State v. Shane M. Helmbrecht

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
January 13, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2025AP315-CRAC Cir. Ct. No. 2016CF921

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

SHANE M. HELMBRECHT,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Eau Claire County:
SARAH M. HARLESS, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz, and Gill, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. On September 17, 2024, Shane M. Helmbrecht was
found competent to proceed to trial on a charge of first-degree intentional
No. 2025AP315-CRAC

homicide. Helmbrecht filed a notice of intent to pursue postdisposition relief with
respect to that decision; however, on December 9, 2024, his attorney filed a
motion for a postdisposition competency evaluation. Counsel asserted that he had
reason to doubt Helmbrecht’s competency to assist in postdisposition and
appellate proceedings, but he did not provide any specific reasons in support of
that opinion, citing his duty of confidentiality and his belief that Helmbrecht was
not capable of providing informed consent to waive that duty. The circuit court
denied Helmbrecht’s motion for a postdisposition competency evaluation,
reasoning that Helmbrecht’s attorney had not provided any reason for the court to
revisit its recent determination regarding Helmbrecht’s competency.

¶2 Helmbrecht now appeals, arguing that the circuit court erroneously
exercised its discretion by denying his motion for a postdisposition competency
evaluation without first ordering his attorney “to provide an affidavit with his
reasons for raising competency.”1 We conclude that Helmbrecht forfeited his
argument that the court should have ordered his attorney to provide an affidavit
setting forth his reasons for doubting Helmbrecht’s competency because
Helmbrecht failed to adequately raise that issue in the circuit court. We further
conclude that, on the record before it, the court did not erroneously exercise its
discretion by denying Helmbrecht’s motion for a postdisposition competency
evaluation. We therefore affirm.

1
By order dated October 23, 2025, this appeal was advanced for decision, pursuant to
WIS. STAT. RULE 809.20 (2023-24). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24
version.

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No. 2025AP315-CRAC

BACKGROUND

¶3 This case has a lengthy procedural history, involving numerous
challenges to Helmbrecht’s competency. On August 4, 2016, the State filed a
criminal complaint charging Helmbrecht with one count of first-degree intentional
homicide. Less than one month later, on August 24, 2016, Helmbrecht’s trial
attorney informed the circuit court that he had reason to doubt Helmbrecht’s
competency, and the court ordered a competency evaluation. Two psychologists
subsequently examined Helmbrecht and determined that he was not competent to
stand trial but was likely to regain competence with appropriate treatment. Both
sides then stipulated that Helmbrecht was not competent, and the court entered an
order on October 10, 2016, committing Helmbrecht to the Department of Health
Services (DHS) for treatment.

¶4 Helmbrecht was admitted to the Mendota Mental Health Institute
(MMHI) for treatment on November 9, 2016. On December 20, 2016, Dr. Kevin
Murtaugh, a psychiatrist from MMHI, filed a report opining that Helmbrecht was
competent to stand trial, as he had the substantial mental capacity to understand
the proceedings and assist in his own defense. Helmbrecht disputed Murtaugh’s
competency determination and requested a second competency evaluation at his
own expense. That examiner, psychologist Paul Caillier, opined that Helmbrecht
was not competent to stand trial.

¶5 Following a competency hearing, the circuit court found that
Helmbrecht was competent. Shortly thereafter, Helmbrecht moved to substitute
judges, and a new judge was assigned to the case on March 6, 2017. At a
scheduling conference on March 15, 2017, Helmbrecht’s trial attorney asked the
court to reconsider the issue of Helmbrecht’s competency, and the court ordered

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No. 2025AP315-CRAC

another competency evaluation. The examiner, psychologist Steven Benson,
concluded that Helmbrecht was not competent and was not likely to become
competent within the requisite statutory time frame.2

¶6 Given the mixed nature of the examiners’ reports, the State asked the
circuit court to find Helmbrecht incompetent and to order him committed to the
DHS for treatment. The court complied with that request.

¶7 In July 2017, psychiatrist Laurence Trueman submitted a report to
the circuit court opining that Helmbrecht was competent to stand trial. In
December 2017, psychiatrist Elliot Lee submitted another report opining that
Helmbrecht was competent. Helmbrecht, however, then obtained a report from
another evaluator, who found him not competent.

¶8 On January 22, 2018, the circuit court found that Helmbrecht was
not competent to stand trial and was not likely to regain competence within the
required statutory time period. The criminal case against Helmbrecht was
therefore suspended, civil commitment proceedings were initiated, and
Helmbrecht was transported to the Winnebago Mental Health Institute (WMHI).
Staff at WMHI determined that Helmbrecht was feigning symptoms. Eau Claire
County ultimately determined that Helmbrecht was not an appropriate subject for
a civil commitment under WIS. STAT. ch. 51, and it did not seek to extend his
commitment following the initial six-month commitment period. Helmbrecht’s

2
A defendant may be committed for treatment to competency “for a period not to exceed
12 months, or the maximum sentence specified for the most serious offense with which the
defendant is charged, whichever is less.” See WIS. STAT. § 971.14(5)(a). “If a defendant who has
been restored to competency thereafter again becomes incompetent, the maximum commitment
period under [§ 971.14(5)(a)] shall be 18 months minus the days spent in previous commitments
under this subsection, or 12 months, whichever is less.” Sec. 971.14(5)(d).

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No. 2025AP315-CRAC

bond was then revoked, and he was remanded to the custody of the Trempealeau
County Healthcare Facility. On August 1, 2018, the circuit court in the instant
case entered an order commanding MMHI to hold Helmbrecht pending further
order of the court.

¶9 Over four years later, on November 8, 2022, the State filed a motion
for another competency evaluation. According to the motion, the State had
learned that Helmbrecht was residing at a “community based resource center” in
Tomah, Wisconsin, “in apparent contravention of” the circuit court’s August 1,
2018 order. The motion further alleged that Helmbrecht had no restrictions
limiting his movement to and from the Tomah facility and that he had obtained a
Wisconsin driver’s license on April 6, 2021, which showed that he had
“demonstrated to the Wisconsin Department of Transportation, Division of Motor
Vehicles[,] that he possesses the requisite faculties necessary to safely and
responsibly operate a motor vehicle on the public roadways.” The State argued
that this new information showed “an ability to function at least somewhat
independently in society,” which suggested that Helmbrecht had “potentially
become competent.”

¶10 On March 14, 2023, the circuit court ordered a competency
evaluation. The examiner, psychologist Christina Engen, noted that Helmbrecht’s
“symptoms of mental illness and neuropsychological functioning have waxed and
waned according to the situation” and that “the progression of his symptoms
follows a pattern of secondary gain.” For instance, Engen noted “an absence of
psychotic symptoms when Mr. Helmbrecht has sought placement in a less
restrictive environment, and a re-emergence of symptoms when facing prosecution
for the underlying case.” Engen stated that her evaluation of Helmbrecht provided
“compelling objective evidence of symptom fabrication.” However, “[g]iven the

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No. 2025AP315-CRAC

complicated nature of this case,” Engen recommended “ongoing evaluation of
Mr. Helmbrecht in the hospital setting.” (Formatting altered.)

¶11 After Engen submitted her report to the circuit court, Helmbrecht
absconded from the facility where he was living. He was located by law
enforcement in New Mexico on October 2, 2023, but the New Mexico authorities
released him because he did not have a nationwide attachment order and the
officers did not believe that he was mentally ill. A nationwide bench warrant was
subsequently issued for Helmbrecht’s arrest after he failed to appear for a hearing
in this case on October 13, 2023. Helmbrecht was later located in Mexico, where
he had registered in a motel using his middle name.

¶12 Helmbrecht was extradited to Wisconsin, and the circuit court
entered an order for an inpatient competency evaluation on December 5, 2023.
Helmbrecht was then admitted to MMHI, where his primary diagnosis was listed
as “Rule out malingering.” Psychologist Katelyn Grusecki subsequently
performed a competency evaluation and submitted a report to the circuit court
opining that malingering was “strongly indicated” and that Helmbrecht was
competent to stand trial. Helmbrecht then retained Benson to perform an
independent competency evaluation. Benson opined that Helmbrecht was not
competent to stand trial and was not likely to become competent within the
permissible statutory time frame.

¶13 The circuit court held a four-day competency hearing, which began
in May 2024 and concluded on September 17, 2024. After hearing testimony from
16 witnesses, including Grusecki and Benson, the court found that the State had
met its burden to prove, by the greater weight of the credible evidence, that
Helmbrecht “understands or has the substantial capacity to understand the

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No. 2025AP315-CRAC

proceedings and assist in his defense.” Accordingly, the court found that
Helmbrecht was competent to stand trial, and it reinstated the criminal proceedings
against him.

¶14 On September 24, 2024, Helmbrecht filed a notice of intent to
pursue postdisposition relief with respect to the circuit court’s competency
determination. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.109(2)(b). However, rather than filing a
postdisposition motion or notice of appeal, on December 9, 2024, Helmbrecht’s
postdisposition attorney filed a “Motion for Postdisposition Competency
Evaluation.” In the motion, counsel alleged that he had “reason to doubt”
Helmbrecht’s “competency to assist in postconviction and appellate proceedings.”
Counsel did not provide any specific reasons for his belief that Helmbrecht was
incompetent. While counsel noted that a court “may rely on affidavits of counsel”
when assessing a defendant’s competency, counsel asserted “that the duty of
confidentiality prevents the filing of an affidavit without the permission of the
client or an order of the Court. SCR 20:1.6(a), (c)5.” Counsel stated, “Given the
nature of this motion, counsel does not believe Mr. Helmbrecht is capable of
providing informed consent.”

¶15 The State opposed Helmbrecht’s motion for a postdisposition
competency evaluation, noting that a circuit court “does not have to order a
competency evaluation and hearing every time defense counsel alleges that they
have reason to doubt competency” and that the mere “suggestion” by defense
counsel of a reason to doubt competency, without supporting facts, is “insufficient
to require an examination.” The State further argued that Helmbrecht’s motion
was “based solely on conclusory allegations” and did not allege “a single fact that
says anything about why counsel doubts his competency.” The State characterized
the motion as a “delay tactic designed to frustrate the Court into changing its

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No. 2025AP315-CRAC

ruling by insinuating that it will have to redo competency proceedings every time
Helmbrecht decides to file a motion” for a competency evaluation.

¶16 In response, Helmbrecht’s attorney wrote to the circuit court, stating,
in part:

Due to undersigned counsel’s ethical obligations, he cannot
disclose confidential client information—including his
observations of Mr. Helmbrecht that led to the initial
request [for a competency evaluation]—without
Mr. Helmbrecht’s consent. Mr. Helmbrecht has not—and
undersigned counsel believes cannot—provide this consent.
However, as undersigned counsel alluded to in the motion,
this Court can order undersigned counsel to provide an
affidavit regarding his observations that led to the request.
SCR 20:1.6(a); State v. Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d 111, 132,
523 N.W.2d 727 (1994). This Court should not deny the
request for a postconviction competency determination
simply because undersigned counsel cannot ethically
disclose the basis for the request, when the Court has the
ability to order counsel to disclose that information.

¶17 The circuit court held a hearing on Helmbrecht’s motion for a
postdisposition competency evaluation on February 12, 2025. At the beginning of
the hearing, the court asked Helmbrecht’s attorney, “[W]as there anything you
wished to add to what’s been filed, any additional reasons or reasoning you wish
to give to the Court for your request?” Counsel responded, “I don’t think so, Your
Honor. Obviously, … I have tried to state what I think the law says with regards
to this matter.” Counsel subsequently reiterated, “I don’t have anything further to
add unless the Court has specific questions.”

¶18 The circuit court then denied Helmbrecht’s motion for a
postdisposition competency evaluation in an oral ruling. The court explained:

[W]e recently had a very long and extensive competency
hearing over the course of days where much testimony and
information was presented on the record regarding
Mr. Helmbrecht’s competency. I found after considering

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No. 2025AP315-CRAC

all of that information that he was, in fact, competent. And
some of the information that was put on the record was
information from jailers and other people that interacted
with him that spoke to the change in demeanor of when he
was in the courtroom and when he was in unobserved
situations and certainly information indicating that his
behavior, his demeanor changed, that he was, in fact,
understanding things. I’m not going to reiterate everything
that I’ve said because I think I made a fairly thorough
ruling at the time that I did find based on all of the evidence
presented that he was competent.

It was a recent finding, and I have not seen anything that
makes me believe that that needs to be revisited or that
there’s any reason to believe that anything changed
between that fairly recent ruling and now such that it would
be appropriate to order a new competency evaluation.

¶19 Helmbrecht’s attorney then sought clarification from the circuit
court, stating, “I did everything I could to suggest that the Court get info—order
me to file an affidavit with information which I believe might change the Court’s
opinion, but it sounds like the Court is not ordering that, so I want to clarify that as
well.” The court responded:

At this point I’m making my ruling based on the
information I have, which is why I opened the hearing with
you can provide any additional information you wished to
the Court. I understand that can place Defense in a
situation that is difficult in terms of what you can and
cannot divulge. I’m making my ruling based on the
information I have, and based on the information I have, I
don’t find it appropriate to order a competency evaluation.

¶20 The circuit court subsequently entered a written order denying
Helmbrecht’s motion for a postdisposition competency evaluation, stating the
motion was denied because the court had not “been presented with any evidence
that would make it question its September 17, 2024 determination as to the
defendant’s competency.” Helmbrecht now appeals from that order.

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No. 2025AP315-CRAC

DISCUSSION

¶21 On appeal, the parties dispute, as an initial matter, whether
defendants “on appeal from competency-related orders must be competent to assist
postdisposition counsel.” (Formatting altered.) Helmbrecht argues that a
defendant must be competent to assist his or her counsel in an appeal from a
competency determination, just as a defendant must be competent to assist his or
her counsel in an appeal from a criminal conviction under WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.30. In support of this argument, Helmbrecht cites Debra A.E., where
our supreme court held that “a circuit court should determine a defendant’s
competency when it has reason to believe that the defendant is unable, in the
postconviction relief proceedings under [RULE 809.30], to assist counsel or to
make decisions committed by law to the defendant with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding.” Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d at 119.

¶22 In contrast, the State argues that “[d]efendants do not need to be
competent to appeal a competency finding.” (Formatting altered.) The State
argues that Debra A.E. is materially distinguishable from the instant case because
Debra A.E. involved an appeal from a criminal conviction under WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.30, while this case involves an appeal from a pretrial competency
determination under WIS. STAT. RULE 809.109. The State contends that an appeal
from a conviction under RULE 809.30 requires a defendant to consider and provide
input regarding various “factors” that can “change whether a defendant wants to
appeal certain issues or appeal at all, even if there is an identifiable error in the
proceedings.” According to the State, such considerations are not present with
respect to an appeal from a pretrial competency determination because “the task at
issue, i.e. determining whether to appeal such a finding and pursuing appeal of the
order[,] requires no mental capacity of the defendant,” as “putting an incompetent

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No. 2025AP315-CRAC

defendant on trial is prohibited both by statute and by the Due Process Clause, and
incompetency cannot be waived by the defendant.”

¶23 For the purposes of this appeal, we assume, without deciding, that a
defendant must be competent in order to appeal a pretrial order determining the
defendant’s competency to stand trial. We nevertheless conclude that, under the
circumstances of this case, the circuit court did not err by denying Helmbrecht’s
motion for a postdisposition competency evaluation.

¶24 “Competency proceedings must be initiated whenever there is reason
to doubt a defendant’s competency to proceed.” State v. Weber, 146 Wis. 2d 817,
823, 433 N.W.2d 583 (Ct. App. 1988); see also WIS. STAT. § 971.14(1r)(a).
However, “[b]efore competency proceedings are required, evidence giving rise to
a reason to doubt competency must be presented to the [circuit] court.” Weber,
146 Wis. 2d at 823. Importantly, the mere “suggestion” by counsel that a
defendant is incompetent is insufficient “to raise the question and thereby require
the appointment of a physician to examine the defendant.” State v. McKnight, 65
Wis. 2d 582, 595, 223 N.W.2d 550 (1974). Instead, “there must be some evidence
raising doubt as to [the defendant’s] competence or a motion for a determination
on the question setting forth the grounds for belief that such competency is
lacking.” Id.

¶25 “Whether there is evidence giving rise to a reason to doubt
competency is a question left to the sound discretion of the [circuit] court.”
Weber, 146 Wis. 2d at 823. We will sustain a discretionary decision if the circuit
court “examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and, using a
demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could
reach.” Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982).

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No. 2025AP315-CRAC

¶26 In this case, Helmbrecht argues that the circuit court erroneously
exercised its discretion by denying his motion for a postdisposition competency
evaluation without first ordering his attorney “to provide an affidavit with his
reasons for raising competency.” According to Helmbrecht, his attorney’s duty of
confidentiality prevented counsel from informing the court of his specific reasons
for doubting Helmbrecht’s competency, given that counsel did not believe
Helmbrecht was competent to provide informed consent for that disclosure.
Helmbrecht asserts, however, that the court could have ordered his attorney to file
an affidavit outlining his reasons for doubting Helmbrecht’s competency, and he
further contends that the court’s failure to do so constituted an erroneous exercise
of discretion.

¶27 We agree with the State that Helmbrecht forfeited this argument by
failing to adequately raise it in the circuit court. “Arguments raised for the first
time on appeal are generally deemed forfeited.” Northbrook Wis., LLC v. City of
Niagara, 2014 WI App 22, ¶20, 352 Wis. 2d 657, 843 N.W.2d 851. Moreover, to
preserve an issue for appeal, a litigant must raise the issue “with sufficient
prominence such that the [circuit] court understands that it is being called upon to
make a ruling.” Bishop v. City of Burlington, 2001 WI App 154, ¶8, 246 Wis. 2d
879, 631 N.W.2d 656. “The mere mention of an issue will not preserve the right
of review.” State v. Hennessey, No. 2009AP2100-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶9
(WI App Mar. 30, 2010).3 Furthermore, “it is fundamental that a court does not
erroneously exercise its discretion if it is not asked to exercise discretion in the

3
An unpublished opinion that is authored by a single judge and issued on or after July 1,
2009, may be cited for its persuasive value. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3)(b).

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No. 2025AP315-CRAC

first place.” Shoreline Park Pres., Inc. v. DOA, 195 Wis. 2d 750, 773 n.11, 537
N.W.2d 388 (Ct. App. 1995).

¶28 Here, Helmbrecht’s attorney mentioned several times the possibility
that the circuit court could order him to file an affidavit disclosing his reasons for
doubting Helmbrecht’s competency. However, counsel never specifically asked
the court to do so or argued that the court’s failure to do so would constitute an
erroneous exercise of discretion. Under these circumstances, we agree with the
State that Helmbrecht’s counsel failed to adequately preserve this issue for
appellate review.

¶29 We further conclude that, on the record before it, the circuit court
did not erroneously exercise its discretion by denying Helmbrecht’s motion for a
postdisposition competency evaluation. In its oral ruling, the court noted that it
had recently held a “very long and extensive competency hearing,” during which
“much testimony and information was presented on the record regarding
Mr. Helmbrecht’s competency.” The court further noted that, after considering all
of the evidence presented at that hearing, it had found Helmbrecht competent to
stand trial. The court then observed that Helmbrecht’s attorney had not presented
any new evidence that would call the court’s recent competency determination
into question.

¶30 As noted above, counsel’s mere suggestion that a defendant is
incompetent is insufficient to require a circuit court to order a competency
evaluation, see McKnight, 65 Wis. 2d at 595, and counsel must instead present
evidence to the court “giving rise to a reason to doubt [the defendant’s]
competency,” see Weber, 146 Wis. 2d at 823. In light of counsel’s failure to
provide any such evidence in this case, and given the court’s recent determination

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No. 2025AP315-CRAC

that Helmbrecht was competent following a four-day competency hearing, the
court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by denying Helmbrecht’s motion
for a postdisposition competency evaluation.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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