Winnebago County v. A. P. D.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
November 16, 2022
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2022AP817 Cir. Ct. No. 2021ME480

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

IN THE MATTER OF THE CONDITION OF A.P.D.:

WINNEBAGO COUNTY,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

A.P.D.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Winnebago County:
JOHN A. JORGENSEN, Judge. Affirmed.
No. 2022AP817

¶1 GROGAN, J.1 A.P.D. appeals from two WIS. STAT. ch. 51 orders
extending his commitment entered after a bench trial in January 2022. The circuit
court ordered him recommitted2 for twelve months and ordered involuntary
medication and treatment during that time. A.P.D. contends the circuit court erred
in concluding Winnebago County proved by clear and convincing evidence that he
had a mental illness or that he was dangerous under the fifth dangerousness
standard in WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.e. As a part of the latter argument, A.P.D.
claims the circuit court failed to make the requisite findings set forth in Langlade
County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶59, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277. This
court affirms.

I. BACKGROUND

¶2 In November 2021, A.P.D.’s treating psychiatrist,
Dr. George Monese, wrote a letter to the circuit court recommending an extension
of A.P.D.’s initial commitment.3 Dr. Monese recommended the extension because
A.P.D. told the doctor that he was only taking the medication “because he is under
court order[,]” A.P.D. does not believe he has a mental illness, and that A.P.D.
“will take the first opportunity to get off the medications.” Based on that lack of
insight, Dr. Monese advised that A.P.D. “is likely to become the subject for

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(d) (2019-20).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise noted.
2
“Recommitment” is synonymous with “extension of a commitment,” and the terms will
therefore be used interchangeably. See Sheboygan County v. M.W., 2022 WI 40, ¶6 n.3, 402
Wis. 2d 1, 974 N.W.2d 733.
3
In a letter dated November 12, 2021, Dr. Monese recommended extending A.P.D.’s
ch. 51 commitment. In a follow-up correspondence, Dr. Monese provided further information in
support of his request.

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No. 2022AP817

Chapter 51 commitment if it was withdrawn at this time.” The letter also told the
court that despite Dr. Monese’s “lengthy explanation to [A.P.D.] of the risks and
the benefits of treatment, [A.P.D.] was unable to use this information to his best
interest.” Dr. Monese also submitted a form requesting the extension of A.P.D.’s
commitment and involuntary medication orders to the County, asserting that
A.P.D.:

 “[I]s mentally ill and his diagnosis is Bipolar disorder, Manic[,]”
and A.P.D. “continues to have a substantial disorder of”
“thought” and “mood” “which grossly impairs” A.P.D.’s
“judgment” and “capacity to recognize reality[.]”

 “[I]s a proper subject for treatment.”

 “[I]s dangerous because there is a substantial likelihood, based
on his treatment record, that he would become a proper subject
for commitment if treatment were withdrawn” because he
“evidences” “dangerousness” under the fifth statutory standard.

 Is “not competent to refuse medication or treatment” and that
when Dr. Monese “recently tried to explain” “the advantages,
disadvantages, and alternatives to accepting a particular
medication or treatment[,]” A.P.D., “because of his mental
illness,” is not capable of understanding or applying them and is
unable “to make an informed choice as to whether to accept or
refuse medication or treatment.”

¶3 The County then filed a formal Petition for Recommitment and for
Involuntary Medication or Treatment with the circuit court. The matter was
originally scheduled for a bench trial on January 6, 2022, in front of a different
circuit court than the one that ultimately presided over A.P.D.’s trial and entered
the orders at issue on appeal. However, when the parties arrived for the trial, they
informed the judge of a potential conflict of interest due to the fact that A.P.D.
“might have made some threats” to that judge. As a result, this case was reset for

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No. 2022AP817

a bench trial on January 19, 2022, before the circuit court judge noted in this
opinion.

¶4 Dr. Monese was the only witness to testify at the trial. Much of his
testimony will be provided below. After his testimony, the parties made their final
arguments. The County argued it proved each element for the recommitment by
clear and convincing evidence. A.P.D. argued only that the County failed to prove
that he was dangerous. The circuit court determined that the County met its
burden of proof, ordered A.P.D. recommitted for twelve months, and entered a
concomitant order for the administration of involuntary medication. A.P.D. now
appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

¶5 This case involves a WIS. STAT. ch. 51 recommitment, which is
governed by WIS. STAT. § 51.20. To involuntarily commit an individual, a county
must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person is mentally ill, a
proper subject for treatment, and dangerous. Sec. 51.20(1)(a)1-2, (13)(e),
(13)(g)3; Waukesha County v. J.W.J., 2017 WI 57, ¶18, 375 Wis. 2d 542, 895
N.W.2d 783.

¶6 “To prevail in a recommitment proceeding, the petitioner must
demonstrate the same three elements necessary for the initial commitment[,]” but
“‘WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(am) provides a different avenue for proving
dangerousness if the individual has been the subject of [commitment] immediately
prior to’” the recommitment petition. Sheboygan County v. M.W., 2022 WI 40,
¶¶18-19, 402 Wis. 2d 1, 974 N.W.2d 733 (quoting Portage County v. J.W.K, 2019
WI 54, ¶19, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509). Dangerousness “‘may be
satisfied by a showing that there is a substantial likelihood, based on the subject

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No. 2022AP817

individual’s treatment record, that the individual would be a proper subject for
commitment if treatment were withdrawn.’” M.W., 402 Wis. 2d 1, ¶20 (quoting
§ 51.20(1)(am)). This method of proving dangerousness is necessary because “‘an
individual receiving treatment may not have exhibited any recent overt acts or
omissions demonstrating dangerousness because the treatment ameliorated such
behavior, but if treatment were withdrawn, there may be a substantial likelihood
such behavior would recur.’” M.W., 402 Wis. 2d 1, ¶20 (quoting J.W.K., 386
Wis. 2d 672, ¶19). If the County relies on § 51.20(1)(am) to prove dangerousness,
a link to one of the five dangerousness standards enumerated in § 51.20(1)(a)2 is
required. See D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶59. And, the circuit court must “make
specific factual findings with reference to the subdivision paragraph of WIS. STAT.
§ 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment is based” so that: (1) an individual
will know which dangerousness standard forms the basis of the recommitment;
and (2) appellate courts receive a better record to review. D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d
231, ¶¶3, 42-44.

¶7 Our supreme court imposed this directive because, in D.J.W., the
circuit court’s failure to identify the specific dangerousness standard created
confusion on appeal. Id., ¶¶38-40. Specifically, before the court of appeals, the
county did not identify a specific dangerousness standard, which resulted in the
court of appeals selecting WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.d during the course of its
analysis. At oral argument before the supreme court, however, the county argued
that the recommitment was based on the third standard, § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. D.J.W.,
391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶¶38-40.

¶8 The significance of the directive set forth in D.J.W., as our supreme
court acknowledged in Sauk County v. S.A.M., is to ensure that all parties and the
reviewing courts know which statutory dangerousness standard the recommitment

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No. 2022AP817

is based upon. See Sauk County v. S.A.M., 2022 WI 46, ¶36, 402 Wis. 2d 379,
975 N.W.2d 162. Failure to identify the particular dangerousness standard
deprives the commitment subject of due process and interferes with an appellate
court’s ability to review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.

¶9 Here, A.P.D. makes two arguments. First, he contends the evidence
is insufficient to prove he suffers from a mental illness. Second, he contends the
evidence is insufficient to prove he is dangerous. These issues present “a mixed
question of law and fact”; this court “uphold[s] a circuit court’s findings of fact
unless they are clearly erroneous[,]” but whether the facts satisfy the statutory
standard of dangerousness is a question of law this court reviews de novo.
See D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶¶24-25. “‘When the trial court acts as the finder of
fact, it is the ultimate arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to
be given to each witness’s testimony.’” S.A.M., 402 Wis. 2d 379, ¶33 (citation
omitted).

A. Mental illness

¶10 A.P.D. argues there is insufficient evidence to support the circuit
court’s determination that he suffers from a mental illness because the only
evidence in support of the diagnosis is “conclusory” testimony his treating
psychiatrist, Dr. Monese, provided. A.P.D. contends Dr. Monese needed to give
more details about his mental illness and diagnosis before the circuit court could
find he had a mental illness. This court rejects A.P.D.’s argument.

¶11 First, A.P.D. did not challenge whether he had a mental illness at his
trial. Rather, he focused only on whether he was dangerous. Thus, he cannot raise
issues on appeal that he did not raise in the circuit court. See State v. Mercado,
2021 WI 2, ¶35, 395 Wis. 2d 296, 953 N.W.2d 337 (recognizing that courts

6
No. 2022AP817

generally do not allow attorneys to “sandbag” the other side by not raising an issue
below and then “alleg[e] reversible error upon [appellate] review”). The
transcript, in fact, reflects that A.P.D.’s counsel suggested that A.P.D. is not
dangerous because he recognizes that he has a mental illness that requires him to
take medication. Referring to notes in A.P.D.’s medical chart, A.P.D.’s counsel
pointed out that A.P.D. told staff that “he needed help with his mental health
because he was hearing too many voices” and “was requesting Thorazine.”4

¶12 Second, the circuit court accepted Dr. Monese’s testimony as
sufficient proof that A.P.D. suffered from a mental illness. It did so based on
Dr. Monese’s expertise and experience and because the doctor had been treating
A.P.D. for his mental illness for some time. It is necessary for circuit courts to
rely on the testimony of doctors because “[w]hether a person is mentally ill is a
medical judgment, made by applying the definition of mental illness in WIS. STAT.
§ 51.01(13)(b)[.]” State v. Dennis H., 2002 WI 104, ¶19, 255 Wis. 2d 359, 647
N.W.2d 851 (emphasis added; citation omitted). The circuit court found
Dr. Monese credible, and this court sees no reason to overturn that determination.
See State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶23, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305 (we will
not overturn a circuit court’s credibility finding unless it is clearly erroneous).
Based on Dr. Monese’s credible testimony, the circuit court did not err in finding
A.P.D. was mentally ill.

4
The circuit court noted in its decision that A.P.D.’s mental illness of bipolar disorder
“is not contested[.]”

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No. 2022AP817

B. Sufficiency of evidence on dangerousness

¶13 A.P.D. contends the evidence was insufficient to establish by clear
and convincing evidence that he was dangerous. As noted, the circuit court based
the dangerousness finding on WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(am), linking it to the fifth
dangerousness factor, § 51.20(1)(a)2.e. Thus, we review the Record to see
whether it supports the circuit court’s decision on dangerousness. As this is a
recommitment, the County relied on subsection (1)(am), which requires a showing
“that there is a substantial likelihood, based on [A.P.D.’s] treatment record, that
[he] would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn.” See
§ 51.20(1)(am); see also M.W., 402 Wis. 2d 1, ¶20. The County argued that in
relying on subsection (am), the statutory dangerousness link was to the fifth factor,
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.e, which as material to A.P.D., requires that:

after the advantages and disadvantages of and alternatives
to accepting a particular medication or treatment have been
explained to him … and because of mental illness, [he]
evidences either incapability of expressing an
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of
accepting medication or treatment and the alternatives, or
substantial incapability of applying an understanding of the
advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to his …
mental illness in order to make an informed choice as to
whether to accept or refuse medication or treatment; and
evidences a substantial probability, as demonstrated by
both the individual’s treatment history and his … recent
acts or omissions, that the individual needs care or
treatment to prevent further disability or deterioration and a
substantial probability that he … will, if left untreated, lack
services necessary for his … health or safety and suffer
severe mental, emotional, or physical harm that will result
in the loss of the individual’s ability to function
independently in the community or the loss of cognitive or
volitional control over his … thoughts or actions. The
probability of suffering severe mental, emotional, or
physical harm is not substantial under this subd. 2.e. if
reasonable provision for the individual’s care or treatment
is available in the community and there is a reasonable

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No. 2022AP817

probability that the individual will avail himself … of these
services[.]

¶14 Although the Record in this case is somewhat sparse, having
reviewed the circuit court’s decision and the Record, this court concludes there
was sufficient evidence from which the circuit court could determine that the
County satisfied its burden of proving that A.P.D. was dangerous by clear and
convincing evidence.

¶15 The circuit court heard the sworn testimony of A.P.D.’s treating
psychiatrist, Dr. Monese. Dr. Monese testified that he had been treating A.P.D.
for a while, and explained that he supervises the resident doctors at the
Wisconsin Resource Center and reviews the residents’ treatment notes and
A.P.D.’s medical records. Dr. Monese also testified that he met with A.P.D.
regularly, including on the morning of the trial and two weeks earlier. When
asked if A.P.D. would “become a proper subject for commitment” if his treatment
were withdrawn, Dr. Monese answered in the affirmative. The doctor agreed that
A.P.D. is not competent to make his own medication or treatment decisions
“because of his intrinsic mental health disorder[,]” and when asked if A.P.D. needs
treatment “to prevent further disability or deterioration[,]” he confirmed this to be
true. Dr. Monese explained that A.P.D. “has done very well in psychiatry
treatment,” particularly “given the kind of condition he was of dangerousness
before[—]prior to starting commitment.” The doctor acknowledged that A.P.D. is
“doing much better” and “hasn’t had any violent episodes” but that he does not
have “insight[,]” which results in him denying to Dr. Monese that he has a mental
illness and telling the doctor “that he wants all medications discontinued
immediately.” The doctor also testified to being concerned about A.P.D.’s “level
of aggression” and referred to “the threats that he made to the judge before as well

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No. 2022AP817

as other individuals at the institution[.]” The threats were described as “severe and
could not be ignored[,]” but Dr. Monese testified that treatment was helping
A.P.D. In addition, A.P.D. stopped partaking in his “psychosocial intervention”
therapy, which could benefit him, and without it, stopping the medications “may
present problems in the future[.]”

¶16 Dr. Monese then clarified that A.P.D. made the threats and “carried
them out” when he “was receiving only psychosocial intervention,” noting the
psychotherapy alone was insufficient to “contain his mental health disorder” and
prevent dangerousness. The doctor said the threat to the judge was in April 2021,
and the spitting at an individual therapist was “within the last six months in 2021.”

¶17 When the County’s attorney asked whether there is a “substantial
probability” that A.P.D. “would suffer severe mental, emotional, or physical
harm” if “left untreated” and would lose his “ability to function independently
within the community[,]” Dr. Monese answered affirmatively. Without treatment
for his mental illness, Dr. Monese opined that A.P.D.’s lack of insight would
prevent him from functioning independently because he cannot interact normally
with others in certain situations due to his “lack of volitional [control].” The
doctor explained that because A.P.D. does not want treatment and just wants to be
“left alone[,]” A.P.D. would not take part in any community services that may be
available to him.

¶18 When asked about A.P.D.’s competency to refuse medications,
Dr. Monese testified that A.P.D. is “unable to give informed consent to receive
medication” and is “incompetent” and that, although he tried to explain the
advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to medication to A.P.D., he was
unable to do so because A.P.D. got upset and walked away. Dr. Monese testified

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No. 2022AP817

that until A.P.D. agrees to take medication and work with his psychiatrist, he will
need to be committed because, without the medication, he will have problems, be
dangerous, will affect others, and “could die” without treatment. The doctor
testified: “If you don’t treat [A.P.D.’s mental illness], [A.P.D.] may die from it or
kill other people[.]” When asked if A.P.D. showed “any willingness to voluntarily
take medication or follow treatments as recommended[,]” Dr. Monese responded:

Absolutely not. He told me that he doesn’t want to take
treatment today. He told me in no uncertain terms he does
not want treatment, he does not want to take medications.
In fact, the more I talked about it, he got upset and walked
away as I was trying to explain.

¶19 Dr. Monese also testified about the advantages of A.P.D.’s
medication: “Less tendency to become violent, more stable mood. Those are the
most important ones. Stable mood and decrease of violent tendencies.” He also
testified that the disadvantages are “[s]ide effects including muscle stiffness,
tiredness.” With respect to alternatives, Dr. Monese explained there really “are no
alternatives to the medications.” He explained the medications can be
supplemented with “psychotherapy” that is available to A.P.D., “but he has been
refusing those of late, within the last one month to six weeks.”

¶20 On cross-examination, A.P.D. pointed out the notes by staff (who
Dr. Monese supervised) in the chart from Wisconsin Resource Center indicating
that A.P.D. may not be dangerous to himself or others, that he is taking his
medications, and his “insight and judgment are reasonable[.]” Dr. Monese
admitted that these notes contained that information but said those notes were
written by medical “residents who are training” and who forget both that A.P.D. is
being forced to take the medications and that when he is on his medication, he
appears reasonable.

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No. 2022AP817

¶21 Dr. Monese explained that he is “a specialist in this area who has
been doing [this work] for so many years,” and based on his evaluation of A.P.D.,
after going “through the details,” A.P.D. does not have “reasonable insight.” The
doctor compared A.P.D.’s mental illness to hypertension: “If you don’t treat it,
you are going to have problems. Same thing here. If you don’t treat it, he’s going
to have some problems.”

¶22 The circuit court concluded, based on Dr. Monese’s testimony, that
the County proved by clear and convincing evidence that A.P.D. was dangerous
under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(am) and specifically connected that finding to
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.e, the fifth dangerousness standard. The circuit court specifically
found:

 Dr. Monese to be “an expert in this area” who “has the
knowledge of [A.P.D.]” as he has been treating him “for an
extended period of time[.]”

 Dr. Monese reviewed A.P.D.’s records and “understand[s] his
diagnosis.”

 Based on Dr. Monese’s evaluation, A.P.D. “will decompress if
he doesn’t take these medications if he isn’t under this
commitment order.”

 Acts by A.P.D. are problematic. A.P.D. said “he’s going to get
off of the medications as soon as he can,” and A.P.D. is not
“participat[ing] in the other psychotherapy that will help him stay
-- get healthy and stay healthy.”

 A.P.D. “has a mental illness” that will “not just go away[.]”

 A.P.D.’s mental illness must “be treated and maintained,
otherwise it guarantees decompression.”

 A.P.D.’s history shows that without the treatment, he is
dangerous to himself or others as evidenced by the past threats
and A.P.D.’s indication that he will stop taking his medication.

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No. 2022AP817

 The County “met its burden” of establishing “there are grounds
for the extension of the commitment” because A.P.D. “is
mentally ill and he is dangerous pursuant to the standards under
Chapter 51, specifically standard ‘e’ which is that he is going to
decompress if he does not continue taking his medication and
taking treatment.”

 Medication controls A.P.D.’s dangerousness and “[t]he
advantages and disadvantages to these medications or treatments
have been explained to him or attempted to be explained to him.”

 A patient cannot refuse to participate in a conversation about the
advantages and disadvantages and then later claim these things
were not explained to him because it “would be a ridiculous
outcome where the patient would just hold his hands over his
ears and then under that theory, they could never be committed
or ordered to take these medications.”

 Dr. Monese attempted to have the conversation about medication
with A.P.D., but A.P.D. “walked away during that time period so
they had been explained to him.”

 Due to A.P.D.’s “mental illness, he’s not competent to refuse the
psychotropic medication or treatment because he’s incapable of
expressing an understanding of the advantages and
disadvantages, substantially incapable of applying an
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages to his
condition to make an informed choice.”

 “[T]he medication and treatment is necessary to prevent serious
physical harm to himself or to others.”

¶23 A.P.D. says Dr. Monese’s testimony was not enough, and he argues
that the doctor’s testimony primarily just parroted the language of the statute. He
also says the circuit court failed to make specific findings as directed by D.J.W.,
and therefore this Record is insufficient to find A.P.D. dangerous. This court
rejects A.P.D.’s arguments.

¶24 As explained, in a recommitment, to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that a subject is dangerous, the County must establish that there is a

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No. 2022AP817

substantial likelihood that if treatment is withdrawn, A.P.D. would become a
proper subject for treatment. The Record shows this to be the case. Dr. Monese
explained that A.P.D.’s mental illness is not going to go away, and the only way
A.P.D. will not be dangerous to himself or others is if he agrees to take his
medication and continue treatment. A.P.D. indicated he will not take his
medication or continue treatment if he is not subject to a commitment order.

¶25 The Record links A.P.D.’s dangerousness to WIS. STAT.
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.e, and the Record supports that link. The Record reflects that
A.P.D. does not even want to talk about the advantages and disadvantages of
treatment because he does not believe he has a mental illness. Dr. Monese
testified to this and explained that A.P.D.’s lack of insight and volitional control
makes him incompetent to make an informed choice. Dr. Monese, an expert in
this area, explained that without treatment, A.P.D. will regress to his pretreatment
condition, which will make him dangerous to himself and others and will cause
him to be incapable of functioning safely in the community.

¶26 This court is also not convinced that Dr. Monese’s use of statutory
language in his testimony somehow renders his opinions or his testimony
insufficient. The Record reflects that many of the questions the County asked
“parroted” the statutory language, but this is the nature of these types of cases.
Reference to the statutory language ensures that a subject is not committed
unlawfully, and our supreme court has reversed a commitment when an expert
failed to use the statutory terminology. See Outagamie County v. Melanie L.,
2013 WI 67, ¶91, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607. This court is convinced
from Dr. Monese’s testimony that his opinion was not just a parroting of the
statute but rather that his opinion that A.P.D. met the recommitment statute’s
dangerousness requirement was based on his personal interactions with A.P.D.,

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No. 2022AP817

A.P.D.’s type of mental illness, A.P.D.’s treatment records together with
Dr. Monese being A.P.D.’s treating psychiatrist, and A.P.D.’s insistence that he
would discontinue his medication if he was released from the commitment. This
is evident from the examples Dr. Monese provided and his explanation that A.P.D.
has a mental illness that will not go away and that without the proper medication
and treatment, A.P.D. will be a danger to himself and to others. The circuit court
did not err in concluding from Dr. Monese’s testimony—and all reasonable
inferences derived therefrom—that the County proved by clear and convincing
evidence that A.P.D. was dangerous under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(am) with a link
to § 51.20(1)(a)2.e, the fifth dangerousness standard.5

¶27 Here, we have an individual who has been committed after
threatening a judge and making serious threats attributable to his mental illness.
The administration of involuntary medication has controlled the danger. But
A.P.D. says, “in no uncertain terms,” that he will stop taking the medication as
soon as he can. An expert (also A.P.D.’s treating psychiatrist) opined that the type
of mental illness involved here requires medication and that without medication,
A.P.D. will become dangerous again. There is no doubt these are challenging
cases. This court certainly does not want to unnecessarily restrain A.P.D.’s liberty

5
This court notes that the circuit court used the terms “decompress” and
“decompression” instead of the statutory terms of “disability or deterioration,” but that does not
require this court to reverse. It is reasonable to infer from the circuit court’s decision that it used
“decompress” as an expression of A.P.D. returning to his pre-commitment dangerous condition if
treatment stopped. “‘[W]e accept reasonable inferences from the facts[.]’” Winnebago County
v. Christopher S., 2016 WI 1, ¶50, 366 Wis. 2d 1, 878 N.W.2d 109 (citation omitted). As we
have often said, appellate courts do not insist that the circuit court use “magic words.” See State
v. Brown, 2020 WI 63, ¶27, 392 Wis. 2d 454, 945 N.W.2d 584 (“The law generally rejects
imposing ‘magic words’ requirements.”). It is clear from the circuit court’s decision as a whole
that it made the requisite findings.

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No. 2022AP817

and freedom. But, this court, based on this Record, is required to affirm. As our
then-Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court cautioned:

[I]t is important for … all Wisconsin courts who adjudicate
civil commitments and recommitments under WIS. STAT.
ch. 51, to recognize that there is a category of
seriously mentally ill individuals whose symptoms are
described in WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.e. They are
dangerous to themselves because their illness prevents
them from understanding the advantages and disadvantages
of treatment and, as demonstrated by their treatment
history, they need care or treatment to prevent further
disability or deterioration and they have a substantial
probability, if left untreated, of losing the ability to function
independently in the community or of losing cognitive or
volitional control over their thoughts or actions.

D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶62 (Roggensack, C.J., dissenting).

¶28 As for A.P.D.’s allegation that the circuit court failed to comply with
the D.J.W. directive here by not making the required specific findings, this court
disagrees. Could this circuit court have made more findings? Yes—it could have.
But the purpose of the D.J.W. directive was satisfied. A.P.D. had notice as to
which dangerousness standard the County based its prosecution on, and the circuit
court specifically indicated that it grounded its decision in WIS. STAT.
§ 51.20(1)(am) and linked it to § 51.20(1)(a)2.e. All parties knew the statutory
standards that were being applied, and the circuit court’s decision provides this
court with notice as to which dangerousness standard it relied on and its reasons
for doing so. See S.A.M., 402 Wis. 2d 379, ¶36 (recognizing that even “[t]hough
no witness recited the Third [dangerousness] Standard with exactness,” the record
showed “the circuit court, parties, and witnesses [were] all in accord regarding the
statutory standards they were applying”).

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No. 2022AP817

By the Court.—Orders affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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