Amy J. Trevino v. Klint Trevino

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
August 5, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2022AP1393 Cir. Ct. No. 2013FA132

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:

AMY J. TREVINO,

JOINT-PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

LINCOLN COUNTY CHILD SUPPORT AGENCY,

RESPONDENT,

V.

KLINT TREVINO,

JOINT-PETITIONER-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Lincoln County:
JAY R. TLUSTY, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz, and Gill, JJ.
No. 2022AP1393

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. Klint Trevino, pro se, appeals an order modifying
child support. He argues that the circuit court erred by failing to rule on his
motion to compel discovery and by failing to issue a subpoena duces tecum to
compel the production of a document. He also asserts that the court erred by
retroactively ordering a change in child support. Finally, he argues that the court
erroneously exercised its discretion in various ways by modifying his child
support obligation. We reject these arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Klint and Amy Trevino were married in August 2005 and filed a
joint petition for divorce in August 2013.1 At the time of filing, Klint and Amy
had three minor children together. The parties reached a marital settlement
agreement (MSA), which was incorporated into a divorce judgment entered on
April 12, 2016.

¶3 Pursuant to the MSA, Amy was granted sole legal custody and
primary physical placement of the parties’ children. The MSA provided that Klint
would have periods of physical placement “at reasonable times upon reasonable
notice,” but it also set forth a “default schedule” that would apply “in the event the
parties [could not] agree” as to what reasonable placement would be. The MSA
further provided that Klint would pay $800 per month in child support.

1
Because the parties share a surname, we refer to them by their first names throughout
the remainder of this opinion. We note that Amy was represented by counsel in the circuit court
but, like Klint, is self-represented on appeal.

2
No. 2022AP1393

¶4 In April 2018, Klint filed a motion to prevent Amy from relocating
to the Madison area with the children and for joint legal custody and primary
physical placement. Thereafter, in May 2018, Amy filed a motion seeking
permission to relocate with the children to the Baraboo or Madison area “for
employment and advancement in the employment circle.” Later that month, Amy
filed an amended motion seeking permission to relocate to the Baraboo area.

¶5 In September 2018, a court commissioner entered an order granting
Amy’s motion to relocate to the Madison/Baraboo area and denying Klint’s
motion for joint legal custody and shared physical placement. Amy subsequently
relocated to the Madison area with the children. Klint sought de novo review of
the court commissioner’s decision, and a de novo hearing took place over multiple
days during October 2018 and February and April 2019.

¶6 On June 11, 2019, Amy filed a motion “amending the pleadings
from the original filings in April 2018 to specifically request [that] the child
support be modified.” After Amy filed that motion, the de novo hearing continued
over multiple days during July, September and December 2019. The parties then
filed briefs regarding the outstanding issues in the case. Additional hearings took
place on December 15, 2020, and January 8 and February 3, 2021. On
February 18, 2021, the circuit court issued a written decision denying Klint’s
motion to prevent Amy from relocating with the children and denying his motion
for joint legal custody and primary physical placement.

¶7 Klint subsequently filed two motions to dismiss Amy’s motion to
modify child support. The circuit court held additional hearings on August 25,
2021, September 22, 2021, November 19, 2021, and January 18, 2022. The court

3
No. 2022AP1393

orally denied Klint’s second motion to dismiss during the January 18, 2022
hearing.

¶8 Thereafter, on July 25, 2022, the circuit court entered a written order
granting Amy’s motion to modify child support. The court first determined that a
substantial change in circumstances had occurred since the entry of the last order
setting child support, which was the parties’ April 2016 divorce judgment. The
court noted that, under WIS. STAT. § 767.59(1f)(b)2. (2023-24), “the expiration of
33 months after the date of the entry of the last child support order” gives rise to a
“rebuttable presumption of a substantial change in circumstances sufficient to
justify a revision of” the prior child support order.2

¶9 The circuit court found that this presumption “ha[d] not been
rebutted.” The court reasoned that in the original divorce judgment, Klint

was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $800.00
per month commencing immediately. There is no
documentation in the file as to how the amount of $800.00
was arrived at. If, however, $800.00 is divided by 29% the
result would be $2,758.62 per month for gross income
attributable to [Klint]. If gross monthly income of
$2,758.62 would be multiplied by 12 months the resulting
number would be annual gross income for [Klint] of
$33,103.45. Exhibit 1, from the August 25, 2021 hearing,
indicated that [Klint] had W2 wages of $69,716.76 for
2016. Using the percentage standard of 29% for three
children on the 2016 W2 income for [Klint] would have
resulted in a child support payment of $1,684.82.

¶10 The circuit court further found that Klint’s gross income as of
July 2022 was $109,408 per year, and it noted that both parties’ incomes had

2
Although the circuit court issued its written decision in July 2022, the relevant statutes
have not changed since that time. Accordingly, for convenience, all references to the Wisconsin
Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

4
No. 2022AP1393

increased significantly since the divorce judgment was entered. In addition, the
court stated:

As children grow older, clearly their needs in terms of
clothing, food, school[-]related expenses, and
extra[]curricular activity expenses increase. At the time of
the divorce the children were 10 years, 8 years, and 5 years
of age. At the time of the filing of the motion the children
were 13 years, 11 years, and 8 years of age. They are now
16 years, 14 years, and 11 years of age.

The court also found that the parties’ “cost of living, until recently, has been
modest, but nevertheless, has increased.” Under these circumstances, the court
determined that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred that warranted
a modification of child support.

¶11 Next, the circuit court addressed “whether or not this is a shared
placement, and if so, what is the number of overnights or equivalent care that the
children spend with the parent with less time.” The court declined to “award[] any
equivalent care” to Klint, but it concluded that he was “entitled to a 25% shared
placement child support calculation.”

¶12 The circuit court then addressed “what income should be used for
[Klint] and what income is to be used for [Amy] for purposes of a revised child
support calculation.” The court found that Klint’s “annual salary is $109,408.00
and that he is a salaried employee, and therefore, [is] not eligible for overtime.”
The court found that Amy “is guaranteed a salary of $95,000.00, and in the future
may also be entitled to commissions.” However, the court determined that any
additional income from those potential future commissions was “speculative,” and
it therefore declined to include any amount for commissions in Amy’s gross
income. Based on the parties’ respective gross incomes, the court determined that

5
No. 2022AP1393

Klint’s monthly income available for child support was $9,117.33 and Amy’s
monthly income available for child support was $7,916.66.

¶13 Given those income figures, the circuit court stated that both parties
“would be entitled to a high-income payer calculation for three children pursuant
to” the relevant provision of the Wisconsin Administrative Code. The court also
noted that Klint was “entitled to a 25% shared placement calculation based upon
the Court’s above analysis.”

¶14 The circuit court rejected Klint’s argument that he “should be
entitled to a reduction of his child support obligation for health, dental, and vision
insurance he provides for his children through his employer.” The court noted that
the MSA required Klint to maintain insurance for the children, but Klint
“indicated at the September 22, 2021 hearing that insurance was not going to be an
issue in the child support calculation.”

¶15 The circuit court also rejected Klint’s request “that he and [Amy]
begin sharing the right to claim the children for federal and state income tax
purposes.” The court reasoned:

This issue was addressed in the parties[’] Marital
Settlement Agreement … in which [Amy] was granted the
right to claim all the children for federal and state income
tax purposes, and that such agreement was in lieu of
maintenance and/or any equalizing payment to [Amy] for
property [division]. It was also the Court’s understanding
that [Klint] was not asking for any changes in the tax
provisions during the hearings conducted regarding this
matter.

¶16 Based on the analysis set forth above, the circuit court determined
that Klint’s monthly child support obligation under the relevant guidelines would
be $1,991.31. However, after considering several factors set forth in WIS. STAT.

6
No. 2022AP1393

§ 767.511(1m), the court determined that a deviation from that amount was
warranted. Specifically, the court reasoned that Klint had three other children who
lived with him, while Amy had one other child who lived with her. See
§ 767.511(1m)(bz). In addition, the court noted that due to Amy’s relocation, both
parties must incur travel expenses in order to exchange the children. See
§ 767.511(1m)(em). The court also acknowledged that in the future, Amy “could
be entitled to receive commissions[,] such that her income could be in a range
equivalent to [Klint’s] income.” See § 767.511(1m)(hs). Based on these factors,
the court concluded “that a deviation of $491.31 is appropriate such that [Klint’s]
revised child support obligation will be $1,500.00.”

¶17 Finally, the circuit court addressed the effective date of the child
support modification. The court explained:

This is a difficult decision for the Court given the income
changes and employment position changes the parties have
experienced since the motion was filed on June 11, 2019,
which should be the earliest date the modification could be
effective to. In addition, the parties have been utilizing the
default physical placement schedule significantly more than
the regular physical placement schedule of placement of
reasonable times upon reasonable notice. Said another
way, there have been significant moving parts as it pertains
to income and placement of the children. The Court
concludes that the effective date of the modification of
child support shall be October 1, 2021, as this is a time
when both parties were earning their substantially higher
salaries.

¶18 The above notwithstanding, the circuit court recognized that Klint
“has paid and will pay his $800.00 per month child support payment for the
months of October 2021–August 2022, [and] he would have a credit of $800.00
for each of those eleven months such that his past support would be $7,700.00

7
No. 2022AP1393

($700.00 x 11 months).” The court ordered Klint to pay the past support “at the
rate of $500.00 per month, commencing October 1, 2022.”

¶19 Klint now appeals the circuit court’s order modifying his child
support obligation. Additional facts are discussed below where necessary to our
resolution of Klint’s arguments.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to compel discovery

¶20 On appeal, Klint first argues that the circuit court erred by failing to
rule on his motion to compel discovery. The record shows that on June 9, 2021,
Klint submitted a discovery request to Amy containing 125 requests for
admissions, 18 interrogatories, and 10 requests for production of documents. The
record also contains a letter dated July 6, 2021, from Amy’s attorney to Klint,
stating: “Please find enclosed the Response to Joint Petitioner, Klint Trevino’s
First Set of Requests for Admissions, Interrogatories and Production of
Documents in the above action.” The response itself is not part of the record on
appeal.

¶21 Only July 13, 2021, Klint filed a motion to compel discovery,
pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 804.12. In the motion, Klint asserted that the majority of
his discovery requests to Amy “went unanswered” and, specifically, that “the
majority of Admissions were wrongfully denied, the interrogatories were ignored
and the documents requested have not been provided.” The motion noted that
Amy’s attorney “cites over-litigation and is seeking a protective order.”

¶22 Amy’s attorney subsequently wrote to the circuit court, asserting that
“[m]uch of what has been asked” in Klint’s discovery requests “has already been

8
No. 2022AP1393

covered.” Counsel also cited the “great cost and burden” to Amy of being
required to respond to discovery regarding “issues that have already been
answered by the Court.”

¶23 On August 2, 2021, Amy’s attorney filed a motion for a protective
order regarding Klint’s discovery requests, pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 804.01(3).
The motion alleged that Klint’s requests for admissions were merely
“argumentative questions” and that Amy “has endeavored to answer the questions,
but it is clear that these are being propounded for purposes to harass or intimidate
and cause undue burden and expenses to” Amy. The motion further asserted that
Klint’s requests for admissions and interrogatories were “not relevant” and that
“these matters have been litigated in custody proceedings at length and denied by
the Circuit Court.” Amy therefore asked the court to order Klint “to pare down his
requests for admissions to non-argumentative versions of facts and to ask
questions, if there is something that [Amy] is to admit or deny to.” Amy further
sought actual attorney fees as a sanction for Klint’s “over-trial.”

¶24 Klint asserts that the circuit court never ruled on his motion to
compel discovery. This court has reviewed the record, and we do not see that the
court ever ruled on that motion or on Amy’s motion for a protective order. Klint
asserts that the court erroneously exercised its discretion in that regard.3

¶25 We note, however, that “[n]o judgment shall be reversed or set
aside … for error as to any matter of pleading or procedure” unless “the error

3
Throughout his briefs, Klint actually states that the circuit court “abused its discretion.”
In 1992, our supreme court replaced the phrase “abuse of discretion” with “erroneous exercise of
discretion.” See, e.g., Shirk v. Bowling, Inc., 2001 WI 36, ¶9 n.6, 242 Wis. 2d 153, 624 N.W.2d
375.

9
No. 2022AP1393

complained of has affected the substantial rights of the party seeking to reverse or
set aside the judgment.” WIS. STAT. § 805.18(2). Thus, in determining whether
the circuit court’s alleged error in failing to rule on Klint’s motion to compel
discovery requires reversal, “we must determine whether the error was prejudicial
or harmless.” See Hannemann v. Boyson, 2005 WI 94, ¶57, 282 Wis. 2d 664,
698 N.W.2d 714. “For an error ‘to affect the substantial rights’ of a party, there
must be a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the outcome of the
action or proceeding at issue.” Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ¶32, 246
Wis. 2d 67, 629 N.W.2d 698.

¶26 Klint has failed to develop an argument that the circuit court’s
apparent failure to rule on his motion to compel discovery affected his substantial
rights. He merely asserts that the court’s failure to rule on the motion “hindered
[his] ability to try [his] case.” He does not explain, specifically, what discovery
should have been produced and how the absence of that discovery affected his
ability to oppose Amy’s motion to modify child support. Moreover, we observe
that the circuit court held multiple days of evidentiary hearings on Amy’s motion,
during which both parties testified and presented other evidence. Klint does not
explain what evidence his motion to compel discovery would have revealed that
was not otherwise presented to the court during those hearings or how that
evidence would have affected the court’s decision.

¶27 Under these circumstances, Klint has not presented a developed
argument showing how the circuit court’s alleged error in failing to rule on his
motion to compel discovery affected his substantial rights. See State v. Pettit, 171
Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (explaining that this court
need not address undeveloped arguments); Industrial Risk Insurers v. American
Eng’g Testing, Inc., 2009 WI App 62, ¶25, 318 Wis. 2d 148, 769 N.W.2d 82

10
No. 2022AP1393

(explaining that this court will not abandon its neutrality to develop arguments for
a party). Accordingly, Klint has not shown that this issue provides a basis to
reverse the circuit court’s decision.

II. Subpoena duces tecum

¶28 Klint next argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion by failing to “grant or deny [his] subpoena duces tecum to gain
discovery pursuant to” WIS. STAT. § 805.07(2)(a). In support of this argument,
Klint asserts that Amy submitted two income and expense statements in the circuit
court, one showing monthly childcare expenses of $450 and another showing
monthly childcare expenses of $900. Based on that discrepancy, Klint apparently
believes that some of Amy’s claimed childcare expenses were being used for
Amy’s youngest child, a child that Amy had with another man following the
parties’ divorce.

¶29 Consequently, on December 13, 2021, Klint filed a proposed
subpoena duces tecum in the circuit court, seeking an order requiring the
Dane County Circuit Court to “release [Amy’s] expense statement” that was filed
in the Dane County family court case regarding Amy’s youngest child. The circuit
court declined the proposed subpoena on July 25, 2022—the same day that the
court granted Amy’s motion to modify child support—with the notation,
“Decision on child support modification completed.”

¶30 As with Klint’s first argument on appeal, we conclude Klint has
failed to present a developed argument showing how the circuit court’s failure to
grant his proposed subpoena duces tecum affected his substantial rights. See WIS.
STAT. § 805.18(2). Klint apparently believes that the document in question would
have shown that Amy’s claimed childcare expenses included expenses for her

11
No. 2022AP1393

youngest child. The circuit court, however, did not base its decision to modify
child support on Amy’s claimed childcare expenses. Rather, as summarized
above, the court concluded that a modification of child support was warranted
based on: (1) the amount of time that had passed since the entry of the prior child
support order; (2) both parties’ increased incomes; and (3) the children’s ages and
resultant increases in expenses for clothing, food, school, and extracurricular
activities.

¶31 After calculating Klint’s child support obligation using the
high-income payer formula, the circuit court determined that a deviation from
guideline child support was appropriate based on, among other things, the fact that
both Klint and Amy had other children to support. See WIS. STAT.
§ 767.511(1m)(bz). Despite acknowledging that fact, the court did not base its
calculation of Klint’s child support obligation on the amount of childcare expenses
listed on either of Amy’s income and expense statements.

¶32 On this record, Klint has failed to show how the circuit court’s
alleged error in failing to grant his proposed subpoena duces tecum affected his
substantial rights. Again, this court need not address undeveloped arguments.
Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d at 646-47.

III. Retroactive child support modification

¶33 Next, Klint contends that the circuit court erred by “retroactively
appl[ying] a change in child support when [Amy] failed to properly file a motion
pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 802.09.” Klint argues that because “no proper motion
was before the court[,] the court reasonably should have dismissed the motion or
made the change effective with the date of the order.”

12
No. 2022AP1393

¶34 As noted above, in May 2018, Amy filed a motion seeking
permission to relocate with the children to the Baraboo or Madison area. Later
that month, Amy filed an amended motion seeking permission to relocate to the
Baraboo area. Neither of those motions sought a modification of child support.
However, on June 11, 2019, Amy filed a motion “amending the pleadings from the
original filings in April 2018 to specifically request [that] the child support be
modified.”4

¶35 Klint subsequently filed two motions to dismiss Amy’s motion to
modify child support. The first motion to dismiss, filed in March 2021, asserted
that Amy was required “to adhere to the agreements made in the MSA and on the
record during the final judgment in conjunction with the MSA.” The second
motion to dismiss, filed in January 2022, asserted that Amy’s attempt to amend
her relocation motion to add a request for modification of child support was
improper under WIS. STAT. § 802.09, the statute governing the amendment of
pleadings.

¶36 During a hearing on January 18, 2022, the circuit court orally denied
Klint’s second motion to dismiss Amy’s motion to modify child support. 5 The
court explained:

4
We presume that the reference to “April 2018” in Amy’s June 11, 2019 motion should
have been “May 2018,” as the record does not contain any motions or pleadings filed by Amy in
April 2018.
5
It is not clear whether the circuit court ever separately denied Klint’s first motion to
dismiss. We note, however, that Klint does not renew the argument raised in that motion on
appeal. See A.O. Smith Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Cos., 222 Wis. 2d 475, 491, 588 N.W.2d 285
(Ct. App. 1998) (stating that an issue raised in the circuit court, but not raised on appeal, is
deemed abandoned).

13
No. 2022AP1393

The Court is going to deny the motion to dismiss, in that
we have had, now, two hearing on the issue of child
support. I have gone through various pleadings. Clearly,
the motion that I have referenced, [Amy’s June 11, 2019
motion], is the motion to modify child support. Currently,
it does have slightly confusing language, but when I look at
this file in it[]s entirety, it’s clear to me that, that’s the
motion I am deciding, and that’s the motion we’ve been
having testimony on.

So, for the record, I am—and the motion is not labelled as
an amended motion, it’s just titled as a motion, although the
title, I understand, of a pleading is not controlling. But, it’s
clear to me that we’re here on a motion by [Amy] to
modify child support. And, again, we’ve been on this issue
for, now, the third time. So, the motion to dismiss is
denied.

As previously discussed, the court later granted Amy’s motion to modify child
support and made the modification retroactive to October 1, 2021.

¶37 Klint now argues that the circuit court erred by ordering a retroactive
modification of child support because Amy did not properly amend her prior
motion in order to add a request to modify child support. Klint cites WIS. STAT.
§ 802.09(1), which allows a party to amend a pleading

once as a matter of course at any time within 6 months after
the summons and complaint are filed or within the time set
in a scheduling order under [WIS. STAT. §] 802.10.
Otherwise a party may amend the pleading only by leave of
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave
shall be freely given at any stage of the action when justice
so requires.

Klint argues that Amy had already amended her relocation motion once before she
filed the amended motion including a request to modify child support in
June 2019, and he further asserts that the June 2019 amendment was filed “outside
of the 6-month window.” Klint argues that the date Amy moved to modify child
support matters because a court “may not revise the amount of child

14
No. 2022AP1393

support … prior to the date that notice of the action is given to the respondent.”
See WIS. STAT. § 767.59(1m).

¶38 In making his argument that Amy never properly filed a motion to
modify child support, Klint ignores the language in WIS. STAT. § 802.09(1)
permitting a party to amend a pleading “by leave of court” and stating that leave
“shall be freely given at any stage of the action when justice so requires.” The
decision to grant or deny leave to amend a pleading is within the circuit court’s
discretion, and we will affirm as long as the court “applied the correct legal
standard to the facts of record in a reasonable manner.” Mach v. Allison, 2003 WI
App 11, ¶20, 259 Wis. 2d 686, 656 N.W.2d 766. “Although the proper exercise of
discretion contemplates that the circuit court explain its reasoning, when the court
does not do so, we may search the record to determine if it supports the court’s
discretionary decision.” Randall v. Randall, 2000 WI App 98, ¶7, 235 Wis. 2d 1,
612 N.W.2d 737.

¶39 Here, although the circuit court did not expressly state that it was
granting Amy leave to amend her motion under WIS. STAT. § 802.09(1), it is clear
that the court did so when it denied Klint’s second motion to dismiss. In its oral
ruling denying that motion, the court essentially concluded that justice required
granting Amy leave to amend because: (1) the parties had already had multiple
hearings regarding the substance of Amy’s motion to modify child support; and
(2) it was “clear” that Amy was seeking a modification of child support. In other
words, the court concluded that both the court and Klint had notice that Amy was
asking the court to modify child support. Furthermore, Klint did not file his
second motion to dismiss until over two and one-half years after Amy filed her
amended motion seeking to modify child support, at which point the parties had
engaged in discovery and participated in multiple hearings addressing the

15
No. 2022AP1393

substance of that motion. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the
court erroneously exercised its discretion by granting Amy leave to amend her
motion.

¶40 As Klint concedes, WIS. STAT. § 767.59(1m) allows a circuit court to
make a revision of child support retroactive to the date notice of the motion was
given to the respondent. The appellate record shows that Amy’s amended motion
including her request to modify child support was filed on June 11, 2019. While
Klint asserts that he “never received service” of the motion, he cites no evidence
in support of that assertion, and he concedes that the motion was “electronically
filed” in June 2019.

¶41 Moreover, we note that the circuit court did not actually make its
revision of child support effective as of June 11, 2019, the date Amy’s motion was
filed. Instead, the court ordered that the effective date of the modification would
be October 1, 2021—“a time when both parties were earning their substantially
higher salaries.” Aside from his claim that Amy did not properly amend her
motion to add a request to modify child support—which we have rejected for the
reasons explained above—Klint develops no argument that the court erred by
setting October 1, 2021, as the effective date of the modification. We therefore
reject Klint’s assertion that the court erred in that regard.

IV. Decision to modify child support

¶42 Finally, Klint argues that the circuit court erred in several respects
by granting Amy’s motion to modify child support. A circuit court’s decision
whether to modify child support is reviewed for an erroneous exercise of
discretion, and we will affirm if the court “examined the evidence before it,

16
No. 2022AP1393

applied the proper legal standards and reached a reasoned conclusion.” Rottscheit
v. Dumler, 2003 WI 62, ¶11, 262 Wis. 2d 292, 664 N.W.2d 525 (citation omitted).

¶43 A circuit court may modify a party’s child support obligation “only
upon a finding of a substantial change in circumstances.” WIS. STAT.
§ 767.59(1f)(a). “The burden of demonstrating a substantial change in
circumstances is on the party seeking modification.” Kelly v. Hougham, 178
Wis. 2d 546, 556, 504 N.W.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1993). “A circuit court’s findings of
fact regarding what changes have occurred in the circumstances of two parties will
not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous.” Benn v. Benn, 230 Wis. 2d
301, 307, 602 N.W.2d 65 (Ct. App. 1999). Whether those changes are substantial,
however, is a question of law for our independent review, id., although we may
give weight to the circuit court’s determination, Kelly, 178 Wis. 2d at 556.

¶44 As an initial matter, Klint contends that the circuit court erred by
determining that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred. He contends
that “[t]he only change the parties have experienced is that both parties’ incomes
have [risen] to a level which is higher individually than … it was combined
pre-divorce.”

¶45 Pursuant to statute, however, based on the amount of time that had
elapsed since the last child support order, there was a rebuttable presumption that a
substantial change in circumstances had occurred. See WIS. STAT.
§ 767.59(1f)(b)2. The circuit court properly concluded that presumption had not
been rebutted based on: (1) both parties’ increased incomes; and (2) the children’s
increased ages and resultant increases in expenses for clothing, food, school, and

17
No. 2022AP1393

extracurricular activities.6 Both “[a] change in the needs of the child” and “[a]
change in the payer’s earning capacity” “may constitute a substantial change of
circumstances sufficient to justify revision of” a child support order.
Sec. 767.59(1f)(c)2.-3. As such, the court did not err by determining that a
substantial change in circumstances had occurred.

¶46 Citing Lofthus v. Lofthus, 2004 WI App 65, 270 Wis. 2d 515, 678
N.W.2d 393, Klint argues that the children’s increased ages could not constitute a
substantial change in circumstances. Lofthus involved a father’s motion to
modify physical placement under circumstances where the applicable statute
created “a rebuttable presumption for maintaining the current placement
schedule.” Id., ¶19. In concluding that the father had failed to overcome that
presumption, we reasoned, “If we declared the natural aging process of the
children to be a substantial change warranting placement modification, there
would always be a basis for modification in every case. The legislature, by
creating a presumption of the status quo, meant to raise the bar.” Id., ¶22.

¶47 Lofthus is materially distinguishable from this case because it
involved a statutory presumption in favor of the status quo, while this case
involves a statutory presumption in favor of a substantial change in circumstances.
Moreover, the circuit court in this case did not simply determine that “the natural
aging process of the children,” in and of itself, constituted a substantial change in
circumstances. See id. Rather, the court reasoned that the children’s increased
ages has resulted in increased expenses. While Klint appears to suggest that the

6
Contrary to Klint’s assertion, the circuit court did not “cite[] Klint’s remarriage as a
factor in creating a substantial change.”

18
No. 2022AP1393

court’s finding in that regard was clearly erroneous, he concedes that Amy “did
testify that because the children are older, the cost of food and clothing has
increased.”

¶48 In addition, while Klint emphasizes that the MSA required Amy to
pay “[v]ariable costs, except for uninsured medicals,” he cites no legal authority in
support of the proposition that the MSA’s provision to that effect prevented the
circuit court from considering the children’s increased expenses when deciding
whether a substantial change in circumstances had occurred. As noted above, “[a]
change in the needs of the child” “may constitute a substantial change of
circumstances sufficient to justify revision of” a child support order. See WIS.
STAT. § 767.59(1f)(c)2.

¶49 Klint also argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion in modifying child support by “fail[ing] to consider proper factors.”
Specifically, he asserts that the court failed to consider his “placement schedule
and equivalent care”; his “158-mile round trip needed for placement”; the fact that
the MSA required him to pay for the children’s health, dental, and vision
insurance; and the fact that he had three additional children and was expecting a
fourth.

¶50 Contrary to Klint’s assertion, the circuit court’s written decision
shows that the court did consider these factors. First, the court addressed and
rejected Klint’s argument that he was entitled to equivalent care, but it
nevertheless determined, based on the parties’ use of the default placement
schedule in the MSA, that Klint was “entitled to a 25% shared placement child
support calculation.”

19
No. 2022AP1393

¶51 Second, the circuit court expressly considered both parties’ travel
expenses associated with exchanging the children. The court relied on that factor
to support a downward deviation in Klint’s monthly child support obligation.

¶52 Third, the circuit court addressed and rejected Klint’s argument that
“he should be entitled to a reduction of his child support obligation for health,
dental, and vision insurance he provides for his children through his employer.”
The court noted that the MSA required Klint to provide insurance for the children
and that Klint had previously told the court “that insurance was not going to be an
issue in the child support calculation.”

¶53 Fourth, the circuit court acknowledged that Klint “is the father of
three other children that live with him” and that he has “the obligation to support
those children.” Again, the court expressly relied on that factor in determining
that a downward deviation in Klint’s child support obligation was warranted.

¶54 Thus, the circuit court clearly considered each of the factors that
Klint now raises on appeal. The court’s rejection of Klint’s arguments regarding
two of those factors does not show that the court erroneously exercised its
discretion. Klint essentially asks us to reweigh the various factors that the court
considered in modifying child support. However, our role on appeal is to
determine whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion, not to
substitute our own discretion for that of the circuit court. See State v. Rhodes,
2011 WI 73, ¶26, 336 Wis. 2d 64, 799 N.W.2d 850.

¶55 Klint also argues that the circuit court erred by considering Amy’s
youngest child—“a child that [Klint is] not legally obligated to take care of”—
when deciding whether to modify child support. This argument is misplaced
because the court did not increase Klint’s child support obligation in order to

20
No. 2022AP1393

provide support for Amy’s youngest child. Rather, in determining that a
downward deviation from guideline support was warranted, the court properly
considered the fact that both parties were responsible for supporting additional
children, beyond the three children that they share. See WIS. STAT.
§ 767.511(1m)(bz) (listing “[t]he needs of any person, other than the child, whom
either party is legally obligated to support” as a factor that may support a deviation
from guideline child support).

¶56 Next, Klint argues that by “agreeing to a fixed sum” for child
support in the MSA, the parties “agreed that [they] were deviating from the [child
support] guidelines,” which prevented the circuit court from later using the
guidelines to modify Klint’s child support obligation. However, Klint cites no
legal authority in support of the proposition that an agreement to deviate from the
child support guidelines at the time of divorce prevents a court from subsequently
relying on those guidelines when modifying child support after a substantial
change in circumstances has occurred. We need not address arguments that are
unsupported by references to legal authority.7 See Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d at 646.

¶57 Klint also argues that the circuit court erred by finding that Amy’s
gross income was $95,000 per year. Based on the record, we conclude that

7
Klint cites Nelsen v. Candee, 205 Wis. 2d 632, 638-44, 556 N.W.2d 784 (Ct. App.
1996), in which we concluded that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by
deviating from the child support guidelines when setting a modified child support amount. The
circuit court in Nelsen reasoned “that the support award must reflect the postmarriage history,
including [the wife’s] earlier agreement not to apply the guidelines and her failure to fulfill her
original plan of completing her degree and working outside the home.” Id. at 635 (emphasis
added). Although we concluded in Nelsen that the circuit court had not erroneously exercised its
discretion in that regard, nothing in Nelsen stands for the proposition that a court is prohibited
from using the guidelines to modify child support in a case where the parties previously agreed to
a support amount that was not determined using the guidelines.

21
No. 2022AP1393

finding was not clearly erroneous. Amy specifically testified that her annual
salary at her new employer was $95,000. She further testified that she expected to
earn commissions in the future, but she was unsure of the structure and timing of
those commissions. Amy also submitted documentation from her new employer
showing weekly gross pay of $1,826.92, which the circuit court correctly noted
would result in annual gross pay of approximately $95,000. Based on this
evidence, the court did not clearly err by finding that Amy’s gross income was
$95,000 per year and that any future income she might earn from commissions
was “speculative.” In other words, the court’s finding in that regard was not
against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. See Phelps v.
Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 2009 WI 74, ¶39, 319 Wis. 2d 1, 768 N.W.2d 615.

¶58 Lastly, Klint argues that the amount of child support ordered by the
circuit court is excessive. He relies on Parrett v. Parrett, 146 Wis. 2d 830, 841,
432 N.W.2d 664 (Ct. App. 1988), where we concluded that the circuit court did
not err by deviating from the child support guidelines because the court
“considered the guidelines and concluded that their use would result in a figure so
far beyond the child’s needs as to be irrational.” Like the circuit court in Parrett,
the court here considered the child support guidelines but ultimately determined
that a downward deviation was appropriate. While Klint argues that the court
should have deviated further, on the record before us, we cannot conclude that the
court’s failure to do so constituted an erroneous exercise of discretion.

¶59 Klint also cites Hubert v. Hubert, 159 Wis. 2d 803, 816, 465
N.W.2d 252 (Ct. App. 1990), where we stated, “The award of child support must
recognize that it is in the best interests of the children that they continue at a
standard of living substantially equal to what they enjoyed before this [divorce]

22
No. 2022AP1393

action was commenced.” (Emphasis added.) Klint further cites Nelsen v. Candee,
205 Wis. 2d 632, 643, 556 N.W.2d 784 (Ct. App. 1996), where we stated:

Because [the father] is a high-income payor, the Parrett
rule informs us that the guideline amount may be more than
what the children actually need. But because [the children]
are the children of a high-income physician, the Hubert
corollary suggests that [the father’s] child support
payments should be high so that the children continue to
enjoy the lifestyle that they had before he and [the mother]
divorced. The issue left for the family court, therefore, was
to set an award within these guideposts.

(Emphasis added.)

¶60 Based on Hubert and Nelsen, Klint appears to argue that, in
modifying child support, the relevant question for the circuit court was what
amount of support would allow the children to maintain the same standard of
living that they had before the divorce. Klint then argues that the modified child
support award is excessive because, given Amy’s increased income, the children
“enjoy a higher standard of living in [Amy’s] home post-divorce than they ever
did during the marriage.”

¶61 Klint’s argument in this regard is unpersuasive. Hubert involved an
initial determination of child support at the time of divorce, not a subsequent
modification of child support like the one at issue in this case. See Hubert, 159
Wis. 2d at 809-11. In that context, it made sense for the court to consider the
children’s standard of living before the divorce when determining the payer’s
child support obligation. Although Nelsen involved a modification of child
support, the father in that case was a “a high-income physician” both during and
after the marriage. See Nelsen, 205 Wis. 2d at 643. Thus, unlike this case, Nelsen
did not involve a situation where the payer’s income dramatically increased
following the parties’ divorce.

23
No. 2022AP1393

¶62 Accordingly, under the factual circumstances of this case, neither
Hubert nor Nelsen required the circuit court to limit Klint’s child support
obligation to the amount of support necessary to maintain the children at the same
standard of living they had during the parties’ marriage. Instead, given the
significant increases in both parties’ incomes following the divorce, the court
could reasonably determine that Klint’s child support obligation should reflect the
parties’ standards of living at the time of the modification. In addition, as noted
above, the court specifically—and reasonably—considered the children’s
increased need for support when setting Klint’s revised child support obligation.
Under these circumstances, we reject Klint’s argument that the court erroneously
exercised its discretion by ordering him to pay excessive child support.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

24