Jefferson County DHS v. G. J. J.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
March 5, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2025AP2491 Cir. Ct. No. 2024TP9

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO J.L.J.,
A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

G.J.J.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Jefferson County:
THERESA A. BECK, Judge. Affirmed.
No. 2025AP2491

¶1 GRAHAM, P.J.1 G.J.J. appeals an order that terminated her
parental rights to her son, J.L.J. G.J.J. argues that, when determining whether
termination of her rights was in J.L.J.’s best interests, the circuit court misapplied
the statutory factor that addresses whether J.L.J. “has substantial relationships with
the parent or other family members, and whether it would be harmful to the child
to sever these relationships.” See WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3)(c). I affirm because I
conclude that the circuit court’s reasoning fell within the limits of a proper
exercise of discretion.

BACKGROUND

¶2 J.L.J. was born when G.J.J., who was subject to guardianship and
protective placement orders, was 19 years old. Due to concerns that G.J.J. was not
able to care for a newborn, Jefferson County removed him from G.J.J.’s care two
days after his birth and placed him with foster parents. Around the same time, the
County filed a “CHIPS” petition: one seeking to have J.L.J. adjudicated a child in
need of protection and services. Eventually, the circuit court entered an order in
the CHIPS case that continued J.L.J.’s placement with his foster parents, and J.L.J.
remained in that placement throughout the termination of parental rights (“TPR”)
proceedings that are described below.

¶3 The County filed a petition to terminate G.J.J.’s parental rights to
J.L.J. when he was about two and a half years old. Around the same time, the
County also filed a petition to terminate G.J.J.’s parental rights to another child
who is younger than J.L.J. and had been placed with G.J.J.’s mother. G.J.J. did

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(e) (2023-24).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

2
No. 2025AP2491

not appeal the order terminating her rights to her younger child, and this appeal
solely concerns the TPR proceedings with respect to J.L.J.2

¶4 The petition alleged two grounds for termination: that J.L.J.
continued to need protection and services, and that G.J.J. had failed to assume
parental responsibility for J.L.J. After a court trial, the circuit court found that the
County proved both grounds, and the case proceeded to the dispositional phase. A
County social worker and G.J.J. both testified during an evidentiary hearing on
disposition.

¶5 After hearing the testimony and arguments from the parties, the
circuit court announced its decision. In so doing, the court addressed each of the
six statutorily mandated factors listed in WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3). With respect to
the third factor, whether J.L.J. “has substantial relationships with the parent or
other family members, and whether it would be harmful to [J.L.J.] to sever these
relationships,” § 48.426(3)(c), the court said the following:

Whether the children have substantial relationships
with the parent, other family members, and whether it’s
harmful to those children to sever those relationships.
Again, we have two children slightly different in age, but
still relatively young. They’re both under the age of five.
They were separated from their mother at birth, placed in
what appear to be very stable placements.

There was some testimony … that the children have
had supervised visitation with their mother for long periods
of time. [G.J.J.] did regularly attend those or consistently
attend those visits before the Court entered the injunction
suspending contact….

….

2
The County also petitioned to terminate J.L.J.’s father’s parental rights; the father
agreed to the termination of his rights and has not appealed.

3
No. 2025AP2491

[G.J.J.] has, I think, been very clear about the fact
she cares for her children a great deal; that she loves her
children and she would love nothing more than to have
both of her children come back to her and live with her.
But as very succinctly pointed out, that’s not going to
happen tomorrow. It may never happen ever.

But that doesn’t mean, [G.J.J.], that you don’t love
your children. It doesn’t mean that you haven’t done
everything within your power, as authorized by the Court,
to establish that you are a loving mother to both kids. I
don’t think anyone doubts that here.

The issue really comes down to [does J.L.J.] have a
substantial parental relationship with … either parent….
[The social worker] testified related to this issue that she
has been the ongoing case manager for both [children]
since almost the inception of their cases. She has seen the
children’s interaction with the current placements. I do
recall that she had also had the opportunity, if not
personally observe but to observe through collateral
sources, the interactions between [the children] and [G.J.J].

We’ve had a long period of time when [the
children] have had limited contact with [G.J.J.]. They have
integrated into the homes of [the foster parents and G.J.J.’s
mother]. [The social worker] testified that with respect to
[J.L.J.], that [J.L.J.] refers to [the foster parents] as mom
and dad; that [J.L.J.] engages well with [the foster parents];
that [J.L.J.] responds to them.

[J.L.J.] takes direction from them. [J.L.J.] responds
to them…. [J.L.J.] seeks assurance and safety from them.
And in [the social worker’s] opinion, based on what she has
seen, [J.L.J.] identifies [the foster parents] as mom and dad.
[G.J.J.], certainly, has an attachment to her children. I just
don’t think it’s as strong as the one [J.L.J.] has with [the
foster parents].

Understanding that there have been some
impediments for [G.J.J.], most significantly it has been her
ongoing struggles with mental health, she has made some
pretty significant strides. She’s testified today she’s
employed. She’s got a two-bedroom apartment coming.
She appears to be financially stable. But we do have a
child, at least with [J.L.J.], who has a relationship with
[G.J.J.] but I don’t think that it’s a substantial parental
relationship with [G.J.J.].

….

4
No. 2025AP2491

Then there comes down to the issue of whether or
not [the children] have a substantial relationship with other
family members. This really centers on the issue of the
siblings. We’ve heard some testimony, I think some of it
came from [G.J.J.], that based upon her observations of [the
children] together, she does believe they have a bond….
The reality is, we have two children who have never lived
in the same house.

They have had visits….

Visits are not the same quality as living in the same
house. I don’t doubt that [the children] know who each
other are. I don’t doubt that they’ve had fun together, but
there is nothing in the record that convinces the Court to
the level of clear and convincing evidence that [the
children] have such a bonded relationship that either one of
them would be harmed if that relationship is severed. Now,
it’s possible down the road, maybe they have contact with
each other. The Court has no guarantee of that and doesn’t
consider that it’s a possibility.

¶6 The circuit court found that it was in J.L.J.’s best interests to
terminate G.J.J.’s parental rights, and it entered an order to that end. G.J.J.
appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶7 In Wisconsin, there is a two-part statutory procedure for an
involuntary termination of parental rights. Steven V. v. Kelley H., 2004 WI 47,
¶24, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856. In the first “grounds” phase, the petitioner
must prove the existence of “one or more of the statutorily enumerated grounds for
termination” by clear and convincing evidence. Id.; WIS. STAT. § 48.31(1). If
such grounds are found to exist, the circuit court then proceeds to the second
“dispositional” phase, in which it decides whether it is in the best interests of the
child that the parent’s rights be terminated. Steven V., 271 Wis. 2d 1, ¶27; WIS.
STAT. § 48.426(2). The arguments in this appeal concern the dispositional phase.

5
No. 2025AP2491

¶8 The decision about whether it is in the child’s best interests to
terminate parental rights is committed to the circuit court’s discretion. Mrs. R. v.
Mr. and Mrs. B., 102 Wis. 2d 118, 131, 306 N.W. 2d 46 (1981). This court must
affirm a circuit court’s discretionary decision unless it constitutes an erroneous
exercise of discretion. State v. Abbott Laboratories, 2013 WI App 31, ¶31, 346
Wis. 2d 565, 829 N.W.2d 753. A circuit court properly exercises its discretion
when it examines the relevant facts, applies a proper standard of law and, using a
demonstrated rational process, reaches a conclusion that a reasonable judge could
reach. Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982).

¶9 Although a circuit court’s decision in the dispositional phase is
discretionary, the statutes provide six factors that the court must consider. WIS.
STAT. § 48.426(3). The third factor is “[w]hether the child has substantial
relationships with the parent or other family members, and whether it would be
harmful to the child to sever these relationships.” § 48.426(3)(c). “Substantial
relationships” include “the child’s emotional and psychological connections to the
child’s birth family.” State v. Margaret H., 2000 WI 42, ¶19, 234 Wis. 2d 606,
610 N.W.2d 475.

¶10 G.J.J. argues that the circuit court’s discussion of this factor reflects
an erroneous exercise of discretion for two reasons, which I discuss in turn.

I. Comparison Between G.J.J. and the Foster Parents

¶11 First, G.J.J. argues that, rather than assessing the relationships
between J.L.J. and his birth family, the circuit court undertook to compare those
relationships to the relationships that J.L.J. had with his foster family. In so doing,
G.J.J. argues, the court failed to apply the “proper standard of law” or use a
“demonstrated rational process.” Loy, 107 Wis. 2d at 415.

6
No. 2025AP2491

¶12 G.J.J. points to State v. Y.P.V., Nos. 2022AP1935 and 2022AP1936,
unpublished slip op. (WI App Mar. 21, 2023).3 In that case, the birth mother
whose rights had been terminated argued that the circuit court erred because,
rather than considering the harm that could arise from severing the children’s
relationships with their birth mother, as the statute mandates, the court instead
considered the potential harm to the children from severing their relationships with
their foster mother. Id., ¶28; see WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3).

¶13 In its decision reversing the circuit court’s exercise of discretion, this
court first noted that the six statutory factors are non-exclusive—a circuit court
“may consider additional facts and factors.” Y.P.V., Nos. 2022AP1935 and
2022AP1936, ¶30. Therefore, it was not improper for the circuit court to have
considered the bond between the children and their foster mother as part of its
exercise of discretion. Id.

¶14 Nevertheless, this court concluded that the circuit court did err
because, rather than considering the children’s bond with their foster mother in
addition to the statutorily required consideration of their bond with their birth
mother, it considered the former nearly to the exclusion of the latter. Id., ¶31-33.
In particular, although the circuit court “concluded that it would be difficult for the
[children] to sever the legal relationship with” their birth mother, “it focused on a
possible continuation of a ‘co-parenting’ relationship” between the birth mother
and the foster mother. Id., ¶31. This court noted that any promise by a foster
parent to maintain such a relationship between child and birth parent is “‘legally

3
An authored, unpublished, one-judge opinion issued on or after July 1, 2009, may be
cited for its persuasive value pursuant to WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3)(b).

7
No. 2025AP2491

unenforceable.’” Id. (citing Margaret H., 234 Wis. 2d 606, ¶30). This court
further determined that, by focusing on the children’s relationships with their
foster mother and the possibility that their relationships with their birth mother
would not actually be severed, the circuit court failed to fulfill its statutory
mandate to consider the harm that could come to the children if their relationships
to their birth mother were severed. Y.P.V., Nos. 2022AP1935 and 2022AP1936,
¶32.

¶15 Here, G.J.J. contends that the circuit court erred in a manner similar
to the circuit court in Y.P.V. G.J.J. notes that, at the outset of the court’s
discussion of the third factor, it observed that J.L.J. had been removed from
G.J.J.’s care since birth and had been in a “very stable” placement with the foster
family. Then, just after commenting on the consistent visits between G.J.J. and
J.L.J., the court observed that J.L.J. calls the foster parents “mom and dad” and
relates to them in ways typical of young children to their parents. Finally, the
court expressly compared the relationship that J.L.J. has with G.J.J. with the
relationship that J.L.J. has with the foster parents, saying that while G.J.J. “has an
attachment to her children[,] I just don’t think it’s as strong as the one [J.L.J.] has
with [the foster parents].”

¶16 G.J.J. argues that this mode of reasoning was improper and that the
dispositional hearing was “not a contest between [G.J.J.] and the foster family.”
G.J.J. further points out that in Y.P.V., this court appeared to fault the circuit court
for contrasting “the children’s substantial relationship to [the birth mother] … to
the foster mother throughout the court’s considerations,” placing the two sets of
relationships in “stark contrast.” Y.P.V., Nos. 2022AP1935 and 2022AP1936,
¶¶29-30.

8
No. 2025AP2491

¶17 G.J.J. is correct in observing that the third factor does not call for a
comparison or weighing of a child’s relationships with their birth family against
the child’s relationships with other parties. WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3)(c).
Nevertheless, as Y.P.V. noted, the six statutory factors are not the only permissible
considerations at a dispositional hearing. Y.P.V., Nos. 2022AP1935 and
2022AP1936, ¶30 (citing Sheboygan County v. Julie A.B., 2002 WI 95, ¶29, 255
Wis. 2d 170, 648 N.W.2d 402). Nothing in the statutes prohibits a circuit court
from considering a child’s relationships with foster parents. And more generally,
when a circuit court is directed to consider the relationships between a child and
the child’s birth family, it is not unreasonable for that court to consider whether
aspects of typical parent-child bonds are present within those relationships, or
whether those aspects are present in other relationships the child may have,
including with foster parents. Y.P.V. did not suggest that comparisons between
birth- and foster-family relationships are forbidden in the dispositional phase; it
reversed the circuit court’s disposition because the court failed to consider the
relationships the children had with their birth mother or the likely harms from
severing those relationships. Y.P.V., Nos. 2022AP1935 and 2022AP1936, ¶32.

¶18 Here, in contrast, the circuit court’s remarks convey that it did
consider the relationships between J.L.J. and his birth family—and particularly,
both J.L.J.’s relationship with G.J.J. and his relationship with G.J.J.’s other child.
The court noted that J.L.J. had been separated from G.J.J. at birth. It noted that
J.L.J. had consistent supervised visitation with G.J.J. “for long periods of time.” It
asserted its belief that G.J.J. loved and cared for J.L.J. a great deal. It noted the
social worker’s testimony regarding interactions between G.J.J. and J.L.J., and the
limited contact between G.J.J. and J.L.J. And, after noting that J.L.J. appears to
have a parent-child relationship with the foster parents, the court observed that

9
No. 2025AP2491

although G.J.J. and J.L.J. have an attachment, the court did not believe that
attachment was as strong as the one between J.L.J. and the foster parents. It also
considered the other existing relationship between J.L.J. and J.L.J.’s birth family:
the relationship with G.J.J.’s other child, J.L.J.’s sibling. The court concluded that
the two children knew each other and had played together, but they were not so
bonded that either one would be harmed if the relationship were severed. I
conclude that the court’s comments concerning J.L.J.’s relationship with the foster
parents do not demonstrate that it failed to apply a “proper standard of law” or use
a demonstrated rational process in considering the factor mandated by WIS. STAT.
§ 48.426(3)(c).

II. Substantial Relationship vs. Substantial Parental Relationship

¶19 G.J.J. also argues that the circuit court erred because, rather than
considering whether J.L.J. had a “substantial relationship[]” with G.J.J., as WIS.
STAT. § 48.426(3)(c) requires, the court’s comments twice suggested it was
instead considering whether there was a “substantial parental relationship.”

¶20 As G.J.J. notes, the term “substantial parental relationship” is used in
TPR cases, but it is used in relation to the grounds phase rather than the
dispositional phase. Specifically, one ground for termination of parental rights is
that the parent has failed to “assume parental responsibility,” which requires a
showing that the parent has “not had a substantial parental relationship with the
child.” WIS. STAT. § 48.415(6)(a). In this context, “substantial parental
relationship” is defined to mean “the acceptance and exercise of significant
responsibility for the daily supervision, education, protection and care of the
child,” and the statute provides a list of factors to guide a court’s consideration of
whether a “substantial parental relationship” exists. § 48.415(6)(b).

10
No. 2025AP2491

¶21 G.J.J. further observes that the presence or absence of a “substantial
parental relationship” was at issue in the grounds phase of this TRP proceeding,
because failure to assume parental responsibility was one of the grounds that the
County alleged. The County prevailed on this ground in the first phase of the
proceeding, so by the time of disposition, the circuit court had already determined
that there was no “substantial parental relationship” between G.J.J. and J.L.J.

¶22 Then, during the dispositional hearing, the circuit court used the
term “substantial parental relationship” twice with respect to J.L.J. First, it said
“[t]he issue really comes down to [does J.L.J.] have a substantial parental
relationship with … either [G.J.J. or his birth father]”; later, it concluded by saying
that “we do have a child, at least with [J.L.J.], who has a relationship with [G.J.J.]
but I don’t think that it’s a substantial parental relationship.”

¶23 These remarks, in this context, give me some pause—if the circuit
court’s consideration was focused on whether there was a “substantial parental
relationship” rather than a “substantial relationship,” that might amount to the
application of an improper standard of law. However, after evaluating the remarks
in light of the entirety of the court’s comments on the third factor, I am persuaded
that they reflect a slip of the tongue rather than the application of an improper
standard of law.

¶24 I reach this conclusion for three reasons. First, the circuit court’s
comments do not suggest that it regarded its prior finding of no “substantial
parental relationship” during the grounds phase as conclusive of, or even relevant
to, the question posed for the dispositional phase by WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3)(c). If
the court had been confused about the meaning of the § 48.426(3)(c) factor and
had believed it to raise the same question the court had already answered, one

11
No. 2025AP2491

might expect the court to have referred to that earlier finding in some way, but it
did not. Second, at no point in its comments at disposition did the court refer to
either the definition of “substantial parental relationship” or to the factors that
WIS. STAT. § 48.415(6)(b) provides for evaluating whether a “substantial parental
relationship” exists during the grounds phase. Again, had the court mistakenly
believed the two questions were one and the same, it might have shown as much
by citing the statutory meaning given to “substantial parental relationship.”
Relatedly, the court’s discussion of the relationship between G.J.J. and J.L.J. did
not suggest that the court was disregarding any aspect of G.J.J.’s love, care, and
efforts for J.L.J., or any aspect of J.L.J.’s bond to G.J.J., as being insufficiently
“parental.” Finally, although the court did use the term “substantial parental
relationship” in its discussion of the third factor, the court then used the correct
term later in its remarks, saying that it could not “find that the child had substantial
relationships with [G.J.J.] or between J.L.J. and [his birth father].”

¶25 For all these reasons, I conclude that the circuit court’s reasoning fell
within the limits of a proper exercise of discretion.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

12