State of Alaska v. Winona M. Fletcher

FOR PUBLICATION
In the Court of Appeals of the State of Alaska
State of Alaska,
Petitioner,
v.
Winona M. Fletcher,
Respondent.
rial Court Case No. 3AN-11-12161CI
Court of Appeals No. A-14351
Order
Petition for Review
Date of Order: August 9, 2024
T
Before: 	Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Terrell, Judges.
In Fletcher v. State, this Court held that Article I, Section 12 of the Alaska
Constitution requires a sentencing judge to consider a juvenile offender’s youth and the
attendant characteristics of youth (the Miller factors 1 ) before the court can sentence a
juvenile tried as an adult to the functional equivalent of life without parole. 2 We further
held that a juvenile offender can only be constitutionally sentenced to the functional
equivalent of life without parole if there is an on-the-record sentencing explanation that
either explicitly or implicitly finds that the juvenile offender is one of the “rare” juvenile
offenders “whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” 3 We then remanded Fletcher’s
case to the superior court to determine whether this new constitutional rule applied to
cases like Fletcher’s, which are on collateral review. 4
1 	See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477-78 (2012).
2 	Fletcher v. State, 532 P.3d 286, 290, 311 (Alaska App. 2023).
3 	Id. at 308 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80).
4 	Id. at 325-26.

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File No. A-14351 – pg. 2
The superior court subsequently issued a written order, ruling that the new
constitutional rule was retroactive under Judd v. State.5 The State now petitions for
review of that decision, arguing that the superior court’s retroactivity ruling is
erroneous. For the reasons explained in this order, we grant the State’s petition and
affirm the superior court’s ruling.
Why we affirm the superior court’s retroactivity ruling
The Judd test requires the court to consider three factors when deciding
whether a new constitutional rule applies to cases that are on collateral review. These
three factors are: “(1) the purpose to be served by the new standards; (2) the extent of
the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards; and (3) the effect on
the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.”6 For the
most part, these factors involve questions of law to which we apply our independent
judgment.7
5 	See Judd v. State, 482 P.2d 273 (Alaska 1971), overruled on other grounds by
Charles v. State, 326 P.3d 978 (Alaska 2014). In Charles v. State, the Alaska Supreme
Court distinguished between “limited (‘direct review’) retroactivity” — i.e., when a new
constitutional 	rule 	applies 	retroactively 	to 	cases 	on 	direct 	review 	— 	and 	“full
retroactivity”— i.e., when a new constitutional rule applies retroactively to cases on
collateral review after the conviction is considered final. See Charles, 326 P.3d at 982. In
Charles, the Alaska Supreme Court held that new constitutional rules automatically apply
to cases on direct review. Id. at 984-85. Therefore, Fletcher already applies to cases on
direct review. However, whether Fletcher is fully retroactive and applicable to cases
already on collateral review is determined by the three-part Judd test. See id. at 985 n.66;
State v. Smart, 202 P.3d 1130, 1138-40 (Alaska 2009) (using the three-part Judd test to
determine whether Blakely is fully retroactive and explaining that the Judd test is at least
as protective as the federal full retroactivity test under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989)).
6 	Smart, 202 P.3d at 1140 (citing Judd, 482 P.2d at 277-78).
7 	Id. at 1134.

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The first factor — the purpose to be served by the new rule — “generally
takes precedence over the other two factors[.]”8 Thus, “[w]here the major purpose of
new constitutional doctrine is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial which
substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the
accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials, the new rule [is to be] given complete
retroactive effect” and no further analysis is required.9 Conversely, “where the purpose
of a new constitutional standard is not to minimize arbitrary or unreliable fact findings,
but to serve other ends, retroactive application has generally been denied.”10
Here, the purpose to be served by the new constitutional rule relates to the
integrity and fairness of a juvenile offender’s sentence. That is, the new constitutional
rule helps ensure that children are recognized as constitutionally different than adults
for purposes of criminal sentencing and that only “irreparably corrupt” juvenile
offenders are sentenced to the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of
parole.11 The new rule also helps ensure that the trial court’s sentencing is informed by
the new brain and social science that underpin the United States Supreme Court
8 	Fletcher, 532 P.3d at 325.
9 	Rutherford v. State, 486 P.2d 946, 952-53 (Alaska 1971).
10 	Id. at 953.
11 	Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479-80 (2012); see also Montgomery v. Louisiana,
577 U.S. 190, 206-10 (2016).

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decisions in Roper v. Simmons, 12 Graham v. Florida,13 Miller v. Alabama, 14 and
Montgomery v. Louisiana.15
Because the new rule enhances the accuracy and integrity of a juvenile
offender’s criminal sentence, the superior court concluded that the first Judd factor
weighed in favor of full retroactivity. However, because the new rule related only to the
accuracy and integrity of a defendant’s sentence rather than their underlying conviction,
the court concluded that the first factor was not dispositive and that consideration of the
other two factors was also required. We agree with both parts of this analysis.
The second factor — the extent of the reliance by law enforcement
authorities on the old standards — requires the court to look at past practices and to
determine how reasonable that past reliance was.16 The superior court concluded that
it was reasonable for state officials to rely on the then-existing case law governing
sentencing juvenile offenders as adults. That is, because there was ample case law prior
to Fletcher indicating that youthfulness should be considered when sentencing juvenile
offenders as adults, it was not unreasonable for officials to assume this more general
consideration of age was adequate, without the specific consideration of the Miller
factors. The superior court also later concluded that, like society in general, crime
12 	Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570-71 (2005).
13 	Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010).
14 	Miller, 567 U.S. at 471-72, 476-80.
15 	Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 213.
16 	See State v. Smart, 202 P.3d 1130, 1146 (Alaska 2009).

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victims have an interest in the finality of criminal cases.17 We agree with this analysis
and therefore find that this factor weighs against full retroactivity.
Lastly, we agree with the superior court that the third Judd factor — the
effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards
— weighs in favor of full retroactivity. To evaluate this factor, courts look at “the entire
number of retroactivity claims that will be brought and ask[] how those cases will affect
the administration of justice.”18 Thus, in evaluating the retroactivity of the Blakely v.
Washington19 decision in State v. Smart, the Alaska Supreme Court held that this factor
weighed against full retroactivity because there were 250 Blakely claims already filed
and “hundreds more” that would likely be filed if Blakely were held to be fully
retroactive.20 As the court noted, “[r]eview of even 250 cases would take up a great
amount of court and staff time.”21 Moreover, if a defendant’s sentence is overturned,
“more time will be spent re-litigating aggravating factors”:
Prosecutors will have to reevaluate whether to bring the
charges, old witnesses will have to be found, juries may have
to be empaneled, court time will be spent relitigating,
defense 	attorney 	and 	prosecutor 	time 	will 	be 	spent
relitigating, and Department of Corrections time will be
spent transporting convicted defendants to the courtroom. [22]
17 	Alaska Const. art. I, § 24.
18 	Smart, 202 P.3d at 1146.
19 	Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
20 	Smart, 202 P.3d at 1146.
21 	Id.
22 	Id.

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The court therefore concluded that making Blakely retroactive would create “a major
administrative problem” while not actually advancing an important constitutional
principle.23
The opposite is true here. Making Fletcher fully retroactive would
advance an important constitutional principle — namely, ensuring that juveniles tried
as adults in the Alaska courts are not subject to cruel and unusual punishment and that
only juveniles who have been found to be “irreparably corrupt” will remain sentenced
to de facto life without parole sentences. 24 Moreover, advancing this important
constitutional principle will not create a major administrative problem because there
are, by all accounts, only a handful of cases that would be directly affected by a fully
retroactive Fletcher holding.25
Indeed, in Fletcher, we identified only one other juvenile (Brian Hall) who
received a sentence above the 135-year-sentence that Fletcher received.26 We also
noted that there were two other juveniles who had received sentences above 99 years to
23 	Id. (quoting Smart, 146 P.3d at 44 (Coats, C.J., dissenting)).
24 	See Fletcher v. State, 532 P.3d 286, 296-303 (Alaska App. 2023) (describing how
the landscape of juvenile sentencing has changed since Miller and discussing legislative
changes and state court decisions); see also State v. Booker, 656 S.W.3d 49, 61-63
(Tenn. 2022) (noting that juvenile homicide offender’s sentence of 60 years with parole
eligibility after serving 51 years made Tennessee “a clear outlier in its sentencing of
juvenile homicide offenders” because the vast majority of jurisdictions (thirty-six states)
allow juvenile homicide offenders to be parole eligible after serving, at most, 35 years).
25 	We note that, even if Fletcher was not given full retroactivity, the Fletcher rule
would still apply to any future sentencings and to any cases that were still on direct review
when Fletcher was decided. See Charles v. State, 326 P.3d 978, 985 (Alaska 2014).
26 	Fletcher v. State, 532 P.3d 286, 321 n.223 (Alaska App. 2023) (citing Hall v. State,
1999 WL 34000714 (Alaska App. Mar. 10, 1999) (unpublished) (159 years with parole
eligibility after 53 years)).

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serve.27 We then remanded the case to the superior court for further proceedings on
retroactivity, which provided the State an opportunity to put forward any additional
statistics.
Notably, the State did not identify any additional cases where juvenile
offenders had received lengthy sentences akin to the four cases already identified in
Fletcher. But, in its motion before the superior court, the State pointed out that there
were currently six cases on collateral review in which juvenile defendants who were
tried as adults have filed motions to correct their sentences or applications for post-
conviction relief seeking to apply the Fletcher rule retroactively to their sentences. The
State acknowledged that these defendants “might not prevail on their claims” because
they may not have sentences that qualify as de facto life without parole sentences. But
the State noted that the claims would nevertheless have to be “entertained and litigated”
in at least some capacity because our decision in Fletcher did not definitively resolve
what constitutes a de facto life without parole sentence.
We agree with the State that we must look at the total number of claims
that may be filed, in addition to the number of claims for which some form of relief
may be granted.28 But we disagree that the two sets of claims weigh equally heavily.
The time that it will take to resolve cases where the juvenile offender has a colorable
claim of a de facto life without parole sentence will obviously take longer than cases
27 	Id. (citing Watkinson v. State, 980 P.2d 469, 470, 473-74 (Alaska App. 1999);
Gonzales 	v. 	State, 	2014 	WL 	4176179, 	at 	*11-13 	(Alaska 	App. 	Aug. 	20, 	2014)
(unpublished)).
28 	See Smart, 202 P.3d at 1146 (“Judd asks what effect retroactive application will
have on the administration of justice, not how many appeals might be successful. Full
retroactive application thus looks at the entire number of retroactivity claims that will be
brought and asks how those cases will affect the administration of justice.”).

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where the sentence is not long enough to qualify as a de facto life without parole
sentence.
In any event, the proceedings on remand have largely confirmed that the
effect on the administration of justice of making Fletcher fully retroactive will be
minimal and that the number of directly affected cases will be significantly less than
the hundreds at issue in the Smart decision.29
This is not to ignore the impact that any resentencings may have on the
participants and the administration of justice. In its role as amicus, the Office of
Victims’ Rights urges us to consider the potential trauma to the victim that resentencing
may pose. We agree that the interests of crime victims should be considered as part of
the Judd analysis.
As an initial matter, we note (as the superior court did) that crime victims
are not a monolithic group and that different victims may have different reactions to a
potential resentencing. As the superior court observed:
[T]he Court must consider the interests of all crime victims.
It is well understood that not everyone reacts to trauma in the
same way. Many, like the victims here, feel revictimized
every time the case reaches a new stage of litigation. Many
others choose never to interact with the justice system. And
still others forgive the perpetrators, and state their sincere
hope for the offenders’ rehabilitation. Even the range of
reactions discussed here oversimplifies the complex and
shifting 	emotions 	of 	crime 	victims. 	The 	Court 	cannot
emphasize enough that all reactions are equally valid and
deserve the Court’s respect.
The superior court acknowledged that the retroactivity ruling “will
undoubtedly have some impact” on the victims of the affected cases and the court
recognized that a victim’s right to a timely disposition is adversely affected by any
29 	See id.

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resentencing that may occur. But the court also concluded that a victim’s constitutional
right to be treated with dignity and fairness was not implicated by the retroactivity
decision because “the justice system can protect both the constitutional rights afforded
to all defendants and ensure that victims are treated with dignity, fairness, and
respect.” 30 As the superior court observed, “Rights are not a finite commodity —
affording rights to a defendant does not necessarily lessen the rights of a victim.”
We agree that the rights of victims should be safeguarded through this
process and that it is possible to address the potential constitutional infirmities in
juvenile offenders’ sentences on collateral review without undermining the important
rights that crime victims have in our system. 31
Ultimately, having balanced the three Judd factors, we agree with the
superior court’s conclusion that the Fletcher decision should be fully retroactive to
those cases on collateral review where juvenile offenders have received the functional
equivalent of a life without parole sentence. Accordingly, the State’s petition is
GRANTED and the superior court’s order ruling that Fletcher is fully retroactive is
AFFIRMED.
Entered at the direction of the Court.
Clerk of the Appellate Courts
________________________________
Meredith Montgomery
30 	See Alaska Const. art. I, § 24.
31 	See id.

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File No. A-14351 – pg. 10
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