State v. M. G.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
May 15, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal Nos.
2025AP2883 Cir. Ct. Nos. 2023TP102
2023TP103
2025AP2884 2023TP104
2025AP2885 2023TP105
2023TP106
2025AP2886 2023TP107
2025AP2887
2025AP2888
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

APPEAL NO. 2025AP2883

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO G.E.G., A PERSON UNDER
THE AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

M.G.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
Nos. 2025AP2883
2025AP2884
2025AP2885
2025AP2886
2025AP2887
2025AP2888

APPEAL NO. 2025AP2884

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO C.J.-J.G., A
PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

M.G.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL NO. 2025AP2885

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO A.R.G., A
PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

M.G.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

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APPEAL NO. 2025AP2886

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO S.R.G., A
PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

M.G.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL NO. 2025AP2887

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO K.J.G., A
PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

M.G.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

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Nos. 2025AP2883
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2025AP2888

APPEAL NO. 2025AP2888

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO N.H.-J.G., A
PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

M.G.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEALS from orders of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
JOSEPH R. WALL, Judge. Affirmed.

¶1 COLÓN, P.J.1 Molly appeals from orders terminating her parental
rights to her six children: Ginny, Charlie, Alicia, Sybill, Katie, and Nick. 2 Molly
argues that the circuit court erred when it found that the State had proven by clear
and convincing evidence that the Department of Milwaukee Child Protective
Services (DMCPS) had made reasonable efforts to provide her with court-ordered
services, and that Molly had failed to assume parental responsibility for three of

1
These appeals are decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(e) (2023-
24). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version unless otherwise noted.
2
We refer to the family in this matter by initials or pseudonyms to maintain
confidentiality and privacy, in accordance with WIS. STAT. RULE 809.19(1)(g).

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her six children. For the following reasons, we disagree with Molly, and affirm
the orders of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In April 2022, DMCPS received a referral alleging that Nick, who
was then eight months old, had missed a weight check after being diagnosed with
failure to thrive. The initial assessment worker who responded determined that the
conditions of the home were unsafe because of excessive clutter, choking hazards
within the reach of small children, and concerns that parental responsibilities for
the younger children were being placed on the older children.

¶3 After intensive in-home services failed, the children were taken into
temporary physical custody by DMCPS on April 11, 2022. The circuit court
entered identical CHIPS dispositional orders on November 14, 2022. The orders
required that DMCPS make reasonable efforts to assist Molly in (among other
services) completing a psychological evaluation and following all the
recommendations therein, and securing medication management, taking all
medications as prescribed.

¶4 Molly completed the required psychological evaluation on January
25, 2023. The evaluating doctors found that Molly’s cognitive abilities ranged
from “Extremely Low” to “Borderline.” They further stated in the psychological
evaluation report that Molly “may have trouble understanding and expressing
herself with language, engaging in problem solving, attending and storing
information in her mind (e.g., remembering instructions or what was said in
appointments), and may struggle to sustain her concentration or make decisions.”

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They also diagnosed Molly with posttraumatic stress disorder and an unspecified
mood disorder.

¶5 On June 30, 2023, the State petitioned to terminate Molly’s parental
rights. As grounds, the State alleged that the children were in continuing need of
protection or services (continuing CHIPS) and that Molly had failed to assume
parental responsibility.

¶6 A court trial was held in September and October of 2024. At trial,
Molly testified that she had cooperated with the psychological evaluation and had
gone to therapy, though she admitted she had attended inconsistently, and had
switched therapists multiple times. Molly recalled that the psychological
evaluation report recommended that she engage in therapy and take all her
medications as prescribed. Molly testified that she was currently on four
medications and was taking all of them as prescribed, and that she did not need
any help with medication management.

¶7 Molly further testified that, initially, she had scheduled all
appointments for the children herself, but eventually needed the children’s
caregivers to do it. She confirmed that she was aware of all of her children’s
appointments and attended most of them. She listed that she attended Sybill’s GI,
urology, therapy, occupational therapy, and primary care appointments; Alicia’s
and Katie’s therapy appointments; Charlie’s physical therapy appointments; ear
appointments for Alicia and Nick, Alicia’s and Charlie’s IEP and speech therapy
appointments, and dental appointments for all of the children. Molly stated that
she was on good terms with the children’s foster parents and would text them for

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updates about the children. One of the foster parents also testified about
communicating with Molly, specifically about Sybill’s dietary restrictions ahead
of visits.

¶8 The circuit court also heard testimony from the ongoing case
manager, Sarena Farber. Farber agreed that Molly had completed the
psychological evaluation, and stated that she had discussed the results of the
evaluation with Molly and had offered to make referrals for therapy and
medication management. According to Farber, Molly initially declined a referral
for therapy but later changed her mind; however, the therapist to which Farber
referred her did not take Molly’s insurance. Molly was able to find a therapist on
her own in February 2023. At the time of trial, Molly had seen three therapists,
each of which she had found on her own. Farber testified that she provided a copy
of the psychological evaluation and documents from the CHIPS case to only one
of Molly’s therapists.

¶9 According to Farber, Molly originally told Farber that she didn’t
need a referral for medication management because she could manage her own
medications. Farber testified that she encouraged Molly to see a psychiatrist for
medication management at least four or five times, but Molly never took her up on
the offer. At one point, Molly told Farber that she was not taking one of her
medications as prescribed, and Farber again encouraged Molly to discuss it with
her doctor.

¶10 At the conclusion of the trial, the circuit court found that the State
had proved by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate

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Molly’s parental rights to all six children. It concluded that the State had proven
the ground of continuing CHIPS as to all six children, and the ground of failure to
assume parental responsibility as to the three youngest children. Molly moved for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the basis of insufficient evidence, which
the court denied.

¶11 The dispositional phase of the case took place on February 26, 2025.
Molly did not appear at the hearing, as she had checked herself into a mental
health facility. The circuit court heard testimony from the foster parents and
Farber, and ultimately decided that it was in the best interests of the children to
terminate Molly’s parental rights.

¶12 Molly now appeals. Additional facts will be discussed as needed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶13 The State has the burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence,
every element of the grounds alleged in the petition. See St. Croix Cnty. DHHS v.
Michael D., 2016 WI 35, ¶28, 368 Wis. 2d 170, 880 N.W.2d 107. On review, this
court examines all of the testimony and other evidence presented in analyzing
whether “any credible evidence” supports the verdict. Sheboygan Cnty. DHHS v.
Tanya M.B., 2010 WI 55, ¶49, 325 Wis. 2d 524, 785 N.W.2d 369. “Findings of
fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” WIS.
STAT. § 805.17(2). “The [circuit] court, not the appellate court, … resolve[s]
conflicts in the testimony, … and we review the evidence in the light most

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favorable to the findings made by the [circuit] court.” Tang v. C.A.R.S. Prot.
Plus, Inc., 2007 WI App 134, ¶19, 301 Wis. 2d 752, 734 N.W.2d 169.

DISCUSSION

I. The circuit court did not err when it found that the State had proved
by clear and convincing evidence that DMCPS had made “reasonable
efforts” to provide services to Molly.

¶14 Molly first argues that the State did not prove by clear and
convincing evidence that DMCPS made reasonable efforts to provide her with
services in helping her to fulfill the requirements of the CHIPS dispositional
orders. In particular, Molly asserts that DMCPS failed to make reasonable efforts
to help her follow all of the recommendations stemming from her psychological
evaluation, and to provide her with medication management.

¶15 The State is required to prove that DMCPS made a “reasonable
effort” to provide court-ordered services. WIS. STAT. § 48.415(2)(a)2.
“Reasonable effort” is defined as “an earnest and conscientious effort to take good
faith steps to provide the services ordered by the court which takes into
consideration the characteristics of the parent, … the level of cooperation of the
parent … and other relevant circumstances of the case.” Id.

¶16 The recommendations made in the psychological evaluation report
for Molly are organized by bullet point. Under the heading, “Psychiatry &
Psychotherapy,” are five sections. The first section recommends that Molly
“consult with a psychiatric provider to determine the best treatment for her
symptoms of PTSD and possible mood-related symptoms.” The second

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recommends that Molly “establish a long-term relationship with a mental health
professional to determine whether she may meet criteria for more specific
diagnoses that would better inform her treatment,” noting that Molly “may require
the use of motivational interviewing strategies to participate in services.” The
third recommendation states that Molly would likely “benefit from a strengths-
based and trauma-informed approach that [would] provide concrete ways to
understand and regulate her emotions and develop important skills.” It then lists
things that may be helpful for Molly to work on in therapy, including
“[i]dentifying and expressing strong negative emotions in a safe and comfortable
way,” “[i]nterception awareness for self-regulation, self-awareness, and problem
solving,” “[u]tilizing emotion-regulation and grounding strategies,” and
“[p]racticing taking others’ perspective and fostering empathy.”

¶17 The fourth recommendation lists certain adaptations in therapy that
Molly may benefit from, including “[a]djusting [the] pace of therapy and number
of ideas or themes addressed” and “[u]sing basic rather than abstract concepts …
that are developmentally appropriate and simplified language.” Finally, the fifth
recommendation lists therapeutic approaches that could be effective for Molly
given her concerns, including “Motivational Interviewing” and “Cognitive
Behavioral Therapy.”

¶18 Molly first asserts that DMCPS did not make reasonable efforts to
help her follow all recommendations in the psychological evaluation because its
efforts focused on only the first two bullet points of recommendations (i.e., that
Molly consult with a psychiatric provider and establish a long-term relationship
with a mental health professional), and Farber testified that she did not share the

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evaluation with two of Molly’s three therapists. Molly contends that the circuit
court failed to consider the fact that she ultimately had to find her own therapist
after the therapist to which Farber referred her did not take her insurance.

¶19 In addition, Molly argues that the State provided no evidence that
Farber made reasonable efforts to help her establish a long-term relationship with
a mental health professional. She points to the fact that there was no testimony
from Farber indicating that Farber had intended to place another referral for Molly
if she was unable to find a therapist on her own, nor that she helped Molly find
other therapists. In addition, she argues that the State provided no evidence that
Farber communicated with any of the therapists to ensure that they were following
the treatment plan recommended in the psychological evaluation report, nor did
the State call any of Molly’s therapists to testify to the sort of therapies provided
to Molly. Molly further points out that, of the three therapists Molly saw and
provided releases for, Farber only sent the psychological evaluation report to one
of them.

¶20 Thus, Molly argues that the State did not introduce any evidence that
Farber made an “earnest and conscientious effort to take good faith steps” to
ensure that any of Molly’s therapists were aware of the recommendations in the
psychological evaluation and were engaging in proper therapies with her. In
Molly’s view, there was no credible evidence supporting the circuit court’s
conclusion that DMCPS made a reasonable effort to provide her with services.

¶21 Molly’s understanding of the recommendations made in the
psychological evaluation report is confused. She incorrectly interprets the

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evaluation report to recommend that DMCPS fulfill each and every one of the
bullet points contained therein. However, a simple reading of the report on its
face, and as a whole, indicates that the majority of the bullet points were
recommendations for therapists, not DMCPS. The bullet points discussed ways in
which a therapist could best assist Molly and her mental and emotional needs, as
well as the types of therapies from which Molly would be most likely to benefit.
Molly’s interpretation of the report is erroneous because only the first two bullet
points were actual recommendations for services. Additionally, we point out that
it would be illogical for DMCPS to somehow be required to engage in therapies
with Molly, as Molly’s interpretation would require us to conclude.

¶22 Of the bullet points contained in the report that did apply to DMCPS,
we conclude that the court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it
found that the State had proven by clear and convincing evidence that DMCPS
had made reasonable efforts to help Molly find and engage with a therapist. The
evidence here sufficiently established that DMCPS made “reasonable efforts” to
make referrals and to try to get Molly to engage with court-ordered services;
however, a case manager cannot force a parent to engage with service providers.

¶23 In State v. Raymond C., 187 Wis. 2d 10, 522 N.W.2d 243 (Ct. App.
1994), Raymond C. appealed a circuit court order terminating his parental rights to
his two children, contending that the court erred when it concluded that the Eau
Claire County DHS had made a “diligent effort” to provide him with court-ordered

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services, as required by WIS. STAT. § 48.415(2)(b) (1993-94).3 Raymond argued
that, because he was developmentally disabled and unable to read, the County was
required to do more than its ordinary procedures for helping parents comply with
the court-ordered conditions for the return of their children. Raymond C., 187
Wis. 2d at 12. The court had imposed three conditions on Raymond for the return
of his children to the home: (1) that Raymond maintain contact with his children,
with contact as close to every other week as possible; (2) that Raymond maintain
at least monthly contact with the children’s social worker and keep the County
informed of any changes in his status; and (3) that Raymond maintain a residence
suitable and adequate to meet the needs of those who lived there. Id. at 13.

¶24 At trial, the circuit court heard evidence that, while Raymond was
developmentally disabled and unable to read, he had a driver’s license. Id. at 13.
The social worker assigned to the case knew that Raymond was developmentally
disabled, but testified that Raymond never told her he could not read. Id. The
social worker stated that she had approximately eight to ten conversations with
Raymond, most of which concerned his requests to have contact with the children.
Id. The social worker testified that, as far as she was aware, Raymond had had
two contacts with his children, and that he had not visited his children in quite

3
WISCONSIN STAT. § 48.415(2) (1993-94) stated that “[c]ontinuing need of protection or
services may be established by a showing of all of the following: … (b) That the agency
responsible for the care of the child and the family has made a diligent effort to provide the
services ordered by the court.” We held in M.P. v. Dane Cnty. DHS, 170 Wis. 2d 313, 331-32,
488 N.W.2d 133 (Ct. App. 1992) that “diligent effort” meant a “reasonable, earnest, and energetic
effort.”

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some time and had failed to show up at three visits he had arranged. Id. In
addition, Raymond failed to keep the social worker informed of his address. Id.

¶25 The social worker admitted that there was no case plan in place to
help Raymond meet the conditions of return; however, she stated that she was
often unable to facilitate Raymond’s completion of the court-ordered services
because Raymond failed to provide her with updated addresses and phone
numbers. Id. at 13-14. Based on the evidence provided, the circuit court
terminated Raymond’s parental rights, finding that Raymond had substantially
neglected the conditions established for the return of his children, and that the
County had made a diligent effort to provide Raymond with court-ordered
services. Id. at 14.

¶26 On appeal, this court concluded that the circuit court’s finding, that
the County had made a “diligent effort” to provide the services ordered by the
court, was not clearly erroneous. Id. at 16. We did so based on the fact that:
(1) while the social worker was unaware that Raymond could not read, she knew
that Raymond was developmentally disabled; (2) the County sent Raymond
numerous letters telling him to contact the social worker; (3) nothing in the record
indicated that, because of his developmental disability, Raymond was unable to
understand the nature of the correspondence sent to him, nor that the inability to
read deprived Raymond of an opportunity to understand the correspondence
because no one was available to read or explain it to him; (4) the social worker
testified she had eight to ten verbal conversations with Raymond; (5) much of the
County’s inability to facilitate Raymond’s completion of the court-ordered
conditions was attributable to Raymond’s failure to keep appointments he

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scheduled and to keep the County informed of his current address or phone
number; and (6) the County made earnest and energetic efforts to provide services
to Raymond and acted reasonably in light of Raymond’s disability. Id. at 16-17.

¶27 In the present case, Molly was initially resistant to any referrals to
therapy, indicating that she did not believe she needed it. Nevertheless, Farber
still made a referral to Wisconsin Community Services (WCS); however, that
provider did not accept Molly’s insurance. Farber did not make additional
referrals for therapy because Molly indicated that she had found her own therapist
by the time the WCS referral was rejected. Molly initially signed releases so that
Farber could exchange information with the therapy providers, but Molly was
inconsistent with therapy and was at one point discharged for nonattendance.

¶28 Although Molly switched providers multiple times and had
inconsistent attendance; Farber did send materials to the provider that Molly saw
for the longest period of time, including the psychological evaluation report, the
CHIPS petition, and permanency plans. Of Molly’s three therapists, she was with
two of them for about one month each—which the State argues was not a
sufficient period of time for case management to identify the therapist, get releases
signed, and information exchanged.

¶29 The circuit court found that Molly was “at times” cooperative, but
was “for the most part, very, very antagonistic and uncooperative” with Farber.
Molly was found to be “hostile” to Farber, and evidence was presented that Molly
went as far as blocking Farber’s phone number during the case, or otherwise
ignoring Farber’s attempts to communicate, schedule meetings, or provide other

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services. Additionally, the court found that that Farber went to “great, great
lengths … to provide [Molly] with the various services.” Thus, similar to the
parent in Raymond C., Molly’s own actions significantly interfered with the
ability of DMCPS to assist her in participating in therapy, and it was not erroneous
for the circuit court to find that DMCPS’s efforts to do so were reasonable.

¶30 Molly next argues that the State did not prove by clear and
convincing evidence that DMCPS made reasonable efforts to provide her with
medication management services. Molly points out that the CHIPS dispositional
order required DMCPS to provide “[m]edication [m]anagement” to ensure that
Molly “take all medications as prescribed.” Molly insists that the State did not
introduce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Farber attempted to understand
Molly’s medical needs.

¶31 At trial, Farber testified that, after Molly stated that she would work
with her primary care provider to manage her medications, Farber did not make a
referral for any kind of medication management. In addition, Molly argues that
Farber did not attempt to determine who Molly’s prescribing physician was.
Molly argues that the State introduced no evidence demonstrating that Farber
made any attempt to ensure Molly was managing her medications, other than
asking Molly if she was taking them as prescribed. When Molly indicated that she
was not taking her medications as prescribed, Farber did not attempt to assist
Molly in taking them as prescribed, other than telling her to discuss it with her
physician. In addition, Farber never looked at Molly’s prescription bottles to see
what they were, how they should be taken, or to confirm whether Molly was
taking them correctly. There was no testimony indicating Farber requested that

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Molly sign a medical release so that she could see the medications Molly was
taking. Thus, Molly insists that the court incorrectly put the onus on her, rather
than on Farber, to provide the medication management services.

¶32 As stated previously herein, the statute requires that DMCPS make
“reasonable efforts” to provide the services mandated in the dispositional order.
However, Molly’s argument as to the steps that DMCPS should have taken goes
beyond “reasonable” into the realm of “extraordinary.” Molly provides no
authority for her contentions that Farber should have insisted on making a referral
for medication management even after Molly declined it and insisted that she
could handle it herself; that Farber should have somehow “ensure[d]” that Molly
was taking her medications as prescribed; or that Farber should have somehow
assisted Molly in taking them as prescribed. Farber was not required to personally
manage Molly’s medications. Farber testified that she discussed a psychiatry
referral with Molly, but Molly told Farber she did not need it, stating that she
could manage her own medications. Molly later claimed to be seeing a
psychiatrist through her primary care provider, but never gave Farber sufficient
information to confirm it, although Farber tried to discuss it with Molly at least
four or five times.

¶33 Nothing in the records suggest that Farber is qualified to delve into
the realm of prescription medication or offer any sort of advice or assistance other
than to recommend to Molly that she consult with a physician. It would have been
ill-advised, even careless, for Farber to do so. The records clearly indicate that
Molly’s own resistance to Farber’s efforts made it impossible for Farber to move
forward with providing any sort of medication management services. The circuit

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court properly concluded that the State had proved by clear and convincing
evidence that DMCPS made reasonable efforts to help Molly participate in
medication management services.

II. The circuit court did not err when it found that the State had
proved by clear and convincing evidence that Molly had failed to
assume parental responsibility for her three youngest children.

¶34 Under WIS. STAT. § 48.415(6)(a), failure to assume parental
responsibility is “established by proving that the parent … of the child [has] not
had a substantial parental relationship with the child.” A “substantial parental
relationship” is defined as “acceptance and exercise of significant responsibility
for the daily supervision, education, protection and care of the child.” WIS. STAT.
§ 48.415(6)(b). In evaluating whether the parent has a substantial parental
relationship with the child, the court considers multiple factors, including (but not
limited to) “whether the person has expressed concern for or interest in the
support, care or well-being of the child, whether the person has neglected or
refused to provide care or support for the child,” id., and “whether the parent,
while caring for the child, exposed the child to a hazardous living environment,”
Tammy W–G. v. Jacob T., 2011 WI 30, ¶38, 333 Wis. 2d 273, 797 N.W.2d 854.

¶35 Molly argues that the State did not prove by clear and convincing
evidence that she failed to assume parental responsibility for her three youngest
children, Sybill, Katie, and Nick. She particularly takes issue with the court’s
conclusion that she did not have a substantial parental relationship with them.
Molly points out that the circuit court distinguished the two sibling groups (the

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three oldest children and the three youngest) based on how long they had been in
out-of-home care.

¶36 While the circuit court acknowledged that, once children go into
foster care, it is very difficult for a parent to have a substantial relationship with
them, Molly insists that the court did not adequately take into account her efforts
to do so. She argues that, once the children were removed from the home, she
parented them as much as DMCPS would allow her. Molly points out that she
attended supervised visits with Sybill, Katie, and Nick weekly until DMCPS
reduced the visits to every other week. At trial, Farber estimated that Molly
attended 70-75% of visits, and acknowledged that sometimes DMCPS was the one
that had to cancel the visit, not Molly. In April 2024, visitation with the three
youngest was suspended at the request of the children’s guardian ad litem, and
Molly was instructed to meet with the children’s therapist until they felt she was
ready for family therapy.

¶37 Molly also argues that she attended Sybill and Katie’s parent/teacher
conferences (Nick was too young for school at the time). Molly acknowledged
that, early in the case, Sybill had disclosed that her paternal grandfather had
sexually assaulted her, and Molly had not believed her; however, at trial, Molly
testified that she was working with Sybill’s therapist to understand the disclosure,
and stated that she would not live with her father-in-law again in the future. Molly
also points out that she attended almost all of the children’s many medical
appointments, including routine check-ups and dental appointments; Nick’s ear
appointments; Sybill’s occupational therapy, urology, and GI appointments; and
therapy appointments for Katie and Sybill.

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¶38 Molly thus insists that the circuit court did not adequately take her
efforts to assume parental responsibility into account, and instead relied too much
on the fact that the children were in out-of-home care. We disagree.

¶39 While the circuit court did take into consideration the fact that the
three youngest children had been in out-of-home care for a significant part of their
lives, it acknowledged that being in out-of-home care served as an obstacle to
Molly’s ability to parent her children. The fact that the children were in out-of-
home care was not the focus of the court’s findings on this issue; the evidence on
the whole still demonstrated that Molly had neglected the children and had
exposed them to hazardous living conditions. See Tammy W–G., 333 Wis. 2d
273, ¶38.

¶40 The circuit court heard testimony that, at removal, the home was in a
deplorable condition, with the floors soaked in cat urine, garbage and toys
covering the floor, and many animals in the home. In addition, the home
conditions did not improve even after removal, and Molly and her husband refused
home management services. The older children were often made to be responsible
for the feeding and care of the three youngest children, and Molly and her husband
placed the responsibility of cleaning the home on the children. After being forced
to leave the home, Molly and her husband chose to live in their vehicle rather than
seeking out other housing options such as shelters. The court also heard testimony
that Molly admitted to occasionally biting the children as a form of physical
discipline.

20
Nos. 2025AP2883
2025AP2884
2025AP2885
2025AP2886
2025AP2887
2025AP2888

¶41 Further, the court heard that Nick was not being fed properly despite
being diagnosed with failure to thrive. Nick therefore had to be hospitalized
multiple times; he gained significant weight while in the hospital but this slowed
when he would return home with Molly. In addition, Sybill had been diagnosed
with a food allergy which caused her to become ill when she was not following a
strict diet; despite this, Molly and her husband often fed Sybill restricted foods,
declined meetings or additional coaching on the matter, and indicated that they
were not interested in following the diet.

¶42 The State also provided evidence that the children were routinely
exposed to the paternal grandfather, who had a documented arrest history on at
least two occasions for sexual assault of other minor children. Alice had
demonstrated visible fear of the grandfather during visitation, and Sybill later
disclosed that he had sexually abused her. Molly disregarded and diminished all
of this evidence, continuing to request that the grandfather be allowed to visit with
the children, continuing to talk about the grandfather to the children, and testifying
that she did not believe he was a safety concern.

¶43 Overall, the evidence provided by the State was more than sufficient
to demonstrate that Molly had failed to assume parental responsibility for her three
youngest children. The majority of their lives were characterized by hazardous
living environments; neglect of their physical and emotional health; exposure to
sexual abuse; and disregard for their overall wellbeing. We therefore conclude
that the circuit court did not err in finding that the State demonstrated this by clear
and convincing evidence.

21
Nos. 2025AP2883
2025AP2884
2025AP2885
2025AP2886
2025AP2887
2025AP2888

CONCLUSION

¶44 For all of the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the orders of the
circuit court.

By the Court.—Orders affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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