Courtney Daniels v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2019 Ark. App. 507
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
Digitally signed by Elizabeth DIVISION I
Perry
No. CR-19-369
Date: 2022.08.05 10:46:34 -05'00'
Adobe Acrobat version:
2022.001.20169
Opinion Delivered: October 30, 2019

COURTNEY DANIELS APPEAL FROM THE CRAIGHEAD
APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
WESTERN DISTRICT
[NO. 16JCR-18-333]
V.
HONORABLE RANDY F.
PHILHOURS, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED

WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge

Appellant Courtney Daniels was found guilty by a Craighead County jury of one

count of breaking or entering and sentenced to serve a term of six years in the Arkansas

Department of Correction and ordered to pay a $5000 fine. On appeal, he contends that

the circuit court erred in denying his directed-verdict motion, arguing there was insufficient

evidence to sustain the conviction. We affirm appellant’s conviction without reaching the

merit of his sufficiency challenge due to his failure to preserve the argument for appellate

review.

As he was leaving for work in the early morning hours of January 5, 2018, Dan

Hancock saw a man “robbing” his neighbor’s vehicle. Hancock reached for the nine-

millimeter pistol that he kept in his truck but discovered that it was missing. The man,

whom Hancock described as wearing a dark hoodie and dark pants, took off running; at the
same time, a car that was parked directly behind his (Hancock’s) drove off. Hancock chased

the car, took down the license-plate number, and provided it to police.

Security-camera footage obtained by the Jonesboro Police Department from

Hancock’s neighbor showed appellant checking the door handles of several vehicles and

“rummaging through” another vehicle. The man in the footage was wearing clothing

similar to the clothing worn by the man Hancock described—he was wearing a dark hoodie

and dark pants. He was also wearing a knit hat displaying the word “DOPE” across the

front.

The Jonesboro Police Department tracked the license-plate number provided by

Hancock to a car owned by Chelsea Cannady. After obtaining a search warrant, police

searched the vehicle and found a marriage license with Cannady’s and appellant’s names on

it and a knit hat with the word “DOPE” on the front that matched the one seen in the

security-camera footage.

Appellant was charged with breaking or entering and theft of property. 1 The jury

found appellant guilty of breaking or entering; however, the jury was unable to reach a

verdict on theft of property, and a mistrial was granted as to that charge. Appellant was

sentenced to a term of six years’ incarceration and ordered to pay a $5000 fine. He now

appeals.

Appellant argues that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion for directed

verdict because “there was insufficient substantial proof to sustain a conviction” against him.

1
Appellant was initially charged with criminal mischief and an additional count of
breaking or entering; however, these charges were nolle prossed.

2
In order to preserve a sufficiency challenge on appeal, a timely, clear, and specific

motion for directed verdict must be made to the circuit court. 2 Our courts have explained

that the reason for the specificity requirement for a directed-verdict motion is that

when specific grounds are stated and the absent proof is pinpointed, the circuit court
can either grant the motion, or if justice requires, allow the State to reopen its case
and supply the missing proof. A further reason that the motion must be specific is
that this court may not decide an issue for the first time on appeal.[3]

At the close of the State’s case, appellant moved for a directed verdict stating,

Your Honor, I just want to make a Motion for Directed Verdict, and I’m going to
be referring to the information that is filed by Mr. DeProw. As to Count 1, breaking
or entering, as it says here said defendant in this case Mr. Daniels, did unlawfully and
feloniously about January 5 for the purposes of committing the theft of felony,
entered, or breaking into a vehicle. All right. So my basis for the motion on this
count would be that—while the Prosecution has entered evidence, which they
purport to show the presence of Mr. Daniels in the neighborhood, also evidence
from the police department, and from one of the victims, the presence of an
automobile belonging to Chelsea Cannady. There’s been no evidence regarding the
actual breaking or entering into the truck of Mr. Hancock by Courtney Daniels. In
regarding the committing of a felony or theft, I admit there is circumstantial. I am
making this based on direct evidence, so that is as to that count.

A person commits the offense of breaking or entering if for the purpose of

committing a theft or felony he or she breaks or enters into any building, structure, or

vehicle. 4 In his directed-verdict motion, appellant argued that there was “no evidence

regarding the actual breaking or entering into” Hancock’s truck by appellant. On appeal,

appellant now contends that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence of his “purpose”

to commit a theft. A party is bound by the nature and scope of the objections and arguments

2
Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(c).
3
Pinell v. State, 364 Ark. 353, 357, 219 S.W.3d 168, 171 (2005) (citations omitted).
4
See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-39-202(a)(1) (Repl. 2013).

3
made at trial and may not enlarge or change those grounds on appeal. 5 Here, at trial

appellant failed to move for a directed verdict on the “purpose” argument that he now

makes. Consequently, the issue is not preserved for our review.

Affirmed.

GLADWIN and MURPHY, JJ., agree.

Terry Goodwin Jones, for appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Joseph Karl Luebke, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

5
Merchant v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 576, 532 S.W.3d 136.

4