amendment-xviii•Constitution of Connecticut (2025 publisher edition) — Amendment XVIII
Constitution of Connecticut (2025 publisher edition) — Amendment XVIII
amendment-xviiiConnecticut Const. Amendment XVIIIConstitution
Publisher edition notice: The publisher identifies this compilation as revised to January 1, 2025. It preserves the annotated original 1965 text and all ratified amendments, alongside the Revisors' unofficial convenience version incorporating extant amendments. The latter does not supersede the original Constitution and amendments; later changes have not been independently verified.
Amendment XVIII Ratified amendment and publisher annotations.
ARTICLE XVIII.* *Adopted November 24, 1982. Effect of division into departments. 78 C. 547. Legislature cannot exercise or confer judicial power. 36 C. 446; see 8 C. 547; 3 Dal. 395. But it can give more effect to evidence than it had at common law; 66 C. 163; shift the burden of proof or order of taking testimony; 79 C. 351; enlarge methods of remedial justice; 78 C. 100; can repeal forfeiture recoverable in qui tam action, to affect pending cases; Id., 428; can pass law affecting procedure in pending action; 81 C. 217; or reasonably modifying statute of limitations in such case. 77 C. 528. But it cannot disturb a final judgment of a court; 83 C. 353; see 71 C. 43; and as to probate decree, see 3 Dal. 386; nor authorize change in application of charitable trust. 85 C. 309. Nature of judicial and legislative functions. 73 C. 18; 78 C. 428. Functions overlap; administrative body may perform judicial acts; committing witness for failure to testify. 65 C. 36. The courts cannot exercise legislative functions; 33 C. 586; nor administrative functions; as in control of manner of construction of street railway; 69 C. 576; 78 C. 301; but they may review exercise of administrative powers to see if they are properly exercised; 80 C. 623; 84 C. 40; 85 C. 517; so question whether lands are “seriously damaged” may present judicial question; 84 C. 24; so power of municipal- ity to impose conditions on street railway. 74 C. 102; 80 C. 623. Legislature can leave it to courts to determine towns benefited by highway change; 68 C. 153; so apportionment of expense of reconstructing bridge crossed by highway and street railway. 88 C. 471; 89 C. 537. Functions of courts on appeals in liquor license matters. 65 C. 146; 76 C. 686; 79 C. 4; 81 C. 454; 89 C. 310. Courts cannot review valuation of land by special commission to assist assessors. 73 C. 646. Question of common convenience and necessity is judicial. 71 C. 50. This article not violated by act of 1925 authorizing tax collectors to depute sheriff or other officer to serve tax warrant. 106 C. 231. Proceeding by petition to judge for res- toration of elector’s name to party list is judicial, not administrative. 124 C. 275–277. Statute delegating to milk admin- istrator power to set minimum prices held not to afford requisite standards of policy and procedure. 126 C. 623. Act re- quiring mayor’s approval of application for license to sell gasoline held not to set up sufficient guide for mayor’s discretion. 128 C. 701–705. Plaintiffs cannot seek approval of zoning board and at same time attack the constitutionality of its power to act as an unlawful delegation of legislative authority. 137 C. 36. Qualification for admission as attorney a judicial matter and not under legislative control. One object of this article was to divest general assembly of judicial power. 145 C. 222. Limits of power of legislature and judicial branch discussed. 147 C. 48. Objection based on uncon- stitutional delegation of legislative power overcome. 152 C. 57–59. Nonjudicial powers or duties cannot be imposed on superior court judge. 157 C. 150. Provisions of general assembly for administration of and procedure in probate court upheld. Distinction as to powers of regulation of constitutionally established courts and lower courts discussed. Id. Spe- cial act permitting the incorporation of a charitable trust association is an infringement on the judicial branch’s power to interpret a bequeath. 161 C. 312. Statute held to infringe upon judicial power. Analysis and history. 166 C. 501. Cited. 168 C. 212. Art. prohibits legislature from exercising those powers which are inherently within the sphere of the judi- ciary. Test for determining unconstitutionality of statute which infringes upon judicial power. 171 C. 395. Connecticut’s state colleges are not a separate, fourth department of state government. State board of higher education is within exec- utive department. State’s interest in enforcing separation of powers is compelling state interest which justifies dual-job ban restrictions. 175 C. 586, 595, 596, 602, 609. Exercise of judicial power by a retired judge who has been designated a state referee is not unconstitutional. 177 C. 173. Cited. 179 C. 552; 181 C. 292; 182 C. 253; 183 C. 17; Id., 313; 184 C. 569. The Sentence Review Act (Secs. 51-194 through 51-197) does not violate the separation of powers provisions since those provisions do not preclude the legislature from authorizing the judicial department to vacate its own judg- ments. 187 C. 109. Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (chapter 735a) does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers in present circumstances. 190 C. 510. Cited. 191 C. 336; 192 C. 234; Id., 704; 193 C. 180. Constitutional sepa- ration of powers cited. Id. Cited. Id., 670; 197 C. 554; 199 C. 618. Sec. 4-85(b) not in violation of separation of powers doctrine. 200 C. 386. Cited. 203 C. 63; Id., 641; 206 C. 40. Separation of powers clause of state constitution cited. Id. Cited. 209 C. 579; Id., 652; 211 C. 289; Id., 555; 212 C. 83. Separation of powers provisions cited. Id. Cited. Id., 368; Id., 570; 213 C. 54; Id., 373; Id., 570. Principle of separation of powers cited. 214 C. 256. Unconstitutional usurpation of legislative power cited. 215 C. 616. Cited. 217 C. 532. “... the existence of discretionary judicial authority over oral argument does not automatically preclude some measure of legislative regulation.” Cited. Id., 671. Separation of powers cited. Id. Constitutional provision applies to state, not municipalities. 220 C. 584. Separation of powers doctrine cited. Id. Cited. 221 C. 331. Separation of powers principle cited. Id. Cited. 222 C. 166. Distribution and separation of powers -- 58 of 129 -- Art. XVIII AMENDMENTS TO THE 201 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT cited. Id. Cited. Id., 799. Separation of powers cited. Id. Exercise of judicial power confined to members of judiciary cited. Id. Encroachment on judiciary power cited. Id. Cited. 224 C. 168. Separation of powers provisions cited. Id. Cited. Id., 917. Separation of powers doctrine cited. Id.; 225 C. 355. Separation of powers cited. Id., 450. Cited. 226 C. 314; 227 C. 207. Separation of powers doctrine cited. Id., 566. Cited. Id., 641; 229 C. 1. Separation of powers cited. Id., 193. Cited. 230 C. 183. Separation of powers cited. Id. Separation of powers principal cited. 232 C. 65. “... separation of powers doctrine does not obliterate the obligation and authority of the judicial branch to investigate and discipline pros- ecutors.” 234 C. 579. Separation and distribution of powers cited; mandates of separate magistry cited. Id. Principles of separation of powers cited. 236 C. 1. Separation of powers cited. 238 C. 1. Cited. Id., 389; Id., 653; 242 C. 17. Separation of powers doctrine cited. Id. Statute that grants prosecutor discretion to recommend transfer of juvenile from criminal docket to juvenile docket does not violate principles of separation of powers by impermissibly infringing upon the judi- cial function. 245 C. 93. Composition of Elections Enforcement Commission as provided by Secs. 9-7a(a) and 9-7b(a) does not violate separation of powers doctrine. 255 C. 78. Sec. 1-210(b)(10) does not violate the separation of powers clause because it preserves powers of the judicial branch and does not delegate to Freedom of Information Commission the power to define the attorney-client privilege. 260 C. 143. Public act which prohibits trial court from releasing on bail any person who has been convicted of an offense “involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another person” violates the separation of powers provision because it presents significant interference with or- derly functioning of Superior Court’s judicial role. 261 C. 492. No immunity to governor from subpoena to testify before inquiry committee performing investigative, fact-finding advisory duties re impeachment since there is a compelling government need for all relevant information from third parties and from the governor, and misconduct of governor not exempt from accountability because not all executive power lies with governor and there is no categorical immunity from a legislative subpoena. 271 C. 540. Sec. 51-198(c) does not constitute a legislative encroachment on judicial powers because it does not purport to remove power from the judicial branch and confer it upon another branch nor does it in- terfere with the orderly performance of the Supreme Court’s essential functions by assigning it additional, nonjudicial duties, but rather promotes that orderly performance by permitting the court to exercise its core function in the most ef- ficient manner. 293 C. 641. Debt negotiation statutes, Secs. 36a-671 to 36a-671e, as limited by Sec. 36a-671c(1), offend the separation of powers provision of the Connecticut Constitution and are unenforceable with respect to Connecticut attorneys engaged in the bona fide practice of law. 318 C. 652. A legislature can exercise its right to limit judicial discre- tion in sentencing by bestowing on prosecutors the right to make decisions that may curtail judicial discretion because it is the legislative branch that has the power to define a crime and set its punishment. 329 C. 770. Cited. 3 CA 497. Separation of powers provision of the Connecticut Constitution cited. Id. Constitutional princi- ple of separation of powers cited and discussed. 4 CA 339. Due process cited. 6 CA 469. Cited. 7 CA 164. Grievance committee mechanism does not supplant or diminish inherent and plenary power of superior court to regulate and discipline its officers; court has discretion to grant or deny motion to amend; potential separation of powers issue cited. 9 CA 464. Separation of powers doctrine cited. 14 CA 322. Cited. Id., 688. Separation of powers cited. 19 CA 495. Unlawful delegation of legislative power cited. 22 CA 193. Cited. 23 CA 221. Separation of powers cited. Id. Cited. Id., 657. Constitutional doctrine of separation of powers cited. 25 CA 421; judgment reversed, see 222 C. 299. Cited. 28 CA 145. Sec. 51-183b not in violation of separation of powers; doctrine of separation of powers cited. 29 CA 157. Doctrine of separation of powers cited. 39 CA 632. Cited. 46 CA 545. Violation of separation of powers cited. Id. Administrative suspension of driver’s license by Department of Motor Vehicles and prosecution by the court of underlying offense of driving while intoxicated does not violate separation of powers provision. 51 CA 4. The recalculation of presentence confinement credits by Commissioner of Correction in wake of Harris v. Commissioner of Correction did not violate separation of powers doctrine because commissioner, an agent of the executive branch, implemented policy in accordance with judiciary’s interpretation of a statute promulgated by legislature and petitioner failed to demonstrate any improper commingling of governmental powers. 104 CA 793. Separation of powers doctrine was not violated where court allowed petitioner to accept plea deal after finding in- effective assistance of counsel in failing to advise him to accept plea deal, since such action did not impermissibly transfer control of plea bargaining process from executive to judicial branch. 120 CA 560. Trial court’s sua sponte dismissal of prosecution for creating a public disturbance in violation of Sec. 53a-181a, midway through defendant’s direct examination and predicated on trial judge’s view that the state’s time is more precious than a $75 infraction, infringed on a core legislative function in violation of the separation of powers mandate of state constitution; it is the responsibility of the state’s attorneys, not the judiciary, to determine when, who, why and whether to prosecute for violations of law. 134 CA 346. Cited. 11 CS 489. Demurrer to special defense of state questioning constitutionality of special act allowing plaintiff to sue state for negligence overruled. 20 CS 496. Cited. 38 CS 426; 40 CS 394; 41 CS 90; 42 CS 57; Id., 129. Sepa- ration of powers cited. Id., 526; 44 CS 297. Constitutional separation of legislative, executive and judicial functions and powers cited. 45 CS 11. Administrative adjudication under Sec. 20-342(h) by defendant Department of Consumer Protection concluding that plaintiff swimming pool contractor violated Home Improvement Act by failure to return homeowner’s deposit after his cancellation of contract and defendant’s subsequent ordering of restitution under that statute to homeowner found not to be an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers provision of the state constitution. 48 CS 248. Presumed legislature intended to exclude from operation of “right to know” statutes the exclusive power over ad- mission to the bar vested in superior court. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 313, 321. No judicial power is conferred by constitution on general assembly, either directly or as incident of legislative power, and general assembly cannot confer it. Id., 318. (Distribution of powers. Delegation of regulatory authority. Disapproval of administrative regulations.) Article second of the Constitution is amended to read as follows: -- 59 of 129 -- 202 AMENDMENTS TO THE Art. XX CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them confided to a separate magistracy, to wit, those which are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to another. The legislative department may delegate regulatory authority to the executive department; except that any administrative regulation of any agency of the executive department may be disapproved by the general assembly or a committee thereof in such manner as shall by law be prescribed.
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