The City of Magnolia v. Dennis Milligan, in His Official Capacity as Treasurer of the State of Arkansas; Larry Atkinson, in His Official Capacity as County Judge for Columbia County; And Selena Blair, in Her Official Capacity as County Treasurer for Columbia County

Cite as 2019 Ark. App. 374
Digitally signed by Elizabeth ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
Perry
Date: 2022.07.25 11:19:20 DIVISION I
-05'00' No. CV-18-516
Adobe Acrobat version:
2022.001.20169
Opinion Delivered: September 11, 2019

THE CITY OF MAGNOLIA
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
THIRTEENTH DIVISION
V. [NO. 60CV-15-3961]

DENNIS MILLIGAN, IN HIS OFFICIAL HONORABLE W. MICHAEL REIF,
CAPACITY AS TREASURER OF THE JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS; LARRY
ATKINSON, IN HIS OFFICIAL AFFIRMED
CAPACITY AS COUNTY JUDGE FOR
COLUMBIA COUNTY; AND SELENA
BLAIR, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS COUNTY TREASURER FOR
COLUMBIA COUNTY

APPELLEES

WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge

In 1992, the City of Magnolia (“Magnolia” or “the City”) had to close its landfill

after the Environmental Protection Agency found chemicals and other contaminants in the

groundwater of the surrounding land. The Magnolia landfill was Columbia County’s largest

in the area, receiving most of the trash collected from the other cities in Columbia County

as well as from the county itself. With the landfill closing, Magnolia, the county, and the

other municipalities urgently needed to find a new way to dispose of their trash.
To solve the problem, the General Assembly amended the tax code to allow local

governments to levy sales and use taxes to finance the operation, maintenance, or rental

expense of a solid waste management system. 1 The county followed with an ordinance that

levied a one percent sales tax throughout the county and called a special election for approval

of the tax. Additionally, the county and the cities entered into a cooperative agreement to

establish a county-wide solid waste management system that would be administered by the

county quorum court and financed through the 1 percent tax.

The voters of Columbia County approved the tax on April 21, 1992. Appellee

Dennis Milligan (“Milligan” or “the Treasurer”) thereafter remitted the proceeds of the tax

directly to the county.

The unified solid waste management system worked well until 2015, when Magnolia

filed a petition for a declaratory judgment against Milligan, county judge Larry Atkinson,

and county treasurer Selena Blair. 2 Magnolia argued that it was entitled to its per capita share

of the revenue from the sales and use tax. According to the City, the cooperative agreement,

in which the county and each of the cities pledged their share of the tax revenue to the solid

waste management system, was repealed by an ordinance that the county quorum court

enacted in 1998. Magnolia argued that in the absence of a cooperative agreement or other

voter-approved means of directing all the tax proceeds to the county, Arkansas law required

the Treasurer to remit Magnolia’s per capita share of the proceeds from the sales and use tax

1
See Act of March 11, 1992, No. 40, § 1, 1992 Ark. Acts 4456, 4457; Ark. Code
Ann. § 26-73-113(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 2017).
2
We will hereafter refer to Atkinson and Blair as “the County Appellees.”

2
directly to the City. The circuit court disagreed and granted summary judgment in favor of

Milligan and the County Appellees. We affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

On March 16, 1992, shortly after the General Assembly amended section 26-73-113

to allow the proceeds of local sales and use taxes to be used to finance the operation,

maintenance or rental expense of a solid waste management system, 3 the Columbia County

Quorum Court passed Ordinance 92-2 to levy a sales and use tax for that purpose. The

ordinance explained the need for the tax, stating that “the Magnolia Municipal Landfill into

which Columbia County deposits solid waste from the residents of Columbia County is

currently at capacity and will, in the immediate future, be closed down by governmental

entities[.]” Consequently, “Columbia County and the municipalities will need a means of

collecting, disposing of, and hauling solid waste from Columbia County to other

locations[.]” The ordinance also provided that the county would be responsible for the new

solid waste collection system, declaring that “it [was] the desire of Columbia County to

provide weekly door to door pickup for all residents of Columbia County and for residents

of each municipality in the County and to provide for the disposal of such solid waste in an

environmentally safe and acceptable manner[.]”

Noting also that Columbia County “wish[ed] to finance . . . a solid waste

management system to deal with all aspects of solid waste within the county and

municipalities[,]” the ordinance levied “a sales and use tax . . . at a rate of one percent (1%)”

on goods sold within the county. The ordinance further provided that the county “wish[ed]

3
Ark. Code Ann. § 26-73-113(a)(2)(A)(i)–(iii) (Supp. 2017).

3
to dedicate all proceeds of the sales and use tax” and “use such proceeds for the purpose of

developing within Columbia County a Solid Waste Management System.” Among other

duties, the new solid waste management system would “administer[] the proceeds from the

sales and use tax[.]” The ordinance also made it clear that the proceeds of the tax would be

used only for solid waste management, providing “[t]hat all revenues derived by the County

or the municipalities from the proceeds of such tax are designated for use in solid waste

management and for no other reason or purpose.”

Ordinance 92-2 also called a special election to approve the tax and provided that

the official ballot would read as follows:

FOR ADOPTION OF A ONE PERCENT (1%) SALES AND USE TAX WITHIN COLUMBIA
COUNTY, ARKANSAS, TO BE USED SOLELY FOR SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT.

AGAINST ADOPTION OF A ONE PERCENT (1%) SALES AND USE TAX WITHIN
COLUMBIA COUNTY, ARKANSAS, TO BE USED SOLELY FOR SOLID WASTE
MANAGEMENT.

Finally, Ordinance 92-2 declared that cities and counties would enter into a cooperative

agreement, called an interlocal agreement, regarding the solid waste management system. In

particular, section 5 of the ordinance provided as follows:

Each governmental unit within the County which is entitled to receive a
proportionate share of the revenues derived from the sales and use tax shall authorize,
by appropriate action of its governing body, the approval of and the entering into of
an interlocal agreement with and among the other units for the purpose of assigning
all revenues from the sales and use tax, to which each governmental unit may be
entitled, to the authority for the use by the authority of solid waste collection,
disposal, recycling, and compost facilities. Provided, further, that all such
governmental units shall execute and deliver such interlocal agreements prior to the
date of the special election[.]

4
The county judge and the mayors of each city—including Magnolia—signed the

interlocal agreement on March 23, 1992. The agreement declared that all the parties

determined that the sales and use tax, which was “pledged for solid waste management

purposes and no other,” was “the best means of financing a solid waste management system

for all persons residing within Columbia County[.]” It further declared that the parties

determined that all proceeds of the sales and use tax, which may otherwise be
receivable by them for revenue purposes, should be pledged to the County for use
by the County in the development of a solid waste management system[.]

The agreement also made it clear that the parties intended that the county would be

responsible for administering the solid waste management program and tax proceeds, stating

as follows:

[T]he County Court of Columbia County has undertaken responsibility to form and
administer a solid waste management system on behalf of all of the citizens of
Columbia County and to disburse funds derived from the sales and use tax solely for
the purpose of solid waste management.

They agreed, therefore, that the solid waste management would be financed from the

proceeds of the sales and use tax and that each party “consent[ed] to the pledge of any

proportionate shares of their proceeds which they may be entitled to otherwise receive and

the payment of all proceeds of such tax into the solid waste management system to be

administered by the County Court of Columbia County, Arkansas.” The voters

subsequently approved the sales and use tax on April 21, 1992, and the Treasurer thereafter

remitted the proceeds of the tax directly to Columbia County.

On September 4, 1998, the quorum court in Columbia County enacted Ordinance

98.9 to amend the purpose and use of the sales and use tax. The ordinance provided that 25

percent of the total net collections would be used to retire bonds that Columbia County

5
issued to finance a new county jail. Ordinance 98.9 also called a special election on the

question of the changed use and purpose.

The voters in Columbia County approved the proposed 25 percent diversion on

October 8, 1998, whereupon the quorum court enacted Ordinance 98.15. The new

ordinance amended Ordinance 92-2, which originally levied the sales and use tax, to

authorize the pledge of 25 percent of the net proceeds of the tax to retire the bonds for the

new jail. Ordinance 98.15 also repealed section 5 of Ordinance 92-2, which required the

cities and the county to execute the interlocal agreement pledging their shares of the tax

proceeds to the new solid waste management system. According to Ordinance 98.15, “all

Net Collections are paid directly to the County under the Authorizing Legislation and are

not divided among the County and any municipalities therein”; therefore, “Section 5 of

Ordinance No. 92-2 is hereby repealed and deleted.”

Several years later, on June 23, 2015, Parnell Vann, the mayor of Magnolia, wrote a

letter to Milligan “to request that [his] office remit to the City of Magnolia its per capita

share of the proceeds of Columbia County’s one percent (1%) sales and use tax levied under

Ark. Code Ann. § 26-73-113 for solid waste management.” The mayor claimed that

“Magnolia’s portion of the tax was paid to Columbia County pursuant to a Solid Waste

Management System Interlocal Agreement,” which “pledged each city’s portion of the tax

to solid waste management and authorized the county to act as the agent for all the cities in

developing and administering a solid waste management system.”

Mayor Vann told the Treasurer that “Columbia County [recently] repudiated the

interlocal agreement and [has] taken the position that it was repealed in 1998 by Ordinance

6
98.15.” The mayor also pointed out that “the 1992 and 1998 ballots were silent as to any

method of distribution of the tax.” Therefore, according to the mayor, Magnolia should

start receiving its share of the tax proceeds under Ark. Code Ann. § 26-74-214(b)(2)(B)(i)

(Supp. 2017), providing that

[i]f the ballot is silent on the method of distribution [of the proceeds of the sales and
use tax], it shall be per capita among the county and each municipality located within
the county unless an interlocal agreement is executed between the affected county
and its municipalities indicating a different distribution.

Consequently, Mayor Vann requested that the Treasurer “stop remitting the City of

Magnolia’s share of this tax to Columbia County and instead remit the same directly to the

City of Magnolia[.]”

Mayor Vann also explained how Magnolia would use its per capita share once it

received it from the Treasurer. According to the mayor,

[u]pon receipt of its share of the tax, it is the City’s intent to assume responsibility
for solid waste management within the City and to use the City’s portion of this tax
only for that purpose. This tax was approved by voters only for use in solid waste
management, and that is the only purpose for which the City of Magnolia will use
its per capita share of those funds.

The Treasurer disagreed that he was required to follow section 26-74-214(b)(2)(B)(i)

and denied Mayor Vann’s request. The Treasurer maintained that he must continue

remitting the tax only to Columbia County, which was the governmental entity that actually

levied the tax. Specifically, the Treasurer explained that “the Tax in question was levied

pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 26-73-113, which incorporates the sales and use tax

provisions of the Local Government Bond Act of 1985[.]” The Treasurer asserted that the

Local Government Bond Act (LGBA) did not further incorporate the per capita remittance

procedure in section 26-74-214(b)(2), as Mayor Vann suggested. Rather, the LGBA has its

7
own remittance procedure, providing that “[s]ales and use taxes levied by counties under

Ark. Code Ann. § 26-73-113 are distributed only to the levying county and not to the

municipalities located therein.” Consequently, the Treasurer explained that he had “no

authority to distribute the tax proceeds in a manner inconsistent with Ark. Code Ann. §

26-73-113” and its incorporated procedures from the LGBA.

Magnolia thereafter filed a petition for a judgment declaring that the City was entitled

to “its per capita share of the tax levied by Columbia County Ordinance 92-2 pursuant to

Ark. Code Ann. § 26-73-113,” as well as “its per capita share of the surplus proceeds of the

tax accumulated since Columbia County’s repudiation of the Solid Waste Management

System Interlocal Agreement[.]” As Mayor Vann asserted in his letter, the City alleged that

section 26-74-214(b)(2)(B)(i) required remittance of Magnolia’s per capita share directly to

the City because two conditions warranting per capita distribution under the statute—the

silence of the 1992 and 1998 ballots as to distribution of the tax and the alleged repeal of

the interlocal agreement—had occurred.

The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The circuit

court denied Magnolia’s motion and granted summary judgment in favor of the Treasurer

and the County Appellees. The circuit court observed that the LGBA requires the Treasurer

to remit the tax proceeds only to the municipality or the county that levied the tax, here

Columbia County, and “[t]he remittance language of Arkansas Code Annotated § 26-74-

214 is simply not incorporated into the LGBA” or, by extension, into section 26-73-113.

The circuit court also suggested that the alleged repeal of the interlocal agreement

was of no consequence because it was unnecessary in the first place. The Treasurer was

8
always required to remit the tax to the county, with or without a local agreement, under

section 26-73-113 and the LGBA. Finally, the circuit court ruled that paying Magnolia its

per capita share would violate the illegal exaction clause. The City now appeals the circuit

court’s order.

II. Issues on Appeal

The City argues that the circuit court erred when it ruled that the Treasurer was not

required to follow the per capita remittance procedure in section 26-74-214(b)(2).

According to the City, the provisions of the LGBA, which are expressly incorporated into

section 26-73-113, direct the Treasurer to follow section 26-74-214(b)(2)(B)(i), and the

only conditions that would warrant remitting the money directly to Columbia County—a

ballot or interlocal agreement specifying that method of distribution—now do not exist.

The Treasurer and the County Appellees respond that the alleged repeal of the

interlocal agreement is immaterial for two reasons. First, because the Treasurer was always

bound to follow the remittance provision in the LGBA, section 14-164-336, that requires

payment of the tax only to the governmental unit that levied it in the first place—here

Columbia County—it simply was not necessary for Magnolia and the other municipalities

to pledge their share of the tax proceeds in the interlocal agreement. Secondly, the LGBA

plainly does not direct the Treasurer to the remittance procedures in section 26-74-

214(b)(2).

The Treasurer and the County Appellees additionally argue that diversion of any part

of the sales tax to Magnolia would constitute an illegal exaction that is prohibited by article

16, section 11 of the Arkansas Constitution. According to the appellees, the voters of

9
Columbia County authorized only “a single, county-wide tax, to be used for a unified,

county-wide solid waste management system,” and per capita distribution of the tax to

Magnolia for the mayor’s stated purpose of operating a separate solid waste system would

violate the illegal-exaction clause.

III. Standard of Review

A circuit court may grant summary judgment only when it is apparent that no

genuine issues of material fact exist requiring litigation and that the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. 4 Once the moving party has established a prima facie

entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing party must meet proof with proof and

demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact. 5

“Ordinarily, on appeal from a summary-judgment disposition, the evidence is

viewed in the light most favorable to the party resisting the motion.” 6 “[I]n a case where

the parties agree on the facts,” however, this court “simply determine[s] whether the

appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 7 Indeed, “[w]hen parties file cross-

motions for summary judgment . . . they essentially agree that there are no material facts

4
Blevins v. Hudson, 2016 Ark. 150, at 3, 489 S.W.3d 165, 167.
5
Id.
6
Abraham v. Beck, 2015 Ark. 80, at 8, 456 S.W.3d 744, 751.
7
Id. at 8, 456 S.W.3d at 751–52.

10
remaining, and summary judgment is an appropriate means of resolving the case.” 8 “As to

issues of law presented, [this court’s] review is de novo.” 9

IV. Discussion

As we indicate above, Magnolia’s case turns on whether the statute that authorized

the sales and use tax, section 26-73-113, incorporates the per capita remittance procedure

in section 26-74-214(b)(2). As straightforward as that question may seem, its answer depends

on an examination of a series of statutes in Arkansas’s tax code. Accordingly, we set forth

the relevant statutes before discussing the merits of Magnolia’s argument.

We start with the LGBA, which is now codified at Arkansas Code Annotated sections

14-164-301 to –340. In 1985, the General Assembly enacted the LGBA in response to the

voters’ approval of Amendment 62, which granted “county and municipal governments

expanded powers and authority with respect to the creation of bonded indebtedness for

capital improvements of a public nature[.]” 10 Among other things, the LGBA authorized

counties and municipalities to use more than real and personal property taxes to retire bonds

for capital improvements, providing that sales and use taxes may also be used for that

purpose:

In lieu of or in addition to the levying of an ad valorem tax to retire bonds for capital
improvement purposes . . . the legislative body of a municipality or county may
adopt an ordinance levying a local sales and use tax in the amount of one-eighth of
one percent (0.125%), one-fourth of one percent (.25%), one-half of one percent

8
Id. at 8, 456 S.W.3d at 752.
9
Id.
10
Ark. Code Ann. § 14-164-302 (Supp. 2017).

11
(0.5%), three-fourths of one percent (.75%), one percent (1%), or any combination
of these amounts to retire the bonds[.]” 11

The LGBA also set forth procedures for the administration, collection, and

remittance of the sales and use taxes. Regarding the collection of the tax, the Act provided

that the director of the Department of Finance and Administration would follow the same

procedures used for the collection of other taxes, including county sales taxes pursuant to

Arkansas Code Annotated sections 26-74-201 to –219 (Repl. 2008). 12

Regarding the remittance of collected taxes, the LGBA created a trust fund that “shall

be known as the Local Sales and Use Tax Trust Fund.” 13 The trust fund “shall be held apart

from the State Treasury by the Treasurer of State” and “shall be administered by the

Treasurer of State as provided in this section, in addition to the other duties of the Treasurer

of State prescribed by law.” 14 Specifically, the LGBA requires the state treasurer to deposit

the tax money “as cash funds into the Local Sales and Use Tax Trust Fund” and to

transmit monthly to the treasurer of the municipality or county, as the case may be, or
in the alternative, to a bank or other depository designated by the municipality or
county, the moneys of the municipality or county held in the Local Sales and Use Tax
Trust Fund established by his subchapter, subject to the charges payable and retainage
authorized by §§ 26-74-201–26-74-219[.][15]

11
Ark. Code Ann. § 14-164-327(a) .
12
See Ark. Code Ann. § 14-164-333(a)(1)–(2).
13
Ark. Code Ann. § 14-164-336(a).
14
Id.
15
Ark. Code Ann. § 14-164-336(b)–(c).

12
In 1991, the General Assembly determined that counties and municipalities lacked

sufficient financial resources to “maintain and finance capital improvements of a public

nature and to provide services to their inhabitants[.]”16 Consequently, the legislature enacted

Act 777 of 1991 to enable local governments to use some of its taxing authority to levy

taxes for other purposes in addition to retiring bonds, as originally authorized under the

LGBA.

Codified at Arkansas Code Annotated section 26-73-113, the new law provided that

any municipality or county may levy a sales and use tax of up to one percent “[i]n lieu of

any other municipal or county sales and use tax,” in order to “finance the operation or

maintenance of capital improvements” as well as to “secure the repayment of bonds.” 17

Additionally, as we indicate above, the law was further amended in 1992 to authorize

counties and municipalities to use sales and use taxes—as Columbia County did here—to

finance the operation, maintenance, or rental expense of a solid waste management system. 18

Significantly for our purposes here, Arkansas Code Annotated section 26-73-113

does not provide any procedure for the collection and remittance of the special-purpose

sales and use tax(es) that it authorizes. Rather, it incorporates the procedures set forth in the

LGBA, providing as follows:

To the extent permitted by this section, a governing body levying a tax under
this section shall follow the procedures prescribed by the Local Government Bond
Act of 1985, § 14-164-301et seq., and the new tax shall be collected, reported, and

16
Act of March 26, 1991, No. 777, § 6, 1991 Ark. Acts 2369, 2370.
17
Ark. Code Ann. § 26-73-113(a)(1)–(2) (Supp. 1991).
18
Ark. Code Ann. § 26-73-113(a)(2)(A).

13
remitted in the same manner and at the same time as a tax levied under the Local
Government Bond Act of 1985, § 14-164-301 et seq.[19]

In the instant case, the parties disagree over the scope of the procedures that are

incorporated through section 26-73-113(b). Magnolia argues that section 14-164-333(a)

directs the Treasurer to the procedures outlined in section 26-74-214, including the per

capita remittance procedure in section 26-74-214(b), which, in relevant part, provides as

follows:

(2)(A)(i) [t]he Treasurer of State shall monthly transmit to the county treasurer
and to the city treasurer of each municipality located in a county levying the tax
authorized in this subchapter and all other subchapters authorizing county sales and
use taxes their per capita share, if any, of the moneys received by the Treasurer of
State from all of the sales taxes levied by the county and credited to the account of
the county in the Local Sales and Use Tax Trust Fund.

....

(B)(i) If the ballot is silent on the method of distribution, it shall be per capita
among the county and each municipality located within the county unless an
interlocal agreement is executed between the affected county and its municipalities
indicating a different distribution.

Magnolia argues, moreover, that it should be receiving its per capita share under these

provisions principally because the interlocal agreement, which it claims once directed

Magnolia’s share to the county, no longer exists.

In response, Milligan and the County Appellees argue that the circuit court did not

err by disregarding section 14-164-333, and its alleged redirection to the per capita

remittance provisions in section 26-74-214, because section 14-164-333 “only refers to the

19
Ark. Code Ann. § 26-73-113(b).

14
[c]ollection functions of the [Department of Finance and Administration]” and “makes no

reference to the [r]emittance function of the State Treasurer” or any “reference to the State

Treasurer at all.” The appellees further assert that the Treasurer’s remittance function is

addressed only in section 14-164-336, which requires the Treasurer to distribute the tax

money solely to the local government that levied the tax. Any reference to section 26-74-

214, they say, is only with respect to the Treasurer’s duty to withhold “charges payable and

retainage” from the remitted funds, as described in Arkansas Code Annotated section 26-

74-214(a)(2). The appellees are correct.

This court reviews issues of statutory construction de novo. 20 Additionally, “the first

rule in considering the meaning and effect of a statute is to construe it just as it reads, giving

the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language.” 21 “When the

language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to rules of

statutory construction.” 22 “A statute is ambiguous only where it is open to two or more

constructions, or where it is of such obscure of doubtful meaning that reasonable minds

might disagree or be uncertain as to its meaning.” 23 “When a statute is clear, however, it is

given its plain meaning, and this court will not search for legislative intent; rather that intent

must be gathered from the plain meaning of the language used.” 24 Indeed, “[t]his court is

20
E.g., City of Fort Smith v. Carter, 364 Ark. 100, 108, 216 S.W.3d 594, 599 (2005).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.

15
very hesitant to interpret a legislative act in a manner contrary to its express language, unless

it is clear that a drafting error or omission has circumvented the legislative intent.” 25

Magnolia’s argument is not supported by the plain language of the relevant statutes.

Section 14-164-333, which according to the City, directs the Treasurer to follow section

26-74-214(b)(2)’s per capita remittance procedure, does not apply to the Treasurer at all;

saying only that “the Director of the Department of Finance and Administration shall perform all

functions incidental to the administration, collection, enforcement, and operation of the tax

as provided in sections 26-74-201–26-74-219, [and] 26-74-221[.]” 26 Rather, the state

treasurer’s remittance of the tax is addressed in section 14-164-336, which provides that

[t]he Treasurer of State shall transmit monthly to the treasurer of the municipality or
county, as the case may be, or in the alternative, to a bank or other depository
designated by the municipality or county, the moneys of the municipality or county
held in the Local Sales and Use Tax Trust Fund established by this subchapter, subject
to the charges payable and retainage authorized by §§ 26-74-201–26-74-219[.][27]

The appellees are also quite correct that section 14-164-336(c)’s reference to the county tax

code does not include the per capita remittance procedure in section 26-74-214(b)(2). The

plain language of section 14-164-336(c) is directed only to those provisions, such as section

26-74-214(a)(2), that authorize the Treasurer to withhold “charges payable and retainage”

from the remitted funds. Accordingly, the statutes do not support Magnolia’s argument that

since the alleged repeal of the interlocal agreement, section 26-73-113, the LGBA, and

25
Id.
26
Ark Code Ann. § 14-164-333(a)(2) (emphasis added).
27
Ark. Code Ann. § 14-164-336(c).

16
section 26-74-214(b)(2)(B)(i) combine to require the Treasurer to remit the solid-waste tax

to the county and municipalities on a per capita basis. 28

Because we hold that Magnolia is not entitled to a per capita share under the

controlling statutes, we need not reach the question of whether payment of Magnolia’s per

capita share would constitute an illegal exaction. 29 The circuit court’s order, therefore, is

affirmed.

V. Conclusion

Magnolia’s argument for the application of the per capita remittance procedure in

section 26-74-214(b)(2) is not supported by the plain language of section 26-73-113 or the

provisions of the LGBA that are incorporated therein. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit

court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Milligan and the County Appellees.

Affirmed.

GLADWIN AND VAUGHT, JJ., agree.

28
Indeed, the execution of the interlocal agreement—and its alleged repeal—is of no
consequence in this case. Magnolia’s argument apparently assumes that the Treasurer
remitted all the tax proceeds to Columbia County prior to 1998 only as a result of the
interlocal agreement. On the contrary, the Treasurer was always required to remit the tax
proceeds directly to Columbia County in accordance with section 26-73-113 and section
14-164-336(c). As officials in Columbia County apparently realized in 1998, it simply was
not necessary for Magnolia and the other municipalities to pledge their share of the proceeds,
as they purported to do in the interlocal agreement.
29
We reject, however, Magnolia’s suggestion that continued payment of the tax to
the county after the alleged repeal of the interlocal agreement is itself an illegal exaction.
Magnolia’s argument is misplaced because it conflates the repeal of section 5 of Ordinance
92-2, requiring the execution of an interlocal agreement, with a repudiation of the
agreement itself. There is no indication that Columbia County has abandoned the
responsibility it assumed in the interlocal agreement to “administer a solid waste
management system on behalf of all of the citizens of Columbia County[.]”

17
Bell & Boyd, PLLC, by: Michael W. Boyd and Karen Talbot Gean, for appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Patricia Ann Ausdell, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee

Dennis Milligan.

Rose Law Firm, by: James M. Fowler, Jr., and Stephen N. Joiner, for appellees Larry

Atkinson and Selena Blair.

18