Marinette County Health and Human Services Department v. T. P.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
June 1, 2023
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal Nos. 2023AP429 Cir. Ct. Nos. 2022TP2
2022TP3
2023AP430

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

NO. 2023AP429

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO L. C. P.-R.,
A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

MARINETTE COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

T. P.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
___________________________________________________________________
NO. 2023AP430

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO A. E. H.,
A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

MARINETTE COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.
Nos. 2023AP429
2023AP430

T. P.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEALS from orders of the circuit court for Marinette County:
JANE M. SEQUIN, Judge. Affirmed.

¶1 HRUZ, J.1 Talia appeals orders terminating her parental rights
(TPR) to her two children, Lyle and Alice.2 Talia argues that there was
insufficient evidence for the jury to determine that grounds existed for the TPRs
and the circuit court’s finding that she is an unfit parent was, therefore, clearly
erroneous. Talia additionally argues that there was insufficient evidence for the
court to conclude that terminating her parental rights was in the children’s best
interests and, therefore, the court erroneously exercised its discretion in doing so.
We conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find grounds for the
TPRs and that the court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by terminating
Talia’s parental rights. We therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In February 2022, the Marinette County Health and Human Services
Department filed petitions to terminate Talia’s parental rights to her two

1
These appeals are decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(e)
(2021-22). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise
noted.
2
For ease of reading, we refer to the appellant and the children in these confidential
matters using pseudonyms, rather than their initials.

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children: Lyle, then age ten, and Alice, then age nine. The petitions alleged that
Talia had failed to assume parental responsibility and that the children had a
continuing need of protection or services (“CHIPS”). The children had been
removed from Talia’s care three times since January 2014, and they had not been
returned to Talia’s care since the most recent removal in March 2020. That
removal was based on concerns over Talia’s ongoing substance abuse.

¶3 The circuit court ordered conditions for Talia to complete in order to
be reunified with her children. Specifically, the court ordered Talia to: cooperate
with the ongoing social worker; engage in individual counseling; participate in
alcohol and other drug abuse (AODA) counseling; refrain from prescription drug
and illegal substance use; maintain sobriety for at least six months; engage in
parenting skills training; provide appropriate supervision to the children; maintain
safe and appropriate housing; maintain employment; participate in consistent
visitation; maintain a valid driver’s license and insurance; and sign all necessary
releases of information.

¶4 In November 2022, a two-day jury trial was held where Talia and
her three social workers testified.3 June Kruse, the then current ongoing social
worker, testified that Talia did not sufficiently comply with the conditions to have
her children returned. Kruse stated that Talia was “overall” compliant with
keeping her informed. Talia had consistently been in mental health counseling,
but Kruse stated that Talia would often switch counselors. According to Kruse,
Talia had “been in AODA counseling but never completed [counseling] with one

3
Talia’s counsel called two of the earlier ongoing social workers in Talia’s case. They
testified regarding the prior removals and Talia’s efforts toward reunification during the prior
removals of the children.

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counselor to meet her goals.” Kruse further testified that, throughout her time as
Talia’s social worker, Talia’s drug tests came back positive for amphetamines and
methamphetamines. Kruse also stated that Talia had “very unstable” housing and
“on and off” employment. Although Talia’s visits with her children were
normally “good,” Kruse described Talia’s visits as “sporadic.” Kruse noted that
Talia had completed parenting skills training.

¶5 Kruse testified that she believed that she “provided [Talia] with
many resources” and that she “made very reasonable efforts to help [Talia] reunify
with her children.” She testified that she “helped [Talia] move out of one of [her]
homes” and “helped her move to her apartment and g[ot] her furnishings.” Kruse
stated that she gave Talia six drug tests to help her meet her conditions and that
she also reviewed the drug tests other providers administered to Talia. Lastly,
Kruse testified that she met with Talia often, discussing reunification and Talia’s
conditions. Talia also testified that she felt Kruse, overall, had helped her with her
conditions.

¶6 Talia testified that she engaged in psychiatric appointments and
AODA counseling. When asked about AODA counseling, Talia testified it was
“an ongoing matter” and a “[w]ork in progress.” Talia also testified that during
the time period between the most recent removal of her children up until the filing
of the TPR petitions, she lived at seven different addresses. Talia stated that she
was employed in the fast food industry, but recently she had not worked for
eighteen months due to a medical leave. Regarding visitation, Talia testified she
had only nine visits with the children in 2021 and no visits in January and
February 2022. Talia admitted that she did not have a driver’s license until
recently. Talia also stated that she signed nearly all of the releases requested by
the County.

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¶7 Because the circuit court determined that the first element of
continuing CHIPS was undisputed—given that there was no question the children
had been removed from the home—the court answered “yes” to the first element
of continuing CHIPS before the verdict went to the jury. The jury returned a
verdict finding that the County had proved both of its alleged grounds for the
TPRs—i.e., continuing CHIPS and failure to assume parental responsibility. The
court subsequently found Talia unfit.

¶8 In December 2022, a dispositional hearing was held and Kruse again
testified. The circuit court weighed each statutory dispositional factor based on
Kruse’s testimony. The court found that there was a high likelihood of adoption
for both children. The court then noted the health and ages of the children, finding
that Alice had no medical issues and Lyle’s health was being monitored for any
future issues related to his testing positive for a “sickle cell trait.” As to whether
the children had a substantial relationship with Talia, the court noted that both
children had recently refused to attend in-person visits with Talia.

¶9 Reviewing the children’s wishes, the circuit court read out loud to
the parties letters the children wrote to Talia and noted that both children
requested that the TPRs occur. The court noted the long duration of Talia’s
separation from the children and stated that they were removed “at a very young
age.” As to whether the children would enter a more stable and permanent family
relationship, the court found that “the lives of these children have been full of
instability” and noted the “back and forth” history between reunification and
removal.

¶10 The circuit court concluded that Talia had been “doing well” since
the TPRs were filed, but it noted the repetitive history between Talia doing well,

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prompting reunification, followed by Talia ceasing to do well, requiring the
children to be removed again. The court ultimately determined that it was in the
best interests of both children to terminate Talia’s parental rights. Talia now
appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary below.

DISCUSSION

¶11 “[A]n involuntary termination of parental rights proceeding involves
two steps—grounds and disposition.” Oneida Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v.
Nicole W., 2007 WI 30, ¶11, 299 Wis. 2d 637, 728 N.W.2d 652. “The first step is
a fact-finding hearing ‘to determine whether grounds exist for the termination of
parental rights,’” and the parent’s rights are paramount in this step. Evelyn C.R. v.
Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, ¶22, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768 (citation omitted).
At the grounds step, “the petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that one or more of the statutorily enumerated grounds for termination of parental
rights exist.” Steven V. v. Kelley H., 2004 WI 47, ¶24, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 678
N.W.2d 856. A “court has no discretion to refrain from finding a parent unfit after
all the elements of a statutory ground have been established,” id., ¶25, and once
grounds have been proven with sufficient evidence, “the court shall find the parent
unfit,” WIS. STAT. § 48.424(4).

¶12 The second step is disposition, and a circuit court holds a
dispositional hearing “to decide whether it is in the best interest[s] of the child that
the parent’s rights be permanently extinguished.” See Steven V., 271 Wis. 2d 1,
¶27; see also WIS. STAT. § 48.426(2). At this hearing, the focus shifts to the
interests of the child. Sheboygan Cnty. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. v.
Julia A.B., 2002 WI 95, ¶28, 255 Wis. 2d 170, 648 N.W.2d 402. The court
“‘should welcome’ any evidence relevant to the issue of disposition, including any

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‘factors favorable to the parent,’ and must at a minimum consider the six ‘best
interests’ factors set forth in … § 48.426(3).” Steven V., 271 Wis. 2d 1, ¶27
(citation omitted).4 The “ultimate decision to terminate parental rights is
discretionary.” Gerald O. v. Cindy R., 203 Wis. 2d 148, 152, 551 N.W.2d 855
(Ct. App. 1996).

I. Sufficiency of the evidence as to grounds for the TPRs

¶13 Talia contends the circuit court’s finding that she was unfit was
clearly erroneous, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support a
determination that the County established the elements of the continuing CHIPS

4
The nonexclusive factors that a circuit court is required to consider at disposition are:

(a) The likelihood of the child’s adoption after termination.

(b) The age and health of the child, both at the time of the
disposition and, if applicable, at the time the child was removed
from the home.

(c) Whether the child has substantial relationships with the
parent or other family members, and whether it would be
harmful to the child to sever these relationships.

(d) The wishes of the child.

(e) The duration of the separation of the parent from the child.

(f) Whether the child will be able to enter into a more stable and
permanent family relationship as a result of the termination,
taking into account the conditions of the child’s current
placement, the likelihood of future placements and the results of
prior placements.

WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3).

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ground.5 We “review as a question of law whether the evidence presented to a
jury is sufficient to sustain its verdict.” Sheboygan Cnty. Dep’t of Health &
Hum. Servs. v. Tanya M.B., 2010 WI 55, ¶18, 325 Wis. 2d 524, 785 N.W.2d 369.
“When considering the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply a highly deferential
standard of review.” Jacobson v. American Tool Cos., 222 Wis. 2d 384, 389, 588
N.W.2d 67 (Ct. App. 1998).

¶14 Our “review of a jury’s verdict is narrow,” and we “will sustain a
jury verdict if there is any credible evidence to support it.” State v.
Quinsanna D., 2002 WI App 318, ¶30, 259 Wis. 2d 429, 655 N.W.2d 752. Even
“‘if the evidence gives rise to more than one reasonable inference,’ we will ‘accept
the particular inference reached by the jury.’” Id. (citation omitted).

¶15 Talia fails to fully engage with the evidence the County presented or
even align the evidence favorable to her with the elements of the continuing
CHIPS ground. To establish that ground for termination, the County was required
to prove:

5
Talia also argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove the ground of failure to
assume parental responsibility. We need not address this issue because we conclude there was
sufficient evidence to prove the continuing CHIPS ground. Because only one ground is required
for a TPR, and we determine this issue to be dispositive, we address only the continuing CHIPS
ground. See Steven V. v. Kelley H., 2004 WI 47, ¶24, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856 (stating
that a petitioner must prove that one or more of the statutory grounds for a TPR exist); Sweet v.
Berge, 113 Wis. 2d 61, 67, 334 N.W.2d 559 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding that an appellate court need
not address every issue raised by the parties when one issue is dispositive).

Although the ultimate decision to terminate parental rights is within the circuit court’s
discretion, Gerald O. v. Cindy R., 203 Wis. 2d 148, 152, 551 N.W.2d 855 (Ct. App. 1996), we
agree with the County that WIS. STAT. § 48.424(4) instructs the court to find a parent unfit if
grounds for termination are found by a jury. See § 48.424(4); see also Steven V., 271 Wis. 2d 1,
¶25. As such, we construe Talia’s argument regarding grounds as challenging not the court’s
exercise of discretion per se, but the sufficiency of the evidence before the jury. Thus, we
proceed with the standard of review regarding a jury’s verdict.

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1. That the child has been adjudged to be a child or an
unborn child in need of protection or services and placed,
or continued in a placement, outside his or her home
pursuant to one or more court orders ….

2.

....

b. That the agency responsible for the care of the child and
the family or of the unborn child and expectant mother has
made a reasonable effort to provide the services ordered by
the court.

....

3. That the child has been placed outside the home for a
cumulative total period of 6 months or longer pursuant to
an order listed under subd. 1., not including time spent
outside the home as an unborn child; that the parent has
failed to meet the conditions established for the safe return
of the child to the home; and, if the child has been placed
outside the home for less than 15 of the most recent 22
months, that there is a substantial likelihood that the parent
will not meet these conditions as of the date on which the
child will have been placed outside the home for 15 of the
most recent 22 months, not including any period during
which the child was a runaway from the out-of-home
placement or was residing in a trial reunification home.

WIS. STAT. § 48.415(2)(a). “‘Reasonable effort’ means an earnest and
conscientious effort to take good faith steps to provide the services ordered by the
court which takes into consideration the characteristics of the parent or
child, … the level of cooperation of the parent … and other relevant circumstances
of the case.” Sec. 48.415(2)(a)2.a.

¶16 The jury returned a verdict finding that all the elements of
continuing CHIPS were satisfied. Talia does not dispute that the County provided
her with reasonable efforts, and Talia even testified that she felt Kruse helped her
with meeting her conditions. Kruse testified regarding the various things she did
to assist Talia, such as providing drug tests and helping her move.

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¶17 There was also a wealth of evidence that Talia failed to meet the
court-ordered conditions for the children’s return to her care. Talia acknowledged
that she lived at seven different addresses between the children’s removal and the
filing of the TPR petitions; that she did not work for eighteen months; that she had
only nine visits with the children in 2021 and none in January and February 2022;
and that she did not have a driver’s license until well after the filing of the TPR
petitions. Kruse testified that Talia never completed AODA counseling; that
Talia’s drug tests came back positive;6 that Talia had on-and-off employment; that
Talia had unstable housing; and that Talia had sporadic visitations with her
children. There was plenty of credible evidence to support the jury’s finding that
Talia failed to meet her conditions and, given our limited standard of review, we
uphold this finding. See Quinsanna D., 259 Wis. 2d 429, ¶30.

¶18 Even if we determined that the evidence could support a finding that
the County failed to provide reasonable efforts or that Talia completed her
conditions, we are to “accept the particular inference reached by the jury,”
regardless of whether “the evidence gives rise to more than one reasonable
inference.” See id. (citation omitted). Here, there is sufficient evidence to uphold
the jury’s verdict on the continuing CHIPS ground for both of Talia’s children.
The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in finding Talia unfit,
and it followed its statutory mandate to do so after the jury determined that the
County had proven at least one ground for termination.

6
Talia states that she had been “clean and sober” since the filing of the TPR petitions;
however, the jury was instructed to only weigh the evidence regarding Talia’s progress on
conditions up until the filing of the TPR petitions.

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II. Sufficiency of the evidence regarding the children’s best interests

¶19 Talia also argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion when it determined that termination of her parental rights would be in
the children’s best interests. Similar to Talia’s first argument, Talia fails to
substantively engage with the evidence in the record. Instead, and without citation
to legal authority, Talia argues “there was no expert or professional testimony
which served to corroborate the social worker’s opinion.” There is no requirement
for expert testimony at a dispositional hearing. See State v. Whitaker, 167 Wis. 2d
247, 255, 481 N.W.2d 649 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that expert testimony is
required only when an issue is beyond the fact finder’s general knowledge and
experience); see also WIS. STAT. § 48.427(1) (stating that any party “may present
evidence relevant to the issue of disposition, including expert testimony”).
Additionally, Talia argues that there was “limited evidence presented by the
County,” but she fails to mention, at least with any specificity, Kruse’s testimony
at the dispositional hearing.7

¶20 Whether to terminate an individual’s parental rights is within the
discretion of the circuit court. Gerald O., 203 Wis. 2d at 152. “A circuit court
properly exercises its discretion when it examines the relevant facts, applies a
proper standard of law, and using a demonstrated rational process reaches a
conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach.” Dane Cnty. Dep’t of Hum.

7
Talia additionally makes various arguments, alleging that there was no documentary
evidence that termination was in the children’s best interests; asserting a general challenge to the
report Kruse submitted to the circuit court for the TPR proceedings without acknowledging
Kruse’s testimony; and stating that the County provided limited testimony on adoptive resources.
These arguments are very brief and lack citation to legal authority, and we therefore decline to
address them. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992)
(appeals court is not required to address undeveloped arguments).

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Servs. v. Mable K., 2013 WI 28, ¶39, 346 Wis. 2d 396, 828 N.W.2d 198. The
circuit court’s findings of fact will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.
WIS. STAT. § 805.17(2).

¶21 We conclude that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in
terminating Talia’s parental rights. In its brief, the County reviews each of the
statutory “best interests” factors and notes the evidence presented in support of
those factors. Talia generally presents no argument in reply to this discussion and
actually admits “that the evidence of the disposition[al] hearing supplied a
sufficient basis for the termination of her parental rights.” She merely argues that
the court’s weighing of the evidence relative to the factors was erroneous.

¶22 In any event, the record shows that the circuit court weighed the
required factors in WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3) and demonstrated a “rational process”
when examining Kruse’s testimony and the facts of the case. See Mable K., 346
Wis. 2d 396, ¶39. Talia’s only discernably developed argument is that the court
erred by allegedly overemphasizing the multiple removals of the children from her
multiple residences. However, the court reached a conclusion “that a reasonable
judge could reach” when it weighed the damage caused by the children’s
back-and-forth history of living with Talia, concluding that this pattern led to a life
of instability for them. See id. The court did not erroneously find that after Talia
had done well in the past and reunification occurred, Talia then ceased doing well
and the children needed to be removed again. The court was allowed to weigh this
evidence in the manner it did, and its ultimate decision that termination would be
in the children’s best interests was not an erroneous exercise of discretion.

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By the Court.—Orders affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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