B.T. v. Jefferson County Department of Human Resources and Legal Aid Society of Birmingham (Appeal from Jefferson Juvenile Court, Bessemer Division: JU-21-387.02).

Rel: April 25, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025
_________________________

CL-2024-0982
_________________________

B.T.

v.

Jefferson County Department of Human Resources and Legal
Aid Society of Birmingham

Appeal from Jefferson Juvenile Court, Bessemer Division
(JU-21-387.02)

LEWIS, Judge.

B.T. ("the father") appeals from a judgment entered by the Jefferson

Juvenile Court, Bessemer Division ("the juvenile court") terminating his

parental rights to B.L.T. ("the child"), who was born in August 2021. We

affirm the juvenile court's judgment.
CL-2024-0982

Procedural History

This case has previously been before this court. See B.T. v.

Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., [Ms. CL-2023-0944, Aug. 30, 2024]

___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2024). In B.T., we set out the pertinent

procedural history as follows:

"On January 9, 2023, the Jefferson County Department
of Human Resources ('DHR') filed in the juvenile court a
petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of B.K. ('the
mother') and of the father to the child. A trial on the petition
was held on November 8, 2023. On December 11, 2023, the
juvenile court entered a final judgment terminating the
parental rights of the mother and of the father to the child.
The juvenile court's final judgment provided, in pertinent
part:

" 'The Court does find, pursuant to § 12-15-
319(a), Code of Alabama, 1975, that the ... father
[is] unable to discharge [his] responsibilities to and
for the child due to [his] conduct and conditions
and that such conduct and conditions are unlikely
to change soon.

" 'The Court does find, pursuant to § 12-15-
319(a)(1), Code of Alabama, 1975, the ... father
ha[s] failed to visit with the minor and maintain
consistent contact or attempts to contact the child
or to contact DHR to arrange visitation with the
child.

" 'The court finds that ... [the] father
pursuant to § 12-15-319(a)(1), Code of Alabama,
1975, ha[s] not made attempts to arrange
consistent visitation with [the child] and the living

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CL-2024-0982

conditions said minor would be exposed to are not
in her best interest.

" 'The court finds, pursuant to § 12-15-
319(a)(10), Code of Alabama, [1975,] that the ...
father ... ha[s] failed to provide for the material
needs of the child. The court finds, pursuant to §
12-15-319(a)(12) Code of Alabama, 1975, that the
... father has failed to adjust [his] circumstances to
meet the needs of the child.

" 'The court finds that 'DHR' has made
reasonable efforts to locate relative resources for
placement of the child. 'DHR' investigated all
known relatives provided by the mother and father
and independently identified relative resources for
placement of the child have not yielded positive
results. Relatives that were located are not
suitable to take care of the minor child. 'DHR' did
not find an interested or viable relative placement
option for the child. The court finds there are not
viable relative resources ready willing or able to
receive custody of the child at the date of the
termination trial.'

"On December 15, 2023, the father timely filed a
postjudgment motion to alter, amend, or vacate or, in the
alternative, for a new trial. On December 18, 2023, the
juvenile court denied the father's postjudgment motion. The
father filed his notice of appeal to this court on December 29,
2023."

B.T., ___ So. 3d at ___ (footnotes omitted). In appeal number CL-2023-

0944, this court reversed the juvenile court's judgment and remanded the

case with instructions. B.T., ___ So. 3d at ___. Specifically, we instructed

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the juvenile court to vacate certain factual findings and then to

"reconsider whether the petition to terminate the father's parental rights

should be granted or denied in the absence of those findings." Id. at ___.

On September 13, 2024, DHR filed in the Alabama Supreme Court a

petition for writ of certiorari to this court. On October 11, 2024, the

Alabama Supreme Court denied DHR's petition, without opinion. See Ex

parte Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., [Ms. SC-2024-0598, Oct. 11,

2024] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2024). On that same day, this court issued the

certificate of judgment in appeal number CL-2023-0944.

On December 4, 2024, the juvenile court entered an amended final

judgment terminating the parental rights of the father to the child. The

juvenile court's amended final judgment provides:

"On August 30, 2024, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
reversed this Court's December 11, 2023, Order terminating
the parental rights of … the father as to [the child]. It should
be noted that … the mother[] did not appeal this Court's
judgment and her parental rights were and remain
terminated. The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals remanded
the cause to this Court with the following instructions:

"[']On remand, the juvenile court shall vacate the
findings that the father failed to maintain
consistent visitation and contact with the child
and that the father failed to provide for the
material needs of the child. The juvenile court
shall then reconsider whether the petition to

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CL-2024-0982

terminate the father's parental rights should be
granted or denied in the absence of those findings.
Upon reconsideration, the juvenile court shall then
enter a new judgment reflecting its decision.[']

"In compliance with the appellate court's instructions, this
Court's December 11, 2023[,] findings that the father failed to
maintain consistent visitation and contact with the child and
that the father failed to provide for the material needs of the
child are hereby VACATED.

"In compliance with the appellate court's instructions, this
Court has reconsidered the entirety of the evidence presented
at the November 8, 2023[,] trial, for which the father failed to
appear despite being personally served with the petition but
was represented by counsel and a Guardian ad litem. This
Court considered the ore tenus testimony of multiple
witnesses, including an expert in the field of infectious disease
who has treated [the] child's HIV diagnosis since her birth, as
well as certain properly authenticated and relevant exhibits.
This Court finds that, even in the absence of its vacated
findings, [DHR's] petition to terminate the father's parental
rights is due to be GRANTED.

"This Court finds from clear and convincing evidence,
competent, material, and relevant in nature, that the father
is unable or unwilling to discharge his responsibilities to and
for the child, and that his conduct or condition renders him
unable to properly care for the child[,] and that the conduct or
condition is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. In
reaching its decision, this Court has considered the evidence
presented, the best interests of the child, and those
enumerated factors set forth in Ala. Code []1975[,] § 12-15-
319(a). This Court specifically finds that, pursuant to Ala.
Code § 12-15-319(a)(12), the father has failed to adjust his
circumstances to meet the needs of [the] child. As such,
grounds for termination of the father's parental rights exist.

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CL-2024-0982

"This Court has considered all known alternatives to
termination and rejects the same as not being viable or in the
best interests of [the] child. [DHR] investigated all known
relative resources, and none are suitable for placement of
[the] child and therefore not viable alternatives. This Court
specifically rejects maintenance of the status quo because
such is contrary to the child's best interests and therefor[e]
not a viable alternative. This Court finds that there are no
viable alternatives to termination of the father's parental
rights.

"This Court finds that termination of the father's parental
rights and adoption by current foster parents is in the child's
best interests. [The] child can and will achieve permanency
through adoption, and [the] child deserves the permanency
that adoption by her current foster parents will provide her.

"It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as
follows:

"1) That [the child] is a DEPENDENT child.

"2) That grounds for termination of the father's
parental rights exist.

"3) That there are no viable alternatives to
termination of parental rights.

"4) That [DHR] has made reasonable and
consistent efforts to promote reunification
between the child and the father, but that
reunification with the father is not in the child's
best interests.

"5) That [DHR]'s petition to terminate the father's
parental rights has been proven by clear and
convincing evidence and is hereby GRANTED.

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CL-2024-0982

"6) That [the father]'s parental rights are hereby
PERMANENTLY SEVERED AND
TERMINATED as to [the child].

"7) That PERMANENT LEGAL CUSTODY of [the
child] is hereby vested in [DHR] for permanent
placement and adoption.

"8) That pursuant to Ala. Code § 12-15-321[,] this
child's case shall be set for a permanency review
December 6, 2024[,] @ 08:30 a.m."

(Capitalization in original; emphasis omitted). On December 9, 2024, the

father filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, or in the

alternative, for new trial. That motion was denied by the juvenile court

on December 11, 2024. On December 17, 2024, the father timely filed his

notice of appeal to this court.

Evidence

Deshaunda Cooper, a social service caseworker with DHR, testified

that she was assigned to the case shortly after the child's birth in August

2021. She testified that, on August 5, 2021, DHR received a report that

the mother had given birth to the child and that the mother had not

received any prenatal care. Cooper further testified that there were

concerns of alleged domestic violence, substance abuse, and an untreated

mental-health diagnosis of schizophrenia for the mother. According to

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CL-2024-0982

Cooper, DHR became involved with the family in January 2016 after

receiving a report that the father had spanked one of his children, leaving

excessive marks and bruises on that child's buttocks and thighs; the

father was found "indicated" for physical abuse and charged with

domestic violence in the third degree.

Cooper testified that both the mother and the father admitted that

they had been involved in an incident of domestic violence with one

another. Therefore, the mother and the father were ordered to complete

domestic-violence and anger-management classes. According to Cooper,

the father completed both those requirements.

Cooper testified that, after the mother admitted to Cooper that she

and the father had smoked marijuana together, the father was court

ordered to submit to random drug screens twice a month; DHR paid for

the screens. According to Cooper, the father submitted to random drug

testing only once, and the father's test was negative. Cooper testified

that the father told Cooper that "there was no need for him to test and

[that] he felt like he did not have to test based on just allegations from

[the mother]."

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CL-2024-0982

Cooper testified that, during a home visit with the father on the day

before the trial, she found a marijuana "roach" on the floor of the father's

bedroom and cigar fillings on the top of his dresser. According to Cooper,

the father stated that he sometimes had friends at his home who smoked

marijuana. Further, Cooper testified that she found another piece of

marijuana on the bathtub; the father told Cooper that what Cooper had

found was actually "fake weed" that the mother smoked. Cooper testified

that the drugs found had been within the reach of a child.

Cooper testified that the father had been ordered to obtain

employment but that he was not employed at the time of the trial. Cooper

testified that, the day before the trial, the father stated that he had begun

working with a temporary employment service called Staff Zone but that

he had not yet been offered employment.

Cooper testified that the father completed parenting classes in

2021; however, she still had concerns about his ability to parent the child.

According to Cooper, her concerns with the father's parenting abilities

were based on the father not completing court-ordered services, how he

had displayed his parenting skills in visitations with the child, and his

prior history with DHR.

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CL-2024-0982

Mikki Bendt, an employee of Covenant Services, testified that, as

part of her employment, she had worked with the mother, the father, and

the child to facilitate visitations and transportation. According to Bendt,

she supervised visits between the child and the father every week in the

months leading up to the trial. Bendt testified that the mother and the

father argued and cussed at each other during their joint visits.

According to Bendt, even at their separate visits, the mother and the

father would

"call one another on the phone, and they would do it by phone
call or [the videoconferencing service] Facetime to the point
that, you know, you would have to threaten to end the
visitation if they did not stop the phone calls because they
would focus more on arguing and yelling at one another th[a]n
paying attention to the baby."

Bendt further testified that she observed concerning behavior between

the father and the child during their visits. According to Bendt, the

father kissed the child with his eyes closed, and his kisses lingered for an

extended period of time with his lips on the child's forehead, head, cheek,

neck, face, and lips; Bendt testified that these kisses were "very

uncomfortable" to watch. She testified that she attempted to correct the

father but that he told her not to tell him what to do.

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CL-2024-0982

Bendt also testified that the father brought the paternal

grandmother with him to visits and argued with her to the point that

Bendt "had to make the [paternal grand]mother leave because they

started to yell and scream and cuss at one another" while the child was

in the room. According to Bendt, she was concerned with the father's

behavior during visits because the father became angry at the child "over

small things that for her age would be things you shouldn't get angry like

that over." Bendt testified that, at a visit a few weeks before the trial,

the child

"was playing and she didn't come to him like he wanted her
to, so he grabbed her by the arm and brought her to him. He
didn't like yank her, but it was enough to -- I mean, she -- her
whole demeanor went from she was playing to she instantly
had a look of fear on her face, had tears in her eyes. He told
her she was being disrespectful, that per the Bible it says the
child is to respect her mother and father and he was tired of
her not listening to him. …"

According to Bendt, the child cried, and the father did not console her in

any way. She testified that she redirected the father, and he stated that

he did not need her "to tell him how to parent his child." Bendt testified

that she told the father that she was there to help guide him and to make

sure he was doing what he needed to do so that everyone can be assured

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CL-2024-0982

that he can take care of the child; the father responded that he did not

have to prove anything to anybody.

Bendt testified that she encouraged the father to be more involved

in playing with the child during visits by bringing coloring books and

toys. According to Bendt, at visits, the father usually sat at a table using

his cellular telephone and interacted with the child on only a few

occasions. Bendt testified that the father "told [the child] that he's going

to whoop her butt and that once they're home, she's not going to have to

worry about anybody stopping him from whopping her butt." When

asked if Bendt has observed any improvements in the father's

interactions with the child, Bendt testified that there had never been a

full progression and that "[i]t was just kind of a teeter-totter back and

forth. Further, when asked if she would be comfortable with the father

being alone with the child in a DHR playroom after two years of observing

visits, Bendt testified that she would not because she feels "if he doesn't

have someone there to keep him from going over the top, he's -- if he

doesn't have that buffer, he's going to go over t[he] top." She went on to

clarify that she was referring to the father's angry behavior towards the

child and his methods of discipline described above.

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CL-2024-0982

Dr. Joshua Cooper, a physician at Children's Hospital, testified that

the child is one of his patients. Dr. Cooper testified that the child, who

tested positive at birth for HIV, has been placed on a strict drug regimen

to ensure that the virus may not mutate. According to Dr. Cooper, the

child's HIV status has become "undetectable" through that strict drug

regimen. Dr. Cooper testified that the father has attended only two of

the child's doctor's appointments and that the father had little

engagement in managing the child's medical issues. Deshaunda Cooper

testified that, although she had encouraged the father to attend the

child's doctor's appointments, he had not attended or given a reason for

his failure to attend. She testified that, on the day before the trial, the

father stated that he was going to try to attend more medical

appointments and to learn how to properly administer the child's

medication.

Cooper testified that, based on her evaluation of the father's home

the day before the trial, the father's home would not be approved for the

child's placement. She testified that she was concerned about the father's

ability to exercise protective capacities for the child based on his housing,

employment, history of domestic violence, and the "indicated" finding

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against him for physical abuse of another child. Cooper further testified

that she had observed nothing to show that the father had adjusted his

circumstances to meet the child's specific needs.

According to Cooper, there were no relative resources available to

take custody of the child. Cooper testified that the maternal

grandmother was not an appropriate relative resource because she had

been found "indicated" for child abuse and neglect and lacked stable

housing. Cooper also testified that the paternal grandmother was not an

appropriate relative resource because she also had been found "indicated"

for child abuse and neglect. Cooper testified that the father had two

biological siblings who had reached out to DHR stating that they would

be receptive to becoming a relative resource for the child. However,

according to Cooper, the father's sister later stated that the child's

medical history would be too much for her to commit to managing, and

the father's brother stated that he did not want to deal with the father.

C.F., the child's foster mother, testified that the child had lived with

her and her husband since the child was nine days old; the child was two

years and three months old at the time of the trial. C.F. testified that

she and her husband had 3 other children in the home who were 10, 13,

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and 15 years old, respectively. According to C.F., the child's medication

regimen is challenging. She testified that, at each doctor's appointment,

they learned to take care of the child, including any medication and

dosage changes.

C.F. testified that, at the doctor's appointment the father attended,

the child "was comfortable, but [the child] definitely did not want [her

husband or her] to leave the room. And when [the child's] blood was being

drawn or she was insecure, she wanted to sit in [C.F.'s] lap." According

to C.F., the father has not requested information concerning the child's

medical appointments or medication.

According to M.F., the child's foster father, he and C.F. live

approximately 15 minutes from Children's Hospital, and Dr. Cooper has

provided the family with his cellular-telephone number and is

"extraordinarily available" to them. According to M.F., he and C.F. have

cultivated a relationship with the child's pharmacist, who, he testified,

has been a "tremendous" resource. He testified that "[w]e can email her

an up-to-date weight sometimes and she will change the dose for us

without us having to come into the clinic."

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M.F. testified that they have enjoyed having the child as a part of

their family. According to M.F., the child is full of joy, smart and

engaging, loves people, and fits right in with their family. The child has

her own room at the foster parents' home, and they consider the child to

be a member of their family. M.F. testified that the child is "most

definitely" part of their family, and they want to adopt her. C.F. testified

"we're in love with her. She's adored."

Standard of Review

"A judgment terminating parental rights must be
supported by clear and convincing evidence, which is
' " '[e]vidence that, when weighed against evidence in
opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm
conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high
probability as to the correctness of the conclusion.' " ' C.O. v.
Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 206 So. 3d 621, 627 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2016) (quoting L.M. v. D.D.F., 840 So. 2d 171, 179
(Ala. Civ. App. 2002), quoting in turn Ala. Code 1975, § 6-11-
20(b)(4)).

" ' "[T]he evidence necessary for
appellate affirmance of a judgment
based on a factual finding in the
context of a case in which the ultimate
standard for a factual decision by the
trial court is clear and convincing
evidence is evidence that a fact-finder
reasonably could find to clearly and
convincingly … establish the fact
sought to be proved."

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CL-2024-0982

" 'KGS Steel, Inc. [v. McInish], 47 So. 3d [749,] 761
[(Ala. Civ. App. 2006)].

" '… [F]or trial courts ruling … in civil cases
to which a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard
of proof applies, "the judge must view the evidence
presented through the prism of the substantive
evidentiary burden[,]" [Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed.
2d 202 (1986)]; thus, the appellate court must also
look through a prism to determine whether there
was substantial evidence before the trial court to
support a factual finding, based upon the trial
court's weighing of the evidence, that would
"produce in the mind [of the trial court] a firm
conviction as to each element of the claim and a
high probability as to the correctness of the
conclusion." '

"Ex parte McInish, 47 So. 3d 767, 778 (Ala. 2008). This court
does not reweigh the evidence but, rather, determines
whether the findings of fact made by the juvenile court are
supported by evidence that the juvenile court could have
found to be clear and convincing. See Ex parte T.V., 971 So.
2d 1, 9 (Ala. 2007). When those findings rest on ore tenus
evidence, this court presumes their correctness. Id."

M.W. v. Marshall Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 399 So. 3d 287, 290-91 (Ala.

Civ. App. 2024).

Discussion

I. Grounds for Termination

On appeal, the father first argues that the juvenile court's judgment

terminating his parental rights to the child was not supported by clear

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and convincing evidence. Section 12-15-319, Ala. Code 1975, provides, in

pertinent part:

"(a) If the juvenile court finds from clear and convincing
evidence, competent, material, and relevant in nature, that
the parent[] of a child [is] unable or unwilling to discharge
[his] responsibilities to and for the child, or that the conduct
or condition of the parent[] renders [him] unable to properly
care for the child and that the conduct or condition is unlikely
to change in the foreseeable future, it may terminate the
parental rights of the parent[]. In a hearing on a petition for
termination of parental rights, the court shall consider the
best interests of the child. In determining whether or not the
parent[] [is] unable or unwilling to discharge [his]
responsibilities to and for the child and to terminate the
parental rights, the juvenile court shall consider the following
factors including, but not limited to, the following:

"….

"(12) Lack of effort by the parent to adjust his
… circumstances to meet the needs of the child in
accordance with agreements reached, including
agreements reached with local departments of
human resources or licensed child-placing
agencies, in an administrative review or a judicial
review."

In this case, there was evidence presented that the father was court

ordered to submit to random drug screens twice a month. However, after

submitting to only one drug screen, the father told Cooper that "there

was no need for him to test and he felt like he did not have to test based

on just allegations from [the mother]." Cooper testified that, at a home

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visit the day before the trial, she found a marijuana "roach" on the floor

of the father's bedroom and a piece of marijuana on the father's bathtub.

Further, Cooper testified that the father admitted that he sometimes had

friends at his home who smoked marijuana.

Evidence presented at trial indicated that the father was also

ordered to obtain employment but that he was still not employed at the

time of the trial. Although the father completed parenting classes in

2021, Cooper testified that she still had concerns with the father's ability

to parent the child. Bendt also testified that she would not be comfortable

with the father being alone with the child. According to Bendt, during

visits, the mother and the father argued and cursed. Moreover, the father

told the child that, once the child was at home and he had no one to stop

him, he would "whoop her butt." There was also evidence that the child

was on a strict medication regimen for HIV and that the father had failed

to attend most of the child's doctor's appointments.

Considering the evidence presented that the father had failed to

attend court-ordered drug screens, had continued to have marijuana in

his home, had not obtained employment, had failed to engage in the

child's medical treatment, and failed to improve his ability to parent the

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child even after completing parenting classes, the juvenile court could

have been reasonably convinced that the father had failed to adjust his

circumstances to meet the needs of the child. See § 12-15-319(a)(12), Ala.

Code 1975. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the juvenile court

exceeded its discretion in determining that the father was "unable or

unwilling to discharge [his] responsibilities to and for the child, or that

the conduct or condition of the [father] renders [him] unable to properly

care for the child and that the conduct or condition is unlikely to change

in the foreseeable future." See § 12-15-319(a).

II. Viable Alternatives

The father also argues that the juvenile court erred in determining

that DHR sufficiently explored viable alternatives to the termination of

his parental rights. Specifically, the father appears to argue that DHR

failed to explore relative resources for placement of the child and that

maintaining the status quo was a viable alternative to the termination of

his parental rights.

"It is well settled that a noncustodial parent continues
to maintain a fundamental right to a legal relationship with
his or her child. See McQuinn v. McQuinn, 866 So. 2d 570,
572 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003). A juvenile court may only interfere
with that fundamental right using the most narrowly tailored
means to achieve the State's compelling interests. See Roe v.

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Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976). Only two interests
have been identified as sufficiently compelling to justify a
termination of parental rights: the protection of children from
parental abuse or neglect and the advancement of the
children's need for a permanent custodial arrangement. See
Ex parte Bodie, 377 So. 3d 1051, 1065 (Ala. 2022) (Parker,
C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the result)."

R.D. v. G.A.W., [Ms. CL-2024-0344, Nov. 1, 2024] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala.

Civ. App. 2024).

"Once the court determines that termination of the
parent's parental rights advances a compelling governmental
interest, the court then must consider whether the
government seeks to advance its interest in a manner that
infringes the parent's parental rights in the narrowest
manner possible. See Montgomery Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res.
v. N.B., 196 So. 3d 1205, 1214 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015) (" 'A state
may only interfere with [parental rights] to achieve a
compelling governmental objective using the most narrowly
tailored means available. Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D.
Ala. 1976).' " (quoting J.B. v. DeKalb Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res.,
12 So. 3d at 115 (plurality opinion))); § 26-1-6(b)[, Ala. Code
1975]. "[I]f a court may achieve the compelling governmental
objective at stake through a means other than the drastic
action of permanently revoking the custodial rights of the
parent, a juvenile court cannot terminate parental rights."
J.G. v. Lauderdale Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 379 So. 3d 444,
447 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023). A juvenile court applies this
"narrowly tailored" analysis by considering whether there
exists any viable alternative to termination of parental rights
to achieve the government's compelling interest. See Ex parte
Bodie, 377 So. 3d at 1064 (Parker, C.J., concurring in part and
concurring in the result); S.P. v. Madison Cnty. Dep't of Hum.
Res., 315 So. 3d 1126, 1131 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020); J.B. v.
DeKalb Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 12 So. 3d at 115 (plurality
opinion)."

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M.P. v. DeKalb Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 394 So. 3d 1080, 1086-87 (Ala.

Civ. App. 2023). "[I]f some less drastic alternative to termination of

parental rights can be used that will simultaneously protect the children

from parental harm and preserve the beneficial aspects of the family

relationship, then a juvenile court must explore whether that alternative

can be successfully employed instead of terminating parental rights."

T.D.K. v. L.A.W., 78 So. 3d 1006, 1011 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011). Further, as

a general rule, " 'maintaining a child in indefinite foster care is not a

viable alternative to termination of parental rights.' " T.W. v. Calhoun

Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 391 So. 3d 306, 316 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023)

(quoting T.L.S. v. Lauderdale Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 119 So. 3d 431,

439 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013) (plurality opinion)).

Here, Cooper testified that there were no relative resources

available to take custody of the child. Both the maternal grandmother

and the paternal grandmother had been found "indicated" for child abuse

and neglect. Moreover, the maternal grandmother did not have stable

housing. Cooper testified that the father's sister stated that the child's

medical history would be too much for her to commit to and that the

father's brother stated that he did not want to deal with the father.

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Therefore, we cannot conclude that that the juvenile court erred in

finding that no known relative resource existed that would serve as a

suitable placement for the child.

With respect to maintaining the status quo, evidence was presented

indicating that, although the father had completed parenting classes and

maintained visitation with the child, both Cooper and Bendt had

concerns about the father's behavior during those visits. In fact, Bendt

did not think the father should be left alone with the child. Further,

evidence was presented indicating that the child, who was two years and

three months old at the time of trial, had been with the foster parents

since she was nine days old. The foster parents testified that they have

bonded with the child, consider the child to be a member of their family,

and plan to adopt the child. Based on the evidence presented, we cannot

conclude that the juvenile court erred in determining that maintaining

the status quo was not a viable alternative to the termination of the

father's parental rights.

Having rejected the father's arguments with respect to viable

alternatives, we affirm the juvenile court's finding that there were no

viable alternatives to termination of the father's parental rights.

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Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the judgement of the juvenile court

terminating the parental rights of the father to the child is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.

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