Kimberly Utgaard v. Stuart Utgaard

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
January 5, 2021
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2019AP1877 Cir. Ct. No. 2010FA525

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:

KIMBERLY UTGAARD N/K/A KIMBERLY ANDERSON,

JOINT-PETITIONER-APPELLANT,

V.

STUART UTGAARD,

JOINT-PETITIONER-RESPONDENT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for St. Croix County:
R. MICHAEL WATERMAN, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2019AP1877

¶1 PER CURIAM. Eight years after the parties’ divorce,
Kimberly Anderson filed various motions with the circuit court to reopen the
divorce judgment and to enforce its terms. She now appeals that part of a circuit
court order entered on August 14, 2019, denying her request for reimbursement of
uninsured medical expenses and variable costs, claiming the court erred by
imposing conditions for reimbursement that were not included in the divorce
judgment. She also argues the court erred by relying on WIS. STAT. § 806.07
instead of WIS. STAT. § 767.127 (2017-18)1 when denying her motion to reopen
the property division. Finally, she argues the court erroneously exercised its
discretion in ordering Utgaard to pay less than the amount of attorney fees she
incurred and requested. We reject Anderson’s arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The parties were married on May 24, 1992 and had four minor
children at the time of their divorce on March 3, 2011. The parties were both
self-represented during their divorce proceedings, and the divorce judgment
incorporated the terms of their marital settlement agreement (“MSA”) and their
divorce and child support agreement. A joint financial disclosure statement was
filed listing, as relevant here, that Utgaard owned two life insurance policies,
“NWML 7394266” and “NWML 6903234,” and representing that neither account
had any cash values.

¶3 As relevant to this appeal, the MSA provided that uninsured medical
expenses and variable costs incurred for their minor children would be shared

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise
noted.

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equally. The parties agreed to consult with one another before incurring variable
costs. In addition, a party’s request to the other for reimbursement of variable
costs was required to be made “in writing within 30 days from the day the cost
was incurred,” with the non-incurring party reimbursing the other for their
one-half share “within 10 days from the date of the request.” Requests for
uninsured medical expenses were also required to be made in writing, but they
were not required to be made within thirty days after the medical expenses were
incurred, and they were to be reimbursed within ten days after receiving a written
request.

¶4 The parties also agreed to equally share expenses regarding
insurance, uninsured medical expenses, dental/orthodontics, schooling,
automobiles, and other expenses of the children. A party’s request for
reimbursement of these additional child-related expenses was payable by the 20th
of each month.

¶5 From the date of divorce until late 2012, Anderson made written
requests for reimbursement of medical expenses, other child expenses, and
variable costs, but she then stopped making further requests because Utgaard was
being “argumentative.” The parties’ daughter testified at a contempt hearing
regarding an incident in which Utgaard pulled out a gun at the home during an
altercation when Anderson requested child support payments. The parties
disagree as to what actually occurred during that incident.

¶6 On October 19, 2018, Anderson filed a motion for remedial
contempt against Utgaard, alleging that he had violated the divorce judgment by

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failing to pay child support, variable and uninsured medical expenses, spousal
maintenance, and a 2010 income tax liability of $24,307.542 to be shared equally
by Utgaard and Anderson. Anderson sought reimbursement for a total of
$144,000 in expenses dating back to the date of the divorce. Anderson also
alleged that Utgaard had failed to annually provide his tax returns or business
financial information to her as required by the divorce judgment.

¶7 After an April 11, 2019 hearing, the circuit court found Utgaard in
contempt for nonpayment of $3,201.56 in child support and $19,948 in spousal
maintenance. The court further acknowledged that the parties’ MSA required
them to share equally in the cost of uninsured medical and variable expenses.
However, the court found that Anderson failed to provide credible evidence of the
amounts she claimed that she incurred for those expenses.

¶8 Specifically, the circuit court found that Anderson provided written
demands for reimbursement of the children’s uninsured medical and variable
expenses from March 2011 through June 2012, but she provided no supporting
documentation regarding the expenses. Further, the court found that Anderson
offered no evidence verifying that she made any written demand of Utgaard
between March 2011 and June 2012 for reimbursement of any expenses she
claimed to have incurred for the children, and that “[h]er testimony regarding the
[claimed expenses] was incomplete and unconvincing.” The court also noted that
“[h]ad this been an ordinary debtor action, [Anderson]’s claim would have been
stale as the statute of limitations [had] expired.” Finally, the court was unwilling

2
In late 2010, Utgaard sold his whole life insurance policy that resulted in a tax liability
of $24,307.54 for both parties. Anderson paid the full $24,307.54 in taxes to avoid any penalties,
and now claims reimbursement for that entire sum.

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to accept Anderson’s testimony with only her memory as the sole evidence
supporting her claim for past variable and uninsured medical expenses.

¶9 Additionally, the circuit court found that Utgaard was not ordered by
the divorce judgment to share in the 2010 income tax liability and that no
continuing contempt existed for his failure to supply financial records because he
had cured any alleged noncompliance by producing the financial records after the
contempt motion was filed. Lastly, the court awarded Anderson $3,000 in
reasonable attorney fees because of “the size of the delinquency, the length of time
it persisted and the litigation that was necessary to adjudicate the matter.” The
court did not award Anderson the full amount of attorney fees she had incurred
and requested because she did not prevail on all of her claims.

¶10 On April 4, 2019, Anderson filed another motion for remedial
contempt and/or reopening the property division in order to award her one-half of
the cash balances of the life insurance policies that were awarded to Utgaard in the
divorce judgment’s property division. Anderson also asked that Utgaard be found
in contempt for having failed to carry a $100,000 life insurance policy with
Anderson named as the beneficiary. Anderson also sought attorney fees.

¶11 On May 20, 2019, Anderson filed a motion for reconsideration. As
relevant to this appeal, Anderson argued the circuit court erred by rejecting her
claim for unreimbursed variable and medical expenses. Again, the court found
that Anderson failed to meet her burden of proof because she provided no
documentation to substantiate her claim. Anderson provided no invoices, receipts,
canceled checks, or any other type of documentary proof to support her demand
for reimbursement. In addition, the court found that Anderson failed to meet her
burden of proving her compliance with the MSA because she made no written

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payment demands after June 2012, and her testimony regarding the expenses in
question was insufficient. The court therefore denied Anderson’s motion for
reconsideration.

¶12 In its decision and order, the circuit court first addressed one topic
from Anderson’s earlier contempt motion, which related to withheld proceeds
from the sale of a stainless steel Flair Fountain. The court found Utgaard in
contempt for withholding one-half of the sale proceeds because the fountain was
the parties’ joint personal property. On that issue, the court ordered Utgaard to
pay Anderson $2,250, plus $500 in attorney fees.

¶13 The circuit court next addressed Anderson’s motion to reopen the
property division. The court found that Anderson’s motion was untimely under
WIS. STAT. § 806.07.3 The court noted that more than eight years had passed
before Anderson filed her motion. The court concluded that the eight-year delay
was unreasonable because Anderson knew of the life insurance policies’ existence
at the time of the divorce, and she could have verified their values at that time.
The court was unwilling to reopen or modify the property division after such a
significant lapse of time.

¶14 Finally, the circuit court found that from the date of divorce until
June 2019, Utgaard willfully failed to carry the required, unencumbered life
insurance with Anderson as the named beneficiary. Anderson discovered the
noncompliance during the discovery phase of the October 19, 2018 contempt

3
Both Anderson’s April 4, 2019 motion for remedial contempt and/or reopening
property division as well as the circuit court’s decision and order did not specify a subsection.
Both addressed WIS. STAT. § 806.07 only. Presumably, both meant subsection (2) as that is the
subsection pertaining to timeliness of filing a motion.

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motion. Although Utgaard later obtained the insurance and kept it unencumbered,
the court determined the contempt had continued during the earlier period4
because he was required to continuously maintain an unencumbered policy for
Anderson’s benefit. The court permitted Utgaard to purge his contempt by
maintaining the required insurance and paying reasonable attorney fees related to
the life insurance matter within sixty days. Anderson now appeals.

DISCUSSION

I. Uninsured Medical and Variable Expenses

¶15 Anderson argues the circuit court erred in failing to enforce the
terms of the MSA, the divorce judgment and the child support agreement by
denying her request for uninsured medical and variable expenses incurred for the
parties’ children. The interpretation of a marital settlement agreement, which is
“in the nature of a contract,” is a question of law we review de novo. Rosplock v.
Rosplock, 217 Wis. 2d 22, 30, 577 N.W.2d 32 (Ct. App. 1998). When the terms
of a contract are unambiguous, we will construe the contract as it stands without
examining extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent. Id. at 31. Whether
a contract is ambiguous also presents a question of law for our independent
review. Borchardt v. Wilk, 156 Wis. 2d 420, 427, 456 N.W.2d 653 (Ct. App.
1990). Trial courts, not appellate courts on review, weigh the sufficiency of the
evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses. Mecha v. Mecha, 36 Wis. 2d 29,
35, 152 N.W.2d 923 (1967). Here, we conclude the MSA is unambiguous because

4
The court noted that “[p]urchasing insurance in response to a contempt motion does not
cure the fact that for eight years Mr. Utgaard disregarded his court-ordered obligation and put
Ms. Anderson’s financial health at risk.”

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No. 2019AP1877

it is not reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning, see Ford Motor Co. v.
Lyons, 137 Wis. 2d 397, 460, 405 N.W.2d 354 (Ct. App. 1987), and we therefore
apply its plain language as written.

A. Medical, Dental and Insurance expenses

¶16 Anderson first asserts that the circuit court erred by concluding her
reimbursement requests for medical, dental/orthodontic, and insurance expenses
were stale. Anderson correctly notes that the judgment of divorce did not contain
any specific provision requiring her to request reimbursement of these expenses
within a specific period of time after they were incurred. The judgment required
only that reimbursement for the “additional expenses of kids” (which included
insurance, medical, dental/orthodontics, school, automobile and other expenses as
they arise) was to be paid by the 20th of each month. Additionally, Anderson
contends that even if the medical and dental requests are stale, it was Utgaard’s
conduct that delayed her written reimbursement requests because Utgaard
“accosted, argued with or ignored” her. She believes that Utgaard did not come to
court with clean hands, and he should therefore be prevented from arguing that the
requests were stale.

¶17 Anderson’s argument ignores the basis for the circuit court’s
determination that she was not entitled to reimbursement for these expenses.
Although the court noted that Anderson’s requests were stale, that comment was
made in the overall context of Anderson’s failure to meet her burden of proof.
Anderson provided no documentation to substantiate her claim that she made
written reimbursement requests to Utgaard, as required by the judgment. She
provided no supporting invoices, receipts, canceled checks, or any other type of
documentary proof that she had incurred these expenses and made a request for

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reimbursement other than an exhibit she created consisting of generalized
information that the court found insufficient. Anderson has not shown that the
court erred by concluding she failed to meet her burden of proof, which conclusion
was the primary basis on which the court denied her request for these expenses.

¶18 Anderson also incorrectly claims that the circuit court created a
timing requirement that was not included in the MSA for submission of these
expenses. The court instead merely found that Anderson was required to have
made her reimbursement requests in writing. Indeed, Anderson admitted that she
made no written demands for expense reimbursements after June 2012. And, the
court found that Anderson’s testimony that she had made written demands for
reimbursement of the expenses incurred between March 2011 and June 2012 was
incredible without supporting documentation. When sitting as the finder of fact, a
circuit court is the ultimate arbiter of witness credibility. See Prezioso v. Aerts,
2014 WI App 126, ¶41, 358 Wis. 2d 714, 858 N.W.2d 386.

¶19 Anderson claims the circuit court erred by failing to find that
Utgaard threatened her and that his unclean hands should prevent him from
contesting the failure to submit written claims after 2012. “Unclean hands” is an
equitable doctrine that can be used to deny relief to a party if the things from
which the party seeks relief are the fruit of his or her own wrongful or unlawful
course of conduct. See S & M Rotogravure Serv. v. Baer, 77 Wis. 2d 454, 467,
252 N.W.2d 913 (1977). The court acknowledged that Anderson stopped making
reimbursement demands after June 2012 because Utgaard “refused to pay and
because conversations with him were contentious.” The court, however, did not
err by failing to find the “unclean hands” doctrine applied to prevent Utgaard’s
reliance on the MSA’s requirement for written reimbursement demands because
Anderson does not cite any evidence indicating that Utgaard prevented or

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discouraged her from continuing to make such written demands. Indeed, she
could have made the written demands by mail without any personal contact with
Utgaard. Anderson failed to prove that any wrongful or unlawful conduct by
Utgaard prevented her from making written demand for reimbursement of these
expenses, and, therefore, the “unclean hands” doctrine simply does not apply here.

¶20 In addition, Anderson contends the circuit court erred by requiring
that she provide the court with documentation to support the written expense
requests when such a requirement did not exist in the MSA. The MSA required
written reimbursement requests to Utgaard for insurance and uninsured health and
dental/orthodontic expenses she incurred on behalf of their children. Anderson
argues that a detailed spreadsheet expense report she created and provided to the
court in support of her motion for remedial contempt bolstered her testimony
regarding the expenses in question. On that spreadsheet she itemized the charges
she sought to be reimbursed, including the dates on which they were incurred, the
child for whom they were incurred, the category of the expense, the amount, the
vendor, or service provider and the payment method. She claims the court
misconstrued the MSA by adding a requirement for documentation supporting her
itemization and that, as a result, Utgaard owes her $20,600.32 for unreimbursed
medical, dental/orthodontic and insurance costs.

¶21 Anderson is correct that the MSA did not require the parties to
provide documentation substantiating their reimbursement requests. Nonetheless,
the circuit court could properly require such substantiation in determining whether
Anderson met her burden of proof. The court stated that it found Anderson’s
testimony regarding the expenses “incomplete and unconvincing.” Additionally,
given the passage of time, the court was unwilling to accept Anderson’s testimony
regarding her memory as the sole evidence, which was all that her “expense

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No. 2019AP1877

report” simply repeated. In other words, the court was only requiring Anderson to
provide more or better evidence, such as supporting documentation, before it
could conclude that she met her burden of proof. There was nothing improper in
the court doing so.

B. Variable expenses

¶22 Anderson next argues the circuit court erred by denying her
reimbursement of variable expenses she incurred on behalf of the parties’ children.
Anderson acknowledges that unlike her requests for the reimbursement of
uninsured medical, insurance and other expenses discussed above, the MSA
expressly required that requests for variable expense reimbursement be made
within thirty days after an expense was incurred. Anderson claims that she
requested reimbursement via mail, email, or verbally until late 2012; however,
such requests stopped “due to [Utgaard’s] abusive and disorderly actions.” Thus,
she again argues that Utgaard lacks clean hands. Anderson also argues the court
again erred by requiring that she substantiate her claim with supporting
documentation. Anderson asks us to reverse the court and have it order Utgaard to
pay her $51,502.20 for variable expenses, including automobile expenses.

¶23 Anderson’s unclean hands argument fares no better here than it did
on her claim for uninsured medical and other expenses. Anderson acknowledged
that the MSA required her to submit written reimbursement requests within thirty
days of the date the variable expenses were incurred. This fact is fatal to her claim
for two reasons. First, Anderson acknowledges that she stopped making such
written requests in late 2012, which eliminates her right to reimbursement for any
expenses thereafter. Second, the court also reasonably found that Anderson’s
testimony was insufficient to prove that she provided written reimbursement

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requests between March 2011 and June 2012. Specifically, the court found
Anderson’s testimony “incomplete” and “unconvincing,” and it properly
determined that supporting documents were required for the claimed
reimbursement of variable expenses in order for Anderson to meet her burden of
proof.

II. Reopening the Property Division

¶24 Anderson contends the circuit court erred by denying her motion to
reopen and modify the property division based on the undisclosed cash value of
Utgaard’s life insurance policies totaling $30,596.76. Our review of a circuit
court’s decision on a motion to reopen the marital property division is limited to
the question of whether there has been an erroneous exercise of discretion. See
State ex rel. Cynthia M.S. v. Michael F.C., 181 Wis. 2d 618, 624, 511 N.W.2d
868 (1994). A court properly exercises its discretion if the record shows that there
is a reasonable basis for the court’s decision. Id. Discretion contemplates a
process of reasoning which depends on facts that are in the record or are
reasonably derived by inference from the record, and that yields a conclusion
based on logic and founded on proper legal stands. Id.

¶25 WISCONSIN STAT. § 806.07(1) allows a circuit court to reopen a
judgment for a variety of reasons, but the “motion shall be made within a
reasonable time, and, if based on sub. (1)(a) or (c), not more than one year after
the judgment was entered or the order or stipulation was made.” Sec. 806.07(2).
The circuit court found Anderson’s motion to reopen untimely under subsec. (2).

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¶26 Anderson asserts that the circuit court erred in determining that her
request was untimely under WIS. STAT. § 806.07, and it should have instead
considered her request to reopen under WIS. STAT. § 767.127.5 Section 767.127
does not require a motion to reopen property division of an undisclosed asset to be
brought within a specific period of time. The statute provides:

(1) REQUIRED DISCLOSURE. In an action affecting the
family, except an action to affirm marriage under
s. 767.001(1)(a), the court shall require each party to
furnish, on standard forms required by the court, full
disclosure of all assets owned in full or in part by either
party separately or by the parties jointly. Disclosure may
be made by each party individually or by the parties jointly.
Assets required to be disclosed include, but are not limited
to, real estate, savings accounts, stocks and bonds,
mortgages and notes, life insurance, retirement interests,
interest in a partnership, limited liability company, or
corporation, tangible personal property, future interests
whether vested or nonvested, and any other financial
interest or source.

….

(5) FAILURE TO DISCLOSE; CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST. If a party
intentionally or negligently fails to disclose information
required by sub. (1) and as a result any asset with a fair
market value of $500 or more is omitted from the final
distribution of property, the party aggrieved by the
nondisclosure may at any time petition the court granting
the annulment, divorce, or legal separation to declare the
creation of a constructive trust as to all undisclosed assets,
for the benefit of the parties and their minor or dependent
children, if any, with the party in whose name the assets are
held declared the constructive trustee. The trust shall
include such terms and conditions as the court may
determine. The court shall grant the petition upon a finding
of a failure to disclose assets as required under sub. (1).

5
We note that Anderson’s April 4, 2019 motion seeking to reopen the property division
was specifically based on WIS. STAT. § 806.07, but she later wrote to the circuit court citing only
WIS. STAT. § 767.127.

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No. 2019AP1877

WIS. STAT. § 767.127 (emphasis added). Anderson contends that if the court had
applied § 767.127, it would have found that Utgaard intentionally or negligently
failed to disclose the cash value of his life insurance policies and, thus, the values
should be held in a constructive trust.

¶27 Anderson is correct that Utgaard’s failure to disclose the life
insurance policies would violate WIS. STAT. § 767.27(1) (1995-96). See
Stevenson v. Stevenson, 2009 WI App 29, ¶23, 316 Wis. 2d 442, 765 N.W.2d 811
(holding that failing to make proper financial disclosure was a violation of WIS.
STAT. § 767.27(1)).6 If the circuit court had found that Utgaard, under that statute,
intentionally or negligently failed to disclose the life insurance values, the court
would be required to impose a constructive trust as required by § 767.127(5).

¶28 Ultimately, it is immaterial here whether the circuit court applied
WIS. STAT. § 767.127 or WIS. STAT. § 806.07 in deciding Anderson’s motion
because the court found that Utgaard did not fail to disclose the policies. In fact,
Anderson acknowledges that Utgaard disclosed the existence of the two policies in
the parties’ original financial disclosure statement. The MSA also reflects that the
policies were disclosed and considered in the divorce proceeding. Although
Utgaard represented that the policies had no cash value, Anderson knew the
policies existed at that time, and she had the opportunity to confirm whether they
had cash values prior to the parties’ divorce hearing. The court therefore did not
erroneously exercise its discretion by finding that Anderson’s eight-year delay in
raising the issue regarding the policies’ values was not reasonable.

6
WISCONSIN STAT. § 767.27 (1995-96), was renumbered and amended by 2005 Wis.
Act 443, §§ 68, 121 and 123, and is now WIS. STAT. § 767.127.

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III. Attorney Fees

¶29 When a circuit court awards attorney fees, the amount of the award
is left to the discretion of the court. Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc.,
2004 WI 112, ¶22, 275 Wis. 2d 1, 683 N.W.2d 58. Accordingly, we will uphold
the circuit court’s determination unless it erroneously exercised its discretion. Id.
We are to give deference to the circuit court’s decision because it is familiar with
local billing norms and will likely have witnessed first hand the quality of the
service rendered by counsel. Id. We will not substitute our judgment for that of
the circuit court, but we will instead explore the court’s explanation to determine if
the court employed a logical rationale based on the appropriate legal principles
and facts of record. Id. The circuit court can consider the factors enumerated in
Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 20:1.5(a) in determining the reasonableness of
attorney fees. Id., ¶25. One of these factors includes “the amount involved and
the results obtained.” SCR 20:1.5(a)(4).

¶30 “[T]he party seeking an award of [attorney] fees should submit
evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed. Where the
documentation of hours is inadequate, the … court may reduce the award
accordingly.” Kolupar, 275 Wis. 2d 1, ¶31 (citation omitted). Stated differently,
the party submitting the request for attorney fees has the burden to prove the
reasonableness of the amount requested after it is questioned. Standard Theatres,
Inc. v. DOT, 118 Wis. 2d 730, 748, 349 N.W.2d 661 (1984).

¶31 Anderson argues the circuit court erred by ordering Utgaard to pay a
lesser amount of attorney fees than she incurred and requested. Anderson asserts
that she incurred $7,500 in attorney fees just in bringing her first motion, all of
which fees arose out of a “common core of facts.” While we discern no question

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that Anderson was properly awarded attorney fees based on Utgaard’s
contemptuous conduct under WIS. STAT. § 785.04(1), Anderson cites case law for
the proposition that

a “losing party is not entitled to a reduction in attorney’s
fees for time spent on unsuccessful claims, if the winning
party achieved substantial success and the unsuccessful
claims were brought or pursued in good faith” especially
where all of the “claims arise out of a common core of
facts.”

Rand v. Rand, 2010 WI App 98, ¶7, 327 Wis. 2d 778, 787 N.W.2d 445 (quoting
Radford v. J.J.B. Enters., Ltd., 163 Wis. 2d 535, 550, 472 N.W.2d 790 (Ct. App.
1991)).

¶32 Anderson, however, did not provide the circuit court with any
supporting documentation for her attorney fee request. In fact, the only reference
to $7,500 was the last sentence in her memorandum in support of her motion for
contempt, which states Utgaard “should also pay attorney fees in the amount of
$7,500.00 based on the gross underpayments and [Anderson’s] incurred fees.”

¶33 The circuit court found Utgaard in contempt for nonpayment of
court-ordered child support and maintenance. Utgaard owed $3,201.56 for child
support and $19,948 plus eight percent compound interest for spousal
maintenance. In light of the court’s determination that Anderson failed to follow
the MSA’s requirements for seeking expense reimbursement, her failure to meet
her burden of proof on the sought-after expenses, and her lack of diligence in
verifying the life insurance policies’ cash values when she knew of the policies’
existence, the court could reasonably reduce the amount of the fees sought by
Anderson to $3,000, as she was not successful on all claims. While the court
could award all fees sought, in its discretion, Anderson provides no authority

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stating the court was required to do so. Additionally, the court’s determination of
the fee calculation was reasonable, especially given that Anderson provided no
other method for calculating fees.

¶34 In Anderson’s reply brief, she acknowledges that she did not provide
an underlying factual basis to support her claim for $7,500 in attorney fees, but she
nonetheless argues that the circuit court did not request specific evidence to
support her claim. The court, however, was not required to do so, as Anderson
had the burden in the first instance to prove the reasonableness of the fees she
sought. See Standard Theatres, 118 Wis. 2d at 748.

CONCLUSION

¶35 For all the foregoing reasons, we reject Anderson’s argument that
the circuit court erred by not ordering reimbursement for uninsured medical and
variable expenses. We also conclude the court reasonably exercised its discretion
by denying Anderson’s motion to reopen the property division and by declining to
award Anderson the full amount of attorney fees she sought. Accordingly, we
affirm.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

17