State v. Brenda L. Roszina

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
January 13, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP898-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2018CT2119

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

BRENDA L. ROSZINA,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Milwaukee County: HANNAH C. DUGAN, Judge. Affirmed.

¶1 WHITE, C.J. Brenda L. Roszina appeals from her judgment of
conviction for Operating with a Prohibited Alcohol Concentration (2nd) and from
the May 6, 2024 order denying her motion for postconviction relief. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
No. 2024AP898-CR

BACKGROUND

¶2 On August 3, 2018, at approximately 6:30 p.m., Detective
Christopher Heckman of the Hales Corners Police Department responded to a 911
call regarding a reckless or possibly intoxicated driver at the Hale House tavern.
The callers reported that they observed the vehicle swerving back and forth and
nearly hitting several other vehicles on the road before ending up at the Hale
House. When Detective Heckman arrived on scene, he observed a woman, later
identified as Roszina, leaning up against a vehicle in the parking lot; she then
started to stumble toward the Hale House. Detective Heckman stopped Roszina
and asked her how she got to the Hale House; Roszina stated that she had walked
there. Detective Heckman observed that Roszina had bloodshot eyes and slurred
speech, and smelled strongly of intoxicants. Roszina subsequently admitted to
Detective Heckman that she had driven to the Hale House, pointing to her vehicle
in the parking lot; the vehicle matched the description and license plate number
reported in the 911 call. Roszina also admitted that she drank alcohol while at the
State Fair earlier in the day.

¶3 At this point, Detective Heckman asked Roszina to perform standard
field sobriety tests. Detective Heckman testified that he was concerned about
performing the tests in the Hale House parking lot because there were a lot of cars
going in and out, so he asked Roszina if she would be more comfortable
performing the tests at the nearby police station, which was approximately one
mile away from the Hale House. Roszina agreed, and she was placed in the back
of Detective Heckman’s squad car. She was not handcuffed, and Detective
Heckman told Roszina that she was not under arrest.

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No. 2024AP898-CR

¶4 Once at the police station, Detective Heckman had Roszina perform
the standard field sobriety tests in the garage; Roszina performed poorly,
exhibiting 6 of 6 clues of impairment on the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, 2 of 8
clues on the walk and turn test, and 3 of 4 clues on the one-legged stand test. A
preliminary breath test showed that Roszina’s breath contained an ethanol
concentration of .241g of ethanol per 210L of breath. Roszina also submitted to
an Intoximeter breath test, which showed a concentration of .20g of ethanol per
210L of breath.

¶5 Roszina was subsequently charged with Operating a Motor Vehicle
while Intoxicated (2nd) and Operating with a Prohibited Alcohol Concentration
(2nd). Roszina moved to suppress the evidence related to her arrest on the
grounds that she was unlawfully arrested and transported to the police station to
conduct the field sobriety tests prior to any probable cause determination. At a
hearing on the motion, the circuit court denied Roszina’s motion to suppress,
finding that Roszina was not effectively placed under arrest when transported from
the tavern to the police department. The court also found that Roszina had been
moved within the vicinity of where the incident took place.

¶6 The case proceeded to a court trial, wherein Roszina was found
guilty of operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration, but not guilty of
operating while intoxicated. Roszina filed a motion for postconviction relief,
which was denied by the postconviction court. This appeal follows.

DISCUSSION

¶7 When an appellate court reviews a decision on a motion to suppress
evidence, it upholds the circuit court’s findings of historical fact unless they are
clearly erroneous. State v. Blatterman, 2015 WI 46, ¶16, 362 Wis. 2d 138, 864

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No. 2024AP898-CR

N.W.2d 26. We independently review whether those facts satisfy constitutional
principles. Id.

¶8 A seizure must be reasonable to comply with the Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution and article 1, section 11 of the Wisconsin
Constitution. See State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶10 n.2, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d
634. It is constitutional for a law enforcement officer to temporarily stop a person
based on reasonable suspicion that a crime has been, is being, or will be
committed (a “Terry stop”). See State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶20, 294 Wis. 2d 1,
717 N.W.2d 729 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). “An investigatory
stop, though a seizure, allows police officers to briefly ‘detain a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is no
probable cause to make an arrest.’” Id. (citation omitted).

¶9 When a person under investigation pursuant to a Terry stop is moved
from one location to another, there exists a two-part inquiry: (1) whether the
person was moved within the “vicinity” of the incident; and (2) whether the
purpose in moving the person within the vicinity was reasonable. State v.
Quartana, 213 Wis. 2d 440, 446, 570 N.W.2d 618 (Ct. App. 1997). Police may
not use means that approach the conditions of arrest when seeking to verify or
dispel their suspicions in transporting the person. Id. at 448. “[T]he detention
must at all times be temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop.” Id. “[W]e must determine, given the totality of the
circumstances, whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would not
have considered himself or herself to be in custody given the degree of restraint
under the circumstances.” Id. at 449-50.

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No. 2024AP898-CR

¶10 First, Roszina argues that she was effectively under arrest once she
was placed in the back of Detective Heckman’s squad car and taken to the police
station. She points out that Detective Heckman’s testimony at the motion hearing
demonstrates that she was placed in the squad car prior to performing any field
tests whatsoever and transported directly to the police station. Roszina argues that
it cannot be said that a reasonable person in her position would feel themselves
free to leave after they were removed from the vicinity of their own vehicle,
placed in a squad car, and taken directly to the police station.

¶11 We disagree, and conclude that a reasonable person would not have
believed themselves to be “in custody” if they were in her position. Detective
Heckman asked Roszina if she would be more comfortable performing the field
sobriety tests at the police station, and she agreed. While it is true that Roszina
was transported in the back of Detective Heckman’s squad car, she was never
placed in handcuffs and was specifically told by Detective Heckman that she was
not under arrest at that time. While a police station is a more institutional setting
than a tavern parking lot, Roszina was not taken further into the station than the
garage. A reasonable person in Roszina’s position would have understood that
they were being transported to the police station for the sole purpose of continuing
the investigatory stop in a less busy and chaotic location, and that if they were to
pass the standardized field sobriety tests, they would be free to leave. We
therefore reject Roszina’s argument and conclude that she was not effectively
under arrest at the time she was taken to the police station.

¶12 Roszina also takes issue with the fact that she was taken to the police
station on the basis that the transportation was not reasonable under the
circumstances. The circuit court found that Roszina was kept within the “vicinity”

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No. 2024AP898-CR

of the incident when she was transported to the police station, and that the
transport was reasonable under the circumstances.

¶13 Pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 968.24, a law enforcement officer must
conduct an investigation “in the vicinity where the person was stopped.” Whether
the location of an investigatory detention is within the “vicinity” of the stop is a
question of law we review de novo. Blatterman, 362 Wis. 2d 138, ¶26 n.9.
Further, while an officer may transport a suspect away from the immediate scene
of the stop, the officer must have reasonable grounds to do so. Sec. 968.24;
Quartana, 213 Wis. 2d at 446. Here, Roszina was transported approximately one
mile from the Hale House to the Hales Corners police station. Our supreme court
has previously found such a distance to be within the “vicinity” of an incident.
See Quartana, 213 Wis. 2d at 447. We thus conclude that Roszina was kept
within the “vicinity” of the scene of the incident.

¶14 Finally, Roszina argues that it was unreasonable for her to be placed
in the back of Detective Heckman’s squad car and taken to the police station. She
points to testimony by Detective Heckman wherein he admitted that he may have
been able to find a place in the parking lot or nearby to perform the field sobriety
tests. She further points out that there were no victim identification concerns,
security or safety concerns, or any requirement for on-the-scene identification that
would make her transportation to the station reasonable.

¶15 Again, we reject Roszina’s argument. Detective Heckman testified
that there were many cars coming in and out of the Hale House parking lot. It was
a “very public area, right off a major highway, and there [were] several vehicles
coming and going, people walking around[.]” Again, we point out, Roszina was
asked if she would be more comfortable performing the field sobriety tests at the

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No. 2024AP898-CR

police station, and she agreed. Based on these considerations, we agree with the
circuit court’s determination that the transportation from the scene of the incident
to the police station was reasonable.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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