Janet Huggins v. Jana Linger (Appeal from Monroe Circuit Court: CV-22-900010).

Rel: October 25, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025
_________________________

CL-2023-0654
_________________________

Janet Huggins

v.

Jana Linger

Appeal from Monroe Circuit Court
(CV-22-900010)

PER CURIAM.

Janet Huggins ("Huggins") appeals from a judgment of the Monroe

Circuit Court ("the trial court") approving the final settlement of the

conservatorship of Vernon Charles Huggins ("the ward") and ratifying

two earlier partial or intermediate settlements that had been approved
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by the Probate Court of Monroe County ("the probate court") when it had

jurisdiction over the conservatorship. We affirm in part, reverse in part,

and remand.

Background

By order dated September 13, 2013, the probate court adjudicated

the ward an incapacitated person and appointed Jana Linger, who is the

ward's granddaughter and Huggins's daughter, the conservator of his

property.

On October 31, 2014, Linger filed a petition for a partial settlement

of the conservatorship. The probate court set Linger's partial-settlement

petition for a hearing on November 25, 2014, and appointed a guardian

ad litem to protect the ward's interests at that hearing. Linger served

Huggins with notice of the filing of the October 31, 2014, partial-

settlement petition and the November 25, 2014, hearing regarding that

petition.

Linger supported her October 31, 2014, petition with a written

document titled "register report," which, she said, her attorney had

compiled from the conservatorship's bank statements. The register report

listed and described each receipt of funds by the conservatorship by date

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and source and described each expenditure of funds by the

conservatorship by date, payee, and purpose. The record on appeal does

not contain any bank statements, canceled checks, receipts, invoices, or

other documents verifying the accuracy of the "register report" that

Linger filed in support of the October 31, 2014, partial-settlement

petition.

At the hearing before the trial court in the present case, discussed

infra, Linger testified that she had provided the probate court with

receipts and invoices evidencing the expenditures reflected on the

register report; however, she said, the probate judge decided that only

the register report would be introduced into evidence, and the receipts

and invoices were thereafter discarded. Linger testified that the receipts

and invoices had been in the possession of her then attorney, who had

subsequently died, and that, after that attorney's death, Huggins had

obtained his file and would not give Linger access to it. During her

testimony at the hearing before the trial court in the present action,

Huggins produced a thumb drive that, according to her, contained

Linger's deceased attorney's file. Huggins testified that she had reviewed

Linger's deceased attorney's file and that it did not contain any

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information pertaining to the accounting of the conservatorship. Neither

party introduced either the thumb drive itself or a paper printout of its

contents into evidence.

Huggins testified that she had not filed a written objection to

Linger's October 31, 2014, partial-settlement petition before the probate

court approved it. Following the November 25, 2014, hearing regarding

the October 31, 2014, partial-settlement petition, the probate court, that

same day, entered an order approving the October 31, 2014, partial

settlement. That order also directed Linger to pay her attorney $1,344.47

and to pay court costs totaling $437, which included a fee in the amount

of $300 for the guardian ad litem.

Sometime in 2015, Huggins wrote the probate judge a letter asking

him to remove Linger from her position as the ward's conservator, but

the probate judge did not do so.

On August 24, 2018, Linger filed a petition for partial settlement of

the conservatorship for the period September 16, 2015, through May 31,

2018. The probate court entered an order setting the partial-settlement

petition for a hearing on September 19, 2018, and appointing a guardian

ad litem to protect the ward's interests at that hearing. Linger served

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Huggins with notice of the filing of the August 24, 2018, partial-

settlement petition and the September 19, 2018, hearing regarding that

petition.

In support of the August 24, 2018, partial-settlement petition,

Linger filed bank statements for two checking accounts that she had used

in administering the ward's estate. The bank statements included

thumbnail images of the deposit slips reflecting her deposits of the funds

that the conservatorship had received into those accounts. The bank

statements also included thumbnail images of the front page of the

checks that had been written on those accounts expending funds from the

conservatorship. The thumbnail images of the deposit slips were

annotated with handwritten notes indicating the source of the funds

deposited, and the thumbnail images of the checks were annotated with

handwritten notes indicating the purpose of each check. However, Linger

did not file any receipts or invoices verifying the accuracy of either the

handwritten notes regarding the deposit slips or the handwritten notes

regarding the checks. Huggins testified that she had not filed a written

objection to Linger's August 27, 2018, partial-settlement petition before

the probate court approved it.

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On September 19, 2018, the probate court held the scheduled

hearing and, that same day, entered an order approving the August 24,

2018, partial-settlement petition. That order also directed Linger to pay

her attorney $950 and to pay court costs totaling $1,077, which included

a guardian ad litem fee in the amount of $250.

The ward died testate on December 13, 2020. The ward's will, which

he had executed on April 26, 2009, nominated Judy Huggins Whitener,

one of his daughters, as his executrix and nominated Huggins as his

alternate executrix. After the ward's death, Whitener declined to serve

as the ward's executrix, and Huggins petitioned the probate court to

admit the ward's will to probate and to grant her letters testamentary.

On May 7, 2019, the probate court admitted the ward's will to probate

and granted Huggins letters testamentary.

On May 10, 2022, the trial court entered an order removing the

ward's conservatorship from the probate court to the trial court. On

December 28, 2022, Linger filed a petition for final settlement of the

conservatorship in the trial court.

The trial court entered an order setting Linger's final-settlement

petition for hearing on February 6, 2023, and appointing a guardian ad

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litem. Linger began her testimony on February 6, 2023; however, before

she completed her testimony, the trial court, at Huggins's request,

recessed the hearing until April 11, 2023, so that Huggins's attorney

could confer with her because she was not present in court on February

6, 2023. On March 23, 2023, Huggins filed a written objection to the final

settlement and a motion to reopen the partial settlements that the

probate court had approved when the conservatorship was pending in

that court. Among other things, Huggins's objection to the final

settlement asserted that Linger had failed to file vouchers in support of

her accounting as required by Alabama law.

On April 11, 2023, the trial court resumed the hearing that it had

begun on February 6, 2023. At that hearing, Linger completed her

testimony, and Huggins testified. During the hearing, the witnesses

referred to documents that supported the final-settlement petition;

however, they were neither filed with that petition nor introduced into

evidence at the hearing and, therefore, are not in the record on appeal.

After both parties had rested their cases, both parties and the trial court

agreed on the record that both parties would file posttrial briefs on May

10, 2023.

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However, on May 8, 2023, two days before the deadline for the

parties to file their posttrial briefs, the trial court entered a final

judgment approving the final settlement, ratifying the two partial

settlements that the probate court had previously approved, and

awarding Linger a commission in the amount of $42,775 for her service

as the ward's conservator. On May 10, 2023, the day the trial court and

the parties had agreed that both parties would file their posttrial briefs,

Huggins filed a postjudgment motion and a letter brief. In her letter brief,

Huggins presented the arguments that, she said, she would have

presented in her posttrial brief if the trial court had afforded her an

opportunity to file that brief before entering its final judgment. Huggins's

letter brief asserted, among other things, that the trial court should not

approve either the partial settlements or the final settlement because,

Huggins said, Linger had not supported either of her partial-settlement

petitions or her final-settlement petition with vouchers as required by

Alabama law.

On August 8, 2023, Huggins's postjudgment motion was denied by

operation of law pursuant to Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P. Thereafter,

Huggins timely filed a notice of appeal to this court. On December 20,

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2023, this court transferred the appeal to our supreme court for lack of

jurisdiction. On July 17, 2024, our supreme court transferred the appeal

back to this court.

Standard of Review

This appeal presents only a question of statutory interpretation.

Linger argues that the ore tenus rule dictates that we affirm the trial

court's judgment because, she says, that rule requires us to presume that

the trial court's findings in her favor are correct. However, the ore tenus

rule does not govern our review of this case; instead, our review is de novo

because the only question presented is one of law. See Scott Bridge Co. v.

Wright, 883 So. 2d 1221, 1223 (Ala. 2003) (An appellate court "reviews

de novo a trial court's interpretation of a statute, because only a question

of law is presented.").

Analysis

On appeal, Huggins argues that the trial court erred in approving

the final settlement of the conservatorship and in ratifying the partial

settlements that the probate court had approved when the

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conservatorship was pending in that court1 because, she says, Linger

failed to file "vouchers" in support of her partial- and final-settlement

petitions. In pertinent part, § 26-5-2, Ala. Code 1975, provides that "the

conservator must, at least once in three years, file in the court of probate

an account of his or her guardianship, accompanied with the vouchers

showing his or her receipts and disbursements …." (Emphasis added.) In

pertinent part, § 26-5-4, Ala. Code 1975, provides that, on the day set for

the hearing regarding the partial settlement, "the court must proceed to

examine the vouchers and to audit and state the account, requiring

evidence in support of all such vouchers or items of the account as may

be contested or as may not on examination appear to the court to be just

and proper …." Regarding final settlements of conservatorships, § 26-5-

8, Ala. Code 1975, provides that "[t]he conservator … must file in the

court of probate a full account of the conservatorship, accompanied by the

vouchers …." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, § 26-5-10, Ala. Code 1975,

provides that, at the hearing on the final-settlement petition, "the court

1As will be discussed later in this opinion, under certain
circumstances, §§ 26-2A-147, 26-5-6, and 26-5-15, Ala. Code 1975,
authorize a reexamination of partial or intermediate settlements when
the court hears the petition for final settlement of a conservatorship.
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must proceed to examine the vouchers and to audit and state the account,

requiring evidence in support of all such vouchers or items of the account

as may be contested or as may not on examination appear to the court to

be just and proper …." (Emphasis added.)

The Alabama Code of 1975 does contain a definition of the term

"vouchers." Moreover, the parties have not cited any caselaw in which an

Alabama court has defined that term as it is used in the Alabama

statutes pertaining to conservatorships.

Statutes requiring guardians2 to file "vouchers" in support of their

settlement petitions have been codified since the Alabama Code of 1823,

although the language regarding vouchers used in the Alabama Code of

1823 varied somewhat from the language used in the precursors of the

present code sections, which were codified in the Alabama Code of 1886.

2Before January 1, 1988, under Alabama law, the term "guardian"

included both the fiduciary capacity now referred to by the term
"guardian" and the fiduciary capacity now referred to by the term
"conservator." See § 26-2A-1, Ala. Code 1975, Comment. The Alabama
Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act, § 26-2A-1 et seq.,
Ala. Code 1975 which became effective January 1, 1988, "recognize[s] two
fiduciary capacities–namely, that of a 'guardian,' who is 'of the person'
and analogous to a parent, and that of a 'conservator,' who is 'of the
property' and more closely analogous to a trustee." Vreeland v. Marshall,
584 So. 2d 809, 810 n.1 (Ala. 1991); see § 26-2A-1, Ala. Code 1975,
Comment.
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Compare Chapter X, § 24, Ala. Code 1823, with §§ 2454, 2456, 2460, and

2462, Ala. Code 1886. The language used in §§ 2454, 2456, 2460, and

2462, Ala. Code 1886, remained substantially the same in the

corresponding code sections of the Alabama Codes of 1896, 1907, 1923,

1940 and 1975, before the legislature amended them by enacting the

Alabama Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act ("the

Act"), § 26-2A-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, which became effective January

1, 1988. See §§ 2339, 2341, 2345, and 2347, Ala. Code 1896; §§ 4429, 4331,

4434, and 4437, Ala. Code 1907; §§ 8202, 8204, 8208, and 8210, Ala. Code

1923; Tit. 21, §§ 129, 131, 135, and 137, Ala. Code 1940; and Act No. 87-

590, Ala. Acts 1987. In the Act, the legislature, among other things,

amended Title 26, Chapter 5, Article 1 of the Alabama Code of 1975,

which had previously referred to guardians settling guardianships, to

refer to conservators settling conservatorships instead, in accordance

with the differentiation between guardians and conservators effected by

the Act. See 1987 Ala. Acts, Act No. 87-590; and note 2, supra.

The term "voucher" is a legal term. Although Linger argues for

what she says is the commonly accepted definition of that term, our

supreme court has held that, " '[i]n the absence of a manifested legislative

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intent to the contrary, or other overriding evidence of a different

meaning, legal terms in a statute are presumed to have been used in their

legal sense.' " Crowley v. Bass, 445 So. 2d 902, 904 (Ala. 1984) (quoting

2A D. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.30 (4th ed. 1973))

(emphasis added).

The first edition of Black's Law Dictionary, which was published

five years after the Alabama Code of 1886, defined the term "voucher" as:

"A receipt, acquittance,[3] or release, which may serve as evidence of

payment or discharge of a debt, or to certify the correctness of accounts."

Black's Law Dictionary 1229 (1st ed. 1891). The fifth edition of Black's

Law Dictionary, which was in effect when the legislature enacted the Act,

defined "voucher" using the same language as the first edition. Black's

Law Dictionary 1414 (5th ed. 1979). According to the current edition of

Black's Law Dictionary, which is the eleventh edition and was published

in 2019, one definition of "voucher" is: "confirmation of the payment or

discharge of a debt; a receipt." Black's Law Dictionary 1890 (11th ed.

2019). Based on those definitions, we conclude that the term "voucher" as

3An "acquittance" is "[a] document by which one is discharged from

a debt or other obligation; a receipt or release indicating payment in full."
Black's Law Dictionary 30 (11th ed. 2019).
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used in §§ 26-5-2, 25-5-4, 26-5-8, and 26-5-10 means a receipt or release

confirming payment of a bill or debt either by the ward's estate or to the

ward's estate. This definition can also be inferred from the language of §

26-5-2 stating that that the conservator must file, at least once in three

years, an account of the conservatorship accompanied "with the vouchers

showing his or her receipts and disbursements …." (Emphasis added.)

Contrary to what we conclude is the proper definition of "voucher"

as used in the relevant statutes, Linger argues that our supreme court

has implied that the term "vouchers" should be given a broad definition

such as "evidence or proof" rather than a narrow legal definition such as

a receipt or release confirming payment of a bill or debt either by the

ward's estate or to the ward's estate. In support of that argument, she

cites Newman v. Reed, 50 Ala. 297, 300 (1874), and Savage v. Benham,

11 Ala. 49, 52-53 (1847). In Newman, a guardian sought a final

settlement of the guardianship for which he was responsible. The wards

objected to certain credits that the guardian claimed that he was entitled

to in his accounting. With respect to the credits pertinent to the present

appeal, the wards objected on the ground that no vouchers had been filed

in support of them. The probate court disallowed those credits, and the

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guardian appealed. Regarding those disallowed credits, our supreme

court stated: "There is no proof or vouchers to sustain these items. They

were, therefore, properly refused as credits by the court on the trial

below, though, upon sufficient proof, by voucher or otherwise, they were

proper items of credit in such a case as this." Newman, 50 Ala. at 300

(emphasis added). We interpret our supreme court's statement to mean

that a "voucher" is a particular form of proof rather than meaning that

the word "voucher" is synonymous with the word "proof" as Linger

contends. Otherwise, our supreme court would not have referred to

"proof, by voucher or otherwise." Our supreme court's language implies

that, although a "voucher" is a particular kind of proof, the word

"voucher" is not coextensive with the word "proof." Regarding Savage, we

note that the pages of the Alabama reporter cited by Linger are not part

of our supreme court's opinion in that case and, therefore, have no legal

effect.

Having determined the definition of "vouchers" as used in the Act,

we turn to the two partial or intermediate settlements that the trial court

ratified. In reviewing Huggins's challenge to those settlements, we must

first determine whether Alabama law authorized the trial court to

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reexamine the presence or absence of vouchers supporting those partial

or intermediate settlements when it examined the final settlement.

There are three Code sections that pertain to the reexamination of partial

or intermediate settlements when the lower court examines the final

settlement. Those Code sections are §§ 26-2A-147, 26-5-6, and 26-5-15,

Ala. Code 1975. In pertinent part, § 26-2A-147 provides:

"An order after notice and hearing allowing an intermediate
account of a conservator is a final adjudication as to liabilities
concerning the matters considered in connection therewith.
Thereafter, at any time prior to final settlement, the account
may be reopened by the court on motion or petition of the
conservator or ward or other party having an interest in the
estate for amendment or revision if it later appears that the
account is incorrect either because of fraud or mistake."

(Emphasis added.) Section 26-5-15 echoes § 26-2A-147, providing, in

pertinent part, that, after the court has approved a partial or

intermediate settlement, "the account may be reopened by the court on

motion or petition of the conservator or ward or other party having an

interest in the estate for amendment or revision if it later appears that

the account is incorrect either because of fraud or mistake." (Emphasis

added.) Section 26-5-6, Ala. Code 1975, provides: "Upon the final

settlement, a partial settlement must be taken and presumed as correct,

but any item of the account may be reexamined and, if, on reexamination,

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it is found incorrect, the item must be disallowed or allowed only so far

as its correctness may appear."

All three Code sections deal with the same subject, i.e.,

reexamination of partial or intermediate settlements of conservatorships

when the lower court examines the final settlement. Statutes that deal

with the same subject are in pari materia. See Ex parte R.D., 313 So. 3d

1119, 1125 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020). Statutes that are in pari materia should

be construed together to ascertain the meaning and intent of each. Id.

Where possible, courts should resolve statutes that are in pari materia to

form one harmonious plan and give uniformity to the law. Id.

Construing §§ 26-2A-147, 26-5-15, and 26-5-6 together to form one

harmonious plan, we conclude that they together provide that, upon final

settlement, a court may reexamine a partial or intermediate settlement

but only to determine whether it is in error because of fraud or mistake.

As so construed, the presence or absence of vouchers to support a partial

or intermediate settlement is not by itself a ground for reexamining a

partial or intermediate settlement when a court examines the final-

settlement petition.

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Furthermore, we note that Linger gave Huggins notice of the two

partial- or intermediate-settlement petitions and notice of the hearings

regarding those petitions, yet Huggins did not object to those petitions on

the ground that they were not supported by vouchers before the probate

court approved them. In Vreeland v. Marshall, 584 So. 2d 809, 812 (Ala.

1991), our supreme court affirmed a judgment approving the final

settlement of a guardianship estate where the guardian had not filed

vouchers because the parties opposed to the final settlement had not

timely filed objections to the final settlement before the lower court

approved it. In effect, our supreme court held that the parties opposed to

the settlement had waived the guardian's failure to file supporting

vouchers because they had not timely filed objections to the final

settlement before the lower court had approved it. Based on the holding

in Vreeland, we conclude that, even if Alabama law authorized the trial

court to reexamine the partial or intermediate settlements to determine

whether they were supported by vouchers, Huggins waived the absence

of vouchers because she had not timely filed an objection asserting the

absence of vouchers as a ground for denying approval of those partial or

intermediate settlements before the trial court approved them. See

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Vreeland. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgment insofar as it

ratified the partial settlements that the probate court had approved when

the conservatorship was pending in that court.

Regarding the final settlement, however, it is undisputed that

Huggins timely filed an objection to that settlement, asserting, among

other things, that Linger had failed to file vouchers in support of her

petition. Although the parties referred to documents pertaining to the

final settlement during their testimony, they did not introduce them into

evidence and, consequently, the record does not contain any documents

verifying the accuracy of the receipts and disbursements shown on the

final accounting. Therefore, the final-settlement petition did not satisfy

the requirement of § 25-5-8 that it be accompanied by vouchers, and, as

a result, the trial court erred in approving it in the absence of the

required vouchers. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment

insofar as it approved the final settlement.

Conclusion

In summary, we conclude that a "voucher" for purposes of the Act

is a receipt or release verifying payment of a bill or debt either by the

ward's estate or to the ward's estate. We affirm the trial court's judgment

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insofar as it ratified the partial settlements at issue because we conclude

that there is no statutory basis to reexamine them on the ground that

they were not supported by vouchers and, even if there were such a basis,

Huggins waived her objections on that ground by failing to file an

objection to them in a timely manner. We reverse the trial court's

judgment insofar as it approved the final settlement because we conclude

that Linger failed to properly support her petition with vouchers. We

remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.

Lewis, J., concurs in the result, without opinion.

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