Brown County Department of Human Services v. J. V.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
July 28, 2022
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2022AP532 Cir. Ct. No. 2019TP35

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO K. V.,
A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

BROWN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

J. V.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Brown County:
BEAU LIEGEOIS, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded with directions.
No. 2022AP532

¶1 HRUZ, J.1 Jennifer2 appeals from an order terminating her parental
rights to her son, Kyle. She contends that the circuit court erred by granting
partial summary judgment in this termination of parental rights (“TPR”)
proceeding on the continuing denial of visitation ground.3 Jennifer argues that the
order denying her visitation with Kyle failed to include the written notice required
by statute that her rights could be terminated under that ground.

¶2 We agree that Jennifer was not provided with the required notice.
As a result, the Brown County Department of Human Services (“the County”) did
not meet its burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that each element
of the continuing denial of visitation ground was met. Accordingly, we conclude
that partial summary judgment in favor of the County was improper. We therefore
reverse the order terminating Jennifer’s parental rights and remand with directions
that the circuit court grant summary judgment in Jennifer’s favor on the continuing
denial of visitation ground.

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2) (2019-20). All
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise noted.
2
For ease of reading and to protect confidentiality, we refer to the appellant and her son
in this confidential matter using pseudonyms, rather than their initials or names.
3
Cases appealed under WIS. STAT. RULE 809.107 “shall be given preference and shall
be taken in an order that ensures that a decision is issued within 30 days after the filing of the
appellant’s reply.” See RULE 809.107(6)(e). Conflicts in this court’s calendar have resulted in a
delay. It is therefore necessary for this court to sua sponte extend the deadline for a decision in
this case. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.82(2)(a); Rhonda R.D. v. Franklin R.D., 191 Wis. 2d 680,
694, 530 N.W.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1995). Accordingly, we extend our deadline to the date this
decision is issued.

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No. 2022AP532

BACKGROUND

¶3 The Outagamie County Department of Health and Human Services
temporarily removed Kyle from Jennifer’s home when he was around fourteen
months old, following concerns over Jennifer’s mental health and substance abuse.
Soon thereafter, that department filed a petition alleging that Kyle was a child in
need of protection or services (“CHIPS”). The Outagamie County Circuit Court
entered a CHIPS dispositional order on February 20, 2018, continuing Kyle’s
out-of-home placement. Approximately two months later, venue of the CHIPS
action was transferred to Brown County.

¶4 On October 2, 2018, the County filed a request to modify the CHIPS
dispositional order and suspend Jennifer’s visitation rights. At a hearing on
October 30, 2018, the circuit court stated that it would be suspending Jennifer’s
visitation rights, subject to her completing certain conditions. The court did not
orally warn Jennifer that her parental rights could be terminated after a year if her
visitation rights were not reinstated. Shortly thereafter, on November 2, 2018, the
court entered an order (effective October 30, 2018, the date of the hearing)
revising the original dispositional order and denying Jennifer visitation, subject to
several conditions. We refer to this order as “the revision order.”

¶5 On November 5, 2018, the County mailed to Jennifer the revision
order, a copy of Jennifer’s court-ordered conditions, and a copy of the “Notice
Concerning Grounds to Terminate Parental Rights.” This notice had been signed
by Jennifer on July 11, 2018, several months prior to the revision order. The top
of the form includes the following language:

Your parental rights can be terminated against your will
under certain circumstances. A list of potential grounds to
terminate your parental rights is given below. Those that

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No. 2022AP532

are check-marked may be most applicable to you, although
you should be aware that if any of the others also exist now
or in the future, your parental rights can be taken from you.

Thirteen potential grounds for termination are listed on the form. Of these, a
check mark was made in the boxes that corresponded with three potential
grounds: (1) abandonment; (2) continuing need of protection or services; and
(3) failure to assume parental responsibility. The box corresponding to the
continuing denial of visitation ground was left unchecked.

¶6 On November 12, 2019, the County petitioned for the termination of
Jennifer’s parental rights, alleging only the continuing denial of visitation ground.
The County subsequently filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing
that there were no issues of material fact regarding that ground. Jennifer opposed
the motion, arguing that she had not been warned that the failure to meet her
conditions and regain visitation within a year could lead to the termination of her
parental rights. In response, the County conceded that Jennifer had not been
provided with an oral warning at the October 2018 hearing, but it argued that the
written notice of potential grounds warning attached to the revision order was
“sufficient under the law.”

¶7 Although the circuit court initially denied the County’s summary
judgment motion due to “genuine issues of material fact and issues concerning
[Jennifer’s] due process rights,” it later reconsidered that decision at the County’s
request. In an oral ruling and accompanying written decision, the court granted
the County partial summary judgment on the continuing denial of visitation
ground, and it found Jennifer to be an unfit parent. The court explained in its
written order:

There was a valid revised order denying physical placement
or visitation issued by Judge Zuidmulder on October 30,

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No. 2022AP532

2018, and signed by Judge Zuidmulder on November 2,
2018. This revised order was an Order for Revision of
Dispositional Order under [WIS. STAT.] § 48.363. This
order included reasonable conditions that [Jennifer] could
accomplish through treatment providers in the community.
[Jennifer] was notified of the possibility of her parental
rights being terminated in compliance with [WIS. STAT.]
§ 48.356.

¶8 The circuit court then noted that Jennifer had otherwise received
sufficient notice of the potential termination of her parental rights. It explained
that in addition to the notice form mailed to Jennifer on November 5, 2018, after
her visitation was denied, she had also received subsequent written warnings on
January 18, 2019, and July 22, 2019. The court also pointed to a written notice
provided on January 6, 2020, after the County had filed its petition to terminate
Jennifer’s parental rights. Accordingly, the court concluded that the record was
“substantial that the County has satisfied the notice requirements of [WIS. STAT.]
§ 48.356 by clear, convincing, and undisputed documented evidence in the court
record.”

¶9 Following a dispositional hearing, the circuit court terminated
Jennifer’s parental rights to Kyle. Jennifer now appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶10 Jennifer argues that the circuit court erred by granting partial
summary judgment to the County because the revision order did not include a
warning that her parental rights could be terminated under the continuing denial of
visitation ground, as required by WIS. STAT. §§ 48.415(4) and 48.356(2). We
agree that Jennifer was not provided with the notice required by these statutes.

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No. 2022AP532

¶11 The legislature has set forth a two-part statutory procedure for cases
seeking to involuntarily terminate an individual’s parental rights over his or her
child. Sheboygan Cnty. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs. v. Julie A.B., 2002 WI
95, ¶24, 255 Wis. 2d 170, 648 N.W.2d 402. In the first, or “grounds,” phase of the
proceeding, the TPR petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence the
existence of one or more grounds for termination enumerated in WIS. STAT.
§ 48.415. “Partial” summary judgment may be granted at the grounds phase of a
TPR case and is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Steven V. v.
Kelley H., 2004 WI 47, ¶6, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856; see also WIS. STAT.
§ 802.08(2). The Wisconsin Supreme Court has determined that certain grounds
for termination under § 48.415 are more appropriate for summary judgment,
including the continuing denial of visitation ground, because the grounds are
“expressly provable by official documentary evidence, such as court orders or
judgments of conviction.” Steven V., 271 Wis. 2d 1, ¶37. We review a grant of
summary judgment in a TPR proceeding de novo, applying the same methodology
as the circuit court. State v. Bobby G., 2007 WI 77, ¶36, 301 Wis. 2d 531, 734
N.W.2d 81.

¶12 The continuing denial of visitation ground in WIS. STAT. § 48.415(4)
places the burden on the County to prove the following by clear and convincing
evidence:

(a) That the parent has been denied periods of physical
placement by court order in an action affecting the
family or has been denied visitation under an order
under [WIS. STAT. §§] 48.345, 48.363, 48.365, 938.345,
938.363 or 938.365 containing the notice required by
[WIS. STAT. §§] 48.356(2) or 938.356(2).

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No. 2022AP532

(b) That at least one year has elapsed since the order
denying periods of physical placement or visitation was
issued and the court has not subsequently modified its
order so as to permit periods of physical placement or
visitation.

Jennifer was denied visitation under § 48.363, the statutory section governing the
revision of dispositional orders. Although Jennifer acknowledges that over a year
elapsed after the revision order denying her visitation was entered, she contends
she was not provided with the statutory notice required by § 48.356(2). Section
48.356, addressing the duty of a circuit court to warn parents of any TPR ground
that may be applicable, has two notice components—an oral warning and a written
warning. Subsection 48.356(2)—in addition to § 48.356(1), which describes “the
information” to be included in the written order issued under subsec. (2)—reads:

(1) Whenever the court orders a child to be placed outside
his or her home, orders an expectant mother of an
unborn child to be placed outside of her home, or
denies a parent visitation because the child or unborn
child has been adjudged to be in need of protection or
services under [WIS. STAT. §§] 48.345, 48.347, 48.357,
48.363, or 48.365 and whenever the court reviews a
permanency plan under [WIS. STAT. §] 48.38(5m), the
court shall orally inform the parent or parents who
appear in court or the expectant mother who appears in
court of any grounds for termination of parental rights
under [§] 48.415 which may be applicable and of the
conditions necessary for the child or expectant mother
to be returned to the home or for the parent to be
granted visitation.

(2) In addition to the notice required under sub. (1), any
written order which places a child or an expectant
mother outside the home or denies visitation under sub.
(1) shall notify the parent or parents or expectant
mother of the information specified under sub. (1).

¶13 “[S]tatutory interpretation ‘begins with the language of the statute.
If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.’” State ex rel.

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No. 2022AP532

Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681
N.W.2d 110 (citation omitted). Statutory language is given its common, ordinary,
and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially defined words or phrases
are given their technical or special definitional meaning. Id. In addition,
“statutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation
but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related
statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.” Id., ¶46.
Statutory language is read, where possible, to give reasonable effect to every
word, in order to avoid surplusage. Id. The interpretation and application of a
statute present questions of law that we review de novo while benefiting from the
circuit court’s analysis. State v. Arberry, 2018 WI 7, ¶14, 379 Wis. 2d 254, 905
N.W.2d 832.

¶14 A plain reading of WIS. STAT. § 48.415(4) shows that in order for the
County to meet its burden of proving that the continuing denial of visitation
ground has been met, the order denying a parent visitation must contain the notice
required by WIS. STAT. § 48.356(2). Pursuant to § 48.356(2), “any written order”
denying a parent visitation must contain notice of “any grounds for termination of
parental rights under [§] 48.415 which may be applicable and of the conditions
necessary … for the parent to be granted visitation.” Sec. 48.356(1). In other
words, not only is the circuit court independently required by § 48.356(1) to give
parents an oral warning of the possible grounds for the termination of their
parental rights at the hearing denying visitation, but under § 48.415(4)(a), a
necessary element of the continuing denial of visitation ground is that the court
provide written notice of those possible grounds within the accompanying order.

¶15 In Jennifer’s case, the required notice was not provided. Along with
the revision order, Jennifer was mailed a copy of the notice of the possible

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No. 2022AP532

grounds for termination of her parental rights, a form that she had initially
received and signed four months prior to the revision hearing. Although Jennifer
was not made to sign a new form informing her of the potential grounds for
termination at issue, because the notice form was attached to the written revision
order, it served as written notice of the potential grounds for termination of her
parental rights. Jennifer agrees that “[t]hree grounds were check-marked and had
the continuing denial ground been one of the check-marked grounds, that likely
would [have been] sufficient [notice].”

¶16 As Jennifer makes clear, however, the form did not indicate with an
“x” that the continuing denial of visitation ground might be applicable to her.4 We

4
Jennifer notes that when the circuit court granted the County’s motion for partial
summary judgment, it concluded that the written notice was sufficient, in part, because Jennifer
was sent additional written notices—subsequent to the notice attached to the revision order—
stating that the continuing denial of visitation ground could apply. Jennifer argues that these
notices were insufficient to satisfy the statutory notice requirement, as they came after the
one-year denial of visitation clock began to run and none of them accompanied the order denying
visitation.

In support of her position, Jennifer cites to two recent unpublished cases that each relied
on the plain language of WIS. STAT. § 48.415(4)(a) to reject arguments that the notice
requirement therein could be satisfied by considering more than one order. See Jackson Cnty.
Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. R.H.H., Nos. 2018AP2440, 2018AP2441, 2018AP2442 and
2018AP2443, unpublished slip op. ¶2 (WI App Apr. 4, 2019); Brown Cnty. Dep’t of Health and
Hum. Servs. v. L.F.H., No. 2019AP145, unpublished slip op. ¶16 (WI App Apr. 23, 2019).
Unpublished opinions authored by a single judge and issued on or after July 1, 2009, may be cited
for their persuasive value. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3)(b). The County appears to agree with
Jennifer’s contention that this court’s focus should be on the order denying Jennifer’s visitation,
arguing that the issue of whether notice was provided by “one order or more than one order is
moot” because, it contends, Jennifer received sufficient notice attached to the initial order
denying her visitation. In addition, nowhere does the County argue that sufficient notice could be
provided through more than one order. As a result, we limit the scope of our analysis on the
sufficiency of the notice to the contents and attachments of the single order denying Jennifer’s
visitation.

(continued)

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No. 2022AP532

note that although an oral warning is not explicitly required for the purposes of
proving the continuing denial ground under WIS. STAT. § 48.415(4)(a), the parties
agree that no oral warning was given to Jennifer at the revision hearing. This fact
further supports a conclusion that Jennifer was not provided with the required
notice that the continuing denial of visitation ground could be applicable to her, as
she received neither oral nor written warnings to that effect.

¶17 The County disagrees, arguing that Jennifer did receive sufficient
notice. It contends that the general language included at the top of the notice
form—i.e., “those [grounds] that are check-marked may be most applicable to
you, although you should be aware that if any of the others also exist now or in the
future, your parental rights can be taken from you”—sufficiently notified Jennifer
that she could be subject to a termination of her parental rights on the continuing
denial of visitation ground, even though there was no check-mark next to that
ground on the form.5 We disagree that this general prefatory language was
sufficient under the statutory scheme.

Even if we were to consider the later notices provided to Jennifer, because the one-year
statutory period for the continuing denial of visitation ground begins running when visitation is
denied, these later notices would not have provided Jennifer with a full year in which she would
be aware that the continuing denial of visitation ground could be applicable to her. Furthermore,
the notice provided to Jennifer after the County filed its TPR petition would be of no use to her,
as the one-year period without visitation would already have passed. We conclude that none of
the subsequent notices was sufficient to provide the notice required by WIS. STAT. § 48.415(4)(a),
which states that such notice must be included in the written order denying visitation.
5
The County spends a considerable portion of its brief arguing that Jennifer incorrectly
cites the notice requirement statute as WIS. STAT. § 48.356, generally, as opposed to § 48.356(2),
specifically. In addition, the County seems to interpret Jennifer’s citation to § 48.356 as an
argument that the notice she received was inadequate because it was not provided orally. As
Jennifer points out in her reply brief, however, referring generally to “the statutory notice
requirements of … [§] 48.356” is not misleading because § 48.356(2) expressly requires notice of
“the information specified under sub. (1).”

(continued)

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No. 2022AP532

¶18 As an initial matter, we stress the relevant language in WIS. STAT.
§ 48.356(1), which is directly incorporated into § 48.356(2). To explain, our
legislature defined the necessary information to be provided in the written notice
as “the information specified under sub. (1).” Sec. 48.356(2). As relevant here,
the legislature then chose to define that necessary information as “any grounds for
termination of parental rights under [WIS. STAT. §] 48.415 which may be
applicable.” Sec. 48.356(1) (emphasis added). Notably, the statutory direction is
not to inform a parent of all grounds that exist under the law upon which a
termination may be granted. If that were the case, merely including a plain copy
of § 48.415, which lists every possible ground for a TPR, would suffice. Instead,
the language employed plainly contemplates that such a notice consider the
applicability of particular grounds, albeit with the inclusion of the language “may
be” so as to reflect the forward-looking analysis inherent in considering an
uncertain future. Our analysis must give meaning to all of the language in these
governing statutes. Otherwise, a parent is not given the notice—as intended by
our legislature—necessary to give that parent an opportunity to conform his or her
conduct to avoid having the “state exercise[] its awesome power to terminate
parental rights.” Waukesha County v. Steven H., 2000 WI 28, ¶25, 233 Wis. 2d
344, 607 N.W.2d 607 (citing D.F.R. v. Juneau Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 147
Wis. 2d 486, 433 N.W.2d 609 (Ct. App. 1988)), abrogated on other grounds by

In addition, we observe that Jennifer refers to WIS. STAT. § 48.356(2) where necessary to
make a distinction between the subsections, and she does not misstate the law or argue that WIS.
STAT. § 48.415(4)(a) requires proof of an oral warning. Importantly, in her reply brief, Jennifer
specifically responds to the County’s contention, explaining that she does not argue that an oral
warning is required to meet the statutory requirements under § 48.415(4)(a). Indeed, she
affirmatively states, “It is clear that the continuing denial ground does not require proof that the
parent received an oral warning when visitation is denied. Only proof of written notice is
required to proceed under the continuing denial ground ….” Accordingly, we need not address
the County’s argument further.

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No. 2022AP532

Steven H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶28, modified on other grounds by St. Croix Cnty.
Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs. v. Michael D., 2016 WI 35, 368 Wis. 2d 170,
880 N.W.2d 107.

¶19 Jennifer points to two analogous cases to guide and help confirm our
analysis of whether the notice that occurred in this case was sufficient. In D.F.R.,
this court reversed a termination order for failure to provide adequate notice as
required by WIS. STAT. § 48.356(2). There, the notice attached to the order was in
the form of copies of WIS. STAT. § 48.415 (the statute listing all potential grounds
for a TPR) and § 48.356, with an assertion that the parents had gone over § 48.356
with an intake worker. D.F.R., 147 Wis. 2d at 490. We concluded that the intent
of § 48.356(2) was to provide the parent with warning of any “applicable”
grounds, and that a specific warning regarding any applicable grounds was
therefore necessary—not simply a list of all possible grounds, whether relevant or
not. D.F.R., 147 Wis. 2d at 496. We subsequently confirmed this distinction in
M.P. v. Dane County Department of Human Services, 170 Wis. 2d 313, 488
N.W.2d 133 (Ct. App. 1992), concluding that notice was sufficient where the
circuit court “did not simply supply a copy of the lengthy statute, as [in D.F.R.],”
but specifically provided written notice of the grounds for termination that could
apply. M.P., 170 Wis. 2d at 323.

¶20 We view Jennifer’s notice as more problematic than the notice
provided in D.F.R. Although in this case several boxes on the notice form were
checked, the continuing denial ground was not among them. This omission
resulted in a form that was not merely nonspecific, but was actually misleading.
Because the form’s prefatory language describes the check-marked grounds as
“those that may be most applicable to you,” its recipient could reasonably interpret
those grounds as the relevant, timely grounds affecting his or her parental rights.

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No. 2022AP532

Although the prefatory language notes “that if any of the others also exist now or
in the future, your parental rights can be taken from you,” it is conversely unlikely
that a recipient of the form would necessarily make the assumption that one of the
unchecked boxes would be immediately relevant—or, as in the case of the
continuing denial of visitation ground, start the running of a one-year clock
threatening one’s parental rights.

¶21 The foregoing concerns are particularly relevant in this case, as
Jennifer was not provided with an oral warning that this ground could apply, or
that this revision order specifically—among all of the other procedures in which
Jennifer had been a participant—would possibly subject her to a termination of her
parental rights. We conclude that the prefatory language “if any of the grounds
exist now or in the future, your parental rights can be taken from you” does not
automatically meet WIS. STAT. § 48.356(2)’s requirement that notice be given of
those grounds which “may be applicable.” Without a more specific indication of
which grounds might be applicable, that language is little better than providing a
copy of the statute, which was determined to be insufficient in D.F.R. The
language should not be able to “fill the gap” of providing adequate statutory notice
to any recipient of the form, regardless of whether the grounds checked are
relevant, or even if they are checked at all.

¶22 In other words, the general language “those that are check-marked
may be most applicable to you, although you should be aware that if any of the
others also exist now or in the future, your parental rights can be taken from you”
is perhaps a broad informational warning, but it cannot be said to provide
meaningful notice that the continuing denial of visitation ground was relevant to
Jennifer’s circumstances. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated in Steven H.,

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No. 2022AP532

The notice required by WIS. STAT. §§ 48.356(2) and
48.415(2) is meant to ensure that a parent has adequate
notice of the conditions with which the parent must comply
for a child to be returned to the home. The notice is also
meant to forewarn parents that their parental rights are in
jeopardy.

Steven H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶37 (emphasis added). The prefatory language on the
form provided to Jennifer did not constitute “adequate” notice or forewarn
Jennifer of the manner in which—including the time by when—her parental rights
might be at risk if she did not meet certain conditions, particularly considering the
misleading selection of different grounds for termination than were ultimately
pursued.

¶23 The County cites Cynthia E. v. LaCrosse County Human Services
Department, 172 Wis. 2d 218, 223, 493 N.W.2d 56 (1992), for the proposition
that “the fact that written orders contain more grounds than those applicable at the
time of the order does not mean the orders did not comply with WIS. STAT.
§ 48.356(2).” However, Jennifer rightly points out that the court in Cynthia E.
“decline[d] to reach the issues of whether § 48.356(1) is ambiguous and what
§ 48.356(1) means” because the parties agreed that Cynthia E. had received proper
oral notice that the continuing denial of visitation ground could apply. Cynthia E.,
172 Wis. 2d at 227. As a result, the court held that indicating five of the six then-
existing grounds for termination could apply was not insufficient notice, as the
written notice matched the oral warning the court gave that the continuing denial
of visitation ground could apply. Id. Here, in contrast, an oral warning was not
given, nor was the continuing denial of visitation ground checked as possibly
relevant in the written notice provided. Cynthia E. addresses a different set of
circumstances, and the County’s argument is therefore not persuasive.

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No. 2022AP532

¶24 On these facts, Jennifer received inadequate notice that she was
subject to termination of her parental rights on the continuing denial of visitation
ground at the time she was required to receive such notice. While the bar for
providing sufficient notice may be low, it was not met here. As a result, the
County failed to meet its burden of proving that the elements under WIS. STAT.
§ 48.415(4) had been satisfied by clear and convincing evidence, and the circuit
court therefore erred by granting partial summary judgment on the continuing
denial of visitation ground.

¶25 Jennifer argues that the appropriate remedy in this appeal is the
reversal of the circuit court’s summary judgment order and the entry of summary
judgment on the continuing denial of visitation ground in her favor. She points to
cases in which appellate courts have held that summary judgment should be
granted in favor of the parent on the continuing denial of visitation ground where
the petitioner was unable to prove that the required elements under WIS. STAT.
§ 48.514(4) were met. See Jackson Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. R.H.H.,
Nos. 2018AP2440, 2018AP2441, 2018AP2442 and 2018AP2443, unpublished
slip op. ¶2 (WI App Apr. 4, 2019); and Brown Cnty. Dep’t of Health and Hum.
Servs. v. L.F.H., No. 2019AP145, unpublished slip op. ¶25 (WI App Apr. 23,
2019). The County does not address Jennifer’s argument regarding the
appropriate remedy.

¶26 Because we conclude that the record conclusively establishes the
County cannot prove it provided Jennifer with the notice required under WIS.
STAT. § 48.514(4), we agree with Jennifer’s proposed remedy. Accordingly, we
reverse the order terminating Jennifer’s parental rights and remand with directions
that the circuit court grant summary judgment in Jennifer’s favor on the continuing
denial of visitation ground.

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No. 2022AP532

By the Court.—Order reversed and cause remanded with directions.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

16