Sandra Robinson v. Johnny M. Robinson (Appeal from Clarke Circuit Court: DR-22-900018).

Rel: January 17, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025
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CL-2024-0336
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Sandra Robinson

v.

Johnny M. Robinson

Appeal from Clarke Circuit Court
(DR-22-900018)

EDWARDS, Judge.

Sandra Robinson ("the wife") appeals from a judgment entered by

the Clarke Circuit Court ("the trial court") divorcing her from Johnny M.

Robinson ("the husband"). We reverse the trial court's judgment and

remand the cause with instructions.
CL-2024-0336

The parties married on September 1, 1973, and both the husband

and the wife were 68 years old at the time of the trial. Three children

were born of the parties' marriage, and all three had reached the age of

majority and were self-supporting by the time of the trial. During the

marriage, the husband served in the military and, as a result of his

military service, the parties had resided in Europe, Florida, North

Carolina, Texas, and New Jersey. The husband stated that the wife had

cared for the parties' children and that she and the children had joined

him each time that he was relocated while serving in the military. He

testified that he had retired from the military in 1993 and that the

parties had moved to Jackson, where, he said, they have since resided.

The husband testified that the parties had moved to a house that had

been built on land given to him by his grandfather and that, in 2000, the

parties had built a new house ("the marital residence") on that land, with

the husband acting as the general contractor on the project. The parties

agreed that the marital residence had appraised for $275,000. The

husband testified that, at the time of the trial, the marital residence was

encumbered by a mortgage to Citibank with a balance of $154,000. Both

parties continued to reside in the marital residence at the time of the
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trial, and both requested that they be awarded the marital residence.

The wife admitted, however, that she was unable to pay the mortgage on

the marital residence.

The husband testified that, at the time of the trial, he was receiving

disability benefits in the amount of $3,603 per month from the United

States Department of Veterans Affairs, military-retirement benefits in

the amount of $2,305 per month, and Social Security disability benefits

in the amount of $1,795 per month. He stated that he also receives $800

per month from a rental property ("the rental house") that he had

purchased in 2007 or 2008; according to the husband, the rental house

had appraised for $90,000 and is encumbered by a commercial loan to

SmartBank that had a balance of $39,000 at the time of the trial. The

wife testified that the rental house is in both parties' names and that it

is worth approximately $150,000. She stated that the rental house is

occupied by tenants but that the lease agreement includes a clause that

allows the parties to request that the tenants vacate the property.

The husband testified that the wife had worked "on and off" during

the marriage but that she had never contributed to the household

expenses. He testified, however, that she had begun purchasing
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groceries "every now and then" since he had filed for a divorce. The

husband stated that the wife drives a Toyota Camry ("the Camry")

automobile, that he had given her $1,000 toward the purchase of the

Camry, and that he had paid the insurance on the Camry until the wife

had begun earning $250 per week working as a sitter for an elderly

person. According to the husband, the wife had paid off the debt on the

Camry. He stated that he owns three additional vehicles, none of which

have any associated debt. Additionally, the husband testified that he

owns approximately $25,000 in cryptocurrency and that he has other

financial accounts with a total value of approximately $3,000. The

husband presented a list of his monthly household expenses, which total

$4,442 and include expenses for himself and the wife, as well as their 14-

year-old granddaughter, who resides with them in the marital residence.

When asked whether he and the wife had accumulated certain debts

during the marriage, the husband responded: "Well, I've accumulated

them." He presented as an exhibit an outline of his debts, which included

the debts associated with the marital residence and the rental house, a

debt that he owed to JG Wentworth for consolidating several separate

debts and establishing payment plans with those creditors, and
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additional debts to Citibank, SmartBank, and Chase; that exhibit

indicates that the husband pays $3,114 each month to satisfy those debts.

The wife testified that, during the marriage, she had worked for the

federal civil service each time the family was stationed somewhere new

for the husband's military service. The parties testified that they had

separated at an earlier point in the marriage and that the wife had moved

to Montgomery for a period, but that they had reconciled since that time.

According to the wife, she had worked as a sitter for an elderly couple for

one to two years and that employment had ended approximately two

years before the trial. She testified that the amount that she had earned

from that employment had varied; that she had not filed taxes on those

earnings; that she had used the money she earned as a sitter to pay the

debt associated with the Camry, a car-insurance premium, clothes, and

payments for extensive dental work that she had undergone; and that

she did not have any money remaining from that employment.

According to the wife, her income at the time of the trial included

$1,138 in Social Security benefits and approximately $240 in gross

income per week from her employment with the City of Jackson driving

meals to the elderly, although she stated that her income from that
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employment fluctuates. The wife testified that, during the marriage, the

parties had contributed their earnings into one joint account that had

been used to pay the marital bills until 2017, when she had purchased

the Camry, after which the husband had removed his money from the

parties' joint account and had opened a new account in his own name.

She stated that the husband had since declined her offers to assist with

the payment of household bills. The wife presented evidence of her

monthly expenses at the time of the trial that total approximately

$1,356.56; 1 those expenses do not include amounts related to the marital

residence or other housing. The wife also presented as an exhibit an

outline of her debts, which indicates that she pays $300 per month

toward amounts owed to Mastercard, Military Star, and USAA, and $60

per month for a cellular phone.

1The wife's exhibit outlining her monthly expenses reflects a total

of $1,834; however, the wife admitted during her testimony that the
amount of $572.93 included in that exhibit for automobile insurance
represented the amount she owed for her automobile insurance every 6
months. Accordingly, we adjusted the total amount of the wife's monthly
expenses in consideration of that testimony. ($572.93 ÷ 6 = $95.49;
$572.93 - $95.49 = $477.44; $1,834 - $477.44 = $1,356.56).
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The wife testified that she had filed for a divorce from the husband

twice during the marriage because the husband had engaged in an

extended relationship with another woman. The husband testified that

the parties had separated in March 2022 and that he had decided to file

for a divorce because he was "tired of being lied to" and "cheated on."

Procedural History

On March 8, 2022, the husband filed a complaint in the trial court

seeking a divorce from the wife and an equitable division of the marital

assets. On September 8, 2022, the wife filed an answer to the husband's

petition and a counterclaim for a divorce from the husband; she

requested, among other things, an award of alimony, an equitable

division of the marital assets, and an award of attorney's fees. On

December 13, 2023, a trial was conducted. On that same date, the trial

court entered a final judgment that, among other things, divorced the

parties; awarded the marital residence to the husband and directed him

to pay all indebtedness owed thereon; awarded the rental house to the

wife and directed her to pay all indebtedness owed thereon; directed the

husband to pay the indebtedness owed to JG Wentworth, Citibank,

SmartBank, and Chase; directed the wife to pay the indebtedness owed
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to Mastercard, Military Star, and USAA; awarded the wife the Camry

and awarded the husband all other vehicles owned by the parties;

awarded each of the parties one-half of the value of the cryptocurrency

account; awarded the parties all right, title, and interest in other

financial accounts in his or her individual name; directed the parties to

pay all other debts incurred in his or her own name; directed that each

party receive all right, title, and interest in his or her individual

retirement, pension, or 401(k) plans; directed the husband to pay to the

wife $300 per month for a period of 24 months as alimony; and directed

that all remaining relief requested was denied. On January 12, 2024, the

wife filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the trial court's judgment.

On April 5, 2024, the trial court entered an order denying the wife's

postjudgment motion. On May 12, 2024, the wife filed her notice of

appeal to this court.

The wife argues on appeal that the trial court erred regarding its

division of the marital property and its award of alimony to the wife. In

Turnbo v. Turnbo, 938 So. 2d 425, 429-30 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006), this court

outlined the applicable standard of review:

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" 'Trial judges enjoy broad discretion in divorce cases,
and their decisions are to be overturned on appeal only when
they are "unsupported by the evidence or [are] otherwise
palpably wrong." ' Ex parte Bland, 796 So. 2d 340, 344 (Ala.
2000) (quoting Ex parte Jackson, 567 So. 2d 867, 868 (Ala.
1990)). Also, when, as in this case, a trial court's judgment is
based on ore tenus evidence, the judgment is presumed
correct. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 743 So. 2d 487 (Ala. Civ. App.
1999). The presumption of correctness under the ore tenus
rule 'is based on the trial court's unique position to observe
the witnesses and to assess their demeanor and credibility.'
Glazner v. Glazner, 807 So. 2d 555, 559 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001);
see also Hall v. Mazzone, 486 So. 2d 408, 410 (Ala. 1986).

"Matters such as alimony and property division are
within the sound discretion of the trial court. Ex parte
Drummond, 785 So. 2d 358 (Ala. 2000); Parrish v. Parrish,
617 So. 2d 1036 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993); and Montgomery v.
Montgomery, 519 So. 2d 525 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987). The issues
of property division and alimony are interrelated, and they
must be considered together on appeal. Albertson v.
Albertson, 678 So. 2d 118 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996)."

The wife argues that the trial court's division of the marital

property is inequitable and that its award of alimony to the wife is

insufficient. We first consider the wife's argument regarding the trial

court's award of alimony. Section 30-2-57, Ala. Code 1975, provides, in

pertinent part:

"(a) Upon granting a divorce or legal separation, the
court shall award either rehabilitative or periodic alimony as
provided in subsection (b), if the court expressly finds all of
the following:
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"(1) A party lacks a separate estate or his or
her separate estate is insufficient to enable the
party to acquire the ability to preserve, to the
extent possible, the economic status quo of the
parties as it existed during the marriage.

"(2) The other party has the ability to supply
those means without undue economic hardship.

"(3) The circumstances of the case make it
equitable.

"(b) If a party has met the requirements of subsection
(a), the court shall award alimony in the following priority:

"(1) Unless the court expressly finds that
rehabilitative alimony is not feasible, the court
shall award rehabilitative alimony to the party for
a limited duration, not to exceed five years, absent
extraordinary circumstances, of an amount to
enable the party to acquire the ability to preserve,
to the extent possible, the economic status quo of
the parties as it existed during the marriage.

"(2) In cases in which the court expressly
finds that rehabilitation is not feasible, a good-
faith attempt at rehabilitation fails, or good-faith
rehabilitation only enables the party to partially
acquire the ability to preserve, to the extent
possible, the economic status quo of the parties as
it existed during the marriage, the court shall
award the party periodic installments of alimony
for a duration and an amount to allow the party to
preserve, to the extent possible, the economic
status quo of the parties as it existed during the
marriage as provided in subsection (g)."
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In the present case, the trial court's judgment states, in pertinent

part:

"The [husband] is hereby ordered to pay the [wife] the
sum of $300.00 per month for a period of twenty-four months
as alimony. The Court has considered the length of the
parties' marriage, their ages, health, station in life, and future
prospects; the sources, value, and type of property owned; the
standard of living to which the parties have become
accustomed during the marriage and the potential for
maintaining that standard; and, in appropriate situations,
the conduct of the parties with reference to the cause of
divorce. The Court has considered the fact that the [husband]
has monthly income of $7,703.00 (excluding the rental income
for the home the [wife] is awarded) and the [wife] has income
of $1,138.00. A larger amount of monthly alimony nor a
longer period of time for payment was not awarded because
the amount of debt the [husband] is being required to pay far
exceeds the amount of debt the [wife] is being required to pay.
The Court finds the award of alimony to be proper, given a
consideration of all factors."

In its order denying the wife's postjudgment motion, the trial court

essentially restated those same findings, reiterating that "the amount of

debt the [husband] is required to pay as opposed to the amount the [wife]

will be required to pay justifies the lack of a larger amount of alimony,"

and concluding that it had "considered the income, debts, and assets

awarded to each party and reached the conclusion the Court felt was

proper under the circumstances."
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In Lopez v. Rodriguez, 379 So. 3d 455, 461 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023),

this court considered an argument that the division of property and the

award of alimony in a divorce judgment were inequitable. In reversing

the judgment in that case, this court stated, in pertinent part:

"As to the periodic-alimony award, in Merrick v. Merrick, 352
So. 3d 770 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021), this court discussed the
application of Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2-57, stating: 'The
legislature has clearly required that an alimony award be
either rehabilitative alimony or periodic alimony and that, to
award either type of alimony, the trial court must make
certain express findings ....' 352 So. 3d at 775. Those
requirements include findings as to those matters discussed
in § 30-2-57(a), Ala. Code 1975, and, if a periodic-alimony
award is to be made, a finding 'that rehabilitative alimony is
not feasible,' § 30-2-57(b)(1), Ala. Code 1975, based upon the
trial court's consideration of the various factors described in §
30-2-57(d) & (f), Ala. Code 1975.

"The wife testified that she wanted alimony until she
could 'get on [her] feet,' which she stated would take three or
four years. The husband agreed that the wife should receive
some alimony and that it should be paid for three or four
years. The trial court couched its alimony award in terms of
it being 'periodic alimony'; however, in light of the wife's
testimony and the duration of the alimony award, it may have
been rehabilitative alimony, which this court has described as
a type of periodic alimony that is intended to allow the
recipient spouse to establish a self-supporting status. See
Merrick, 352 So. 3d at 772. Nevertheless, the legislature has
clearly directed that a trial court must make express findings
as to the establishment of the basis for an alimony award and
as to the specific type of alimony that is awarded. As in
Merrick, '[w]e cannot properly review the award in this case
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without having before us the express findings required by §
30-2-57.' 352 So. 3d at 775."

379 So. 3d at 461-62. Quoting Turnbo, 938 So. 2d at 430, for the

proposition that " '[t]he issues of property division and alimony are

interrelated, and they must be considered together on appeal,' " this court

pretermitted any discussion regarding the equity of the division of the

marital property and reversed the judgment in that case with

instructions that, on remand, the trial court enter a new judgment in

compliance with § 30-2-57 and that it reconsider the division of the

marital property in conjunction with any alimony determination. 379 So.

3d at 462.

In the present case, like in Lopez, the trial court failed to make the

express findings required by § 30-2-57(a) and § 30-2-57(b)(1), and the

divorce judgment does not specify the type of alimony awarded.

Accordingly, like in Lopez, we reverse the trial court's judgment, and we

remand the case to the trial court with instructions that it enter a new

judgment in compliance with § 30-2-57. Because the issues of property

division and alimony are interrelated and must be considered together

on appeal, see Turnbo and Lopez, supra, we pretermit any discussion

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regarding the equity of the division of the marital property in this case,

and we instruct the trial court, on remand, to reconsider the division of

the marital property in conjunction with its determination of alimony.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Moore, P.J., and Hanson, Fridy, and Lewis, JJ., concur.

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