State v. Charles Rip Ridley

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
December 29, 2022
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2021AP1468-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2020CF73

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

CHARLES RIP RIDLEY,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Douglas County:
GEORGE L. GLONEK, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Gill, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. Charles Rip Ridley appeals from a judgment of
conviction, following a jury trial, for second-degree sexual assault with use of
No. 2021AP1468-CR

force, aggravated battery with intent to cause great bodily harm, false
imprisonment, and first-degree recklessly endangering safety, all as a domestic
abuse repeater and with a domestic abuse enhancer. At trial, Ridley moved for a
mistrial after an inadmissible photograph was momentarily published to the jury
and the victim testified that Ridley had previously choked her, which violated the
circuit court’s previous ruling on other-acts evidence. The court denied Ridley’s
motion.

¶2 Ridley makes three arguments on appeal: (1) the circuit court erred
by failing to strike a prospective juror for cause based on the juror’s subjective
bias; (2) the court erred by denying Ridley’s motion for a mistrial; and (3) in
addition to the above-mentioned violation of the court’s other-acts ruling, the
victim’s reference to Ridley’s previous incarceration also violated the court’s
ruling on other-acts evidence and was prejudicial. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶3 On February 9, 2020, police responded to a report of a battery in
Superior, Wisconsin. When police arrived, they found Carol1 “naked on the floor
covered by a blanket in the kitchen” of a home. According to police, Carol “was
visibly shaking, crying, and at times having a hard time breathing” and “her eyes
appeared to be ‘terrified.’” When asked what had happened, Carol reported that
Ridley, whom she had been in a romantic relationship with, had “abducted her

1
Pursuant to the policy underlying WIS. STAT. RULE 809.86(4) (2019-20), we use a
pseudonym when referring to the victim in this case. All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are
to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise noted.

2
No. 2021AP1468-CR

from St. Paul, [Minnesota,]” “had been holding her captive inside [Ridley’s
daughter’s nearby apartment] for over a week[,] and had been starving” and
otherwise abusing her both sexually and physically.

¶4 According to Carol, during the week that she and Ridley were at
Ridley’s daughter’s apartment, they had been using methamphetamine, and, at
some point, Ridley’s behavior toward her changed.2 In one incident, Ridley
became jealous because he had seen a “guy looking at [Carol],” and when she
would not “come clean” after denying this happened, Ridley began punching her
in the face. Ridley became physical with Carol again after she “refused to do hot
rails[3] with him.” At trial, Carol explained that Ridley hit her with a hammer “all
over” her body, including her hips, knees, and back. According to Carol, “after
[Ridley] was beating me with that hammer, he started saying, ‘your family will not
recognize you the next time they see you.’” She also testified that Ridley
threatened her with a knife.4 Carol explained that Ridley “kept telling [her] he
was going to kill [her]” and “told [her] that [she] was about to die.”

¶5 Ridley also initiated unwanted sexual intercourse with Carol,
including oral, anal, and vaginal intercourse. Carol testified that Ridley “pretty
much just does whatever he wants to do however he ever wants to do it for as long

2
Carol told police officers that Ridley did not allow her to leave the apartment, and
“when [Ridley] went to the bathroom, she was forced to go with him. If [Ridley] was taking a
shower, she was forced to go with him into the shower.” Carol testified that she was unable to
contact police because before they left Minnesota, Ridley took her phone, gave it to his brother,
and it was never returned.
3
Carol testified that “hot rails” is a method by which people ingest methamphetamine.
4
Additionally, Carol initially reported to law enforcement that Ridley “kept telling her
that he would shoot her with his pistol,” although “she never saw the pistol.”

3
No. 2021AP1468-CR

as he wants to do it.” She explained that she “could not tell him no” because “that
would’ve been like death in itself” and she “knew [she would] probably get [her]
head tore off if [she] did. Not probably, [she] would.” According to Carol, she
did not engage in sexual intercourse with Ridley “because [she] wanted to” but did
so “because [she was] afraid.”

¶6 Ultimately, Carol escaped from Ridley by jumping naked out of a
second story window into a snowbank. Carol testified that just before she
escaped, Ridley moved her to a different room in the apartment because Ridley’s
daughter told him that her neighbors were “complaining” and were “concerned”
due to the noise from Ridley’s attacks on Carol. Ridley then took Carol’s clothes
from her and left the room to retrieve the hammer, which is when Carol jumped
out the window. She “ran across the snow … looking for just a house that had a
light on.” Carol knocked on the door of one home and informed the homeowner
that she was being abused. The homeowner provided Carol with a blanket to
cover herself and called the police.

¶7 When officers responded, Carol was taken to the hospital and
administered a sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE) exam. Ridley was arrested
that same night, and after obtaining a search warrant for Ridley’s daughter’s
apartment, law enforcement recovered a “blue handled claw hammer.”

¶8 The State charged Ridley with second-degree sexual assault with use
of force, aggravated battery with intent to cause great bodily harm, strangulation
and suffocation, and false imprisonment, all with the domestic abuse enhancer.
Later, by amended Information, the State added a charge of first-degree recklessly
endangering safety and charged all the crimes as a domestic abuse repeater and
with a domestic abuse enhancer. Before trial, the State also filed a motion to

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No. 2021AP1468-CR

admit other-acts evidence of Ridley’s conviction5 on domestic violence offenses
against Carol that occurred in Minnesota in 2017.6 In its motion, the State alleged
that the prior conviction and the current charges shared many similarities. After a
hearing, the circuit court granted the State’s other-acts motion.7 The case
proceeded to trial.

¶9 During voir dire, defense counsel asked the prospective jury pool
whether there were “people out there that think, well, … [Ridley] had to have done
something wrong. I mean, people don’t end up in court in a jury trial when they
didn’t do anything wrong.” One prospective juror expressed an opinion that “[i]t
seems like one of [the charges] has got to be true” for Ridley to have been charged
with five crimes. The circuit court entered into a colloquy with the prospective
juror, concluded that he had been rehabilitated, and eventually denied Ridley’s
motion to strike the juror for cause. The prospective juror did not sit on Ridley’s
jury, however, as Ridley removed him from the panel by using a peremptory
strike.

¶10 The State called Carol to testify. Carol began her testimony with the
other-acts evidence from 2017, which involved Ridley not allowing her to leave
and assaulting her by hitting her with his fist and “stomping [her] with [his] boot,”
which left “boot prints in [her] forehead and the side of [her] face.” She testified

5
We note that the record does not clearly state whether there was a single judgment of
conviction for multiple offenses or multiple convictions for those offenses.
6
The 2017 incident giving rise to Ridley’s prior conviction also occurred while Carol
and Ridley were in a relationship. Carol testified that they did not have contact after the 2017
incident, but they again entered into a relationship in January 2020.
7
On appeal, Ridley does not challenge the circuit court’s decision admitting the
other-acts evidence.

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No. 2021AP1468-CR

that she was left with a “straight cut” that “opened [her] face up badly” and
required stitches. Carol then stated that Ridley was convicted for the 2017
incident. The State inquired whether Carol had any contact with Ridley since the
2017 incident, and Carol responded, “Not until he got—no. He went to prison.”
Defense counsel objected, and the State immediately asked the question again.
This time, Carol responded that she had not had in-person contact with Ridley
without mentioning prison. The circuit court did not address defense counsel’s
objection.

¶11 During Carol’s testimony, the State also introduced several pictures
as exhibits. Many of the pictures showed Carol in the aftermath of the attack.
One picture, however—Exhibit 11—was a picture of Ridley, which he describes
on appeal as depicting him “in jail, shoeless, with his arms behind his back. His
upper torso appears to be drenched, and his face is twisted into a manic, or
menacing expression.” Defense counsel objected to Exhibit 11’s introduction due
to lack of foundation, and the circuit court sustained the objection. Nevertheless,
as the State was publishing the pictures to the jury, Exhibit 11 was momentarily
published on a screen visible to the jury in the courtroom. Defense counsel
objected, and the prosecutor explained that “[i]t was a mistake” and that she had
quickly changed the image.

¶12 During Carol’s cross-examination, she also alleged that Ridley had
choked her. Carol explained that Ridley had been choking her just before his
daughter came into the room to inform him that the neighbors were complaining.
Defense counsel observed that Carol had not “testified about any choking” during
her direct examination, and he continued questioning her about the alleged
conduct. On redirect, the State also asked questions about choking and whether
Ridley had “put his arms or his hands around [Carol’s] throat during one of the

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No. 2021AP1468-CR

times that he was attacking [Carol] in Superior.” Carol responded by stating that
her “throat was already messed up because he had choked me … two previous
times.” Defense counsel immediately objected, and, at first, the circuit court
overruled the objection. The court later sustained the objection when defense
counsel clarified that the previous choking incidents were not included in the 2017
other-acts evidence.8 The court then struck the testimony and told the jury to
disregard it.

¶13 Following Carol’s testimony, and outside the presence of the jury,
Ridley moved for a mistrial for two reasons: the prosecutor publishing Exhibit 11
to the jury and Carol’s discussion of the previous choking incidents. The circuit
court denied Ridley’s motion on both grounds. The trial then continued.

¶14 In addition to Carol’s testimony, the jury heard testimony from
various law enforcement personnel, the SANE, and an analyst from the state crime
laboratory. The jury was told that Carol’s DNA was found on the head of the
hammer and that, based on the tests conducted, there is “very strong support that
[Ridley] is a contributor” to the mixed DNA profile found on the hammer’s
handle. Further, Ridley’s DNA was found in both Carol’s vaginal and neck
swabs. Ridley called Carol as his sole witness, only to ask if she had ever been
convicted of a crime and how many times.

¶15 The jury found Ridley guilty of second-degree sexual assault with
use of force, aggravated battery with intent to cause great bodily harm, false

8
Defense counsel explained to the circuit court that “there was an incident just months
before or maybe even weeks before the incident in this case where [Carol] alleged that [Ridley]
had choked her, and that was not part of the other-acts motion.”

7
No. 2021AP1468-CR

imprisonment, and first-degree recklessly endangering safety, but it found him not
guilty of strangulation and suffocation. The circuit court sentenced Ridley to
concurrent sentences on all counts, with Ridley’s conviction for second-degree
sexual assault carrying the longest sentence at fifteen years’ initial confinement
followed by ten years’ extended supervision. Ridley appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶16 On appeal, Ridley makes three arguments that he was denied a fair
trial. First, he claims that the circuit court erred by failing to strike the prospective
juror for cause based on the juror’s subjective bias. Second, Ridley argues that the
court improperly denied his motion for a mistrial based on the prosecutor
presenting the inadmissible photograph to the jury and Carol’s testimony that
Ridley had choked her in the past. Third, he argues that Carol’s reference to
Ridley’s previous incarceration also “violated the court’s ruling on other-acts, and
was highly prejudicial.”

¶17 Ridley argues first that he is entitled to a new trial because the
prospective juror in this case was subjectively biased. According to Ridley, when
the circuit court failed to strike the prospective juror for cause, Ridley was denied
due process of law. “The United States and Wisconsin Constitutions guarantee a
criminal defendant the right to a trial by an impartial jury.” State v. Tobatto, 2016
WI App 28, ¶16, 368 Wis. 2d 300, 878 N.W.2d 701 (citation omitted). We
presume that prospective jurors are impartial. State v. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶31,
335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421. “The party challenging a juror’s impartiality
bears the burden of rebutting this presumption and proving bias.” Id.

¶18 In Wisconsin, there are three types of prospective juror
bias: (1) statutory bias; (2) subjective bias; and (3) objective bias. State v.

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No. 2021AP1468-CR

Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 716, 596 N.W.2d 770 (1999). Here, Ridley alleges
that the prospective juror was subjectively biased. A prospective juror’s
subjective bias “is revealed through the words and the demeanor of the prospective
juror,” id. at 717, and we must consider “whether the record reflects that the juror
is a reasonable person who is sincerely willing to set aside any opinion or prior
knowledge that the juror might have,” State v. Kiernan, 227 Wis. 2d 736, 745, 596
N.W.2d 760 (1999).

¶19 In this case, regardless of whether the prospective juror was
subjectively biased and whether the circuit court erred by not striking the
prospective juror for cause, we conclude that any error was harmless. See State v.
Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶80, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223 (“The legislature
intended the doctrine of harmless error to apply to jury selection.” (citation
omitted)); see also WIS. STAT. § 805.18; State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 547, 370
N.W.2d 222 (1985) (applying § 805.18 to criminal cases). In Lindell, our supreme
court determined that “a circuit court’s failure to excuse a juror who should have
been excused is harmless error if the defendant uses a peremptory challenge to
remove that juror and ends up with a fair, impartial jury.” State v. Sellhausen,
2012 WI 5, ¶39, 338 Wis. 2d 286, 809 N.W.2d 14 (citing Lindell, 245 Wis. 2d
689, ¶¶115-20, 131).

¶20 Ridley concedes that Lindell represents the current state of the law
in Wisconsin. He argues, however, that “Lindell was wrong when it [was]
decided” because it leaves him without a “remedy for the violation of his most
basic, fundamental constitutional rights.” Instead, Ridley advocates for “[a] return
to the [State v. Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 12, 564 N.W.2d 328 (1997),] rule of
automatic reversal.” Returning to the law under Ramos, however, would require
that we overrule Lindell, which expressly overruled Ramos. See Lindell, 245

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No. 2021AP1468-CR

Wis. 2d 689, ¶¶51-120, 131. We are not at liberty to overrule Wisconsin Supreme
Court precedent. Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 189-90, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997)
(“The supreme court is the only state court with the power to overrule, modify or
withdraw language from a previous supreme court case.”).

¶21 Ridley used a peremptory strike on the prospective juror in this case,
and that juror did not sit on the jury. Ridley does not otherwise claim that his jury
was biased, unfair, or partial or that he was somehow inappropriately forced to use
his peremptory challenges. Accordingly, any error in failing to strike the
prospective juror for cause was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶22 Second, Ridley argues that the circuit court improperly denied his
motion for a mistrial. As noted above, Ridley moved for a mistrial on two
grounds: the accidental publication of Exhibit 11 to the jury and Carol’s
testimony that Ridley choked her on two prior occasions. Ridley asserts that the
cumulative effect of these events was that the jury was exposed to highly
prejudicial material, and the “evidentiary bell simply could not be unrung.”
(Formatting altered.) For the reasons that follow, we disagree that the court erred
by denying Ridley’s motion for a mistrial.

¶23 When confronted with a mistrial request, the circuit court must
determine, “in light of the whole proceeding, whether the basis for the mistrial
request is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial.” State v. Bunch, 191
Wis. 2d 501, 506, 529 N.W.2d 923 (Ct. App. 1995). Stated another way, the court
was required to determine whether Ridley could receive a fair trial, in light of all
the facts and circumstances. See State v. Ford, 2007 WI 138, ¶29, 306 Wis. 2d 1,
742 N.W.2d 61. “[N]ot all errors warrant a mistrial and ‘the law prefers less

10
No. 2021AP1468-CR

drastic alternatives, if available and practical.’” State v. Givens, 217 Wis. 2d 180,
191, 580 N.W.2d 340 (Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted).

¶24 As an initial matter, we note that Ridley and the State disagree as to
the standard of review we are to apply on appeal. The State argues that a motion
for a mistrial is committed to the sound discretion of the circuit court. See Bunch,
191 Wis. 2d at 506. Thus, we would reverse a circuit court’s ruling on a motion
for a mistrial “only on a clear showing of an erroneous exercise of discretion.” Id.
As Ridley observes, however, we accord differing levels of deference to a circuit
court’s ruling on a mistrial motion based on the circumstances underlying the
request. See id. at 507. For example, when the defendant seeks a mistrial “on
grounds not related to the State’s alleged laxness or overreaching, we give the
[circuit] court’s ruling ‘great deference.’” Id. (citation omitted).

¶25 Ridley contends, however, that “prosecutorial laxness” induced him
to request a mistrial, and therefore he is “entitled to a less deferential standard of
review” and we “are to give stricter and more searching scrutiny to the judge’s
determination.” See State v. Barthels, 174 Wis. 2d 173, 184, 495 N.W.2d 341
(1993) (“If … the prosecutor requests the mistrial, or the judge determines that the
defendant’s request [for a mistrial] was occasioned by prosecutorial overreaching
or laxness, then this court gives stricter and more searching scrutiny to the judge’s
decision to grant a mistrial.”), abrogated in part by State v. Seefeldt, 2003 WI 47,
¶33, 261 Wis. 2d 383, 661 N.W.2d 822.

¶26 We disagree that we are required to apply “stricter and more
searching scrutiny” to the circuit court’s decision in this case. As we note below,
the court did not specifically find that the errors in this case were the result of
prosecutorial laxness. Instead, the court determined, and we agree, that one error

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No. 2021AP1468-CR

was inadvertent and the other error was not caused by or expected by the State.
Even if we were to apply the standard advocated by Ridley, however, we would
conclude, based on the record, that the court did not erroneously exercise its
discretion by denying Ridley’s request for a mistrial.

¶27 As to the accidental publication of Exhibit 11 to the jury, Ridley
argued before the circuit court that the photograph was “prejudicial” because “[i]t
shows [Ridley] in handcuffs[9] with kind of a menacing look on his face.” The
prosecutor admitted that publishing the photograph “was an accident” and
apologized for the “complete mistake.” She explained, however, that the
photograph was on the screen for “literally, … less than a full second” and “[a]s
soon as [the prosecutor] saw it pop up, [she] scrolled again so that it would not be
recognizable to the jury.” The court found that the photograph was on the screen
“for a very momentary period of time” and “the televisions are at some distance
from the jury.” Accordingly, the court determined that “for the amount of time
and the distance for the jury to take a look at that, I certainly don’t think they
would even know what was on it. So I don’t think that there is any prejudice
there.”

¶28 While it is difficult to find support for the circuit court’s conclusions
regarding the length of time the photograph was on the screen and the distance of
the screen from the jury based on a written transcript, Ridley does not specifically
contest these findings on appeal. And although we agree that the photograph was

9
We note, based on our review of Exhibit 11, that the photograph shows Ridley with his
hands behind his back, but handcuffs are not visible in the photograph. On appeal, Ridley
appears to acknowledge this fact, as he argues that the photograph depicts Ridley “with his arms
behind his back” without mentioning handcuffs.

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No. 2021AP1468-CR

not helpful to Ridley, we conclude that it did not contain anything incriminating
such that it would support his convictions. Regardless, the jury was instructed
regarding what was properly to be considered evidence, and Exhibit 11 was not
marked or received into evidence by the court. Therefore, we agree that the
accidental publishing of Exhibit 11 to the jury was not sufficiently prejudicial to
warrant a new trial.

¶29 As to Carol’s testimony that Ridley had choked her on two prior
occasions, Ridley argued that the testimony was not part of the other-acts motion
and was prejudicial.10 As noted above, once it became clear that the State agreed
that the testimony was not part of the other-acts motion, the circuit court
immediately struck the answer and instructed the jury not to consider it. See State
v. LaCount, 2008 WI 59, ¶23, 310 Wis. 2d 85, 750 N.W.2d 780 (“Jurors are
presumed to have followed jury instructions.”). At the end of the trial, the court
also reminded the jury to “[d]isregard the stricken testimony.” Further, as the
State argues, the jury was also instructed on the proper use of other-acts evidence;
thus, even if the jury did consider Carol’s testimony about choking with the
admissible other-acts evidence, we would presume the jury considered it for a
proper purpose. See State v. Jennaro, 76 Wis. 2d 499, 508, 251 N.W.2d 800

10
Ridley also argues that “[t]here is a longstanding presumption against admitting
evidence of other crimes a defendant has committed.” The State disagrees. It cites State v.
Speer, 176 Wis. 2d 1101, 1115, 501 N.W.2d 429 (1993), for the proposition that “[r]ather than
discouraging the admission of other acts, WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2) ‘favors admissibility in the
sense that it mandates the exclusion of other crimes evidence in only one instance: when it is
offered to prove the propensity of the defendant to commit similar crimes.’” There is no dispute
that Carol’s testimony regarding being choked by Ridley was inadmissible other-acts evidence,
but the question of a presumption against admitting other-acts evidence does not weigh on the
issue of whether the evidence’s introduction was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial,
which is the question before this court. Accordingly, we do not address Ridley’s argument
further.

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No. 2021AP1468-CR

(1977) (“It is the general rule in this state that limiting and admonitory instructions
are presumed to cure the prejudicial effect of erroneously admitted evidence.”).
The court specifically found that the choking incident “was not a question asked or
delved into by the State,” meaning that the State did not solicit Carol’s testimony
on this point. Accordingly, we agree that the error in this case was cured when the
jury was instructed not to consider Carol’s testimony about being choked by
Ridley, and it was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial.

¶30 Third, and finally, Ridley argues that the jury was exposed to
improper and highly prejudicial evidence when Carol testified that Ridley had
been in prison, and the circuit court ignored defense counsel’s corresponding
objection. As noted above, when the State asked whether Carol had any contact
with Ridley since 2017, Carol responded, “Not until he got—no. He went to
prison.” Defense counsel simply stated, “Objection,” and Carol answered again
without referencing prison and the trial continued. The court did not address
defense counsel’s objection on the record, defense counsel did not later address
the objection or clarify the objection, and defense counsel did not allege on the
record that Carol’s reference to prison was a basis for Ridley’s mistrial motion.

¶31 Thus, the State claims that Ridley did not properly preserve his
objection to Carol’s statement that Ridley was in prison. It cites State v. Agnello,
226 Wis. 2d 164, 172-73, 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999), for the proposition that “the
objector must articulate the specific grounds for the objection unless its basis is
obvious from its context.”11 See also WIS. STAT. § 901.03(1)(a) (stating that error

11
In reply, Ridley—we believe, correctly—argues that the basis for his objection was
obvious as “references to Mr. Ridley’s previous incarceration violated the court’s ruling on
other-acts.”

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No. 2021AP1468-CR

may not be predicated upon a ruling admitting evidence unless a substantial right
of the party is affected and “a timely objection or motion to strike appears of
record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not
apparent from the context”). In the alternative, the State argues that even if Ridley
did properly preserve his objection, any error in admitting the testimony was
harmless.

¶32 We agree with the State that regardless of whether Ridley properly
preserved his objection, any error in admitting Carol’s testimony was harmless.
See WIS. STAT. § 901.03(1). “Harmless error analysis requires us to look to the
effect of the error on the jury’s verdict.” State v. Hunt, 2014 WI 102, ¶26, 360
Wis. 2d 576, 851 N.W.2d 434. “For the error to be deemed harmless, the party
that benefited from the error—here, the State—must prove ‘beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” Id.
(citation omitted). Our supreme court

has previously articulated several [nonexhaustive] factors
to assist in a harmless error analysis, including but not
limited to: the importance of the erroneously admitted or
excluded evidence; the presence or absence of evidence
corroborating or contradicting the erroneously admitted or
excluded evidence; the nature of the defense; the nature of
the State’s case; and the overall strength of the State’s case.

Id., ¶27. We also consider “the frequency of the error” and “whether the
erroneously admitted evidence duplicates untainted evidence.” State v. Harris,
2008 WI 15, ¶45, 307 Wis. 2d 555, 745 N.W.2d 397.

¶33 Based on our review of these factors, we conclude that Carol’s error
in testifying that Ridley previously went to prison did not contribute to the jury’s
guilty verdict. First, the error occurred only once: Carol mentioned that Ridley
was in prison after the 2017 incident only one time during the two-day trial.

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No. 2021AP1468-CR

Further, when the State asked Carol again whether she had any contact with
Ridley since 2017, Carol did not repeat her statement about Ridley being in prison
and no additional attention was drawn to Carol’s earlier statement. See id., ¶89
(noting that “the State’s, the defendant’s, and the circuit court’s attempts to limit
any emphasis on the evidence” were a consideration under the harmless error
analysis).

¶34 Next, Ridley’s prior incarceration was not a key piece of evidence.
Prior to mentioning Ridley’s incarceration, Carol had just finished testifying
regarding admissible other-acts evidence concerning the 2017 domestic abuse
incident, where Ridley struck her in the head with his fist and stomped on her face
with his boot, which led to injuries that required stitches. The jury learned that
Ridley had been convicted of “some offenses” for that incident. Given this
testimony, it would have been reasonable for the jury to assume that Ridley had
gone to prison as the result of his conviction; thus, Carol’s testimony about
Ridley’s incarceration both seems to duplicate “untainted evidence” and was also
not “important” within the broader case.

¶35 Finally, as to the nature and strength of the State’s case, we conclude
that the State had a strong case against Ridley. Carol testified in detail regarding
the abuses she experienced at Ridley’s hands and how she escaped from him.
While Carol’s testimony was certainly the lynchpin of the State’s case, the State
also presented DNA evidence connecting Ridley to both wielding the hammer
against Carol and sexually assaulting her. Further, the State presented testimony
from the officer who responded to Carol’s initial report and documented Carol’s
injuries as well as from the nurse who examined Carol at the hospital. In
particular, the nurse testified as to Carol’s injuries, including the existence of four
injuries “with the same pattern” of a “red mark with [a] sort of circle halo around

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No. 2021AP1468-CR

them,” which we presume to be the result of Carol being struck by the hammer.
The nurse also explained that one of the injuries to Carol’s back would not have
occurred “without significant force.”

¶36 On appeal, however, Ridley argues that this court’s unpublished
decision in State v. Castillo, No. 2020AP983-CR, unpublished slip op. (WI App
June 29, 2021),12 should guide our analysis. In that case, the defendant, who was
charged with first-degree sexual assault of a child, also argued that the circuit
court erred by denying his motions for a mistrial. Id., ¶1. The victim, who was
eight years old, testified during the trial, and during her testimony, she responded,
unprompted, to one of the prosecutor’s questions by stating that Castillo “did it to
three other little girls.” Id., ¶12. Later, another witness testifying for the defense
discussed Castillo getting a job “if he gets out.” Id., ¶15. The court immediately
struck both comments and told the jury to disregard them. Id., ¶¶12, 15.

¶37 We reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that “the
combined prejudicial effect” of the witnesses’ statements “was so great that the
[circuit] court’s cautionary instructions were insufficient to remedy the error.”
Id., ¶3. In particular, we noted that “[t]aken together, the two statements could
have led a reasonable jury to conclude that Castillo had been incarcerated prior to
trial because he had sexually assaulted other little girls.” Id., ¶57. “Stated
differently, [the witness’s] statement suggesting that Castillo was incarcerated
enhanced the credibility of [the victim’s] statement about his sexually assaulting

12
An unpublished opinion authored by a member of a three-judge panel and issued on or
after July 1, 2009, may be cited for its persuasive value. WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3)(b).

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No. 2021AP1468-CR

other girls by giving rise to a reasonable inference that Castillo was incarcerated as
a result of those acts.” Id.

¶38 Ridley argues that “[t]he inadmissible evidence the jury was exposed
to in this case is just as prejudicial as in Castillo.” However, we are not bound by
this court’s conclusion in Castillo. Apart from Castillo’s status as an unpublished
decision, its conclusion was based on an entirely different factual record. Unlike
in Castillo, Ridley’s prior conduct against Carol was properly admitted as
other-acts evidence, while the fact that Castillo allegedly sexually assaulted other
little girls was not. See id., ¶45. Thus, Carol’s comment about prison did not have
the same or similar impact upon the jury that it did in Castillo, given that the jury
was already aware of Ridley’s prior conduct and that it led to his prior
incarceration. Further, the victim’s credibility in Castillo and Carol’s credibility
were not similarly on trial. As noted, while Carol’s testimony was central to the
State’s case, there was also corroborating evidence presented to the jury, which
was lacking in Castillo. See id., ¶55 (“[T]here was no physical evidence that
Castillo assaulted [the victim], nor was there any witness who directly
corroborated either [the victim’s] or Castillo’s version of the events.”). Carol’s
comment about prison did nothing to bolster her credibility when the jury already
knew that Ridley had been convicted of a crime for his conduct in 2017.
Accordingly, any error in admitting the testimony about Ridley being in prison
was harmless.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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