State v. A. M.-C.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
March 30, 2021
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal Nos.
2021AP94 Cir. Ct. Nos. 2019TP32
2019TP33
2021AP95
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

APPEAL NO. 2021AP94

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO J.A.M., A PERSON UNDER
THE AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

A.M.-C,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
Nos. 2021AP94
2021AP95

APPEAL NO. 2021AP95

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO E.A.M., A PERSON UNDER
THE AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

A.M.-C,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEALS from orders of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
MARK A. SANDERS, Judge. Affirmed.

¶1 WHITE, J.1 A.M.‑C. appeals the trial court orders terminating her
parental rights to two of her children, J.A.M. and E.A.M. She argues that the trial
court erred when it entered default judgment against her on the grounds for
termination and again when it found it was in the best interests of her children to
order the termination of her parental rights. We conclude the trial court’s exercise
of discretion in both matters was reasonable and appropriate, and, accordingly, we
affirm.

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(e) (2019-20).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise noted.

2
Nos. 2021AP94
2021AP95

BACKGROUND

¶2 The State filed a petition to terminate A.M.‑C.’s parental rights to
J.A.M. and E.A.M. on March 1, 2019. The State’s grounds were that the children
remained in need of continuing CHIPS2 and A.M.‑C. failed to assume parental
responsibilities. J.A.M., born in October 2015, was removed from his mother’s
care in July 2016 after a domestic violence incident in which his alleged father3
threatened to kill both A.M.‑C. and J.A.M. At birth, the Division of Milwaukee
Child Protective Services (DMCPS) imposed a safety plan for A.M.‑C. to care for
J.A.M. under the supervision of her family because A.M.‑C. had two older
children in out-of-home care due to a prior CHIPS order. E.A.M. was born in
December 2016 and was detained by DMCPS from the hospital the next day
because DMCPS had ongoing concerns about A.M.‑C.’s mental health, domestic
violence, and her inability to meet the court-ordered conditions for the return of
her children.

¶3 At the initial plea hearing on the termination of parental rights (TPR)
petition, the circuit court4 adjourned the proceedings for A.M.‑C. to be appointed
adversary counsel and reappointed the guardian ad litem (GAL) who represented

2
“CHIPS is the commonly used acronym to denote the phrase ‘child in need of
protection or services’ as used in the Wisconsin Children’s Code, chapter 48, Stats.” Marinette
Cnty. v. Tammy C., 219 Wis. 2d 206, 209 n.1, 579 N.W.2d 635 (1998).
3
The same man is alleged to be the father of J.A.M. and E.A.M. He did not consent to a
DNA test and generally refused to participate in legal proceedings. The termination of his rights
(or that of an unknown father) is not before us.
4
The Honorable Christopher R. Foley presided over the plea hearing and some pretrial
proceedings; we refer to him as the circuit court. The Honorable Mark A. Sanders presided over
the grounds and disposition of the TPR; we refer to him as the trial court.

3
Nos. 2021AP94
2021AP95

A.M.‑C. in CHIPS proceedings for these children and for her two older children. 5
The circuit court notified A.M.‑C. that she needed to return on the adjourned
hearing date. “If you don’t, you could be defaulted. That means you’d lose your
right to fight against this because you didn’t come to court.”

¶4 At the adjourned plea hearing in April 2019, the circuit court was
informed that A.M.‑C. had mental health issues and multiple competency
evaluations, as recently as 2017, and was found incompetent and unlikely to regain
competency. Because A.M.‑C. spoke Spanish as her primary language, Spanish
language interpreters were also employed at all of A.M.‑C.’s court appearances.
A.M.‑C., by counsel, entered a plea that she was contesting the State’s petition.
The circuit court again informed A.M.‑C.:

You have to appear for all the hearings, be on time for the
hearings. You have to stay in touch with [your attorney
and GAL]. They can’t help you defend against this unless
you maintain reasonable communication with them. So if
your address changes or your phone number changes, you
need to make sure that they know that information.

¶5 A.M.‑C. did not appear at the hearing on the scheduled court trial on
the grounds for the TPR on February 24, 2020. The children’s case manager
informed the trial court that A.M.‑C. notified Saint A, the social services agency
managing her case (the Agency), that she had moved to New York the previous
month. A.M.‑C.’s attorney informed the court that she had received police reports
from December 2019 that “indicated that there was yet another altercation
between [A.M.‑C.] and her significant other.” The trial court stated “so that I
make sure that I understand that exactly, this isn’t a situation of flight from an

5
A.M.-C.’s parental rights to two of her children, E.A.M. and J.A.M.’s older siblings,
were involuntarily terminated in October 2017. Their status is not at issue in this matter.

4
Nos. 2021AP94
2021AP95

abuser or an alleged abuser. It would be a circumstance of flight with an alleged
abuser.” A.M.‑C.’s attorney confirmed that the court was correct. The children’s
GAL informed the trial court that “there may have been a protective service
referral open just shortly before that regarding the child in her care, and she fled
with that child to New York and that child was detained in New York City.”

¶6 A.M.‑C.’s attorney moved the court to allow A.M.‑C. to appear at
the trial by telephone.6 Trial counsel stated that it was her understanding that
A.M.‑C. moved to New York “to receive family support and comfort.” Trial
counsel said she spoke with A.M.‑C. prior to the trial and A.M.‑C. stated she could
not afford to return to Milwaukee, but she “continued to express a desire to be
reunited with her sons.”

¶7 The State objected to having A.M.‑C. participate in the trial
telephonically because she could not meaningfully appear due to concerns about
her mental health, cognitive limitations, and the complications of utilizing an
interpreter by telephone. The State argued that A.M.‑C. had missed a court
appearance in the past, she had notice of the potential consequences of not
appearing, and “this nonappearance is egregious and in bad faith.” The State
asked the trial court to find A.M.‑C. in default and strike her contest posture with
respect to the grounds phase, “subject to prove-up and set this matter forward for

6
WISCONSIN STAT. § 806.17 allows the court to “admit oral testimony communicated to
the court on the record by telephone or live audiovisual means, subject to cross-examination” in
chapter 48 evidentiary hearings. To evaluate whether the proponent of oral testimony has shown
good cause, the court’s considerations may include: “[w]hether any undue surprise or prejudice
would result”; “[w]hether the procedure would allow full effective cross-examination”; “[t]he
importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses in open court, where the finder of fact may
observe the demeanor of the witness”; “[w]hether the quality of the communication is sufficient
to understand the offered testimony”; and any “other factors as the court may … determine to be
relevant.”

5
Nos. 2021AP94
2021AP95

disposition.” The children’s GAL agreed with the State and argued that A.M.‑C.’s
“failure to appear was intentional, it was egregious. It was without good cause and
it is in bad faith.”

¶8 The trial court reviewed the situation, noting that A.M.‑C. “was
previously ordered to appear personally in court in connection with each and every
appearance in this matter.” While the court agreed that in general it was better to
have a parent participate than find her in default, the court also stated:

In this situation, [A.M.‑C.] has voluntarily chosen to move
to the state of New York. She has family there. I’m glad
that she has family there and that they are supportive of her.
She moved around two months ago when she knew about
today’s trial date. That can only be described as a choice.
It was not a circumstance where she moved to flee an
abusive relationship, as I gather the alleged abuser, at least
from the December incident, is with her in New York. It’s
not a situation where she moved for some reason that was
enormously compelling, caring for a dying relative or
something of significant consequence. This was just a
choice.

¶9 The trial court continued, noting that A.M.‑C. “suffers from various
mental health conditions, has some cognitive disabilities and there are language
concerns as well.” The court considered her appearance in person to be
“absolutely necessary” because it needed to be able to assess A.M.‑C. and her
understanding of the proceedings, and if she chose to testify, her credibility and
demeanor. The court stated that the difficulties created by the language barrier
would be compounded by a telephone appearance. Even with an interpreter in the
courtroom talking to A.M.‑C. on the phone, the court considered it nearly
impossible to complete a trial because of the extra layers of complication.
Because A.M.‑C.’s motives to go to New York may have included: (1) an attempt
to avoid a child protective services referral in Wisconsin for her youngest child
and (2) having her alleged abuser avoid being taken into custody in Wisconsin for

6
Nos. 2021AP94
2021AP95

violating a condition of probation, the court concluded the flight to New York
constituted bad faith. The court stated that “[e]ven if it were not in bad faith, it
certainly is egregious.” It also noted that this situation is not one where A.M.‑C.’s
poverty is interfering because the DMCPS would have paid to get her back to
Wisconsin. The trial court ultimately denied A.M.‑C.’s motion to appear by
telephone.

¶10 Having concluded her conduct was egregious and in bad faith, the
trial court found A.M.‑C. in default and struck her contest posture. The court
considered imposing a monetary fine as an alternate remedy, but found that cruel
and not an appropriate remedy for someone in poverty. The trial court rejected
delaying the trial in the hopes that A.M.‑C. would return because it had no reason
to believe that the circumstances that compelled A.M.‑C. to miss the trial and go
to New York would change. The trial court found A.M.‑C. was in default subject
to prove-up, but allowed her to remain on the phone to listen to the proceedings.

¶11 The dispositional hearing was delayed until July 2020 because the
coronavirus pandemic shut down in-person proceedings in the state courts. At the
hearing, the State presented the Agency case manager for the prove-up of the
grounds for the TPR. The case manager reviewed when J.A.M. and E.A.M. were
removed from the parental home as well as A.M.‑C.’s failure to satisfy four of the
five conditions of return of the children to her care. The State and the children’s
GAL joined in arguing that the grounds for the TPR were proven by clear and
convincing evidence.

¶12 The trial court first addressed the evidence received in the prove-up
hearing regarding A.M.‑C.’s failure to assume parental responsibility. During the
time the children were in foster care, A.M.‑C. was inconsistently engaged in

7
Nos. 2021AP94
2021AP95

visitation. A.M.‑C. exposed the children to a hazardous living environment,
particularly exposing J.A.M. to domestic violence. The trial court concluded that
“the State has been able to demonstrate by clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence failure to assume parental responsibility with respect to [A.M.‑C.]”

¶13 The trial court then reviewed the evidence received at the hearing to
show that the children continued to be in need of protection or services
(continuing CHIPS). The State demonstrated that DMCPS made a reasonable
effort to provide services ordered by the court to A.M.‑C. by attempting to provide
therapy and medication management to A.M.‑C., domestic violence programming,
supervised visitation services, parenting skills coaching, and ongoing case
management. The State proved that A.M.‑C. has not been able to meet the
conditions for the safe return of the children. A.M.‑C. was unable to control her
mental health, she continued to be involved in violence in her home or in front of
the children, she could not show she could provide safe care for the children, and
she did not maintain visitation with the children. The trial court found that the
State proved that the grounds to terminate A.M.‑C.’s parental rights based on
continuing need of protection or services (CHIPS) existed.

¶14 Having concluded the State proved both grounds existed for the
TPR, the trial court made a finding that A.M.‑C. was unfit. The court then moved
on to the disposition of the petition, to determine whether the TPR was in the best
interests of the children. The court heard testimony from one of the children’s
foster parents, who has cared for J.A.M. since September 2016, and E.A.M. since
shortly after his birth. The State also recalled the case manager, who reviewed the
evidence regarding the factors in the best interest of the child determination. She
testified that if the TPR was not granted, the children would continue to be in need
of protection or services under a CHIPS order and there has not been behavioral

8
Nos. 2021AP94
2021AP95

change significant enough by A.M.‑C. that would allow the children to be returned
to her care.

¶15 The final witness at the dispositional hearing was A.M.‑C. A.M.‑C.
testified that she left Milwaukee because she did not have help in Milwaukee, but
she had help in New York. She had plans to return to Wisconsin to be reunited
with the boys. Her youngest child, the boys’ younger sister, was taken by child
protective services in New York after A.M.‑C.’s former partner hit A.M.‑C. in
front of the girl. She testified that she had family surrounding her in New York
and that it was in the best interests of the children for them to live with her there.

¶16 The trial court started its disposition of the case with credibility
determinations. It found the foster mother’s testimony to be credible and worthy
of belief. It noted that she was able to describe the children’s needs with a high
level of detail. The court also found the children’s case manager to be credible
and worthy of belief. He noted the level of detail in her memory enhanced the
credibility of her testimony. The trial court then stated that it did not believe
A.M.‑C. was “intentionally deceptive” but her testimony was undermined by its
lack of detail and that “the accurate expression of [her] desire that may not have
been converted into action.”

¶17 The trial court then reviewed the six statutory factors it had to
consider at a minimum when determining the best interests of the children. The
first factor is the likelihood of adoption. The trial court considered it highly likely
that if the children were available for adoption, they would be adopted by their
foster parents. The foster parents have demonstrated their commitment to the boys
over a long period of time. They have completed the steps to be approved for
adoption. The court found the foster mother’s testimony credible that she and her

9
Nos. 2021AP94
2021AP95

wife would like to adopt the boys. The foster parents have integrated the boys into
their family, which the court considered consistent with an intention to care for
them. Finally, the trial court considered the children adoptable; if these foster
parents were to fall through as an adoptive resource, the children were young and
had no major health issues.

¶18 The second factor is the age and health of the children at the time of
removal and the time of disposition. J.A.M. was removed when he was eight
months and twenty-five days old; he was overweight and had ear infections, but no
other significant health issues. E.A.M. was one day old at the time of removal; he
had lactose intolerance and later developed asthma. At the time of disposition,
J.A.M. was four years, nine months, and fourteen days old and E.A.M. was three
years, nine months, and five days old. J.A.M. is healthy, with good weight and he
has resolved an ear infection problem. His speech is advanced and he has a
provisional ADHD diagnosis. E.A.M. is healthy and has asthma, but no other
medical or behavioral concerns.

¶19 The third factor is whether the boys have a substantial relationship
with their biological parents and family members, and then whether there would
be harm in severing that relationship. The court acknowledged that A.M.‑C. has a
substantial relationship with the boys, but its analysis must be centered on
“whether the boys have a substantial relationship with [A.M.‑C.]. They do not.
The best example of that is when [J.A.M.] asks who [A.M.‑C.] is when seeing her
on a video call.”

¶20 The court concluded that A.M.‑C.’s visitation was not frequent
enough or of sufficient quality to develop a substantial relationship between the
boys and her. The court found that neither child seemed to have any memory of

10
Nos. 2021AP94
2021AP95

being in A.M.‑C.’s care. On the issue of A.M.‑C.’s argument that the boys had a
substantial relationship with their younger sister, the court concluded that they
“have knowledge of their sister” but they do not have a substantial relationship
with her. The court concluded there would be no harm to the children to sever the
relationship with A.M.‑C.

¶21 The fourth factor is the children’s wishes. The trial court found that
the boys were too young to explicitly express a wish regarding adoption, but it
noted that the boys call one foster mother “mama” and the other “dada.” Further,
their foster home is the only home they have effectively known. J.A.M. has been
with his foster family for over 80% of his life and E.A.M. has been with them for
more than 99% of his life.

¶22 The fifth factor is the duration of separation of the parent from the
child. The trial court noted that J.A.M. was removed from A.M.‑C.’s care before
he was placed with this foster family; his duration of separation was more than
84% of his life. For E.A.M., he has been separated since he was one day old,
which is over 99% of his life.

¶23 The sixth factor is whether they would be able to enter a more
permanent and stable family relationship through termination. The trial court took
into account that the conditions in the children’s current foster placement was
good because it was stable and that the children were well integrated into the
family. The court also took into account that the likelihood of future placement
with A.M.‑C. was low, but not nonexistent. It noted A.M.‑C. made bouts of
progress, but she also experienced housing, employment, and mental health
instability. Further she experienced domestic violence; instability and violence
followed her to New York. The court considered A.M.‑C.’s prior placements with

11
Nos. 2021AP94
2021AP95

the children: E.A.M. was only in her care for one day, J.A.M. was with her for
over eight months before he was removed. The court concluded that there was
“no effective question that they would be able to enter a more stable and
permanent family relationship through termination. That’s particularly true
because of the high likelihood of adoption by” their current foster parents.

¶24 The court ultimately found that based on its consideration of the
statutory factors it was in the best interests of J.A.M. and E.A.M. to terminate the
parental rights of A.M.‑C.

¶25 A.M.‑C. appeals the termination of her parental rights to both J.A.M.
and E.A.M. We granted A.M.‑C.’s motion to consolidate the separate cases in
accordance with WIS. STAT. § 809.10(3).

DISCUSSION

¶26 A.M.‑C. argues that the trial court erroneously exercised its
discretion in two ways: first, to default her and strike her contest posture for the
grounds of the TPR, and second, to determine that terminating A.M.‑C.’s rights
was in the best interests of the children. We review each argument separately, but
ultimately conclude there was no error in the trial court’s exercise of discretion
and affirm the order terminating A.M.‑C.’s parental rights.

Default and striking contest posture

¶27 It is within the trial court’s discretion to impose sanctions and to
decide which sanctions to impose, including striking contest posture and entering
default judgment in TPR proceedings. See Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110,
¶¶17-18, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768. We review the trial court’s decision to
impose a sanction of default judgment under the erroneous exercise of discretion

12
Nos. 2021AP94
2021AP95

standard. Brandon Apparel Group., Inc. v. Pearson Properties, Ltd., 2001 WI
App 205, ¶10, 247 Wis. 2d 521, 634 N.W.2d 544. “A [trial] court properly
exercises its discretion when it examines the relevant facts, applies a proper
standard of law, and using a demonstrated rational process reaches a conclusion
that a reasonable judge could reach.” Dane Cnty. Dep’t of Human Servs. v.
Mabel K., 2013 WI 28, ¶39, 346 Wis. 2d 396, 828 N.W.2d 198.

¶28 The trial court has inherent and statutory authority to sanction a
party for failing to obey a court order; however, those sanctions are limited to
those that are “just.” See WIS. STAT. §§ 804.12(2)(a), 805.03. “Wisconsin courts
have interpreted this limitation to mean that dismissal requires that the non-
complying party has acted egregiously or in bad faith.” Industrial Roofing Servs.,
Inc. v. Marquardt, 2007 WI 19, ¶43, 299 Wis. 2d 81, 726 N.W.2d 898. For a trial
court to enter default judgment, it is not required to analyze a “specific set of
factors” but instead it focuses on the degree to which the party’s conduct impairs
justice in this action and justice in the operation of our judicial system. Brandon
Apparel, 247 Wis. 2d 521, ¶11 (citations omitted).

¶29 A.M.‑C. argues that her failure to appear in person at the trial was
neither egregious or in bad faith. She asserts that she needed to move to
New York because she was a victim of domestic violence and the move provided
for her physical safety and economic security. Additionally, she argues she lacked
financial means to return to Wisconsin. She argues the court should have granted
her request to appear telephonically, which was allowable under WIS. STAT.
§ 807.13. She contends her telephonic appearance would not have prejudiced the
State, would have only been to her own detriment, and would have been superior
to having her not participate at all.

13
Nos. 2021AP94
2021AP95

¶30 A.M.‑C.’s appearance in person was ordered by the court and notice
of its importance was explained to her on multiple occasions. Her nonappearance
at the grounds hearing was a failure to comply with a court order. See WIS. STAT.
§§ 804.12(2)(a), 805.03. Further, the record refutes each of A.M.‑C.’s arguments
why this nonappearance was not egregious and in bad faith: her nonappearance
was her own choice; her financial insecurity to pay to return could have been
alleviated by DMCPS; and her presence in person—not by telephone—was
necessary for the trial proceedings.

¶31 Our examination of the record supports the trial court’s conclusion
that A.M.‑C.’s nonappearance was her own choice. The trial court stated that this
was “not a circumstance where she moved to flee an abusive relationship,”
because instead she fled with her alleged abuser. It stated that A.M.‑C. presented
no “enormously compelling” reason for missing the trial, such as caring for a
dying relative. The trial court considered her motivation may also have included
avoiding a child protective services referral for her youngest child and that her
alleged abuser was avoiding being taken into custody for violating terms of
Wisconsin probation. Therefore, its conclusion that A.M.‑C. made a voluntary
choice to stay in New York and not attend the hearing was reasonable.

¶32 The trial court acknowledged A.M.‑C.’s challenges including her
mental health conditions and financial insecurity. The trial court noted that “[i]f
the only reason that [A.M.‑C.] could not come back to Wisconsin was that she
couldn’t afford a bus ticket or even an airline ticket, that could have been
arranged. [DMCPS] would have paid to get her here.” A.M.‑C.’s argument that
her nonappearance should be excused based on her financial concerns fails
because the record shows the trial court was willing to address this issue.

14
Nos. 2021AP94
2021AP95

Therefore, her nonappearance was egregious and in bad faith. See Industrial
Roofing, 299 Wis. 2d 81, ¶43.

¶33 Furthermore, the trial court concluded her appearance in person was
an “absolute necessity.” The complications of her request were compounded by
the difficulty of having A.M.‑C. appear by telephone while utilizing an interpreter
in the courtroom. We accept the trial court’s assessment that “conducting a trial
with [A.M.‑C.] appearing on the telephone under these circumstances … is
essentially impossible or close enough to impossible as to be extremely
impractical.” A.M.‑C.’s argument that a telephone appearance would have been
better than no appearance at all fails because the trial court would have not been
able to discern her understanding of proceedings or to observe her demeanor.
Moreover, the quality of communication would have been insufficient for the
court’s function to be accomplished

¶34 Our examination of the record supports the trial court’s conclusion
that A.M.‑C.’s non-appearance was a choice, was egregious, and was in bad faith.
The trial court considered alternate sanctions, but determined that placing her in
default and striking her contest posture was the appropriate action. Here, the trial
court reviewed the relevant facts, applied the proper legal standard and engaged in
a rational process to reach a reasonable conclusion; therefore, we sustain its
exercise of discretion. See Mabel K., 346 Wis. 2d 396, ¶39. We conclude the trial
court did not err when it entered default judgment and struck her contest posture
on the grounds for the TPR.

Best interests of the children

¶35 When the trial court has found that grounds exist for the TPR, the
trial court then turns to the dispositional proceedings, where the focus shifts to the

15
Nos. 2021AP94
2021AP95

best interests of the child. WIS. STAT. § 48.426; see Sheboygan Cnty. DHS v.
Julie A.B., 2002 WI 95, ¶28, 255 Wis. 2d 170, 648 N.W.2d 402. The trial court
must consider, but is not limited to, the following six factors:

(a) The likelihood of the child’s adoption after termination.

(b) The age and health of the child, both at the time of the
disposition and, if applicable, at the time the child was
removed from the home.

(c) Whether the child has substantial relationships with the
parent or other family members, and whether it would be
harmful to the child to sever these relationships.

(d) The wishes of the child.

(e) The duration of the separation of the parent from the
child.

(f) Whether the child will be able to enter into a more stable
and permanent family relationship as a result of the
termination, taking into account the conditions of the
child’s current placement, the likelihood of future
placements and the results of prior placements.

Sec. 48.426(3). The trial court is not required to afford greater weight to any
particular factor, although the “record should reflect adequate consideration of and
weight to each factor.” State v. Margaret H., 2000 WI 42, ¶35, 234 Wis. 2d 606,
610 N.W.2d 475.

¶36 Whether the termination of parental rights is in the best interests of
the child is a discretionary decision by the trial court. Gerald O. v. Cindy R., 203
Wis. 2d 148, 152, 551 N.W.2d 855 (Ct. App. 1996). We will not overturn a trial
court’s discretionary decision unless the court erroneously exercised its discretion.
WIS. STAT. § 805.17(2). A trial court properly exercises its discretion when it
examines the relevant facts, applies a proper standard of law, and using a

16
Nos. 2021AP94
2021AP95

demonstrated rational process reaches a conclusion that a reasonable judge could
reach. Mabel K., 346 Wis. 2d 396, ¶39.

¶37 A.M.‑C. argues that the trial court did not appropriately consider the
significant relationship between A.M.‑C. and her youngest daughter and J.A.M.
and E.A.M. or the harm the children would suffer if the TPR were granted.
A.M.‑C. argues that the trial court’s weighing of the statutory factors under WIS.
STAT. § 48.426(3) was erroneous. A.M.‑C. contends that because the evidence at
the hearing showed that the children valued the relationship with their sister, the
trial court erred to entirely discount the value of this relationship and the harm
caused by severing that legal relationship.

¶38 Here, the record shows that the trial court reviewed the statutory
factors on the record with careful consideration of the relevant facts and
circumstances. A.M.‑C. asks us to determine that the trial court’s weight of the
third factor—the substantial relationships between A.M.‑C. and the children—was
erroneous. This misstates our function as a reviewing court. It is our task to
search for evidence to support the trial court findings, “not for evidence to support
findings the trial court could have reached but did not.” Noble v. Noble, 2005 WI
App 227, ¶15, 287 Wis. 2d 699, 706 N.W.2d 166. The trial court listened to the
testimony and evidence and observed A.M.‑C.’s credibility and demeanor.
A.M.‑C. characterizes her contact with the children as regular visits that had
“recently been via video conferencing.” The record disputes this claim. Although
A.M.‑C. has had periods of regular visitation, there were only two video visits in
the record, both short and both at the request of the children. Further, J.A.M. did
not recognize A.M.‑C. in the video in the foster mother’s testimony. Rather than
showing that the trial court weighed this factor erroneously, the video visit
evidence supports the court’s conclusion.

17
Nos. 2021AP94
2021AP95

¶39 The trial court gave adequate consideration to all factors in WIS.
STAT. § 48.426(3). We conclude that the trial court applied the proper standard of
law to the facts and made a reasonable exercise of discretion to terminate
A.M.‑C.’s parental rights.

By the Court.—Orders Affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE
809.23(1)(b)(4).

18