Fredrick Zackery v. Lucretia Huntley (Appeal from Etowah Circuit Court: CV-23-70).

Rel: September 20, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
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ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
SPECIAL TERM, 2024
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CL-2024-0127
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Fredrick Zackery

v.

Lucretia Huntley

Appeal from Etowah Circuit Court
(CV-23-70)

FRIDY, Judge.

Fredrick Zackery appeals from a judgment of the Etowah Circuit

Court ("the circuit court") awarding damages to Lucretia Huntley in her

action against Zackery for workers' compensation benefits and unpaid

wages. For the reasons set forth herein, we dismiss the appeal to the
CL-2024-0127

extent that it arises from that aspect of the judgment adjudicating

Huntley's claim relating to her on-the-job injury with instructions to the

circuit court to dismiss that claim, and we reverse as unsupported by the

evidence that aspect of the judgment adjudicating Huntley's claim for

unpaid-wages.

Background

Zackery is a member of Renaissance House, LLC ("Renaissance").

Renaissance hired Huntley in late July 2021 to work in a group home.

Huntley worked at the group home throughout the month of August

2021. In the latter part of that month, Huntley was injured by a fire in

the kitchen of the group home. She stayed off work for the following week.

She quit her job with Renaissance on August 30, 2021.

In May 2023, Huntley filed an action against Zackery in the Etowah

District Court ("the district court"). In her handwritten complaint, she

asserted that Zackery had not paid her for all the hours she had worked

at the group home and that he had not compensated her for the injury

she had sustained and for her pain and suffering. She sought a judgment

of "$3,000+". Zackery filed an answer in which he denied that he was

responsible for her claims. He wrote that Huntley had worked only

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twenty-one days and that she had caused the fire in the kitchen. He

stated that she called out from work on August 23, 2021, that she

presented a doctor's excuse on August 24 excusing her from work until

August 29, and that, on August 30, she told her supervisor that she was

not going to return to work.

On August 24, 2023, following a bench trial, the district court

entered a judgment in favor of Huntley for $1,150. Huntley filed a motion

to amend the judgment with attachments, which the district court

denied. Zackery filed an appeal to the circuit court.

The circuit court held a trial de novo on January 2, 2024, at which

both parties appeared pro se. Zackery described Huntley as "an employee

for 21 days in the company that I own." Seemingly to clarify the target of

Huntley's claims, the circuit-court judge asked Huntley whether her

"claim against Zackery is actually against Renaissance House, LLC," to

which Huntley responded in the affirmative. Under further questioning

from the circuit-court judge, Huntley confirmed that her request for

"$3,000+" in damages was based on pain and suffering from the injury

that she had sustained and for the hours she had worked but for which

she had not been paid.

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The circuit court and the parties spent a large part of the hearing

discussing the number of hours Huntley had worked during August 2021,

how much of that time was considered overtime, the amount that she had

been paid during that period, and how much she was still owed, if

anything. Because of how we resolve the appeal, there is no reason to

detail the testimony and documentary evidence showing the parties'

differing positions on how many hours Huntley had worked and whether

she was still owed wages. It is sufficient to note that Huntley testified

that she had earned wages of $2,820 but that she had been paid only

$1,067.81 in a single check dated August 30, 2021, for a difference of

$1,752.19. That August 30 check was drawn on a bank account in the

name of Renaissance. Testimony and documentary evidence indicated

that Huntley was given a second check dated September 15, 2021, for

$541.91, which was also drawn on a bank account in the name of

Renaissance. Huntley testified that she did not cash that check because

the words "final pay" were written in the memo line of the check and, she

said, she was told that if she cashed that check, she would have no further

recourse against Zackery to obtain the remaining wages she believed that

she was owed.

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Regarding her claim relating to her on-the-job injury, Huntley

testified that she had been burned by a fire that had started in the

kitchen of the group home when she was cooking broccoli on the stove.

She testified that, after she had been injured and had gone to the doctor,

she had asked Zackery for a "workmen's comp form," and that Zackery

had replied that he did not have such a form and that she should use her

own insurance. Zackery testified in response that the fire in the kitchen

had been a grease fire caused by Huntley frying fish and that Huntley

had never applied for workers' compensation benefits.

On January 30, 2024, the circuit court entered a final judgment in

which it awarded Huntley $1,752.19 in addition to the $541.91 check

Renaissance had already provided to her. The judgment further provided

that if the check had expired, Zackery was to reissue a check in the same

amount to Huntley.

Zackery, represented by counsel, filed a motion for a new trial or to

alter, amend, or vacate the judgment. Among other things, he argued

that the evidence did not support the award of damages. He also

contended that he had not employed Huntley, but, instead, that

Renaissance had employed her. As a result, he argued, he could not be

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liable to her personally for unpaid wages and workers' compensation

benefits. The circuit court denied Zackery's postjudgment motion.

Zackery appeals.

Analysis

We turn first to Huntley's claim for benefits relating to her on-the-

job injury, which falls under the Workers' Compensation Act, § 25-5-1 et

seq., Ala. Code 1975. Zackery contends that the district court did not have

jurisdiction over that claim and, as a result, the circuit court did not

properly obtain jurisdiction over that claim in its capacity as an appellate

court. We agree.

Section 25-5-81(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975, provides:

"In case of a dispute between employer and employee or
between the dependents of a deceased employee and the
employer with respect to the right to compensation under this
article and Article 2 of this chapter, or the amount thereof,
either party may submit the controversy to the circuit court
of the county which would have jurisdiction of a civil action in
tort between the parties."

This section "grants to the circuit courts and the judges power to adjust

controversies under the [Workers' Compensation] Act." 2 Terry A. Moore,

Alabama Workers' Compensation § 24:3 (2d ed. 2013). As this court has

noted, "Workmen's Compensation cases are required to be brought in

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circuit court regardless of amount sought." Baggett v. Webb, 46 Ala. App.

666, 672, 248 So. 2d 275, 280 (Civ. App. 1971).

In this case, the undisputed evidence showed that Huntley's injury

was an on-the-job injury that was subject to the Workers' Compensation

Act. See § 25-5-52, Ala. Code 1975 (providing that Workers'

Compensation Act provides exclusive basis for compensation for "injury

… occasioned by an accident … proximately resulting from and while

engaged in the actual performance of the duties of his or her employment

and from a cause originating in such employment"). Indeed, the parties

and the circuit court referred to her injury claim as a claim under the

Workers' Compensation Act throughout the litigation. However, Huntley

did not bring her claim in the circuit court; instead, she filed it in the

district court, which did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim.

Because the district court lacked jurisdiction over Huntley's

Workers' Compensation claim, the judgment the district court entered,

to the extent that it adjudicated that claim, was void. See Hilgers v.

Jefferson Cnty., 70 So. 3d 357, 361 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010) ("Because the

district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Jefferson County's

complaint, its judgment is void."). Because a void judgment cannot

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support an appeal, Zackery's appeal of the district court's judgment did

not properly bring before the circuit court Huntley's workers'

compensation claim for de novo adjudication. See id. This is true, even

though Huntley's workers' compensation claim could have originated in

the circuit court. See id.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc. v.

Butler, 630 So. 2d 413, 416 (Ala. 1993) (" 'Jurisdiction limitations to hear

and determine the case remain the same as were imposed upon the court

from which the appeal arose. The appellate jurisdiction of the superior

court may not be enlarged by pointing to that court's original jurisdiction

which might have been invoked had the proceeding been initiated there.' "

(quoting Rojas v. Kimble, 89 Ariz. 276, 361 P.2d 403, 406 (1961))). Thus,

to the extent the circuit court's judgment purported to adjudicate

Huntley's claim under the Workers' Compensation Act on appeal from

the district court's judgment, that portion of its judgment is void. We

therefore dismiss that part of Zackery's appeal directed to the circuit

court's adjudication of Huntley's workers' compensation claim with

instructions to the circuit court to dismiss that claim.

We turn next to Huntley's claim for unpaid wages. Zackery

contends that Renaissance was Huntley's employer, not him. He argues

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that he did not enter into an employment contract with Huntley or

guarantee Renaissance's debts and liabilities. Thus, he argues, he could

not personally be liable to Huntley. We agree.

As Zackery points out, a limited liability company is a legal entity

distinct from its members. See Merrick v. Merrick, 321 So. 3d 1268, 1271

(Ala. Civ. App. 2020). According to § 10A-5A-3.01, Ala. Code 1975, which

is part of the Alabama Limited Liability Company Law, § 10A-5A-1.01 et

seq., Ala. Code 1975, "[a] member of a limited liability company is not

liable, solely by reason of being a member, for a debt, obligation, or

liability of the limited liability company or a series thereof, whether

arising in contract, tort, or otherwise."

Although Huntley testified that she worked for Zackery, the only

reasonable inference arising from the evidence, taken as a whole, is that

Huntley was hired by and worked for Renaissance, not Zackery. Indeed,

under questioning by the circuit court, Huntley admitted that her claims

actually were against Renaissance rather than Zackery. And the

employment, pay, and other documents entered into evidence showed

that Huntley worked for Renaissance, not for Zackery personally.

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Huntley did not assert her claims against Renaissance, her

employer. Instead, she asserted her claims against Zackery, who, as a

member of Renaissance, is not liable to her for her employment-related

claims. Because Zackery was not liable to Huntley on her claims, the trial

court erred in entering a judgment in favor of Huntley and against him

personally. As a result, the circuit court's judgment, to the extent that it

rested on Huntley's claim for unpaid wages, is due to be reversed.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we dismiss the appeal to the extent that it

arises from that aspect of the judgment adjudicating Huntley's claim for

workers' compensation benefits arising from her on-the-job injury with

instructions to the circuit court to dismiss that claim, and we reverse as

unsupported by the evidence that aspect of the judgment adjudicating

Huntley's unpaid-wages claim.

APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND

REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Lewis, JJ., concur.

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