The Estate of Finley Baier v. Jacob Hemauer

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
April 8, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP78 Cir. Ct. No. 2021CV554

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

THE ESTATE OF FINLEY BAIER, TAYLOR BAIER AND FAITH MOENING,

PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS,

J.J. KELLER AND ASSOCIATES, INC. HEALTH AND WELFARE PLAN,

INVOLUNTARY-PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

JACOB HEMAUER, AMERICAN FAMILY INSURANCE COMPANY AND
ABC INSURANCE,

DEFENDANTS,

GRAVITY PARK USA, LLC, DEF INSURANCE AND GHI INSURANCE,

THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS,

NATIONAL CASUALTY COMPANY,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
No. 2024AP78

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Brown County:
MARC A. HAMMER, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded with directions.

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Gill, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. National Casualty Company appeals from a
nonfinal order denying its motion for summary judgment.1 National Casualty
moved for summary judgment on the ground that the policy of insurance it issued
to Robert Schneider DBA Gravity Park USA, LLC,2 did not provide coverage,
pursuant to several endorsements, for the claims alleged in this case against
Gravity Park. For the reasons that follow, we agree with National Casualty’s
reading of the plain language of the policy. Accordingly, we reverse and remand
this case with directions that the circuit court grant National Casualty’s motion for
summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The following facts are undisputed for the purposes of this appeal.
On July 19, 2020, five-year-old Finley Baier suffered a fatal injury while riding a

1
We granted leave to appeal the nonfinal order on February 9, 2024. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.50(3) (2023-24). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version
unless otherwise noted.
2
Schneider is Gravity Park’s owner. Going forward, unless otherwise noted, we will
refer to both Schneider and Gravity Park as “Gravity Park.” National Casualty issued a
commercial general liability policy to Gravity Park for the policy period from May 20, 2020, to
March 29, 2021 (hereinafter, the policy).

2
No. 2024AP78

dirt bike3 on a track owned and operated by Gravity Park. Finley’s death occurred
when he was struck by Jacob Hemauer, who was driving an ATV on that same
track. The record is clear that there was no official scheduled activity or race
taking place at Gravity Park that day. The facility was open for fee-paying guests
to ride freely on the track.

¶3 As a result of the accident, Finley’s parents—Taylor Baier and Faith
Moening—and Finley’s Estate (collectively, Finley’s parents) filed the instant
lawsuit against Hemauer and Hemauer’s insurer, American Family Mutual
Insurance Company (collectively, Hemauer).4 Thereafter, Hemauer filed a
third-party complaint against Gravity Park, Schneider, and Gravity Park’s
unknown insurer, alleging that Gravity Park’s negligence contributed to Finley’s
death. National Casualty then intervened in the lawsuit, seeking a declaratory
judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Gravity Park. Finley’s
parents responded with an amended complaint that included claims against
Gravity Park, alleging negligence and gross negligence against Hemauer and
Gravity Park and alleging a violation of the Safe Place Statute—WIS. STAT.
§ 101.11—against Gravity Park.

¶4 National Casualty subsequently moved to bifurcate and stay
proceedings on liability pending a determination of its coverage obligations, which
the circuit court granted. Thereafter, National Casualty filed a motion for

3
A dirt bike is a “lightweight motorcycle designed for operation on unpaved surfaces.”
Dirt bike, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dirt%20bike (last visited April 3, 2025).
4
United Healthcare Insurance Company was originally named as an involuntary plaintiff
based on its status as Finley’s health insurer. The J.J. Keller & Associates, Inc. Health & Welfare
Plan was substituted for United Healthcare as the correct party of interest on October 18, 2022.

3
No. 2024AP78

summary judgment, asserting that the policy did not provide coverage for any of
the parties’ claims against Gravity Park and that National Casualty had no duty to
defend or indemnify Gravity Park with regard to the lawsuit’s claims.
Specifically, National Casualty argued that its Commercial General Liability
Coverage Form (the CGL Coverage Form) was narrowed by the policy’s Limited
Event Coverage Endorsement “to reported events on file with National Casualty.”
Therefore, damages arising as a result of Finley’s death, which did not occur
during a scheduled, reported, and approved event, were not covered under the
policy. National Casualty also identified three other endorsements that it claimed
barred coverage: (1) the Motorsports Racing Liability Coverage Endorsement (the
Motorsports Endorsement); (2) the Designated Operations Exclusion
Endorsement; and (3) the Legal Liability to Participants Who Are Minors
Endorsement (Minors Endorsement).

¶5 The circuit court denied National Casualty’s summary judgment
motion by written decision and order. The court first noted that the parties agreed
that Finley’s accident was an “occurrence” such that there was an initial grant of
coverage under the CGL Coverage Form. The court also appeared to conclude
that the Limited Event Coverage Endorsement precluded coverage for the claims
against Gravity Park because the evidence “clearly establishes that Gravity Park
had not declared an event for July 19, 2020.”

¶6 Nevertheless, the circuit court then proceeded to address the
Motorsports Endorsement. The endorsement modified the CGL Coverage Form to
add an exclusion for “‘[b]odily injury’ or ‘property damage’ arising out of the use
of the ‘premises’ for any exhibition, event or activity not a part of the ‘covered
program.’” As relevant here, “covered program” was defined as any event that
“[i]s usual and customary to your business activities and events.” The court

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No. 2024AP78

determined that Finley and Hemauer were participating in a noncompetition
motocross riding event, which was “usual and customary” for Gravity Park, and,
as such, the court concluded that the Motorsports Endorsement provided coverage,
notwithstanding the Limited Event Coverage Endorsement.

¶7 The circuit court further determined that the Designated Operations
Exclusion Endorsement precluded coverage under the policy when read in
isolation, but it did not preclude coverage when read in conjunction with the rest
of the policy. The endorsement states that the policy does not provide coverage
for bodily injury or property damage arising out of “‘[o]pen riding and practice
activities’ on the insured premises during nonracing days.” The exclusion defines
“[o]pen riding and practice activities” as “times in which ‘covered programs’ are
not occurring and participation is open to the general public either on a club
membership basis or on a fee basis.” Because the court had already concluded
that Finley’s accident occurred during a “covered program,” the court concluded
that the Designated Operations Exclusion Endorsement did not apply because it
only applied when covered programs were not occurring.

¶8 Finally, the circuit court declined to apply the Minors Endorsement,
citing disputed issues of material fact as to whether Finley was a “participant” as
defined by the policy. That exclusion states:

This insurance does not apply to “bodily injury” to any
“participant” during a “covered program” who is under the
age of sixteen (16) years old at the time of the
“occurrence.”

This exclusion does not apply:

1. To a “participant” who is not a driver or rider;

2. If the “participant” driver possesses a valid driver’s
license; or

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No. 2024AP78

3. The “participant” is injured during a “covered
program” listed in the schedule below.[5]

¶9 According to the circuit court, the first two exceptions to the Minors
Endorsement did not apply. It noted, however, that, as relevant to the third
exception, the Motorsports Endorsement defines a “participant” as “any person
granted permission to enter the ‘restricted area’”—meaning “any area requiring
special authorization, credentials or permission to enter and to which admission by
the general public is restricted or prohibited,” which Schneider testified at his
deposition was the racetrack—“but only if: a. The person has clearly defined
duties directly allotted to them as respects a ‘covered program’; and b. The person
is within the ‘restricted area.’” (Formatting altered.) While it was undisputed that
Finley’s accident occurred within the restricted area, the court concluded that there
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Finley had “clearly defined
duties directly allotted to” him. Accordingly, the court determined that it could
not conclude, as a matter of law, that the Minors Endorsement barred coverage.
National Casualty appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶10 On appeal, National Casualty argues that the circuit court erred by
failing to give proper effect to the Limited Event Coverage Endorsement.
Specifically, while National Casualty concedes that Finley’s injuries constitute
“bodily injury” caused by an “occurrence” during the policy period—such that the
policy provides an initial grant of coverage—it argues that the Limited Event
Coverage Endorsement narrows the general liability coverage provided under the

The schedule listed the event as “MOTORCYCLES & ATVS,” the date “AS
5

REPORTED,” the location as “PER TRACK LOCATION,” and the minimum age as “4.”

6
No. 2024AP78

entire policy, with the result being that coverage is provided only for scheduled
events reported by Gravity Park to National Casualty.

¶11 In response, Gravity Park argues that “the Motorsports Endorsement
adds definitions to the [CGL Coverage] Form, including what constitutes a
‘covered program.’” Because the circuit court found that Finley was participating
in a covered program at the time of his death, Gravity Park contends that there is
coverage under the policy. Finley’s parents agree, arguing that the policy’s
exclusions are inapplicable to the facts of this case. According to Finley’s parents,
the Limited Event Coverage Endorsement is inapplicable to this case “because it
only applies to specifically scheduled races and Finley was not participating in any
such race.” Thus, both Gravity Park and Finley’s parents assert that National
Casualty’s duty to defend has been triggered.

¶12 “Contracts for insurance typically impose two main duties—the duty
to indemnify the insured against damages or losses, and the duty to defend against
claims for damages.” Johnson Controls, Inc. v. London Mkt., 2010 WI 52, ¶28,
325 Wis. 2d 176, 784 N.W.2d 579. The duty to defend is broader than the duty to
indemnify. Id., ¶29. To determine an insurer’s duty to defend its insured, we
generally compare the four corners of the underlying complaint to the terms of the
entire insurance policy. Water Well Sols. Serv. Grp. Inc. v. Consolidated Ins.
Co., 2016 WI 54, ¶15, 369 Wis. 2d 607, 881 N.W.2d 285. However, where an
insurer tenders a defense and seeks a determination of its coverage obligation, a
circuit court may look beyond the complaint and consider relevant extrinsic
evidence to make that determination. 5 Walworth, LLC v. Engerman
Contracting, Inc., 2023 WI 51, ¶13, 408 Wis. 2d 39, 992 N.W.2d 31. If the
record forecloses any possibility of coverage, then all obligations under the
policy—including the duty to defend—are discharged. Pamperin Rentals II, LLC

7
No. 2024AP78

v. R.G. Hendricks & Sons Constr., Inc., 2012 WI App 125, ¶5, 344 Wis. 2d 669,
825 N.W.2d 297.

¶13 This case is before us on National Casualty’s motion for summary
judgment. “Insurers may seek determinations of their coverage obligations
through summary judgment or declaratory judgment.” Wiegert v. TM Carpentry,
LLC, 2022 WI App 28, ¶19, 403 Wis. 2d 519, 978 N.W.2d 207. “Summary
judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and ‘the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Quick Charge Kiosk
LLC v. Kaul, 2020 WI 54, ¶9, 392 Wis. 2d 35, 944 N.W.2d 598 (quoting WIS.
STAT. § 802.08(2)). Our review of a motion for summary judgment is de novo,
applying the same methodology as the circuit court but benefitting from the circuit
court’s analysis. Id.

¶14 This case also requires us to interpret the terms of an insurance
contract, which is a question of law that we review independently. American
Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶23, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 673
N.W.2d 65. “Judicial interpretation of a contract, including an insurance policy,
seeks to determine and give effect to the intent of the contracting parties.” Id.
“Insurance policies are construed as they would be understood by a reasonable
person in the position of the insured.” Id. “However, we do not interpret
insurance policies to provide coverage for risks that the insurer did not
contemplate or underwrite and for which it has not received a premium.” Id.
“When analyzing whether an insurance policy provides coverage, we examine the
terms of the policy and compare it to the facts in the record.” 5 Walworth, 408
Wis. 2d 39, ¶16.

¶15 Our interpretation begins with a three-step process:

8
No. 2024AP78

First, we examine the facts of the insured’s claim to
determine whether the policy’s insuring agreement makes
an initial grant of coverage. If it is clear that the policy was
not intended to cover the claim asserted, the analysis ends
there. If the claim triggers the initial grant of coverage in
the insuring agreement, we next examine the various
exclusions to see whether any of them preclude coverage of
the present claim…. Exclusions sometimes have
exceptions; if a particular exclusion applies, we then look
to see whether any exception to that exclusion reinstates
coverage.

American Girl, 268 Wis. 2d 16, ¶24. “Exclusions are narrowly or strictly
construed against the insurer if their effect is uncertain.” Id. Importantly, “[w]e
analyze each exclusion separately; the inapplicability of one exclusion will not
reinstate coverage where another exclusion has precluded it.” Id. Furthermore,
“[a]n exception pertains only to the exclusion clause within which it appears; the
applicability of an exception will not create coverage if the insuring agreement
precludes it or if a separate exclusion applies.” Id.

¶16 Based on our review of the terms of the policy and the record, we
conclude that although the CGL Coverage Form provides an initial grant of
coverage for the claims alleged in Finley’s parents’ amended complaint and
Hemauer’s third-party complaint, the Limited Event Coverage Endorsement
restricts coverage to occurrences taking place during a scheduled, reported, and
approved event. Given that such an activity or race was not taking place at
Gravity Park on the day of Finley’s accident, the policy does not provide

9
No. 2024AP78

coverage; therefore, National Casualty has no duty to defend Gravity Park against
the claims in this case.6

¶17 We begin, as we must, with the language of the policy. As noted
above, the CGL Coverage Form provides an initial grant of coverage for “sums
that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay” as a result of “bodily injury” or
“property damage” caused by an “occurrence.” However, the Limited Event
Coverage Endorsement, by its plain language, clearly states that it “modifies
insurance provided under” the CGL Coverage Form. That endorsement then
states: “This insurance applies only to ‘bodily injury,’ ‘property damage’ or
‘personal and advertising injury’ arising out of an ‘occurrence’ or offense which
takes place during an event shown in the [s]chedule below.” (Emphasis added.)
That “[s]chedule” includes only “EVENTS REPORTED TO AND APPROVED,
PRIOR TO THE EVENT, BY [National Casualty], AS PER SCHEDULE ON
FILE.”

¶18 The Limited Event Coverage Endorsement’s language is
unequivocal that National Casualty’s insurance contract with Gravity Park—
“[t]his insurance”—provides coverage only for occurrences or offenses taking
place during a scheduled event reported to and approved, prior to the event, by
National Casualty. Thus, given that it is undisputed that Finley’s accident did not
take place during an event that had been reported to and approved by National

6
The parties also present arguments regarding the applicability of the Designated
Operations Exclusion Endorsement, the Motorsports Endorsement, and the Minors Endorsement.
Given our conclusion that the Limited Event Coverage Endorsement precludes coverage under
the policy for the claims in this case, we do not address the remaining endorsements. See Sweet
v. Berge, 113 Wis. 2d 61, 67, 334 N.W.2d 559 (Ct. App. 1983) (when one issue is dispositive of
an appeal, we need not discuss other issues).

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No. 2024AP78

Casualty, the Limited Event Coverage Endorsement bars coverage for the claims
arising out of Finley’s accident.

¶19 The circuit court seemingly agreed with this plain language
interpretation of the policy. The court acknowledged that “the parties agree that
the accident which caused Finley’s death was an ‘occurrence’” and that “Gravity
Park also concedes that there is no coverage for these claims under the Limited
Event Coverage [E]ndorsement … because the evidence clearly establishes that
Gravity Park had not declared an event for July 19, 2020.” The court’s analysis
should have ended there.

¶20 Nevertheless, the circuit court stated, “Therefore, the analysis will
move to the [M]otorsports [E]ndorsement and the exclusions for designated
operations and injuries to minor ‘participants.’” The court did not explain,
however, why it determined that the Limited Event Coverage Endorsement
provided no coverage to Gravity Park but then continued to consider the
Motorsports Endorsement, the Designated Operations Exclusion Endorsement,
and the Minors Endorsement. We agree with National Casualty that “[o]nce the
circuit court determined that no coverage exists for Gravity Park under the Limited
Event Coverage [E]ndorsement[,] … the circuit court should have granted
summary judgment for National Casualty and terminated the coverage portion of
the case as it relates to National Casualty’s policy.” Thus, the circuit court erred.

¶21 On appeal, Finley’s parents contend that the Limited Event
Coverage Endorsement “is inapplicable because it only applies to specifically
scheduled races and Finley was not participating in any such race.” Finley’s
parents’ argument suffers from a fundamental misreading of the plain terms of the
insurance contract. Contrary to their assertion, it is not that the endorsement is

11
No. 2024AP78

applicable or inapplicable based on whether there is or is not a scheduled race.
The endorsement always applies to modify insurance provided under the CGL
Coverage Form. See Romero v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2016 WI App 59, ¶19,
371 Wis. 2d 478, 885 N.W.2d 591 (“An endorsement may add to, modify, or
supplant the original policy…. [I]f the endorsement expressly states that its
provisions should be substituted for those in the main body, the endorsement
prevails. Likewise, if the provisions of the endorsement are inconsistent with the
main body, the endorsement controls.” (citations omitted)).

¶22 As addressed above, the plain language of the Limited Event
Coverage Endorsement provides: “This insurance applies only to [injury or
damage] arising out of an ‘occurrence’ or offense which takes place during an
event” “reported to and approved, prior to the event, by [National Casualty].”
(Formatting altered; emphasis added.) The policy does not say “this endorsement
applies” or that “the endorsement only applies in the event of a scheduled race.”
Therefore, it is the insurance—i.e., the insurance coverage—that is applicable or
inapplicable based on whether there is or is not a scheduled race. Here, Finley’s
fatal injury did not arise out of an occurrence during a scheduled, reported, and
approved event; therefore, “[t]his insurance” does not apply.

¶23 Gravity Park and Finley’s parents also argue that the circuit court
properly determined that National Casualty’s policy provides coverage in this case
by virtue of the Motorsports Endorsement. According to these parties, Finley and
Hemauer were participating in a “covered program” at the time of Finley’s death,
and, as a result, there is coverage under the policy pursuant to the Motorsports
Endorsement. In response to the arguments regarding the Limited Event Coverage
Endorsement, Gravity Park contends that the “Limited Event Coverage

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No. 2024AP78

Endorsement does not and cannot supplant the” Motorsports Endorsement “or the
rest of the policy.” (Formatting altered.)

¶24 As noted above, see supra ¶6, the Motorsports Endorsement
provides that “[t]his insurance does not apply to” “‘[b]odily injury’ or ‘property
damage’ arising out of the use of the ‘premises’ for any exhibition, event or
activity not a part of the ‘covered program.’” The endorsement then “add[s]” to
the CGL Coverage Form the definition of a “covered program,” which means “any
event” that “[w]as specifically submitted to us as a scheduled event or activity at
the inception of this policy”; “[i]s usual and customary to your business activities
and events”; or “[h]as been specifically endorsed to this policy.”7

¶25 According to Gravity Park and the circuit court, the event that Finley
and Hemauer were participating in was a noncompetition motocross open riding
event. Schneider testified that Gravity Park hosted noncompetition motocross
events “[p]robably twice a week” during the 2020 season. Thus, while Schneider
agreed that he had not reported any noncompetition motocross events to National
Casualty, Gravity Park argues, and the court found, that these types of events were
“usual and customary” to the business activities at Gravity Park. Accordingly,
Gravity Park contends that these noncompetition motocross events were covered
by the policy pursuant to the definition of “covered program” under the
Motorsports Endorsement.

¶26 The problem with Gravity Park’s argument and the circuit court’s
decision is that, as addressed above, the Limited Event Coverage Endorsement

7
The Motorsports Endorsement also includes “registration and technical inspection on or
off the ‘premises’” in the definition of “[c]overed program.”

13
No. 2024AP78

explicitly states that it “modifies insurance provided under” the initial grant of
coverage in the CGL Coverage Form in its entirety—as demonstrated by its broad
reference to “[t]his insurance”—to exclude coverage for all occurrences except
those that take place during a scheduled, reported, and approved event.
Essentially, the court concluded that because an exclusion in the Motorsports
Endorsement did not apply, “the [M]otorsports [E]ndorsement provides coverage.”
As we noted above, however, “[t]he inapplicability of one exclusion will not
reinstate coverage where another exclusion has precluded it.” See American Girl,
268 Wis. 2d 16, ¶24; see also Wadzinski v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2012 WI 75,
¶15, 342 Wis. 2d 311, 818 N.W.2d 819 (“[A]n exception to an exclusion cannot
create coverage where the policy’s initial grant of coverage does not provide that
type of coverage.”).8

¶27 Here, the circuit court found ambiguity in the policy by ignoring the
effect of the Limited Event Coverage Endorsement on the CGL Coverage Form,
and it rewrote the policy by reinstating coverage that was precluded under that
endorsement by expansively applying the “covered program” definition under the
Motorsports Endorsement to include open riding. A court’s role is not to rewrite
clear language in an insurance policy “to bind an insurer to a risk which it did not
contemplate and for which it was not paid.” See Paape v. Northern Assurance
Co., 142 Wis. 2d 45, 51, 416 N.W.2d 665 (Ct. App. 1987).

8
In its response brief, Gravity Park challenges National Casualty’s reference to
Wadzinski v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 2012 WI 75, 342 Wis. 2d 311, 818 N.W.2d 819,
stating that the “case simply does not apply” because “[t]he parties here agree that the event at
which [Finley] was killed was an ‘occurrence’ under National Casualty’s [CGL Coverage] Form,
therefore, there is already an initial grant of coverage under the policy.” We disagree. As we
have done here, National Casualty cites Wadzinski for a general proposition of insurance contract
law, which is entirely unrelated to, and not based on, the specific facts of the case.

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No. 2024AP78

¶28 Reading National Casualty’s policy as a whole, it is clear that the
policy was not intended to provide coverage for open riding—as excluded by the
Designated Operations endorsement, see supra ¶7—or events that were not
submitted as a part of Gravity Park’s schedule of events—as excluded by the
Limited Event Coverage endorsement. See Connors v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2015
WI App 89, 365 Wis. 2d 528, 872 N.W.2d 109 (“Courts are to ‘interpret policy
terms not in isolation, but rather in the context of the policy as a whole.’” (citation
omitted)). Moreover, the circuit court’s expansive reading of the Motorsports
Endorsement—finding that it provides coverage for noncompetition motocross
open riding events—would, for all intents and purposes, render the Limited Event
Coverage Endorsement, which eliminates coverage entirely for unreported events,
superfluous. See Stubbe v. Guidant Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 WI App 203, ¶10, 257
Wis. 2d 401, 651 N.W.2d 318 (explaining that an insurance policy must be read as
a whole so that none of its language is superfluous or meaningless).

¶29 In contrast, Gravity Park contends that “the Limited Event Coverage
Endorsement only purports to modify portions of the original general liability
form and not the other endorsements” and that “if the Limited Event Coverage
[E]ndorsement were read to supplant the entire policy, there would be ambiguity
when read in [the] context of other provisions of the policy.” In support of its
position, Gravity Park cites Great American Assurance Co. v. AES Promotions,
LLC, No. 2010AP100041, 2011 WL 3863328 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2011).
Gravity Park argues that on similar facts and in a case involving a Limited Event
Coverage Endorsement, the Ohio Court of Appeals found that “open riding, on
both the trails and the tracks, was the usual and customary business of AES,” and,
therefore, the insurer had a duty to defend and indemnify under its policy. Id.,

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No. 2024AP78

¶¶4, 65-67, 77, 79. The policy in AES Promotions defined “covered program” the
same as in this case. See id., ¶¶46-50.

¶30 We are not persuaded by AES Promotions. First, AES Promotions
is an unpublished case from another jurisdiction. See State v. Muckerheide, 2007
WI 5, ¶7, 298 Wis. 2d 553, 725 N.W.2d 930 (“Although a Wisconsin court may
consider case law from such other jurisdictions, obviously such case law is not
binding precedent in Wisconsin, and a Wisconsin court is not required to follow
it.”). Second, although the policy in AES Promotions also contained a Limited
Event Coverage Endorsement, the Ohio Court of Appeals did not analyze the
language of that endorsement within the case, nor did it apply that endorsement
when it reached its conclusion that the policy provided coverage. Third, the
Limited Event Coverage Endorsement in that case did not limit the type of event
to those reported and approved by the insurer, it limited the type of event to the
insured’s “approved trails and activities.” AES Promotions, No. 2010AP100041,
¶¶7, 65-74. Fourth, the court specifically stated that “[u]pon review of the
insurance policy in this case, we find that while such policy did not cover
scheduled racing and/or competitive motocross events, it is not clear that riding on
the race tracks during times when there were no scheduled events was meant to be
excluded.” Id., ¶77. For these reasons, AES Promotions is not helpful to our
analysis in this case.

¶31 Gravity Park’s reading of the endorsements is not supported by the
policy’s plain language. Nothing in the Motorsports Endorsement expands the
initial grant of coverage provided in the CGL Coverage Form or provides a
separate initial grant of coverage such that the Limited Event Coverage
Endorsement may not apply. We agree with National Casualty’s argument that
the Motorsports Endorsement “takes the CGL Coverage Form, as modified by the

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No. 2024AP78

Limited Event Endorsement, and adds more exclusions to the CGL Coverage
Form which further limit the scope of coverage available to Gravity Park,” but the
“Motorsports Endorsement does not expand the CGL Coverage Form or negate
the applicability of any other exclusions or limitations in the policy.”

¶32 We therefore conclude that the circuit court erred in its interpretation
of the policy. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions that the court
grant National Casualty’s motion for summary judgment.

By the Court.—Order reversed and cause remanded with directions.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

17