State v. Brian L. Mendrzycki

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
April 9, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP432-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2020CF1317

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

BRIAN L. MENDRZYCKI,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Dane County:
CHRIS TAYLOR, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Blanchard, Kloppenburg, and Nashold, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2024AP432-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Brian L. Mendrzycki appeals a judgment
convicting him of two felony counts, following a jury trial. Mendrzycki argues
that his waiver of the right to counsel was invalid because the circuit court did not
inquire into his awareness of the disadvantages of self-representation. Mendrzycki
further argues that the court’s initial finding that he was competent to represent
himself is not supported by the record, and that the court should have required him
to have counsel to represent him at trial because he showed himself to be
incapable of presenting a prima facie defense. We reject these arguments and
affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

¶2 We present the procedural facts in detail because they are relevant to
all of Mendrzycki’s arguments.

¶3 Mendrzycki was charged with: stalking with the domestic abuse
assessment; identity theft for financial gain; and identity theft to harm the victim’s
reputation. See WIS. STAT. §§ 940.32(2m)(c), 973.055(1), 943.201(2)(a) and
(2)(c), 939.32 (2023-24).1 The charges followed a series of actions that
Mendrzycki allegedly took against his ex-girlfriend following the breakup of their
romantic relationship.

¶4 Mendrzycki was represented by counsel at his initial appearance and
at his bail hearing. Mendrzycki appeared without counsel at the preliminary
hearing on September 30, 2020. When asked by the circuit court if it was his
desire to waive his right to counsel, Mendrzycki replied, “At this time, yes.” The

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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court conducted a colloquy with Mendrzycki, as required under State v. Klessig,
211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997), to ensure the validity of Mendrzycki’s
waiver of the right to counsel. Specifically, the court said, “I need to make sure
you understand that you do have the right, in this case, to an attorney. Do you
understand that?” Mendrzycki replied, “I do understand that.” The court also
informed Mendrzycki that he had a constitutional right to represent himself. The
court explained the advantages of having an attorney and the disadvantages of
self-representation, pointing out that attorneys are trained in the law and that
Mendrzycki is not. The court further explained that a lawyer would “have
experience representing defendants in cases like these” and know what defenses to
raise, what facts to look for, and “what evidence might be relevant.” The court
asked Mendrzycki if it was still his desire to represent himself, and he responded,
“yes.”

¶5 The circuit court explained to Mendrzycki the charges and the
maximum imprisonment term and penalties that could be imposed, and
Mendrzycki confirmed that he understood. When the court asked Mendrzycki to
explain in his own words why he wanted to “proceed without an attorney,” he said
it was because he thought that the allegations in the complaint were exaggerated
and that he had tried to explain that to his counsel, but that his counsel was not
“convinced.” Mendrzycki further said, “I decided to pursue this on my own, based
on knowing the facts.”

¶6 The circuit court also questioned Mendrzycki about his age and
education. Mendrzycki said that he was 35 years old, had a bachelor’s degree in
civil engineering, and had been working as a civil engineer. When the court asked
if anyone had made “threats or promises” to induce him to waive his right to
counsel, Mendrzycki said, “No, your Honor.” Mendrzycki also confirmed that he

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understood that if he was indigent he could have counsel appointed for him.
Mendrzycki further confirmed that he was not under the influence of any drugs,
alcohol, or medication. Mendrzycki confirmed that he was “absolutely sure” that
he wanted “to proceed today without counsel.” At the end of the colloquy, the
court found that Mendrzycki was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily giving
up his right to counsel for the purpose of the preliminary hearing.

¶7 After the circuit court found probable cause that Mendrzycki
committed a felony, it asked him if he would like to proceed to arraignment.
Mendrzycki responded that he “would like to look into legal representation.” The
court urged him to do so and provided him with contact information for the State
Public Defender so that he could inquire to see if he was eligible. The court
adjourned the arraignment hearing for a later date, to give Mendrzycki time to
look into obtaining counsel.

¶8 At the arraignment hearing on October 20, 2020, Mendrzycki
appeared without counsel and said that it was his “desire to proceed with the
arraignment without counsel.” The circuit court asked whether Mendrzycki had
made any efforts to obtain counsel, and he responded that he had “considered it,”
but that he decided he did not “need counsel.”

¶9 At the arraignment, the circuit court again engaged in a colloquy
with Mendrzycki regarding the waiver of his right to counsel. The court again
explained the charges and the maximum penalties, and Mendrzycki confirmed that
he understood. Mendrzycki confirmed that he understood that he had a
constitutional right to a lawyer, that the State Public Defender would appoint a
lawyer for him if he could not afford one, and that he might qualify for a program
to hire counsel at a reduced rate. The court informed him that there were

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advantages to having a lawyer who was “schooled” in the law, which Mendrzycki
was not, since his professional training was in civil engineering. Echoing its
earlier admonitions to Mendrzycki, the court explained, “An attorney will be
aware of how to prepare your case in a way that might really ensure that you’re
more successful in your case” and that an attorney would be aware of defenses and
“different procedural outcomes.” The court asked, “Keeping all this in mind, is it
still your choice to proceed unrepresented?” Mendrzycki responded, “At this
time, yes, your Honor.”

¶10 When the circuit court asked him to explain in his own words why
he did not want an attorney, Mendrzycki said it was because he understood the
facts of the case and because he was “the one that’s most at risk” and had “the
most to lose based on the outcome of this case.” The court again inquired about
Mendrzycki’s educational background and age. The court asked whether he had
any mental health issues affecting his decision, and whether he had consumed any
alcohol, drugs, or other medications within the last 24 hours, and Mendrzycki said
no to all. The court again confirmed that no threats or promises had been made to
get Mendrzycki to give up his right to counsel. Following the colloquy, the court
stated, “[M]y strong recommendation continues to be for you to seek counsel in
your case, but for today I will find that you have knowingly, freely, and
voluntarily waived that right.” The court also found, again, that Mendrzycki was
competent to represent himself.

¶11 On November 13, 2020, Mendrzycki signed and filed a written
Waiver of Right to Attorney form. The form provided a detailed explanation of
the charges, the maximum penalties, his right to counsel, the advantages of having
an attorney, and the disadvantages of self-representation. Mendrzycki checked the
box that indicated he had “read and understood” these disclosures. Mendrzycki

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further attested that he had made the decision to represent himself “knowingly and
voluntarily,” without anyone making “promises or threats to” him or using “any
influence, pressure, or force of any kind.” At a status conference on
November 24, 2020, the circuit court referenced the waiver form and asked
Mendrzycki if it was still his desire to proceed without counsel, and Mendrzycki
responded, “Yes, ma’am, it is.”

¶12 At a motion hearing on March 16, 2021, the circuit court noted that
it had previously “found repeatedly that [Mendrzycki was] knowingly and
voluntarily representing” himself. The court again confirmed with Mendrzycki
that his intent was to represent himself, that he knew he had a right to an attorney,
and that no one had threatened him or promised him anything to give up that right.

¶13 At a status hearing on February 1, 2022, the State informed the
circuit court of the terms of its last, best offer to reach a negotiated plea agreement
with Mendrzycki. The court engaged in a colloquy with Mendrzycki to make sure
that he understood the terms of the State’s offer, and also that he understood the
nature of the charges he was facing if he proceeded to trial, and the maximum
penalties in the event of convictions. Mendrzycki said he understood but that he
was “electing to plead not guilty” and go to trial. The court asked Mendrzycki if
he still wanted to represent himself at trial and he responded, “That is correct, your
Honor.” The court again discussed the “perils” of self-representation, including
the fact that Mendrzycki would be responsible for conducting any legal research.
Mendrzycki confirmed that he understood.

¶14 At a pretrial hearing on February 7, 2022, the circuit court again
asked Mendrzycki if it was his “desire to proceed representing” himself at trial.
Mendrzycki confirmed that he still wanted to represent himself and told the court

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that he understood he had a “[c]onstitutional [r]ight to an attorney” and that, as to
his trial, he wanted to “waive that right.” The court continued the trial until April
to give Mendrzycki time to prepare.

¶15 On April 4, 2022, the trial commenced. At the outset, the circuit
court asked Mendrzycki whether it was still his desire to represent himself. He
replied, “Yes, your Honor.” The State called four witnesses at trial, all of whom
Mendrzycki cross-examined thoroughly.

¶16 After the State rested its case, the circuit court informed Mendrzycki
that he had a constitutional right to testify at trial and also a constitutional right to
remain silent, and that he had a decision to make. Mendrzycki told the court that
he wanted to testify. The court then engaged in a colloquy with him and,
following the colloquy, found that he made his decision to testify knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently. Mendrzycki proceeded to testify on his own behalf.

¶17 The jury found Mendrzycki guilty of stalking with electronic access
and of attempted identity theft for financial gain. The jury found Mendrzycki not
guilty of attempting to commit identity theft for purposes of reputational harm.
The circuit court entered a judgment convicting Mendrzycki of the stalking count
and identify theft count. The court withheld sentence and imposed three years of
probation.

DISCUSSION

¶18 Mendrzycki argues that the circuit court failed to inquire into his
awareness of the disadvantages of self-representation and that, therefore, his
waiver of the right to counsel was invalid. To establish a valid waiver of the right
to counsel, the circuit court must conduct an on-the-record colloquy to ensure that

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No. 2024AP432-CR

the defendant: “(1) made a deliberate choice to proceed without counsel, (2) was
aware of the difficulties and disadvantages of self-representation, (3) was aware of
the seriousness of the charge or charges against [the defendant], and (4) was aware
of the general range of penalties that could have been imposed on [the
defendant].” Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 206. If these conditions are not satisfied, the
circuit court must deny the request to proceed pro se; to do otherwise deprives the
defendant of the right to counsel. “Whether a defendant has knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily waived [the defendant’s] right to counsel requires the
application of constitutional principles to the facts of the case, which we review
independent of the circuit court.” Id. at 204.

¶19 Mendrzycki argues that, as to the second requirement for a colloquy
under Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 206, the circuit court did not adequately explain the
pitfalls of self-representation. Specifically, Mendrzycki asserts that, at the
preliminary hearing, the court did not at any time use the particular word
“disadvantages.” This is not accurate. The court at one point said, “We talked a
little bit about the advantages that a lawyer can provide to you, and we talked
about the disadvantages of self-representation and that you just don’t have the
legal background, the experience or the knowledge.” In addition to this statement,
the court explained at the preliminary hearing that attorneys are trained in the law
and that Mendrzycki is not. The court explained that, if self-represented,
Mendrzycki would be giving up the advantage of having a lawyer that would
“have experience representing defendants in cases like th[is]” and would know
what defenses, facts, and evidence might be relevant. The court asked, “Keeping
that in mind, do you still desire to represent yourself?” Mendrzycki answered in
the affirmative. Having reviewed the transcript of the preliminary hearing and

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No. 2024AP432-CR

considering it as a whole, we reject Mendrzycki’s argument that the court did not
adequately explain to him the pitfalls of self-representation.

¶20 Mendrzycki also asserts that, at the November 24, 2020 status
conference, when reviewing the written Waiver of Right to Attorney form, the
circuit court did not discuss the “disadvantages” section of the form with him or
confirm that he had read or understood it. However, Mendrzycki cites no legal
authority suggesting that the court had an obligation to do so. By the time of the
November 24, 2020 status conference, the court had already engaged in two on-
the-record colloquies with Mendrzycki regarding his right to counsel and his
decision to waive that right, at the preliminary hearing and at the arraignment.
Moreover, the waiver form provides on its face an explanation of the charges and
penalties, the right to counsel, the advantages of having an attorney, and the
disadvantages of self-representation. Mendrzycki checked boxes indicating that
he had “read and understood” this information and attesting that he had made the
decision to represent himself “knowingly and voluntarily,” without anyone making
“promises or threats to” him, using “any influence, pressure, or force of any kind,”
or telling him that he “should not ask for an attorney.” Mendrzycki signed and
dated the form. At the November 24, 2020 status conference, the court
acknowledged receipt of the completed waiver and asked Mendrzycki if it was still
his “desire to proceed without counsel today.” Mendrzycki said yes.

¶21 In addition to the colloquies regarding Mendrzycki’s waiver of
counsel that occurred at the preliminary hearing and at the arraignment, the circuit
court confirmed on the record at multiple later proceedings that Mendrzycki still
desired to represent himself and determined that he was competent to do so. The
court’s exchanges with Mendrzycki are described in detail above, and we will not
repeat them here. In sum, we are not persuaded that the court failed to inquire into

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Mendrzycki’s awareness of the disadvantages of self-representation, and we are
satisfied that the record establishes that the court had a strong record to determine
that his choice to proceed pro se was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

¶22 Mendrzycki next argues that the circuit court erred in finding that he
was competent to represent himself. A circuit court’s determination of whether a
defendant is competent to proceed pro se is reviewed on appeal under what is
“‘essentially a clearly erroneous standard of review.’” State v. Marquardt, 2005
WI 157, ¶21, 286 Wis. 2d 204, 705 N.W.2d 878 (quoting State v. Garfoot, 207
Wis. 2d 214, 224, 558 N.W.2d 626 (1997)). We will uphold a circuit court’s
determination that a defendant is or is not competent to represent himself unless
that determination is “‘totally unsupported by the facts apparent in the record.’”
Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 224 (quoted source omitted). To determine competency
for self-representation, the court considers “factors such as ‘the defendant’s
education, literacy, fluency in English, and any physical or psychological
disability which may significantly affect [the defendant’s] ability to communicate
a possible defense.’” Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 212 (quoting Pickens v. State, 96
Wis. 2d 549, 569, 292 N.W.2d 601 (1980), overruled on other grounds by Klessig,
211 Wis. 2d 194).

¶23 Mendrzycki argues that the circuit court erred in two respects when
it found him competent to represent himself. First, he contends that the court
failed to inquire into his mental health and emotional state. Second, he argues that
the court’s finding of competency did not meet the standard of competency for
self-representation. See State v. Imani, 2010 WI 66, ¶36, 326 Wis. 2d 179, 786
N.W.2d 40 (“Determining whether a defendant is competent to proceed pro se is a
higher standard than determining whether a defendant is competent to stand
trial.”).

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No. 2024AP432-CR

¶24 As to the first aspect, Mendrzycki argues that the circuit court
“failed to inquire into [his] emotional fixations on irrelevant matters,” his
difficulties communicating in court, and “his mental health issues.” These
arguments are without merit. The record reflects that the court did inquire about
Mendrzycki’s mental health, asking him explicitly if he had any “mental-health
issues that [affected his] decision” to represent himself, and he responded that he
did not. Relevant to Mendrzycki’s emotional and mental state, the court asked on
multiple occasions if he had consumed alcohol or drugs within the last 24 hours or
had been threatened or promised anything to give up his right to counsel.

¶25 In inquiring whether a defendant is competent to self-represent, the
circuit court is to concentrate on whether the defendant appears able to understand
the proceedings. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401 n.12 (1993). A court may
deny a defendant the right to self-represent only in narrow circumstances, such as
when the defendant has a serious mental illness that interferes with the defendant’s
ability to self-represent, even though the defendant is competent to stand trial if
assisted by counsel. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 178 (2008). In this case,
the court was not presented with evidence that Mendrzycki had a serious mental
illness that interfered with his ability to self-represent. The circuit court “‘is in the
best position to observe the defendant, [the defendant’s] conduct and … demeanor
and to evaluate [the defendant’s] ability to present at least a meaningful defense.’”
Imani, 326 Wis. 2d 179, ¶37 (quoted source omitted). Here, as reflected in the
summaries above, the court inquired about Mendrzycki’s mental health and
emotional state and found, based on his answers and the court’s observations of
him, that he understood the proceedings and was competent to represent himself at
trial. Because the court’s finding is not “‘totally unsupported by the facts apparent

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No. 2024AP432-CR

in the record,’” it must be upheld. See Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 224 (quoted source
omitted).

¶26 We turn next to Mendrzycki’s argument that the circuit court’s
finding of competency fails to meet Wisconsin’s standard of competence for self-
representation, which is a higher standard than the minimum requirements for
competency to stand trial. See Imani, 326 Wis. 2d 179, ¶36. We reject this
argument because the record shows that the court’s inquiry into Mendrzycki’s
competency to represent himself was properly focused on whether he was able to
understand the proceedings. See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 401 n.12. The court’s
unambiguous and patient colloquies with Mendrzycki included the court
ascertaining that he was 35 years old, had a civil engineering degree from the
University of Wisconsin, had been working as a civil engineer, and had not been
threatened or promised anything to give up his right to counsel. Each of these
facts supports the court’s determination that Mendrzycki understood the
proceedings and was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently exercising his right
to represent himself. The court did not err in finding that Mendrzycki was
competent to proceed pro se.

¶27 Mendrzycki also argues that the circuit court should have required
him to have counsel, and appointed counsel for him, because it was “painfully
obvious” that he was not competent to represent himself. This court has already
concluded that the circuit court did not err in finding that Mendrzycki was
competent to proceed pro se, and we will not further elaborate on that conclusion.
In addition, the record contradicts Mendrzycki’s argument that he was incapable
of presenting a prima facie defense. Mendrzycki demonstrated his understanding
of the trial proceedings by extensively cross-examining each of the State’s
witnesses at trial. Mendrzycki also successfully defended himself against one of

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No. 2024AP432-CR

the three charges, such that he was acquitted on the count of attempted identity
theft for purposes of reputational harm. We reject Mendrzycki’s contention that
he showed himself at trial to be so inept that the court should have stepped in and
appointed counsel for him. A defendant may not be forced, constitutionally, to
have representation by counsel when the defendant has voluntarily and
intelligently elected to exercise the right of self-representation. Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975). Mendrzycki fails to show that the court
should have required him to have counsel at trial.

CONCLUSION

¶28 For all the foregoing reasons, we uphold the circuit court’s
determinations that Mendrzycki was competent to represent himself and that his
waiver of the constitutional right to counsel was knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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