Joey M. Parker v. Jennifer Parker

Rel: June 12, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026
_________________________

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_________________________

Joey M. Parker

v.

Jennifer Parker

Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court
(DR-22-900158)

BOWDEN, Judge.

Joey M. Parker ("the husband") appeals from a judgment entered

by the Baldwin Circuit Court ("the circuit court") that divorced him and

Jennifer Parker ("the wife"), in part, on the grounds of cruelty and

domestic violence and that awarded alimony to the wife, awarded sole
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legal custody and sole physical custody of the parties' minor children to

the husband -- but did not require the wife to pay child support -- and

divided the parties' marital property. We reverse the judgment to the

extent that it awarded alimony because the judgment does not contain

the express findings of fact required by Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2-57.

Because we reverse the alimony award, we also reverse the judgment to

the extent that it divides the parties' marital property because those two

issues are interrelated. We affirm the judgment insofar as it divorced the

parties on fault grounds and did not require the wife to pay child support

or otherwise be financially responsible for the expenses of the parties'

minor children.

Procedural History

On February 4, 2022, the husband filed a complaint for a divorce

from the wife in the circuit court on the bases of incompatibility of

temperament and abuse. On that same date, the husband also filed a

motion for custody of the parties' two minor children and possession of

the martial home. The wife filed an answer to the husband's complaint

and a counterclaim for a divorce on February 7, 2022. In her

counterclaim, the wife alleged that the parties suffered from

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incompatibility of temperament and that the husband had subjected her

to cruelty and acts of domestic violence. On that same date, the wife also

filed a motion for the exclusive possession of the parties' marital home.

On February 16, 2022, the wife filed a motion for pendente lite

spousal support. On October 4, 2022, the circuit court entered an order

reflecting an agreement that the parties had reached. The order stated

that the parties would share joint custody of their minor children;

awarded the husband exclusive possession of the marital home and a

separate condominium; ordered the husband to continue to pay for

marital expenses and for the wife's rent, cell-phone bill, automobile-

insurance premium, and health-insurance premium; ordered the

husband to pay the wife $4,000 per month effective October 1, 2022, until

trial; and ordered the parties to submit to a custodial evaluation with a

counselor.

On October 17, 2023, the wife filed a motion to enforce a settlement

agreement that she averred the parties had reached in September 2023.

She averred that the settlement agreement provided that the parties

would share joint legal custody and joint physical custody of their minor

children. The wife stated that the parties appeared on September 7, 2023,

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for their scheduled depositions and entered the settlement agreement

into the record; however, neither party had signed a copy of the

agreement. The wife stated that counsel for the husband had sent an

email to counsel for the wife that stated that the husband did not intend

to honor the settlement agreement. The wife requested that the

settlement agreement be enforced and incorporated into the final divorce

judgment. The circuit court granted the wife's motion on November 15,

2023, following a hearing.

On November 22, 2023, the husband filed a motion to suspend the

wife's parenting time because of her alleged alcohol abuse, pending the

entry of an order directing that she submit to drug and alcohol testing

and setting forth other protective measures for the minor children. The

motion included an affidavit prepared by Dr. Amy Hollimon Phillippi, a

psychologist, who stated that the husband was concerned about a recent

incident between the wife and one of the children and recommended that

the wife seek inpatient addiction treatment and psychiatric care. On

November 27, 2023, the husband filed a motion to appoint a guardian ad

litem for the parties' minor children. The circuit court appointed a

guardian ad litem on November 28, 2023.

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On December 7, 2023, the wife filed a motion to require the husband

to pay for her inpatient treatment. The husband filed a response to the

wife's motion on December 8, 2023, in which he argued that the wife's

chosen treatment facility was "opulent" and that she could seek care at

another facility that would be covered by her health insurance. The

husband also requested that the circuit court set aside the order

awarding the parties joint custody and that the circuit court award him

sole legal custody and sole physical custody of the parties' minor children.

On December 18, 2023, the circuit court granted the husband's motion to

suspend the wife's parenting time following a hearing on the same date.

On February 7, 2024, the circuit court entered a temporary order

continuing the suspension of the wife's parenting time because the wife

was in a rehabilitation facility. The circuit court ordered Dr. Phillippi,

Jennifer Starling, who is another counselor, and the guardian ad litem to

coordinate on a graduated parenting plan for the wife following

treatment.

On February 22, 2024, the husband filed a motion to modify the

pendente lite order requiring him to pay the wife $4,000 per month as

well as pay for her rent. On the same date, the husband filed an

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amendment to his motion, but his request remained the same -- that the

circuit court hold a hearing to recalculate the amount of support and

maintenance to be paid to the wife.

On November 20, 2024, the husband filed a motion to suspend the

wife's visitation with the parties' minor children, alleging that the wife

had relapsed since completing her addiction-treatment program. The

husband alleged that it was not in the best interest of the minor children

to be around the wife. On December 26, 2024, the circuit court entered

an order that left the pendente lite suspension of the wife's parenting

time in place. The circuit court stated again that the counselors involved

and the guardian ad litem should coordinate on a graduated parenting

plan for the wife to eventually return to an unsupervised parenting

schedule.

On May 6, 2025, following a trial held on February 5, 2025,

February 6, 2025, and April 2, 2025, the circuit court entered the divorce

judgment, which stated, in pertinent part:

"It is ORDERED:

"1. That the bonds of matrimony previously existing
between [the husband] and [the wife] are dissolved and they
are forever divorced from each other on the grounds of

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incompatibility of temperament, irreconcilable differences,
cruelty, and domestic violence.

"....

"4. That pursuant to an agreement which was read and
acknowledged in open court by the Parties, the Husband shall
be awarded sole legal custody and primary physical custody
of the minor children ....

"....

"6. That the Wife shall not be required to pay child
support at this point in time due to her present inability to
produce income which would be over and above the amounts
required to meet the expectations of the parenting plan and
mental health rehabilitation testified by Dr. Phillippi.

This wavier of child support is a deviation from Rule 32 of the
Alabama Rules of Judicial Administration.

"....

"9. That the Husband shall be responsible for all
expenses of the minor children.

"10. That the Husband shall pay the Wife, permanent
periodic alimony, in the amount of Six Thousand and 00/100
Dollars ($6,000.00) per month. The Husband’s alimony
obligation shall begin May 1, 2025. This award is not
rehabilitative alimony.

"11. That the Husband shall be awarded possession,
right, title and interest to [the marital home]. That the Wife
shall be awarded possession right, title and interest to the real
property located at ... (hereinafter referred to as the 'River
House'). The Husband shall make the River House available

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for the Wife within sixty (60) days from the date of the entry
of this Final Judgment of Divorce.

"12. That the Court finds the real property located at ...
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Cotton Bayou Property') was
separate property owned by the Husband, and therefore the
Husband shall be awarded all possession, right, title and
interest to the Cotton Bayou Property.

"13. That the Wife shall be awarded one-half (1/2) of the
value of the Husband’s interest in (i) the real property located
at ... (hereinafter referred to as the 'Lulu’s Lot') in the name
of Splitting Queens, LLC and (ii) the real property located at
... (hereinafter referred to as the 'Gulf Front Lot') in the name
of JPEM, LLC. The Husband shall pay the Wife her portion of
the interest within forty-five (45) days of the date of the entry
of this Final Judgment of Divorce.

"....

"16. That the Husband shall be responsible for the costs
of all the Wife's debts and credit cards existing up to the date
of trial.

"17. That the Irrevocable Trust created ... by the
Husband with the sale of the Cotton Bayou Property shall be
used solely for the benefit of the minor children, and no other
purpose.

"....

"19. That the Parties shall equally divide all of their
retirement accounts. The Court reserves jurisdiction to issue
a Qualified Domestic Relations Order ('QDRO') in order to
divide the Parties' retirement consistent with the provisions
herein.

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"20. That the Husband shall pay the Wife's attorney's
fees in the amount of Twenty Thousand and 00/100 Dollars
($20,000.00). This payment may include any amounts charged
on the Wife's credit cards."

(Capitalization in original.)

On June 3, 2025, the husband filed a postjudgment motion to alter,

amend, or vacate the divorce judgment pursuant to Ala. R. Civ. P. 59.

The wife filed a response to the husband's postjudgment motion and a

motion for an interim award of attorney's fees on July 18, 2025. On

August 5, 2025, following a hearing on July 22, 2025, the circuit court

denied the husband's postjudgment motion and the wife's motion for

attorney's fees. The husband timely appealed.

Standard of Review

"When this court reviews a divorce judgment entered
after the presentation of ore tenus evidence, we will presume
that the trial court's findings on disputed facts are correct,
and we will not reverse its judgment based on those findings
unless the judgment is palpably erroneous or manifestly
unjust. Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 386 So. 3d 42, 51 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2023). The presumption of correctness of factual findings
under the ore tenus rule 'is based on the trial court's unique
position to observe the witnesses and to assess their demeanor
and credibility.' Glazner v. Glazner, 807 So. 2d 555, 559 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2001)."

Perry v. Perry, [Ms. CL-2025-0409, Jan. 16, 2026] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala.

Civ. App. 2026). Additionally,

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" ' "[m]atters of property division rest soundly
within the trial court's discretion and its
determination regarding those matters will not be
disturbed on appeal unless its discretion was
plainly and palpably abused. Goodwin v. Estate of
Goodwin, 632 So. 2d 500 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993). A
division of marital property in a divorce case does
not have to be equal, only equitable, and a
determination of what is equitable rests within the
sound discretion of the trial court. Pride v. Pride,
631 So. 2d 247 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993). When
dividing marital property, a trial court should
consider several factors, including the length of
the marriage; the age and health of the parties; the
future prospects of the parties; the source, type,
and value of the property; the standard of living to
which the parties have become accustomed during
the marriage; and the fault of the parties
contributing to the breakup of the marriage.
Hartzell [v. Hartzell, 623 So. 2d 323 (Ala. Civ. App.
1993)]." '

"Yokley v. Yokley, 231 So. 3d 355, 360 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017)
(quoting Golden v. Golden, 681 So. 2d 605, 608 (Ala. Civ. App.
1996))."

Morgan v. Morgan, 322 So. 3d 531, 538 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020).

Analysis

I. Whether the circuit court erred in awarding periodic alimony
to the wife without making the statutorily required findings

The husband argues, among other things, that the circuit court did

not make the express findings required by Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2-57, in

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the provision of the divorce judgment that awarded the wife periodic

alimony. Section 30-2-57 provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) Upon granting a divorce or legal separation, the
court shall award either rehabilitative or periodic alimony as
provided in subsection (b), if the court expressly finds all of
the following:

"(1) A party lacks a separate estate or his or
her separate estate is insufficient to enable the
party to acquire the ability to preserve, to the
extent possible, the economic status quo of the
parties as it existed during the marriage.

"(2) The other party has the ability to supply
those means without undue economic hardship.

"(3) The circumstances of the case make it
equitable.

"(b) If a party has met the requirements of subsection
(a), the court shall award alimony in the following priority:

"(1) Unless the court expressly finds that
rehabilitative alimony is not feasible, the court
shall award rehabilitative alimony to the party for
a limited duration, not to exceed five years, absent
extraordinary circumstances, of an amount to
enable the party to acquire the ability to preserve,
to the extent possible, the economic status quo of
the parties as it existed during the marriage.

"(2) In cases in which the court expressly
finds that rehabilitation is not feasible, a good-
faith attempt at rehabilitation fails, or good-faith
rehabilitation only enables the party to partially
acquire the ability to preserve, to the extent

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possible, the economic status quo of the parties as
it existed during the marriage, the court shall
award the party periodic installments of alimony
for a duration and an amount to allow the party to
preserve, to the extent possible, the economic
status quo of the parties as it existed during the
marriage as provided in subsection (g)."

This court has consistently held that "[t]he legislature has clearly

required that an alimony award be either rehabilitative alimony or

periodic alimony and that, to award either type of alimony, the trial court

must make certain express findings after considering the various factors

described in § 30-2-57 ...." Merrick v. Merrick, 352 So. 3d 770, 775 (Ala.

Civ. App. 2021). That requirement includes making express findings as

to the elements set forth in § 30-2-57(a) "and, if a periodic-alimony award

is to be made, a finding 'that rehabilitative alimony is not feasible,' § 30-

2-57(b)(1), Ala. Code 1975, based upon the trial court's consideration of

the various factors described in § 30-2-57(d) & (f), Ala. Code 1975." Lopez

v. Rodriguez, 379 So. 3d 455, 461 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023). When a judgment

of the trial court has lacked the express findings required by § 30-2-57,

we have consistently reversed the judgment and remanded the case. See

Patrick v. Patrick, 419 So. 3d 555, 557 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024); Robinson v.

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Robinson, 422 So. 3d 1121, 1126 (Ala. Civ. App. 2025); White v. Jones,

397 So. 3d 569, 571 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024).

In this case, the provision of the divorce judgment that awarded the

wife alimony stated "[t]hat the Husband shall pay the Wife, permanent

periodic alimony, in the amount of Six Thousand and 00/100 Dollars

($6,000.00) per month. The Husband’s alimony obligation shall begin

May 1, 2025. This award is not rehabilitative alimony." This provision

clearly awarded periodic alimony without an express finding that

rehabilitative alimony would not be feasible. The provision also lacks the

findings required by § 30-2-57(a) -- (1) that the wife lacked a separate

estate or that her separate estate was insufficient to enable her to

preserve, to some extent, the economic status quo of the parties as it

existed during the marriage; (2) that the husband had the ability to

supply alimony without undue economic hardship; and (3) that the

circumstances of the case made it equitable to award alimony. As a

result, the alimony award is due to be reversed, and the cause must be

remanded for the circuit court to make the required findings. This court

cannot properly review the alimony award otherwise. Merrick, 352 So. 3d

at 775.

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Additionally,

"[i]n light of our reversal on the alimony issue, we pretermit
any discussion regarding the equity of the marital property
award because '[t]he issues of property division and alimony
are interrelated, and they must be considered together on
appeal.' Turnbo v. Turnbo, 938 So. 2d 425, 430 (Ala. Civ. App.
2006). Instead, the trial court is to reconsider the marital-
property division in conjunction with any alimony
determination."

Lopez, 379 So. 3d at 462. Therefore, the circuit court is directed to

reconsider on remand the division of marital property, including its

award of attorney's fees,1 along with its determination of the alimony

issue, and we pretermit discussion of other issues raised by the husband

on appeal regarding the division of the martial property -- (1) the

propriety of the monetary award to the wife representing half of the

husband's interest in two limited-liability companies; (2) the propriety of

the provision in the divorce judgment related to the enforcement of the

trust; (3) the propriety of the division of the parties' retirement accounts;

(4) the propriety of the attorney's fee award to the wife; (5) the propriety

1See Friend v. Friend, 385 So. 3d 53, 58 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023)
("Considering our reversal of the trial court's alimony award and
property division in their entirety, the party's financial circumstances are
undetermined, and we direct the trial court to further consider the issue
of an attorney fee award on remand.")

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of the division of the wife's debts; (6) the overall weight of the evidence to

support the circuit court's property-division awards; and (7) his argument

concerning the successor judge's denial of his postjudgment motion.2

II. Whether the circuit court erred in granting a divorce on fault
grounds

The husband argues that the circuit court's entry of a divorce based

on fault grounds is due to be reversed because the judgment lacks any

express findings of fact. He further argues that the evidence was

insufficient to support the entry of a fault-based divorce. As to the

husband's first point, he cites no statute or caselaw requiring the circuit

court to make express findings of fact in entering a judgment based on

fault grounds. As a result, this portion of his argument is waived.

See Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P.3

2We note that the husband did not raise any concerns under Ala. R.

Civ. P. 63 before the circuit court. Indeed, at the hearing on the husband's
postjudgment motion, counsel for the husband requested that the
successor judge rule on the motion without raising any issue concerning
Rule 63. Rule 63 provides that a successor judge may proceed "upon
certifying familiarity with the record and determining that the
proceedings in the case may be completed without prejudice."

3We have previously held:

" ' "Rule 28(a)(10)[, Ala. R. App. P.,] requires
that arguments in briefs contain discussions of
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As to the husband's argument that the evidence was insufficient to

support the entry of a fault-based divorce, we disagree that the circuit

court could not have reasonably found that the evidence was sufficient.

"A divorce will be granted to either party to the marriage when the other

has committed actual violence on his or her person, attended with danger

to life or health, or when, from his or her conduct, there is reasonable

apprehension of such violence." Atkins v. Atkins, 268 Ala. 428, 429, 108

facts and relevant legal authorities that support
the party's position. If they do not, the arguments
are waived. Moore v. Prudential Residential Servs.
Ltd. P'ship, 849 So. 2d 914, 923 (Ala. 2002);
Arrington v. Mathis, 929 So. 2d 468, 470 n. 2 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2005); Hamm v. State, 913 So. 2d 460,
486 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002). 'This is so, because " 'it
is not the function of this Court to do a party's legal
research or to make and address legal arguments
for a party based on undelineated general
propositions not supported by sufficient authority
or argument.' " ' Jimmy Day Plumbing & Heating,
Inc. v. Smith, 964 So. 2d 1, 9 (Ala. 2007) (quoting
Butler v. Town of Argo, 871 So.2d 1, 20 (Ala.2003),
quoting in turn Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652
So. 2d 248, 251 (Ala. 1994))." '

"Braden Furniture Co. v. Union State Bank, 109 So. 3d 625,
630-31 (Ala. 2012) (quoting White Sands Group, L.L.C. v. PRS
II, LLC, 998 So. 2d 1042, 1058 (Ala. 2008))."

Hooks v. Pettaway, 142 So. 3d 1151, 1157-58 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013).
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So. 2d 166, 167 (1959). We have found evidence to be sufficient to support

a trial court's entry of divorce based on cruelty when the spouse against

whom cruelty was alleged assaulted the complaining spouse to the extent

of leaving bruises and admitted to spanking the complaining spouse.

Sanders v. Sanders, 55 Ala. App. 72, 74, 313 So. 2d 194, 195 (1975).

In this case, the record contains evidence from which the circuit

court could have determined that the parties' relationship involved

physical altercations and abusive conduct. Critically, the circuit court

heard ore tenus testimony on this issue, which means that it was in the

best position to assess credibility and make necessary findings of fact

supporting its judgment on this point. The wife testified that the husband

was physically violent during the marriage beginning in 2015. She

alleged that he would come home drunk during the night, drag her from

bed, and spank her. She testified that, on Memorial Day in 2018, the

husband pushed her, causing her to fall and break her arm. The wife also

testified that the husband struck her and broke her nose on another

occasion. She also testified that the husband put battery acid on her

genitals. The wife further testified that, the night before the husband

filed for a divorce, he came home drunk, slammed her into a cabinet,

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threw her on the floor, and kicked her. The record does contain conflicting

testimony as to instances of violence between the parties. Although the

husband now alleges that the only evidence of violence was on the part of

the wife, that is not the case. To the extent that there was evidence

indicating that the parties both initiated physical altercations and

instances of violence, the circuit court was in the best position to assess

and weigh that evidence. Therefore, we cannot say that the circuit court

exceeded its discretion in granting the parties a divorce based, in part,

on cruelty.

III. Whether the circuit court erred in ordering the husband to
pay all expenses for the minor children and declining to order
the wife to pay child support

The husband argues that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in

failing to require the wife to pay child support or otherwise contribute to

the expenses of the minor children, which, he argues, was contrary to the

best interest of the children. In support of his argument, the husband

cites only Ala. R. Jud. Admin. 32(C)(1), which provides, in pertinent part,

that "[t]he court may use its discretion in determining child support in

circumstances where combined adjusted gross income exceeds the

uppermost levels of the [child-support] schedule." He cites to no other

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authority to support the actual crux of his argument; therefore, the

argument is waived. See Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P.; note 3, supra.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment to the extent that

it divorced the parties on fault grounds and ordered the husband to pay

all the expenses for the minor children and declined to order the wife to

pay child support. We reverse the judgment to the extent that it awarded

alimony and divided the parties' marital property, and we remand the

cause to the circuit court to enter an order consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.

Moore, P.J., concurs in the result, without opinion.

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