State v. Steven Dionne Scott

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
February 3, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2023AP2225 Cir. Ct. No. 2006CF272

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

STEVEN DIONNE SCOTT,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
JEFFREY A. WAGNER, Judge. Affirmed.

Before White, C.J., Colón, P.J., and Donald, J.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2023AP2225

¶1 PER CURIAM. Steven Dionne Scott, pro se, appeals from an order
of the circuit court denying his most recent postconviction motion without a
hearing. The State of Wisconsin contends that Scott’s claims are procedurally
barred. For the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In 2006, Scott was convicted upon an Alford1 plea, incident to a plea
deal, to one count of second-degree sexual assault. He was sentenced to nine
years of initial confinement and six years of extended supervision, consecutive to
any other sentences imposed on him.

¶3 Scott appealed, arguing that the circuit court erroneously exercised
its discretion when it denied Scott’s motion for presentence plea withdrawal
without an evidentiary hearing. See State v. Scott (Scott I), No. 2007AP1311–CR,
unpublished slip op., ¶¶1, 8 (WI App Sept. 3, 2008). This court affirmed,
concluding that Scott’s reasons for plea withdrawal did not constitute “fair and just
reason[s] for plea withdrawal,” were not credible, or were wholly conclusory. Id.,
¶¶10-11, 15. Scott petitioned our supreme court for review, and it denied his
petition.

¶4 In 2011, Scott filed a letter with this court, which we construed as a
request for transcripts and some form of hearing or investigation. We issued an
order taking no action on Scott’s letter because we lacked jurisdiction over his
appeal after remittitur occurred. Scott then filed a motion in the circuit court for a

1
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). An Alford plea involves the defendant
pleading guilty to a charge while still maintaining his or her innocence. State v. Garcia, 192
Wis. 2d 845, 856, 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995).

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No. 2023AP2225

court order to subpoena his work records to prove his innocence. The circuit court
denied his motion, noting that Scott is able to procure his employment records on
his own and that it is unlikely any work records could establish his innocence
because his DNA was found on the body of the victim.

¶5 Scott subsequently filed a motion in the circuit court seeking a
competency examination, Machner2 hearing, court-appointed attorney, and for the
court to vacate his sentence. Scott argued that he was incompetent to enter his
plea due to a head injury, that he was coerced into confessing by the police, that
his trial counsel pressured him to accept the plea deal, and that both trial and
postconviction counsel were ineffective for failing to raise that he was at work
during the assault. The circuit court denied his motion on the grounds that it was
procedurally barred by State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d
157 (1994), and that Scott’s claims were conclusory.

¶6 In 2012, Scott filed another motion seeking to withdraw his plea and
vacate his sentence. Scott argued that he was at work during the crime, and that
trial counsel was ineffective and coerced him into taking the plea deal. The circuit
court again denied Scott’s motion, finding his claims conclusory and barred by
Escalona-Naranjo.

¶7 In 2017, Scott filed another motion seeking to withdraw his plea.
Scott contended that he should have been adjudicated as a juvenile, his trial
counsel coerced him into accepting the plea deal, and his appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise those issues. Again, the circuit court denied his

2
State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979).

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motion. The court found that his claims against his counsel were barred by
Escalona-Naranjo, and that his claim that he should have been tried as a juvenile
was frivolous because he was an adult by the time he was identified as the
perpetrator of the crime. Scott filed a notice of appeal with this court, which we
returned with an explanation that the notice must be filed with the clerk of the
circuit court. Scott did not pursue an appeal of the order any further.

¶8 In 2019, Scott filed another motion seeking to withdraw his plea.
Scott argued that he did not understand his plea because he did not know he would
be subject to GPS monitoring. The circuit court denied his motion finding that
Scott had exhausted his postconviction remedies so his claim was barred by
Escalona-Naranjo.

¶9 Scott then petitioned this court for a writ of habeas corpus. He
argued that the circuit court erred by denying his motion for plea withdrawal, the
plea colloquy was invalid, he was entitled to a hearing on his motion for plea
withdrawal, and his counsel was ineffective. He also challenged the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting his conviction by attacking the victim’s credibility. We
denied his petition ex parte, concluding that his claims relating to his plea were
barred because they were previously litigated in his first appeal, his claims against
his counsel were undeveloped, and he waived his right to challenge the victim’s
credibility at trial by entering an Alford plea. State ex. rel. Scott v. Stevens (Scott
II), No. 2023AP1015-W, unpublished op. and order, 3-5 (WI App July 27, 2023).

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No. 2023AP2225

¶10 In 2023, Scott filed the motion3 for postconviction relief underlying
this appeal in the circuit court. He again argued that his plea should be withdrawn
because he was impaired at the time, he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, and
his trial counsel was ineffective. The circuit court denied the motion on the
grounds that his claims were “a rehash of the issues he raised on direct appeal and
in subsequent pro se motions.” The court also found that any new claims he raised
were ones he could have raised in his prior litigation so they were barred by
Escalona-Naranjo.

¶11 Scott appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶12 On appeal, Scott raises many of the same arguments for plea
withdrawal he has raised previously. He argues that his plea was not made
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because he was impaired when he entered
it, that the plea colloquy was invalid, and that he was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on his presentence plea withdrawal motion. He also argues that both his
trial attorneys were ineffective for not allowing him to review documents obtained
during discovery, for not arguing that the victim’s statements at the preliminary
hearing and in the police reports were fabricated, and for exerting undue pressure
on Scott to accept the plea deal.

¶13 We do not reach Scott’s arguments because we conclude that Scott’s
claims are procedurally barred.

3
Scott labeled his motion a “Rothering petition to challenge the ineffective assistance of
trial counsel.” See State ex rel. Rothering v. McCaughtry, 205 Wis. 2d 675, 556 N.W.2d 136
(Ct. App. 1996).

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No. 2023AP2225

¶14 “Once a defendant’s direct appeal rights are exhausted or the time
for filing an appeal has expired, the defendant may collaterally attack his
conviction via a motion under WIS. STAT. § 974.06 [(2023-24)].”4 State v. Evans,
2004 WI 84, ¶32, 273 Wis. 2d 192, 682 N.W.2d 784, abrogated on other grounds
by State ex rel. Coleman v. McCaughtry, 2006 WI 49, 290 Wis. 2d 352, 714
N.W.2d 900. However, absent a showing of a sufficient reason, claims that a
defendant could have raised earlier but did not are barred. Escalona-Naranjo, 185
Wis. 2d at 185-86. Whether a defendant raises a sufficient reason for failing to
bring his or her claims earlier is a question of law that we review independently.
State v. Romero-Georgana, 2014 WI 83, ¶30, 360 Wis. 2d 522, 849 N.W.2d 668.

¶15 The record reflects that Scott’s most recent postconviction motion is
at least his fifth attempt to overturn his conviction in the circuit court. In addition,
Scott previously pursued an appeal and petitioned for a writ before this court. See
Scott I, No. 2007AP1311–CR; Scott II, No. 2023AP1015-W. Therefore, absent a
sufficient reason for failing to raise his current claims earlier, Scott’s motion is
procedurally barred by Escalona-Naranjo. See id., 185 Wis. 2d at 185-86; WIS.
STAT. § 974.06(4).

¶16 Scott does not address whether there is a sufficient reason for his
failure to raise his claims earlier in his motion or in his briefing on appeal. See
State v. Nawrocki, 2008 WI App 23, ¶2 n.3, 308 Wis. 2d 227, 746 N.W.2d 509
(“To avoid waiving an argument on appeal, parties should develop in the principal
brief all arguments that they reasonably believe may be relevant to the outcome of
the case.”).

4
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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No. 2023AP2225

¶17 Furthermore, we observe that Scott’s claims are based on
information he would have been aware of prior to his first appeal. In fact, many of
his claims were already raised and litigated, and we will not relitigate them. See
State v. Witkowski, 163 Wis. 2d 985, 990, 473 N.W.2d 512 (Ct. App. 1991) (“A
matter once litigated may not be relitigated in a subsequent postconviction
proceeding no matter how artfully the defendant may rephrase the issue.”). To the
extent Scott raises any new claims, they are procedurally barred by Escalona-
Naranjo because Scott has not demonstrated that there is sufficient reason for his
failure to raise them in earlier postconviction litigation. See id., 185 Wis. 2d at
185-86.

¶18 As a final matter the State requests that we impose Casteel sanctions
on Scott. See State v. Casteel, 2001 WI App 188, 247 Wis. 2d 451, 634 N.W.2d
338. We decline to do so at this juncture because we have not previously warned
Scott that filing frivolous appeals will result in such sanctions. However, we will
put Scott on notice that further repetitive allegations—regardless of whether they
are presented as motions, petitions, or appeals—in this case may result in
sanctions, including restricting future access to the courts in the manner set forth
in Casteel, see id., ¶¶25-27, and imposition of penalties or cost. See WIS. STAT.
RULES 809.25(3), 809.103(3), 809.83(2).

¶19 “Frivolous actions hinder a court’s ability to function efficiently and
effectively and to fairly administer justice to litigants who have brought
nonfrivolous actions.” Casteel, 247 Wis. 2d 451, ¶23. This court will not approve
the squandering of scarce judicial resources in considering and reconsidering one
individual’s claims if those claims are frivolous, abusively repetitive, or otherwise
improper. See id., ¶¶23-27.

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No. 2023AP2225

CONCLUSION

¶20 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s order
denying Scott’s postconviction motion without a hearing.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

8