She said

that she is and has always been Celerit’s CEO. Terry testified that she did not know the value

of Celerit because she was “not an appraiser.” She explained that she opined in her

7
November 2022 deposition that Celerit was worth between $20 and $25 million because

Ben had included that amount on a 2022 financial statement. She also testified that Celerit’s

profit margins had changed over the past three or four years due to a merger between

BancorpSouth, their largest client, and Cadence Bank.

Terry said that Celerit would continue to need its office building and the data center

where Celerit Solutions currently operates once it absorbs Celerit Solutions because the

Celerit systems are located there and Celerit will continue to keep all the employees. Terry

testified that the office building and data center were appraised for $1,625,000 in March

2022 in connection with the sale of Celerit to Sollensys, which was not consummated. She

said that Ben had agreed with the terms of the sale.

Terry testified that any distributions she had received from Celerit since the

temporary order had been used to pay interest on the LOCs. She said that between 2020

and 2023, she had paid $451,000 in interest on LOC1 and LOC2. Defendant’s Exhibit

D10A indicates that the total interest paid on all three LOCs from 2020 through the date

of the hearing was $498,570.69. Terry said that after the temporary order was entered, she

initially swept the Celerit operating account to pay the LOCs as required but eventually quit

because Ben removed money from the LOCs every time she paid them down. She said that

this was in spite of the fact that she paid all of Ben’s living expenses, credit cards, and health

insurance. She said Ben had never “paid for anything” or “put a penny in the bank accounts.”

Terry stated that she had no, or very little, involvement in managing the parties’

personal finances during the marriage. She did not look at their bank statement or

8
QuickBooks, pay any bills, keep up with the personal lines of credit, or make personal

investments. She said that her responsibility was to take care of the company, the employees,

and the clients and that she trusted Ben to take care of their personal finances and

investments. She also testified that Ben worked with their accountants to prepare the parties’

tax returns each year and that she had never personally reviewed them.

With specific regard to the 2022 financial statement that contained a valuation for

Celerit, Terry testified that Ben had always prepared the parties’ personal financial

statements, including that one, and that she had never assisted in their preparation. Ben

valued Celerit at $19,675,000 in the 2022 financial statement. Terry testified that she did

not conduct independent research regarding that valuation, did not assist in preparing the

financial statement, and—aside from Steven Schroeder, the expert she hired for the divorce

hearing—had never hired an independent business appraiser, CPA, accountant, or other

professional to value Celerit. She said that the balance on the LOCs in 2022 was $4,000,000

and that if she had not agreed with the valuations Ben gave to the bank, the bank would

have foreclosed on the loans.

She admitted that she knew “bits and pieces” about the gold-mining venture in the

beginning but said Ben had never consulted her about it and she had no idea that he had

been investing millions of dollars into equipment, travel, and attorney’s fees connected with

the venture. She said that she learned about the purchase of a $230,000 airplane for the

gold-mining investment the morning he wired funds for the plane. She said that she told

him not to do it. Regarding the other funds spent by Ben, Terry learned that he had been

9
spending millions after she was served with divorce papers and began preparing “accounting

work.” When she learned about the monthly treasure-hunting payments, she said it would

have been impossible to prevent Ben from using the LOC and their joint checking account

to make the payments since he had equal access to the accounts and did not need her

approval. She said that she did not want any interest in either the gold-mining or the treasure-

hunting ventures.

Terry testified that Ben had taken a minimum of $4 million from marital assets over

a seven-year period for what amounted to gambling, that he had maxed out their LOCs, that

he had not put one penny into the parties’ joint accounts or paid anything towards their

LOCs, that the gold-mining and treasure-hunting ventures were not investments but

“scam[s],” and that he could not even explain where any of the money went. She asked the

court for credit or for an unequal division of property to compensate her for the $4 million

he spent on those ventures and for the $498,570.69 in interest payments she made on the

LOCs Ben maxed out to pay for the ventures. She also asked the circuit court to credit her

for the $154,996.32 Ben received as an early property settlement after the May 2023 hearing

and for reimbursement for a $13,907 check he wrote to his attorney from their joint account

after the court had already awarded him $154,996,32 to pay his attorney.

Ben testified that he had not been involved with Celerit for about a decade but said

he did prepare the financial statement in December 2022, which included a value for Celerit

of $19.675 million. He included a value of $2 million for the data center used by Celerit

Solutions. He said they had never found anyone who would appraise the building as a data

10
center—including all the fiber-optic loops and electronic equipment, raised floors, lowered

ceilings, and security—rather than as an office building, so he had to “fudge” the $2 million

number. Regarding his method for valuing Celerit at $19 million, he said that he used a

“template” that came from his accounting firm because he did not like paying the accounting

firm to prepare a financial statement that he could prepare himself and said that he had used

EBITDA4 to assign a value. However, he could not explain exactly how he used the EBITDA

formula to arrive at a precise number.

Ben said that since the temporary order, he had used the parties’ LOCs to purchase

$200,000 worth of Sollensys stock (which was worthless at the time of the hearing), to

continue investing in the gold-mining venture, and to make the payments for the treasure-

hunting venture in the Philippines. He said he did not have a checking account and did not

deposit money into the parties’ joint checking account; rather, he said that he used funds

from oil and gas investments, rental payments, and the $154,996.32 the court awarded him

in May 2023. However, he admitted writing a check in July 2023 from the parties’ joint

checking account for $13,907 to pay his attorney. He acknowledged that the court had

specifically awarded him “an early division of property [of] $154,000” in May to make this

payment, but he justified the $13,907 check because he did not think the $154,000 was

“specific for that cause.”

4
EBITDA stands for earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization.

11
Ben said that he invested in gold mining in 2016 due to the “benefits of the taxation.”

He testified that he had no background in gold mining and that Terry had less knowledge

or experience than he did. He also said that Terry had “negligible involvement” with the

gold-mining investment. He admitted that he had spent $1 million on equipment for the

gold-mining operation in addition to investing in leases. He conceded that he had never

received a return on his gold-mining investment and that no gold had been found.

Regarding the Philippines treasure-hunting venture, Ben testified that in 2017, after

getting Mr. Ellis’s name from Norman Missionaries and doing some “internet research,” Ben

had hired Mr. Ellis. Ben did not meet Mr. Ellis until February 2023 in Las Vegas, six years

after his initial investment. Ben said that he paid Mr. Ellis a lump sum of $150,000. Shortly

thereafter, Ben then began paying Mr. Ellis $12,600 each month through June 2023. He

testified that the fee was paid by Ms. Johns or him. This monthly amount did not include

the purchase or repair of equipment, which Ben occasionally paid for. He said that Terry

was not told about the initial investment in this venture but that she was told about it after

she recovered. Ben said that he had never traveled to the Philippines, that Mr. Ellis had never

found treasure, and that he (Ben) did not have a written contract with Mr. Ellis. Ben said

that he and Mr. Ellis had a verbal agreement to split any treasure that was found.

Karen Johns testified that she had been paying the parties’ living expenses since before

the divorce was filed and that she used money from their joint checking account to pay both

parties’ expenses after the divorce was filed unless funds in that account were insufficient, in

which case she drew on the LOCs. She said that all the money in the joint checking account

12
was put there by Terry. Ms. Johns testified that since the divorce had been filed, Terry’s

monthly expenses were approximately $11,000 and Ben’s were approximately $30,000. She

said the balance on all three LOCs was about $3.5 million and that Ben had withdrawn a

total of $1,208,920 since he filed the complaint for divorce. She explained that none of the

withdrawals by Ben related to his monthly expenses, credit-card expenses, or home repair,

all of which she had paid. She testified that the interest paid since July 2020 on all three

LOCs was $498,570.69.

Ms. Johns provided the following explanation about her QuickBooks exhibit detailing

the parties’ expenses. She said that Terry had no involvement in the parties’ personal

financial affairs, did not know how much the parties spent, did not assist in the preparation

of taxes, and had never asked to see the QuickBooks documents. Ms. Johns said that Ben

handled all the parties’ personal finances. She said that since 2016, Ben had spent

$4,082,647.86 on treasure hunting and gold mining. She also testified that Terry did not

know anything about Ben’s Philippines treasure-hunting investment until after the divorce

had been filed. Ms. Johns testified that Ben told her that he did not want to tell Terry because

of her heart attack and that he felt like “God wanted him” to treasure hunt in the

Philippines. She said Terry discovered the payments after Ben had filed for divorce. Terry

was sitting at Ms. John’s desk with Ms. Johns going through QuickBooks after her attorney

requested that she review the accounting records. Terry noticed the monthly expenditures

and asked about them. Ms. Johns said that Terry was “appalled” when she explained what

the payments were for.

13
Finally, Steven Schroeder, a business appraiser hired by Terry, testified regarding

Celerit’s value. He said he had forty years of experience in appraising businesses and

appraised approximately twenty-five businesses each year. In his opinion, “the value of the

stock in Celerit . . . is eight million eight hundred thousand dollars ($8,800,000).” He said

that he had reviewed historical information back to 2015, that the profit margins had been

declining over the past four years, and that the loss of part of the BancorpSouth business

after the merger in 2021 with Cadence Bank was going to have a major impact on Celerit.

He said that that the merger may not have a significant effect on revenue, but it would have

an effect on profit because the larger banks do not need as many of the services or consultants

that Celerit provides.

Mr. Schroeder said that he used three methods to appraise Celerit: (1) the single-

period-capitalization method, which indicated a value of $6.285 million; (2) the market-

based-EBITDA-multiplier method, which indicated a value of $10.44 million; and (3) the

market-based-revenue-multiplier method, which indicated a value of $10 million. He testified

that he considered the failed Sollensys sale when evaluating Celerit,5 but he did not find it

relevant because it occurred in 2021—before the impact of the BancorpSouth merger—and

Mr. Schroeder evaluated the company as of May 2023; the Sollensys sale was never completed

and thus was not a ”sale” to establish value; Sollensys was a synergistic purchase since

Sollensys wanted to use Celerit to enhance its own operations; and, finally, the Sollensys sale

5
Terry testified that the value of Celerit’s stock at the time of the potential Sollensys
sale was $28 million.

14
included real estate and Mr. Schroeder valued only the stock of Celerit, not real estate that

was not owned but only leased by Celerit.

Mr. Schroeder said he did not think Ben’s opinions of Celerit’s value were

“legitimate” because no one had explained the basis for Ben’s opinions. Ben said he obtained

“an EBITDA multiplier” from an accountant, but Mr. Schroeder explained that absent

detailed information about a company, an “off the cuff EBITDA multiplier” is as “common

as [a] bellybutton[], everybody has one.” He said that without getting data and performing an

examination, it might be admissible in court, but it was not relevant to his analysis. Finally,

Mr. Schroeder also said that he reviewed the appraisal associated with the real estate, which

indicated a value of $1.65 million for the office building and data center Celerit leased from

CRE Holdings, but he admitted that he did not independently prepare a property valuation

of the buildings.

Ben introduced the testimony of Dr. Ralph Scott, an economics professor at Hendrix

College. Dr. Scott testified that he had never been certified as a business-valuation expert in

a divorce case, that he remembered only one instance in which he had valued a closely held

corporation, that he was not a certified public accountant, that he had taken no specialized

training courses on business appraisals, and that he was not a member of any organization

accredited for the appraisal of privately owned companies. He said that most of his litigation

experience had been in personal-injury cases. He said that he was certified as an economist

and that, as such, he could “handle” the valuation of businesses. He admitted that he had

never met with any Celerit management employees and that he did not prepare an

15
independent written report of the value of Celerit. Dr. Scott said he had a “general valuation

based on the testimony” he had heard.

Dr. Scott said that his main difference in opinion with Mr. Schroeder was Mr.

Schroeder’s failure to consider the sale of Celerit to Sollensys for $28 million in his analysis.

Although admittedly not consummated, Dr. Scott found the sale relevant because it was an

actual sale of Celerit, not simply the sale of a comparable company. He also believed that the

$19.675 million value placed on Celerit by the parties in their financial statement was

relevant. Finally, he testified that Mr. Schroeder relied too heavily on the first five months

of 2023 in trying to project the future. Dr. Scott preferred looking at three to five years of

performance, suggesting that the 2023 numbers could simply be a “blip on the radar.” Dr.

Scott opined that the value of Celerit should be $18.736 million. Terry objected to allowing

Dr. Scott to provide an opinion of value because he was simply a rebuttal witness to Dr.

Schroeder and did not have a formal, independent written report. The court found that Dr.

Scott’s opinion of the value of Celerit was outside the scope of rebuttal, explaining “all that

we’re looking at is whether or not we should believe Mr. Schroeder.”

The court entered an order6 on October 6, 2023, valuing and dividing the parties’

marital assets and debts and finding that Ben engaged in the wrongful dissipation of marital

assets. Terry filed a posttrial motion for reconsideration, amendment, and clarification

asking the court to clarify its order regarding certain bank accounts, retirement accounts,

6
While titled “Order,” the circuit court later referred to this pleading as the original
divorce decree.

16
and royalties. She also pointed out a “typographical error” in the court’s decision awarding

Ben a credit for the difference in value of the parties’ respective residences rather than

awarding her a credit since Ben’s property appraised for a higher amount than Terry’s.

Finally, Terry alleged that it was “unclear what mathematical formula” the court intended to

utilize to apply the various credits and distributions and asked the court to “clarify how the

credits and awards are calculated in the final division of property and the terms and

conditions of any equalizing payments needed.” Ben filed a posttrial motion for amendment

of findings of fact and conclusions of law, for new trial, for judgment notwithstanding the

verdict, and for relief from judgment.

On November 20, the court entered an order granting in part and denying in part

Terry’s posttrial motion and denying Ben’s posttrial motion and also entered an amended

and substituted decree of divorce. The court incorporated its order into the amended and

substituted decree. Relevant to this appeal, the amended and substituted decree provided

that Terry “shall receive a credit for half of the marital funds” spent in furtherance of the

treasure-hunting ventures in the amount of $2,041,323.93; Terry “shall be reimbursed” for

half of the interest payments she made on the LOCs from the time the divorce was filed;

Terry “shall receive a credit” for the early division of property in the amount of $154,996.32

that Ben received; and Terry “shall be entitled to credit in the amount of $13,907.50 for the

check Ben wrote from the parties’ joint checking account to his attorney. The court valued

Celerit at $10 million and the office building and data center used by Celerit at $1.65

million. It awarded both buildings to Terry, who is to pay Ben for his 50 percent interest in

17
both. Finally, the court awarded Terry the Little Rock home and Ben the Heber Springs

home, finding that the Little Rock home appraised for $1.34 million, and the Heber Springs

home appraised for $2.4 million. The court found that Terry should receive credit in the

amount of the difference in value: $1.060 million. Ben’s appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review

We review domestic-relations cases de novo on appeal and will not reverse a circuit

court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Keathley v. Keathley, 76 Ark. App. 150, 61

S.W.3d 219 (2001). In reviewing a circuit court’s findings, we defer to the court’s superior

position to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded to their

testimony. Id. at 157, 61 S.W.3d at 224. Moreover, we will not substitute our judgment on

appeal as to the exact interest each party should have but will decide only whether the order

is clearly wrong. Jones v. Jones, 2014 Ark. 96, at 7, 432 S.W.3d 36, 41 (citing Pinkston v.

Pinkston, 278 Ark. 233, 644 S.W.2d 930 (1983)).

III. Discussion

A. Reimbursements

For his first point on appeal, Ben challenges the circuit court’s findings in the

amended and substituted decree (1) that he repay half the interest due on the parties’ LOCs

while the divorce was pending, (2) that Terry receive a credit for half of every dollar he spent

gold mining and treasure hunting, (3) that Terry receive a credit for the $154,996.32 awarded

to Ben while the divorce was pending, and (4) that Ben reimburse Terry for $13,907 in

attorney’s fees that he paid while the divorce was pending.

18
1. Gold-mining and treasure-hunting expenses and LOC interest

Because Ben’s first two reimbursement arguments are related and decided by the

circuit court under the heading “Unequal Property Division,” we will address them together.

After an explanation of the factors a court must consider when awarding an unequal

distribution of property, an extensive rendition of the facts surrounding Ben’s investment in

the gold-mining and treasure-hunting ventures, its finding that Ben lacked credibility when

discussing the parties’ finances and his treasure-hunting ventures, its determination that

Ben’s spending was “reckless” and constituted a “wrongful dissipation of marital assets,” and

its finding that Terry was entitled to an unequal division of property, the circuit court

awarded a $2,041,323.93 credit to Terry for half of the marital funds that Ben spent on these

investments, which was $4,082,647.86. The court also found that Ben had used the parties’

LOCs to continue paying for these investments after the divorce had been filed and the

temporary order entered, which led to excessive principal balances and, consequently, to

excessive amounts of interest accumulation. Accordingly, the court also ordered Ben to

reimburse Terry $249,285.35 for half of the interest she had paid servicing the three LOCs

while the divorce was pending, which totaled $498,570.69.

On appeal, Ben recognizes that a court has broad powers to distribute property and

may make an unequal distribution of property, but he argues that the $2,041,323.93 credit

to Terry was not an unequal distribution of marital property but rather a reimbursement of

funds spent during the marriage. Similarly, he argues that the LOC interest payments are

not debt for the court to divide because the amounts have been paid with marital funds. He

19
claims that income earned and spent during the marriage is not subject to reimbursement

or division unless the money was spent on a paramour or with the fraudulent intent of

divesting the other spouse of the funds.

In support of his argument that the issues do not involve the unequal distribution of

property but rather the direct reimbursement of funds spent during the marriage, Ben relies

on Johnson v. Cotton-Johnson, 88 Ark. App. 67, 194 S.W.3d 806 (2004), and Chism v. Chism,

2018 Ark. App. 310, 551 S.W.3d 394. These cases do not support Ben’s argument.

In Johnson, we affirmed in part and modified a circuit court’s order requiring Arthur

to reimburse Renita for one-half of the total amount in gifts he had purchased for two

paramours during the parties’ marriage. Although we recognized in Johnson that a court may

divide property unequally when one spouse has diverted marital assets to a paramour, we

reduced the amount that the court awarded for gifts that Arthur gave to one of the paramours

because Arthur and Renita had reconciled after the gifts were made. Id. at 83, 194 S.W.3d

at 815. We stated that reconciliation after the gifts was “tantamount to a forgiveness of the

manner in which marital funds were spent” and that Renita should be precluded from

seeking reimbursement of those funds to the marital estate. Id., 194 S.W.3d at 815. However,

we affirmed the gifts made to the other paramour where there was no evidence that the

parties reconciled after Renita knew of the gifts. Id., 194 S.W.3d at 815.

This court clearly indicated in Johnson that the circuit court could distribute property

unequally on the basis of misspent marital funds and affirmed in part the court’s order doing

so. Here, there is no evidence that Terry “forgave” Ben’s wasteful spending. In fact, the

20
evidence suggested that Terry had no idea about the spending and did all she could to

prevent Ben’s continued spending on the ventures once she discovered it.

In Chism, the circuit court divided the parties’ marital and nonmarital property and

then found that Evelyn’s earnings and retirement benefits that had been paid between 2002

and 2013 (the year before the divorce was filed) had been kept in a separate account in her

separate name and that Evelyn had failed to account for the money. The court awarded a

judgment to Jim for $118,000, representing one-half of the sum earned. Evelyn argued on

appeal that a spouse is not entitled to be reimbursed in a divorce proceeding for every

nonconsensual transfer of marital funds made by the other spouse in the absence of an intent

to defraud; that there was insufficient evidence that she had spent the funds with the intent

to defraud Jim; and that only $20,000 remained in the account at the time the parties

separated, which the court had already divided. 2018 Ark. App. 310, at 5, 551 S.W.3d at

397–98. We reversed the judgment, holding there was no evidence presented, and Jim did

not argue, that Evelyn concealed or disposed of her property in an attempt to defraud him

and that the court’s equal division of the account was based on the balance at the time of

separation. Id. at 398, 551 S.W.3d at 6.

Chism is inapposite to the instant case. Unlike in Chism, the court here did not award

Terry a judgment based on unaccounted-for funds. Rather, the court specifically made an

unequal distribution of property and properly stated its reasons for doing so. Moreover, the

court here specifically found that Ben’s treasure hunting was a wrongful dissipation of the

marital assets and amounted to fraud against Terry.

21
Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-12-315 (Repl. 2020) grants the circuit court

broad powers in distributing both marital and nonmarital property to achieve an equitable

division. Keathley, 76 Ark. App. 150, 157, 61 S.W.3d at 224. The overriding purpose of the

property-division statute is to enable the court to make a division of property that is fair and

equitable under the circumstances. Id., 61 S.W.3d at 224. All marital property shall be

distributed one-half to each party unless the court finds such a division to be inequitable.

Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-315(a)(1)(A). The court may make an unequal division of marital

property if it finds some other division equitable taking into consideration certain factors

listed in the statute, but the circuit court must state the reasons and basis for not dividing

the property equally, which should be recited in the order entered in the matter. Ark. Code

Ann. § 9-12-315(a)(1)(A), (B). The court is not required to list each factor, weigh each factor

equally, or limit itself to the factors listed. Kelly v. Kelly, 2014 Ark. 543, at 8, 453 S.W.3d

665, 661.

In the case at bar, the circuit court made an unequal distribution of marital property

when it awarded Terry a credit for half of Ben’s investment expenses and reimbursement for

half of the LOC interest she paid on those expenses. The court issued these awards in its

decree under the heading “Unequal Property Division,” and the court set forth the factors

it was required to consider pursuant to section 9-12-315(a)(1)(B) when making this unequal

division of marital property. Focusing on the factor regarding each party’s contribution to

the “acquisition, preservation, or appreciation” of marital property, the court found that Ben

used Terry’s trust in him to spend their funds in a “covert, wasteful fashion” while Terry

22
worked hard to accumulate marital assets. It credited Terry’s and Ms. John’s testimony that

Terry was not aware of Ben’s investment in the Philippines treasure-hunting venture until

after the divorce had been filed. The court was “not persuaded” by Ben’s testimony that

Terry should have known about the venture from the parties’ tax returns, and it found that

Ben’s “reckless spending went unchecked for years because he hid it from Terry.” The court

likened Ben’s behavior to one who goes to a casino month after month for seven years,

spending tens of thousands of dollars gambling, but having nothing to show for it. The court

specifically found that Ben’s actions amounted to “fraud against Terry.” Consequently, it

awarded 100 percent of the assets and debts of the parties’ gold-mining and treasure-hunting

ventures to Ben and found that Terry “shall receive a credit for half of the marital funds”

Ben spent on these ventures. The court also found that Ben continued to invest in these

ventures after the divorce had been filed and after Terry had quit funding the expense,

maxing out the parties’ LOCs. The court found that Ben’s use of the LOCs led to the

excessive balances and interest accumulation, found that both parties should bear the

expense equally, and ordered Ben to reimburse Terry for half of these interest payments.7

7
We note that the court did not order Ben to reimburse Terry for all interest paid on
the parties’ LOCs during the marriage but only for the interest it found attributable to Ben’s
excessive and wasteful spending during the parties’ separation and pending divorce. In spite
of the temporary order’s provision barring either party from borrowing more than $250,000
from his or her designated LOC without written approval from the other party, Ben was
responsible for maxing out all three LOCs. The court found this violated the temporary
order, took this violation into account in its decision to order credits and reimbursements,
and found that compliance with its order would purge the contemptuous behavior.

23
The circuit court compared Ben’s actions to the husband’s depletion of the marital

estate in Keathley. In Keathley, this court affirmed an unequal division of property to the wife

after the circuit court found that the husband depleted the marital estate through gambling

losses while the wife was working to accumulate assets. 76 Ark. App. at 155, 61 S.W.3d at

223. The husband in Keathley, like Ben in this case, handled the parties’ finances while the

wife worked to earn income. The circuit court found that the wife did not know about the

husband’s continuing gambling losses, had no reason to suspect that he was accumulating

credit-card debt in her name, and found that his actions rose to the level of fraud against the

wife. Id. at 155, 61 S.W.3d at 223.

Similarly, in Thakar v. Thakar, 2022 Ark. App. 284, 646 S.W.3d 666, this court

affirmed the circuit court’s unequal division of property in favor of the wife where evidence

established that the husband handled the parties financial affairs during the marriage and

transferred considerable assets from the parties’ joint accounts to accounts in India and to

his family members without the wife’s knowledge or consent. The husband argued that he

no longer had all the funds and that the circuit court made no finding that he had committed

fraud, as he contended the supreme court required. We affirmed the court’s order, stating

that fraud included a “scheme of deceit,” which the circuit court found existed. Id. at 7, 646

S.W.3d at 670–71. See also Skokos v. Skokos, 332 Ark. 520, 535, 969 S.W.2d 26, 34 (1998)

(holding that to entitle a spouse to reimbursement of funds spent during the marriage, he or

she must demonstrate a nonconsensual transfer of marital funds was made with the “specific

intent” to defraud them of their interest in the property).

24
We do not have a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made as to the

circuit court’s findings that Terry is entitled to a credit for one-half of the marital funds spent

on the gold-mining and treasure-hunting ventures and that Ben reimburse Terry one-half of

the LOC interest she paid on those expenses during the divorce. As we have previously

explained, we will not substitute our judgment on appeal as to the exact interest each party

should have but will decide only whether the order is clearly wrong. See Pinkston, 278 Ark. at

235, 644 S.W.2d at 931. Any exception to the rule of equal distribution will always depend

on the specific facts as reflected by the circuit court’s findings and conclusions. Kelly, 2014

Ark. 543, at 10, 453 S.W.3d at 662. Our review of the extensive record in this case does not

convince us that the court’s order is clearly erroneous, and we affirm this point.

2. $154,996.32 and $13,907

i. $154,996.32

Ben argues that the circuit court clearly erred by ordering him to reimburse Terry for

the $154,996.32 that the court awarded him after the May 2023 hearing and by ordering

him to reimburse Terry for the $13,907 he paid his attorney from the parties’ joint account

two months later. Ben contends that there was no evidence that he still possessed the money

at the time of the final hearing and that it was money spent during the marriage from the

marital estate. Therefore, as he previously argued, he contends that a court may not order a

party to account for money spent during the marriage absent evidence of fraud. He also

contends that Terry paid her attorney from the parties’ joint account and that nothing

prevented him from doing the same thing.

25
Regarding the $154,996.32 award to Terry, we agree with Terry that Ben acquiesced

in the court’s decision. In Ben’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law filed

immediately after the final hearing, Ben deducted this amount from his share of the marital

estate. An appellant may not complain on appeal that the court erred if he induced,

consented to, or acquiesced in the court’s position. Keathley v. Keathley, 76 Ark. App. 150,

163–64, 61 S.W.3d 219, 228 (2001). Accordingly, we decline to reach this issue on appeal.

ii. $13,907

We now turn to the court’s decision that Ben must reimburse Terry $13,907 for the

attorney’s fees he paid from the parties’ joint checking account rather than the $154,996.32

earmarked for Ben’s expenses. Terry contends that this issue is not preserved for appeal

because Ben failed to raise the issue in his posttrial motion. We disagree and take this

opportunity to clarify our case law.

This court has held that an issue is not preserved for appeal if an appellant failed to

object to the issue on appeal during both the pendency of the case in the circuit court and

in a posttrial motion to the circuit court. In Dace v. Doss, 2017 Ark. App. 531, 530 S.W.3d

893, this court held that Dace’s argument that the court erroneously considered evidence

outside the record regarding Doss’s tax returns was not preserved for appeal because Dace’s

counsel did not object during the discussion of preparing an affidavit of expenses or to the

court’s consideration of evidence outside the record. Later, when Dace was provided with

the disputed information, and later still in his posttrial motion, Dace did not object to the

26
circuit court’s use of the information. We held that Dace raised this issue for the first time

on appeal; thus, we would not consider his argument.

Similarly, in Hartman v. Hartman, 2024 Ark. App. 194, this court held that the issue

the appellant raised on appeal regarding the circuit court’s alimony and child-support

calculations was not preserved for appeal because the circuit court specifically reserved the

issue of alimony and child support to be decided after the decree was entered. The court

invited the parties to file briefs on the issues. The appellant failed to raise the issue in his

posttrial brief. Specifically, our court held that

Jodie elected not to address the issue of child support in his brief, nor did he respond
to the options for child-support calculations that Candie proposed in her posttrial
brief. Then, when the circuit court issued its letter opinion setting forth its gross-
income calculations for purposes of child support, Jodie again failed to object on this
ground. . . . Here, Jodie had ample opportunity to object to the court’s calculations
prior to the entry of the divorce decree and did not do so.

2024 Ark. App. 194, at 13–14.

Both Dace and Hartman are inapposite to the instant case because Ben raised the issue

of reimbursement to Terry for his attorney’s fees at the circuit court level; thus, unlike Dace

and Hartman, the issue was not raised at the appellate level for the first time on appeal. We

decline to hold, as Terry urges, that Ben’s failure to object in the posttrial motion precludes

him from raising the issue on appeal because we would be creating a bright-line rule without

supporting precedent.

Regarding the court’s order for Ben to reimburse Terry $13,907, the circuit court

found that Ben “unapologetically admitted at trial that he wrote a check [for attorney’s fees]

27
out of the parties’ joint bank account” for this amount to pay his attorney “rather than

utilizing the $154,996.32 awarded to him in May for that exact purpose.” 8 The court was

within its discretion to order reimbursement of both the $154,996.32 amount of the award

to Ben for expenses and the $13,907 he paid for attorney’s fees to account for his use of

money earmarked for his expenses to fund his fraudulent treasure-hunting venture. As stated

above, the court has broad powers to distribute property to achieve a distribution that is fair

and equitable under the circumstances, and under the facts of this case, we find no error

and affirm. Coatney v. Coatney, 2010 Ark. App. 262, 377 S.W.3d 381.

B. Value of Celerit

Ben also challenges the circuit court’s valuation of Celerit. He argues that the court’s

finding that Celerit was worth $10 million was clearly erroneous. First, he claims that the

circuit court ignored relevant evidence of value in favor of Mr. Schroeder’s valuation.

Specifically, Ben argues that Mr. Schroeder gave the Sollensys sale no weight. Second, Ben

argues that Mr. Schroeder’s valuation included only the stock and that the circuit court

therefore clearly erred by including the business accounts in the $10 million valuation

collectively with the stock, although he does not specify which accounts.

The only expert witness who appraised Celerit was Terry’s expert, Mr. Schroeder. Mr.

Schroeder testified that he had forty years of experience in appraising businesses and had

8
We note that it was undisputed that Ben contributed nothing to the joint checking
account, that all his expenses were being paid from marital funds by Ms. Johns, and that he
did not place any of the marital funds he received—checks for oil and gas royalties, rent, and
the $154,996.32—into the joint account but kept these amounts in cash in his safe.

28
appraised approximately twenty-five businesses each year. He provided a forty-seven-page

appraisal with a detailed financial analysis of Celerit’s balance sheets and income statements

and set forth the three methods he used to arrive at his opinion of the company’s value. He

testified that he considered the failed Sollensys sale when evaluating Celerit and explained

why he did not find it relevant to his analysis. Ben then presented the testimony of Dr. Scott

to rebut Mr. Schroeder’s opinion, but neither Ben nor Dr. Scott provided a separate

appraisal or evidence of an alternative value for Celerit.

The court considered this evidence, set forth two pages of detailed findings, and

valued Celerit at $10 million. Mr. Schroeder’s appraisal (on which the court relied) was based

on the company’s financial statements, which included the company’s bank accounts. The

circuit court specifically mentioned Sollensys, Terry’s testimony regarding the failed

Sollensys transaction, and Mr. Schroeder’s models that included comparable sales. In fact,

while the court recognized that Mr. Schroeder used three methods to arrive at his valuation

of $8.8 million, the court specifically found that the two methods using comparable sales

were the most reasonable valuations, leading the court to its $10 million value. The court

also recognized that Dr. Scott did not offer an independent appraisal of the company. And

although Ben testified that Celerit was worth anywhere between $10 million and $30

million, he did not present an accountant or other expert to confirm his opinion, and the

circuit court specifically found that Ben’s testimony discussing the parties’ finances lacked

credibility.

29
Ben’s argument is nothing more than a request that we reweigh the evidence and

evaluate it differently than did the circuit court, which we will not do. See Williams v. Williams,

2019 Ark. App. 186, at 19, 575 S.W.3d 156, 166. The circuit court was required, as the trier

of fact, to determine the credibility of witnesses and to resolve conflicting testimony. Thakar,

2022 Ark. App. 284, at 4, 646 S.W.3d at 670. On appeal, we will not disturb a circuit court’s

resolution of disputed facts or determinations of credibility because these are within the

province of the finder of fact. Id. at 7, 646 S.W.3d at 671. This court will reverse the circuit

court’s valuation of a business only if it is clearly erroneous. Fowler v. Fowler, 2023 Ark. App.

543, at 4, 680 S.W.3d 68, 71.

Ben has not demonstrated that the circuit court clearly erred on this point. He failed

to offer his own appraisal or provide any expert evidence to support his opinion. Terry

presented expert testimony, supported by a forty-seven-page appraisal, that was deemed

credible by the circuit court. In short, Ben’s arguments on appeal attempt to parse out various

components of Terry’s expert’s opinion, but this was a matter for the circuit court to consider

and resolve. Our de novo review of the evidence convinces us that the circuit court did not

clearly err in its valuation of Celerit, and we affirm this point.

C. Value of the Office Building and the Data Center

The circuit court valued the office building and data center at $1.65 million and

ordered Ben to receive a credit for $825,000. Ben contends that the circuit court clearly erred

in its valuation of the buildings because it failed to consider all the relevant evidence and

based its determination of value on an appraisal that was not entered into evidence.

30
In its decree, the circuit court found that the buildings were vital to the continuing

operation of Celerit and awarded them to Terry. Neither Ben nor Terry entered an appraisal

of the buildings into evidence, and the court based its determination of value on the

testimony of Terry and Mr. Schroeder. Both testified that an appraisal had been performed

in connection with the potential sale of Celerit to Sollensys in 2021, which valued the

properties at $1,65 million. The court stated that no other credible evidence regarding the

properties was presented, specifically noting Ben’s lack of credibility.

The opinion of the owner of real estate is generally admissible on the question of its

value, regardless of the owner’s knowledge of market values. Enter. Sales Co. v. Barham, 270

Ark. 544, 547–48, 605 S.W.2d 458, 459 (1980). That testimony must, however, be based on

facts that support the owner’s opinion. Ark. State Highway Comm’n v. Geeslin, 247 Ark. 537,

541, 446 S.W.2d 245, 247 (1969). Value cannot be based on a figure plucked from the air.

Ark. State Highway Comm’n v. Stanley, 234 Ark. 428, 353 S.W.2d 173 (1962). The court did

not err by relying on Terry’s opinion, as the owner of the real estate, of the value of this real

property, even though the appraisal on which her opinion was based was not admitted into

evidence. This figure was not “plucked from the air” and is the only value presented

regarding the buildings. We hold that the circuit court’s valuation of the real estate was not

clearly erroneous and affirm this point.

D. Home Values

Ben contends that the circuit court clearly erred by unequally dividing the parties’

homes without offering an explanation for the unequal division. The court awarded Terry

31
the Little Rock home and Ben the Heber Springs home, finding that the Little Rock home

appraised for $1.34 million, and the Heber Springs home appraised for $2.4 million. The

court then found that Terry should receive credit in the amount of $1.06 million—the

difference in value between the two homes. Ben argues that the court gave no justification

for its unequal division and should have awarded Terry half of the difference between the

homes—$530,000—so that each party would have $1.87 million in home value.

It is unclear in the circuit court’s decree whether it intended to equally or unequally

divide the value of the parties’ homes. If the court intended to equally divide it, it failed to

do so. Under the circuit court’s analysis, Terry’s home value is now $2.4 million, and Ben’s

home value is $1.34 million. If the court intended to unequally divide the value of the

homes, it failed to provide any explanation for an unequal division. Therefore, we agree with

Ben that the circuit court clearly erred in dividing the value of the parties’ homes.

We do not hold that the circuit court must divide the value of the homes equally or

unequally, but if it chooses to divide it unequally, it is required to explain why an unequal

division is equitable and state its basis and reasons in the order. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-

315(a)(1)(B). Accordingly, we reverse and remand the issue of the division of the value of the

parties’ homes for the circuit court to either divide the marital property one-half to each

party or to make some other division that it deems equitable and provide written findings

that support the unequal division. See Branscum v. Branscum, 2022 Ark. App. 126, at 5–6,

642 S.W.3d 270, 274.

32
Petition for rehearing granted in part; affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in

part.

TUCKER and HIXSON, JJ., agree.

KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and WOOD, J., concur.

HARRISON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.

WENDY SCHOLTENS WOOD, Judge, concurring. Rehearing should not have been

granted in this case. First, Ben failed to preserve his challenge to the $13,907 attorney’s-fee

reimbursement. Although the majority states that Ben raised the issue of the reimbursement

at the circuit court level, he did not. Terry asked the circuit court to reimburse her for the

$13,907 check Ben wrote to his attorney from the parties’ joint account shortly after the

court awarded Ben $154,996.32 specifically for that purpose. In response, Ben stated that

he did not think the $154,996.32 was “specific for that cause.”

At the conclusion of trial and before the circuit court made findings on this issue or

any other, it requested proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Ben proposed no

findings at all regarding the $13,907, and Terry asked the court to credit her for this amount.

The court entered an order reimbursing Terry for the $13,907 attorney’s-fee payment. After

the initial order was entered, both parties filed motions for reconsideration. Ben’s posttrial

motion asked the circuit court to correct ten specific alleged errors in its order. Once again,

however, he failed to challenge or even mention the $13,907 credit. Thereafter, the circuit

court entered an amended and substituted decree addressing the issues raised by Ben and

33
Terry in their posttrial motions. The amended decree, like the initial decree, included the

$13,907 credit to Terry, as she had requested.

“[I]t is incumbent upon the parties to raise arguments initially to the circuit court and

to give that court an opportunity to consider them. . . . Otherwise, we would be placed in

the position of reversing a circuit court for reasons not addressed by that court.” Roberts v.

Roberts, 2009 Ark. 567, at 8, 349 S.W.3d 886, 891. Although I recognize that a party is not

generally required to raise issues in a posttrial motion in order to preserve them for appeal,

a party who files such a motion specifically challenging the circuit court’s order creates an

opportunity to bring all issues regarding the order to the attention of the circuit court.

Therefore, challenges to the order that could be and are not raised in that motion are not

preserved for appellate review. See, e.g., Hartman v. Hartman, 2024 Ark. App. 194, at 14, 17

(holding that issues raised by the appellant on appeal were not preserved when they could

have been but were not raised after a hearing in a divorce case where a variety of other issues

were raised and addressed in posttrial motions, a letter opinion, and proposed orders of

counsel); Dace v. Doss, 2017 Ark. App. 531, at 8, 530 S.W.3d at 898–99 (holding that Dace

failed to preserve his appellate argument because he failed to raise it in his posttrial motion);

Redwine v. Turner, 2011 Ark. App. 251, at 8–9, 378 S.W.3d 866, 871–72 (holding that this

court was precluded from reviewing an issue that Redwine did not object to at trial or raise

in her posttrial motion).

The majority distinguishes Hartman, stating that Ben raised the issue of

reimbursement to the circuit court, unlike the appellant, Jodie, in that case. That is flatly

34
wrong. Ben never raised this issue but merely responded to Terry’s request at trial that he

did not know the $154,996.32 award had been specifically for attorney’s fees. Then, like

Jodie in Hartman, Ben did not address this issue in his proposed findings of fact before the

court entered its initial order. Finally, after the initial order was entered reimbursing Terry

for this amount, Ben, like Jodie, again failed to object to the award. This is in spite of the

fact that Ben filed a posttrial motion for amendment challenging ten other alleged errors in

the court’s order. It is well settled that this court will not consider arguments raised for the

first time on appeal. Hartman, 2024 Ark. App. 194, at 17; Dace, 2017 Ark. App. 531, at 8,

530 S.W.3d at 899.

Ben failed to preserve a second argument for appeal. Although not addressed in the

majority opinion, Ben argued in his brief to this court that the circuit court should have

ordered the office building and data center sold as required by Arkansas Code Annotated

section 9-12-315(a)(3)(B) (Repl. 2020). This is contrary to his request in his proposed findings

of fact in which he asked the court to award the office building and data center to Terry and

award him one-half of their value, which is what the circuit court ultimately did. A party

cannot complain when he or she has received all the relief requested. Mikel v. Hubbard, 317

Ark. 125, 129, 876 S.W.2d 558, 560 (1994); Carton v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 315 Ark. 5, 17, 865

S.W.2d 635, 641 (1993) (holding that an appellant—who asked for the ruling at trial—will

not be heard to complain of the ruling in her favor).

Moreover, Ben did not raise this second argument at his first opportunity by

including it in the posttrial motion he elected to file challenging the findings in the circuit

35
court’s initial order. For the same reasons his argument about the $13,907 attorney’s-fee

credit is not preserved, his argument about selling the office building and data center is

likewise not preserved. For these reasons, I concur in the majority’s disposition of this case.

KLAPPENBACH, C.J., joins.

BRANDON J. HARRISON, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. wholly

join every part of the majority’s opinion except Part III.A.2.i; and in that part, I dissent only

from the majority’s statement that Ben “acquiesced to the court’s decision” to award Terry

$154,996.32. I respectfully disagree with the majority’s take on the significance of Ben’s

proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in this case’s context and course.

Taylor & Taylor Law Firm, P.A., by: Tory H. Lewis, Andrew M. Taylor, and Tasha C.

Taylor, for appellant.

Kamps & Griffis PLLC, by: Adrienne M. Griffis, for appellee.

36